

Power-Grid Controller Anomaly Detection with Enhanced Temporal Deep Learning

Zecheng He	Aswin Raghavan	Guangyuan Hu	Sek Chai	Ruby Lee
<i>Princeton University</i>	<i>SRI International</i>	<i>Princeton University</i>	<i>SRI International</i>	<i>Princeton University</i>
Princeton, NJ	Princeton, NJ	Princeton, NJ	Princeton, NJ	Princeton, NJ
zechengh@princeton.edu	aswin.raghavan@sri.com	gh9@princeton.edu	sek.chai@sri.com	rblee@princeton.edu

Abstract—Controllers of security-critical cyber-physical systems, like the power grid, are a very important class of computer systems. Attacks against the control code of a power-grid system, especially zero-day attacks, can be catastrophic. Earlier detection of the anomalies can prevent further damage. However, detecting zero-day attacks is extremely challenging because they have no known code and have unknown behavior. Furthermore, if data collected from the controller is transferred to a server through networks for analysis and detection of anomalous behavior, this

loophole of secure communication in the power-grid system, but did not protect controllers and cannot detect new attacks.

Besides the physical sensors and network, protecting the control code running on the industrial programmable logic controllers (PLCs) is an essential and fundamental task in protecting the power-grid systems. No matter how the adversary spreads the malware or bad programs through system vulnerabilities, his ultimate goal is taking control of the power-