

SARS-CoV-2 infections in 165 countries over time

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Abstract

Background: Understanding the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic and evaluating the efficacy of control measures requires knowledge of the number of infections over time. This number, however, often differs from the number of confirmed cases due to a large fraction of asymptomatic infections and variable testing strategies.

Methods: This study uses death count statistics, age-dependent infection fatality risks and stochastic modeling to estimate the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infections among adults (age ≥ 20 years) in 165 countries over time, from early 2020 until June 25, 2021. The accuracy of the approach is confirmed through comparison to previous nationwide seroprevalence surveys.

Results: The presented estimates reveal that the fraction of infections that are detected vary widely over time and between countries, and hence confirmed cases alone often yield a false picture of the pandemic. As of June 25, 2021, the nationwide cumulative fraction of SARS-CoV-2 infections (cumulative infections relative to population size) is estimated at 98% (95%–CI 93–100) for Peru, 83% (61–94) for Brazil and 36% (23–61) for the US.

Conclusions: The presented time-resolved estimates expand the possibilities to study the factors that influenced and still influence the pandemic's progression in 165 countries.

Keywords: COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; prevalence; time series; infection fatality risk; exponential growth rate

21 **Background**

22 Accurate estimates of the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in a population are needed for evaluating dis-
23 ease control policies and testing strategies, determining the role of environmental factors, predict-
24 ing future disease spread, assessing the risk of foreign travel, and determining vaccination needs
25 (Nguimkeu and Tadadjeu, 2021; Pearce et al., 2020). Even if a retreat of the pandemic seems
26 within reach in many countries, the efficacy of control measures in 2020 and 2021 and the envi-
27 ronmental/political/societal factors that influenced the epidemic’s progression in each country will
28 undoubtedly be the topic of scholarly work for years to come. Due to the existence of a large fraction
29 of asymptomatic cases as well as variation in reporting, testing effort and testing strategies (e.g.,
30 random vs symptom-triggered) (Chow et al., 2020), reported case counts cannot be directly con-
31 verted to infection counts and a comparison of confirmed case counts between countries is generally
32 of limited informative value (Lachmann et al., 2020). Large-scale seroprevalence surveys (e.g., us-
33 ing antibody tests) can yield information on the disease’s prevalence and cumulative number of
34 infections in a population, either directly or using dynamical modeling (Larremore et al., 2021).
35 However, such surveys involve substantial financial and logistical challenges, and only yield reli-
36 able prevalence estimates near the time periods covered by the surveys; prevalence estimates based
37 on seroprevalence surveys are thus largely restricted to short time periods (e.g., (Bogogiannidou
38 et al., 2020; Le Vu et al., 2021; Merkely et al., 2020; Murhekar et al., 2021)).

39 In contrast to case reports, COVID-19-related death counts are generally regarded as less sensi-
40 tive to testing effort and strategy (Flaxman et al., 2020; Lau et al., 2021; Lu et al., 2020; Maugeri
41 et al., 2020a), and fortunately most countries have established nationwide continuous reporting
42 mechanisms for COVID-19-related deaths. Hence, in principle, knowing the infection fatality risk
43 (IFR, the probability of death following infection by SARS-CoV-2) should permit a conversion of
44 death counts to infection counts (Bohk-Ewald et al., 2020; Flaxman et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2020;
45 Sánchez-Romero et al., 2021). The IFR of SARS-CoV-2, however, depends strongly on the host’s
46 age, and hence the effective IFR of the entire population depends on the population’s age struc-

ture as well as the disease’s age distribution (Dowd et al., 2020). Indeed, it was shown that the age-dependency of the IFR, the age-dependency of SARS-CoV-2 prevalence, and the age structure of the population are largely sufficient to explain variation in the effective IFR between countries (Levin et al., 2020). This suggests that age-stratified death counts (or estimates thereof) should be used in conjunction with age-dependent IFRs in order to obtain an accurate estimate of infection counts. This approach has been successfully used to estimate SARS-CoV-2 prevalence over time in Europe until May 4, 2020, based on reported age-stratified death counts (Flaxman et al., 2020). In principle, one could also first determine the “effective” (integrated over all ages) IFR for the entire population and combine that effective IFR with total (non-age-stratified) death counts to estimate infection rates. This approach was taken by Sánchez-Romero et al. (2021), who first estimated the effective IFR for various states in the US based — among others — on age-specific mortality data and then estimated the cumulative number of SARS-CoV-2 infections across the US as of September 8, 2020. However, such an effective IFR is specific to the population for which it was estimated, and hence applying it to other countries (even if correcting for the local population age structure, which is possible in the framework by Sánchez-Romero et al. (2021)) would fail to account for differences (or uncertainty) in the age distribution of infections or deaths.

Unfortunately, age-stratified and time-resolved death statistics are not readily available for many countries with insufficiently comprehensive reporting, thus preventing a direct adoption of the above approaches (Flaxman et al., 2020; O’Driscoll et al., 2021). In cases where only total (i.e., aggregated over all ages) death counts are available, such as the ones disseminated by the World Health Organization, one needs to independently estimate the age distribution of deaths (or infections) in order to convert total death counts to infection counts. Bohk-Ewald et al. (2020) disaggregated nationwide total death counts based on a previously determined global average age distribution of deaths, to estimate SARS-CoV-2 infections in 10 countries up to July 23, 2020. However, using a global average age distribution of deaths ignores the fact that the age distribution of infections (and deaths) actually needs to be adjusted for each country’s population age structure, even if any given age group were to experience a similar exposure in each country. Further, while the approaches by

74 Bohk-Ewald et al. (2020) and Sánchez-Romero et al. (2021) can account for the average time lag
75 between infection and death, they cannot account for its actual probability distribution and consid-
76 erable spread around the mean (Linton et al., 2020), which further complicates the estimation of
77 time-resolved infections from deaths. Lastly, all of the above studies cover only an early portion of
78 the pandemic (Bohk-Ewald et al., 2020; Flaxman et al., 2020) or only focus on a single time point
79 (Sánchez-Romero et al., 2021), and focus on a small number of countries (1–11).

80 This study addresses the above challenges by leveraging information on the age distribution of
81 SARS-CoV-2 infections from multiple countries with available age-stratified death reports, to es-
82 timate the likely age-distribution of SARS-CoV-2 in other countries, while accounting for each
83 country's population age structure and for uncertainty due to additional unidentified factors. Based
84 on these calibrations, national SARS-CoV-2 prevalences (cumulative number of infections, weekly
85 new infections and exponential growth rate) are estimated over time, while accounting for each
86 country's population age structure, the likely age distribution of infections, the age dependency
87 of the IFR, and variation in the time lag between infection and death. The estimates are specific
88 to adults aged 20 years or more, covering 165 countries from early 2020 until June 25, 2021. The
89 estimates are largely consistent with data from multiple previously published nationwide seropreva-
90 lence surveys. Unless mentioned otherwise, in the following “infection”, “death” and “vaccination”
91 refer exclusively to SARS-CoV-2 infections, COVID-19-related deaths and full vaccination against
92 SARS-CoV-2, respectively.

93 Results and discussion

94 Calibrating the age distribution of SARS-CoV-2 prevalence

95 In order to calculate infection counts solely from total (i.e., non-age-stratified) death counts, while
96 accounting for the age-dependency of the IFR and each country's population age structure, inde-
97 pendent estimates of the ratios of infection risks between age groups (i.e., the risk of infection in any

98 one age group relative to any other age group) are needed. To determine the general distribution of
99 age-specific infection risk ratios, this study analysed weekly age-stratified COVID-19-related death
100 reports from 15 countries around the world using a probabilistic model of Poisson-distributed time-
101 delayed death counts (see Methods for details). Briefly, for any given country c , any given week w ,
102 and any given age group g , the number of new infections during that week ($I_{c,w,g}$) is assumed to
103 be approximately equal to $\alpha_{c,g} I_{c,w,r} N_{c,g} / N_{c,r}$, where r represents some fixed reference age group,
104 $N_{c,g}$ is the population size of age group g , and $\alpha_{c,g}$ is the relative risk of an individual in age group
105 g being infected compared to that of an individual in age group r . The expected number of deaths
106 in each age group 4 weeks later (roughly the average time lag between infection and death (Linton
107 et al., 2020)), denoted $D_{c,w+4,g}$, was assumed to be $I_{c,w,g} R_g$, where R_g is the IFR for that age group.
108 Note that while R_g could in principle also vary between countries, to date insufficient information
109 is available for calibrating R_g separately for each country (but see discussion of caveats below).
110 Age-specific IFRs were calculated beforehand by taking the average over multiple IFR estimates
111 reported in the literature (Levin et al., 2020; Linden et al., 2020; O'Driscoll et al., 2021; Pastor-
112 Barriuso et al., 2020; Rinaldi and Paradisi, 2020; Salje et al., 2020). This calibration thus accounts
113 for the age-structure of each country, the age-distribution of the disease in each country and the age-
114 dependency of the IFR. A critical assumption of the model is that, in any given country, nationwide
115 age-specific infection risks co-vary linearly between age groups over time, i.e., an increase of dis-
116 ease prevalence in one age group coincides with a proportional increase of prevalence in any other
117 age group. This assumption is motivated by the observation that weekly nationwide death counts
118 generally covary strongly linearly between age groups (Fig. 1A and Supplemental Figs. S1 and
119 S2); the adequacy of this model is also confirmed in retrospect (see below). For each country, the
120 infection risk ratios $\alpha_{c,g}$ (for all $g \neq r$) and the weekly infections in the reference age-group $I_{c,w,r}$
121 (one per week) were fitted to the age-stratified weekly death counts using a maximum-likelihood ap-
122 proach and assuming that weekly death counts follow a Poisson distribution. This stochastic model
123 explained the data generally well, with observed weekly death counts almost always falling within
124 the 95% confidence interval of the model's predictions (Supplemental Fig. S3). This supports the

125 initial assumption that infection risks co-vary approximately linearly between age groups over time
 126 and suggests that country-specific but time-independent infection risk ratios are largely sufficient
 127 for describing the age-distribution of SARS-CoV-2 infections in a country and over time. For any
 128 given age group g , the fitted infection risk ratios $\alpha_{c,g}$ differed between countries but were generally
 129 within the same order of magnitude (Fig. 1B). On the basis of this observation, and as explained in
 130 the next section, it thus seems possible to approximately estimate the number of infections in any
 131 other country based on total death counts, the population's age structure and the pool of infection
 132 risk ratios $\alpha_{c,g}$ fitted above (accounting for the uncertainty in the latter due to unknown additional
 133 factors).




Figure 1: Infection and death rates covary linearly between age-groups. (A) Weekly reported COVID-19-related death counts in the US, in age group 70–74 (horizontal axis) and age group 50–54 (vertical axis). Each point corresponds to a different week (defined here as a 7-day period). The linear regression line is shown for reference. For additional age groups and countries see Supplemental Fig. S1. The strong co-linearity of death rates between age-groups suggests that infection risks also covary linearly between age-groups. (B) Relative infection risks (relative to age group 70–74) for different countries, estimated based on death-stratified COVID-19-related death counts. Each column represents a different age group, and in each column each point represents a distinct country. Horizontal bars represent medians and boxes span 50%-percentiles of the data.

134 **Estimating infection counts over time**

135 Based on the pool of fitted infection risk ratios, the same age-dependent IFRs used above, the
136 probability distribution of time lags between infection, disease onset and death (Linton et al., 2020),
137 and total (non-age-stratified) COVID-19-related death count reports disseminated by the WHO, the
138 weekly infection counts were estimated over time in each of 165 countries that met certain data
139 quality criteria (details in Methods). Briefly, for any given country c , week w and any given set of
140 relative infection risks $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$, the total number of deaths during that week ($D_{c,w}$) was assumed
141 to be Poisson-distributed with expectation equal to:

$$\mathbb{E} \{D_{c,w}\} = \sum_{k=L_{\min}}^{L_{\max}} I_{c,w-k,r} \delta_k \sum_g R_g \alpha_g \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}}, \quad (1)$$

142 where as before R_g is the IFR for age group g , $N_{c,g}$ is the population size of age group g , δ_k is
143 the probability that a fatal infection will result in death after k weeks, L_{\min} and L_{\max} are the min-
144 imum and maximum considered time lags between infection and death, and $I_{c,w,r}$ is the (a priori
145 unknown) number of new infections in the reference age group r during week w . For the second
146 sum in Eq. (1), only age groups at 20 years or older were considered (in 5-year intervals), because
147 estimates of the infection risk ratios α_g were unreliable for younger ages (due to low death counts)
148 and because deaths among below-20-year olds were numerically negligible compared to the total
149 number of deaths reported. Note that the expected number of deaths in any given week depends on
150 the number of infections in multiple previous weeks, due to the variability of the time lag between
151 infection and death (typically 2–6 weeks (Linton et al., 2020)). Hence, the time series of observed
152 weekly death counts ($D_{c,1}, D_{c,2}, \dots$) results from a *convolution* (“blurring”) of the weekly infections
153 counts ($I_{c,1,r}, I_{c,2,r}, \dots$), making the estimation of the latter based on the former a classical *decon-*
154 *volution* problem, similar to those known from electronic signal processing, financial time series
155 analysis or medical imaging (Mendel, 1990; Wiener, 1964). Put simply, deconvolution can be in-
156 terpreted as an algebraic inversion of the operation of convolution, similar to inverting the matrix
157 of a linear transformation. In contrast to estimation approaches based on fitting dynamical mod-

158 els (e.g., SIR or SEIR models) (Baccini et al., 2021; Chow et al., 2020; Maugeri et al., 2020a,b),
159 which assume a particular dynamical model for the epidemic's growth and often require a priori
160 knowledge of several model parameters to ensure identifiability, time series deconvolution meth-
161 ods typically do not assume any particular dynamical model. Dynamics-agnostic deconvolution
162 methods, including the ones deployed here, can thus be applied to more complex epidemiological
163 scenarios with no a priori knowledge on the possible dynamics. A major challenge in deconvolution
164 is to avoid overfitting, which can introduce spurious fluctuations in the estimated infection counts.
165 Here, for every country c the unknown $I_{c,w,r}$ were estimated using a deconvolution operation based
166 on maximum likelihood. To avoid the risk of overfitting, infection counts were first estimated on
167 a lower-resolution time grid, and then linearly interpolated onto a weekly grid (see Methods for
168 details). The total number of new infections among ≥ 20 -year olds during week w was estimated as
169 $I_{c,w} = I_{c,w,r} \sum_g \alpha_g N_{c,g} / N_{c,r}$. Cumulative (i.e., past and current) infection counts were calculated
170 as incremental sums of the weekly infection count estimates. The epidemic's exponential growth
171 rate over time was subsequently calculated from the estimated weekly infection counts based on a
172 Poisson distribution model and using a sliding-window approach.

173 Depending on the particular choice of infection risk ratios, this yielded different estimates for
174 the weekly nationwide infection counts, the cumulative infection counts and the exponential growth
175 rates over time. Uncertainty in the true infection risk ratios in any particular country stemming from
176 non-modeled additional factors was accounted for by randomly sampling from the full distribution
177 of fitted infection risk ratios (i.e., obtained from the various calibration countries) multiple times,
178 and calculating confidence intervals of the predictions based on the obtained distribution of esti-
179 mates. Estimated weekly and cumulative infection fractions (i.e., relative to population size) and
180 exponential growth rates over time are shown for a selection of countries in Fig. 2 and Supplemen-
181 tal Figs. S4, S5, S6, S7, S8. A comprehensive report of estimates for all 165 countries is provided
182 as Supplemental File 6. Global color-maps of the latest estimates for all countries are shown in Fig.
183 3.

To assess the accuracy of the above approach, the estimated cumulative infection fractions were compared to 22 previously published nationwide seroprevalence surveys across 14 countries (Supplemental Table S1) (Alharbi et al., 2021; Anand et al., 2020; Bogogiannidou et al., 2020; Espen-hain et al., 2021; Hallal et al., 2020; Le Vu et al., 2021; Merkely et al., 2020; Murhekar et al., 2020, 2021; Nah et al., 2021; Poljak et al., 2021; Pollán et al., 2020; Reicher et al., 2021; Snoeck et al., 2020; Ward et al., 2020). Only surveys attempting to estimate nationwide seroprevalence in the general population (in particular, either using geographically or demographically stratified sampling or adjusting for sample demographics) were included. Agreement between model estimates and seroprevalence estimates was generally good: 16 out of 22 seroprevalence estimates (accounting for the associated 95% confidence interval and the time period of the underlying survey) overlapped with the model's 95%-confidence intervals, with 3 non-overlaps observed for Brazil, one for Spain, one for the UK, and one for France (Supplemental Fig. S4). When comparing point-estimates (i.e., not accounting for confidence intervals) relative differences (model estimate minus seroprevalence, divided by seroprevalence) were mostly in the range 25–50%, although particularly high relative differences were found for Brazil (170–180%), one time point in France (464%) and one time point in Greece (348%) (overview in Supplemental Table S1). Apart from the possibility of erroneous model predictions (discussed extensively below), it should be kept in mind that seroprevalence surveys themselves yield only estimates of the cumulative fraction of infected individuals with an associated uncertainty interval, and that this uncertainty interval need not always account for all sources of error. In particular, deviations of the model from seroprevalence-based estimates may partly be due to the fact that antibody concentrations in infected individuals (especially asymptomatic ones) can drop over time, rendering many of them seronegative (Bolotin et al., 2021; La Marca et al., 2020; Long et al., 2020). Thus, previously infected individuals may not all be recognized as such. This would be consistent with the fact that in all cases of major disagreement between model predictions and seroprevalence estimates the former were greater than the latter. Further, sensitivity and specificity estimates for antibody tests performed in the laboratory or claimed by manufacturers need not always apply in a community setting (La Marca et al., 2020), thus introducing biases in

211 seroprevalence estimates despite nominal adjustments for sensitivity and specificity.

212 **Case counts alone can yield wrong impressions**

213 Estimates of SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in a population can yield insight into the epidemic's scale
214 and growth dynamics that may not have been possible from reported cases alone. One reason is
215 that the fraction of infections that is detected and reported varies greatly between countries as well
216 as over time. Indeed, according to the present estimates, in most countries reported case counts
217 initially severely underestimated the actual number of infections and often did not properly reflect
218 the progression of the epidemic, while in many countries more recent case reports capture a much
219 larger fraction of infections and more closely reflect the epidemic's dynamics (Figs. 2A–E and Sup-
220 plemental Fig. S5). For example, in the US, France, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, United Kingdom and
221 many other European countries reported cases only reflected a small fraction of infections occur-
222 ring in Spring 2020, while the majority of subsequent infections have been successfully detected.
223 Nevertheless, in many countries even recent reported case counts poorly reflect the actual dynam-
224 ics of the epidemic. For example, recent reported cases in Afghanistan, Angola, Brazil, Ecuador,
225 Egypt, Guatemala and Iran severely underestimate the disease's rapid ongoing growth, with nearly
226 all infections remaining undetected or unreported (Fig. 4). Future investigations, enabled by the
227 infection count estimates presented here, might be able to identify the main factors (e.g., politi-
228 cal, financial, organizational) driving the discrepancies between infections and reported cases and
229 suggest concrete steps to eliminate these discrepancies or correct for them.

230 The above observations imply that comparisons of the epidemic's extent and progression between
231 countries should preferably be done based on infection or death counts, rather than reported cases
232 alone (Flaxman et al., 2020; Sánchez-Romero et al., 2021). For example, as of June 25, 2021
233 the cumulative per-capita number of cases reported for the Czech Republic (16%) and Slovenia
234 (12%) were much higher than for Paraguay (5.8%), Peru (6.3%) or Brazil (8.6%), while the median
235 predicted cumulative infection fractions for the Czech Republic (52%) and Slovenia (38%) are much

236 lower than for Paraguay (86%), Peru (98%, Fig. 2.O) and Brazil (83%) (Supplemental Figs. S6 and
237 S7). Similarly, as of June 25, 2021 the cumulative per-capita number of cases reported for the US
238 (10%) was much higher than for neighboring Mexico (2%), while the median predicted cumulative
239 infection fraction for the US (36%, Fig. 2L) is much lower than for Mexico (77%, Fig. 2M). These
240 examples highlight the value of considering actual infection counts relative to population size when
241 comparing the extent of the epidemic and its relationship to public policy between countries. Future
242 investigations, enabled by the prevalence estimates presented here, may be able to identify concrete
243 political, environmental and socioeconomic factors influencing the epidemic's growth.

244 **Caveats**

245 The predictions presented here are subject to some important caveats. First, erroneous reporting
246 of total COVID-19-related deaths will have a direct impact on the estimated infection counts. This
247 caveat is particularly important for countries with less developed medical or reporting infrastruc-
248 ture (Bastos et al., 2021; Feyissa et al., 2021; Galvães et al., 2021; Lloyd-Sherlock et al., 2021;
249 Natashekara, 2021; Veiga e Silva et al., 2020), as well as for countries where reports may be cen-
250 sored or modified for political reasons (Kilani, 2021; Kobak, 2021). A general underreporting of
251 total COVID-19-related deaths, as has been suspected for example for Brazil (Bastos et al., 2021;
252 Veiga e Silva et al., 2020), Italy (Ciminelli and Garcia-Mandicó, 2020), Turkey (Kisa and Kisa,
253 2020), India (Chatterjee, 2020) and Nigeria (Ohia et al., 2020), would lead to a roughly propor-
254 tional underestimation of infections. Similarly, inconsistencies between countries and over time in
255 the classification of causes of death also have the potential to alter model predictions (Feyissa et al.,
256 2021; França et al., 2020; Leon et al., 2020; Singh, 2021). For example, it was pointed out that
257 the US and Russia tend to follow rather different criteria for identifying COVID-19 as the under-
258 lying cause of death, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan modified their criteria several months into
259 the pandemic (Singh, 2021). Underreporting of COVID-19-related deaths may also explain why
260 in some rare instances the number of reported positive cases substantially exceeds the estimated

261 number of infections (e.g., for Singapore, Supplemental File 6). Comparisons of results between
262 countries should thus be done with care. In countries where COVID-19-related deaths are suspected
263 of being grossly misreported, excess mortality rates may provide an alternative means to obtaining
264 accurate death counts in future analyses (Azofeifa et al., 2021; Beaney et al., 2020; Kobak, 2021).

265 Second, systematic errors in the age-stratified death counts used for model calibration (obtained
266 from the COVerAGE-DB (Riffe et al., 2021)) could impact model predictions. For example, a
267 potentially more frequent erroneous attribution to alternative plausible causes of death (e.g., other
268 respiratory disorders) in older patients could lead to a relative underreporting of COVID-19-related
269 deaths in older age groups. Such an age bias would lead to an underestimation of the infection risk
270 ratios $\alpha_{c,g}$ in older groups, essentially shifting the estimated age distribution of infections towards
271 younger groups. If such erroneous calibrations are subsequently used to estimate infections from
272 total death count data, this would lead to an overestimation of infections because the IFR is lower
273 at younger ages (recall that infections \approx deaths/IFR). Further, while the COVerAGE-DB is a rich
274 and robust dataset, its age group harmonizations could in principle cause distortions in the age
275 distribution of death counts. To assess whether these distortions are strong enough to substantially
276 influence the model calibrations, in this study calibrations were repeated using an independent
277 dataset of national age-stratified death counts, available for a subset of countries, from the French
278 National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED). Across the 2 countries covered by both INED
279 and COVerAGE-DB and satisfying the same data criteria as in the earlier analyses, the infection risk
280 ratios calibrated with the INED data were generally similar to those calibrated with the COVerAGE-
281 DB data (Supplemental Fig. S9).

282 Third, even if all data were error-free, the infection risk ratios are calibrated based on available
283 age-stratified death statistics from a limited number of countries, and may not apply to all other
284 countries (for example due to strong cultural differences). Uncertainty associated with this ex-
285 trapolation is accounted for by considering infection risk ratios calibrated to multiple alternative
286 countries from multiple continents (see Methods).

287 Fourth, governmental policies implemented at various time points could in principle change the
288 infection risk ratios between age groups over time, for example by opening and closing schools
289 and universities, or allowing or prohibiting visits to nursing homes. To assess the extent of this
290 possible issue, here the weekly death counts in each age group were compared to the total (age-
291 integrated) weekly death counts over time (Supplemental Figs. S10 and S2). Age-specific and total
292 death counts correlated strongly linearly over time in nearly all age groups and countries (Pear-
293 son correlations ≥ 0.5 in almost all cases), suggesting that in any given country the proportion of
294 infections per age group did not substantially vary over the course of the epidemic. Further, pre-
295 dictions of the fitted models (which assume time-independent infection risk ratios) were generally
296 highly consistent with the age-stratified death counts (Supplemental Fig. S3), again suggesting that
297 time-independent (but country- and age-dependent) infection risk ratios provide a largely adequate
298 model for the age distribution of infections.

299 Fifth, age-specific IFRs were obtained from studies in only a few countries (mostly western) and
300 often based on a small subset of closely monitored cases (e.g., from the Diamond Princess cruise
301 ship). These IFR estimates may not be accurate for all countries, especially countries with a very
302 different medical infrastructure, different sex ratios in the population or a different prevalence of
303 pre-existing health conditions (e.g., diabetes), all of which can affect the IFR. That said, estimated
304 trends over time within any given country, in particular exponential growth rates (e.g., Figs. 2P–
305 T), are unlikely to be substantially affected by such biases if the biases remain relatively constant
306 over time. For example, the exponential growth rates estimated here remained unchanged when
307 alternative IFRs from the literature (Levin et al., 2020; Linden et al., 2020; O'Driscoll et al., 2021;
308 Pastor-Barriuso et al., 2020; Rinaldi and Paradisi, 2020; Salje et al., 2020) were considered. To
309 nevertheless examine the robustness of estimated SARS-CoV-2 prevalences against variations in the
310 IFR, the above analyses were repeated by considering for each age group an set of multiple IFRs, i.e.,
311 randomly sampling from the set of previously reported IFRs (Levin et al., 2020; Linden et al., 2020;
312 O'Driscoll et al., 2021; Pastor-Barriuso et al., 2020; Rinaldi and Paradisi, 2020; Salje et al., 2020)
313 rather than considering their mean. Median model predictions remained nearly unchanged, however

314 the uncertainty (i.e., confidence intervals) of the estimates increased (examples in Supplemental Fig.
315 S11).

316 Sixth, in countries where a large fraction of the population is now vaccinated, attention should
317 be given to the limitations and interpretation of the model's predictions for the recent parts of the
318 pandemic. Indeed, while existing vaccines substantially reduce the probability of infection and
319 death, none of them is 100% effective (Bermingham et al., 2021; Calzetta et al., 2021; Soiza et al.,
320 2021). Because the IFR may differ between vaccinated and non-vaccinated individuals, converting
321 from death counts to infection counts using IFRs originally determined for non-vaccinated people
322 could lead to erroneous infection estimates. This error is relatively small if vaccinated people only
323 represent a small fraction of new infections, which, given that vaccination substantially reduces
324 the risk of infection, is probably the case in the many countries where the majority of the popu-
325 lation is unvaccinated (as of June 25, 2021, 138 out of 145 countries with available vaccination
326 data, Supplemental File 6). To further assess the implications of vaccination on infection estimates,
327 consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. Let U be the ratio of vaccinated over non-
328 vaccinated individuals, let Q be the risk of COVID-19-related death for a vaccinated individual
329 relative to a non-vaccinated one, and let \tilde{D} and D denote the number of deaths among vaccinated
330 and non-vaccinated individuals, respectively (country and week indices are omitted here for nota-
331 tional simplicity). We have $\tilde{D}/D \approx QU$, and hence the fraction of deaths attributed to vaccinated
332 individuals is roughly:

$$\frac{\tilde{D}}{\tilde{D} + D} \approx \frac{QU}{QU + 1}. \quad (2)$$

333 As of June 25, 2021, in nearly all countries the majority of the population was not yet fully vacci-
334 nated (hence $U < 1$), exceptions being the Seychelles, Malta, Israel, Bahrain, Mongolia, Iceland and
335 Chile (where U ranged between 1 and 2.2 on June 25, 2021). Field estimates for vaccine effective-
336 ness against death generally range from 96.7% in Israel (Haas et al., 2021), to 98% in an Italian
337 province (Flacco et al., 2021) and 98.7% in the US (Vahidy et al., 2021), among fully vaccinated
338 individuals, corresponding to a Q in the range 0.013–0.033. Hence, in nearly all countries (except

339 Seychelles, Malta, Israel, Bahrain, Mongolia, Iceland and Chile) vaccinated individuals likely ac-
340 count for less than 3.2% of the reported deaths in recent months (up until June 25, 2021), and even
341 less at earlier stages of the pandemic where $U \ll 1$. The presented infection count estimates can
342 thus be interpreted as approximately corresponding to the non-vaccinated part of the population
343 (e.g., an estimate of 1000 infections essentially means that among the non-vaccinated population
344 there were about 1000 infections), which in turn likely accounts for the vast majority of infections
345 in most countries (as discussed above).

346 Conclusions

347 This study presented estimates of the nationwide prevalence and growth rate of SARS-CoV-2 in-
348 fections over time in 165 countries around the world, based on official COVID-19-related death
349 reports, age-specific infection fatality risks, each country's population age structure and the dis-
350 tribution of time lags between infection and death. The complete report for all 165 countries is
351 provided as Supplemental File 6. These estimates are also provided as machine-readable tables
352 (Supplemental Files 1–5) for convenient downstream analyses; occasionally updated estimates are
353 available at: www.loucalab.com/archive/COVID19prevalence. Despite a variety of assumptions
354 and caveats, the presented estimates turn out largely consistent with data from nationwide general-
355 population seroprevalence surveys. The presented findings suggest that while in many countries the
356 detection of infections has greatly improved, there are also numerous examples where even recent
357 reported case counts do not properly reflect the epidemic's dynamics. In particular, comparisons
358 between countries based on infection counts can yield very different conclusions than comparisons
359 merely based on reported cases. The present work thus enables more precise assessments of the
360 disease's past and ongoing progression, evaluation and improvement of public interventions and
361 testing strategies, and estimation of worldwide vaccination needs.




Figure 2: Estimated nationwide infection rates (adults aged ≥ 20 years). (A–E) Estimated nationwide weekly number of SARS-CoV-2 infections over time for Canada, US, Mexico, United Kingdom and Peru, compared to weekly reported cases (blue curves). Black curves show prediction medians, dark and light shades show 50 % and 95 % percentiles of predictions, respectively. Note that reported cases are shown 1 week earlier than actually reported (corresponding roughly to the average incubation time (Linton et al., 2020)) for easier comparison with infection counts. (F–J) Estimated nationwide weekly fraction of new infections and fraction of reported cases (relative to population size), for the same countries as in A–E. (K–O) Estimated nationwide cumulative fraction of infections (cumulative infections divided by population size), for the same countries as in A–E. Small circles show empirical nationwide prevalence estimates from published seroprevalence surveys for comparison (horizontal error bars denote survey date ranges, vertical error bars denote 95%-confidence intervals as reported by the original publications; details in Supplemental Table S1). (P–T) Estimated exponential growth rate based on weekly infection counts, for the same countries as in A–E. Horizontal axes are shown for reference. Each column shows estimates for a different country. All model estimates refer to adults aged ≥ 20 years, while reported cases (blue curves) refer to the entire population. Analogous plots for all 165 investigated countries are provided as Supplemental File 6.




Figure 3: Worldwide overview of latest estimates (adults aged ≥ 20 years). Global map of the latest estimated nationwide (A) cumulative (past and current) number of SARS-CoV-2 infections, (B) cumulative fraction of infection (infections relative to population size), (C) weekly fraction of new infections (relative to population size) and (D) current exponential growth rate. Dates of the estimations are given in the lower-right corner of each figure. Countries for which an estimation was not performed (e.g., due to insufficient data) are shown in grey. Analogous world maps for older dates are available in Supplemental File 6.




Figure 4: Case counts can suggest drastically different dynamics than infection counts. Nationwide predicted weekly number of new infections (black curves and shades, among adults aged ≥ 20 years) and weekly reported cases (blue curves, all ages) over time in Afghanistan, Angola, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala and Iran. Black curves show prediction medians, dark and bright shades show 50 % and 95 % confidence intervals, respectively. For easier comparison, case counts are shifted backward by one week (corresponding roughly to the average incubation time (Linton et al., 2020)).

362 **Methods details**

363 **Age-specific infection fatality risks**

364 Age-specific infection fatality risks (IFRs) were calculated based on the following literature: (Levin
365 et al., 2020; Linden et al., 2020; O'Driscoll et al., 2021; Pastor-Barriuso et al., 2020; Rinaldi and
366 Paradisi, 2020; Salje et al., 2020). For each considered age group, the average IFR across all of
367 the aforementioned published IFRs was used, after linearly interpolating where necessary (Supple-
368 mental Table S2).

369 **Calibrating age-specific infection risk ratios**

370 The age-specific infection risk ratios were calibrated as follows. Age-specific population sizes
371 for each country (status 2019) were downloaded from the United Nations website (<https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/CSV>) on October 23, 2020 (DESA, 2019). Time
372 series of nationwide cumulative COVID-19-related death counts grouped by 5-year age intervals
373 were downloaded on April 27, 2021 from COVerAGE-DB (<https://osf.io/7tnfh>), which is a
374 database that gathers and curates official death count statistics from multiple official sources (Riffe
375 et al., 2021). The last 7 days covered in the database were ignored to avoid potential biases caused
376 by delays in death reporting. For each country included in COVerAGE-DB, and separately for each
377 age group, it was ensured that cumulative death counts are non-decreasing (monotonic) over time by
378 linearly re-interpolating death counts at problematic time points. To avoid inaccurate calibrations
379 due to grossly problematic time series, any country for which the strongest violation in monotonic-
380 ity (the largest decrease of cumulative deaths between any two time points for any considered age
381 group) was greater than 1% of the maximum reported total cumulative deaths in that country (for
382 example Canada) was omitted. For similar reasons, countries for which an interpolation was needed
383 (either due to missing data, or due to a violation of monotonicity) in any considered age group over
384 a time span greater than 5 weeks (for example Iceland) was also omitted.

386 The remaining monotonized time series of cumulative deaths were linearly interpolated onto a
 387 regular weekly time grid, i.e., in which adjacent time points are 7 days apart; no extrapolation was
 388 performed, i.e., only dates between the first and last available data points were included. The weekly
 389 number of deaths in each age group was calculated as the difference of cumulative deaths between
 390 consecutive time points on the weekly grid. While some of the input time series are available at a
 391 daily resolution, a weekly discretization was chosen here to (a) reduce time series noise and (b) to
 392 “average out” the hard-to-model systematic variations in the epidemic’s dynamics between different
 393 days of the week (e.g., weekends vs. work days). To ensure a high accuracy in the calibrated
 394 infection risk ratios, only countries for which COVerAGE-DB covered at least 20 weeks with at
 395 least 100 reported deaths each were subsequently considered.

396 For each considered country c , the “reference” age group r was set to the age group that had the
 397 highest cumulative number of deaths. Designating a reference group is done purely for notational
 398 simplicity and consistency, so that age-specific prevalence ratios can all be defined relative to a
 399 common reference. For each other age group g , the infection risk ratio $\alpha_{c,g}$, i.e., the probability of
 400 an individual in group g being infected relative to the probability of an individual in group r being
 401 infected, was estimated using a probabilistic model. According to this model, the number of deaths
 402 in group g during week w (denoted $D_{c,w,g}$) was Poisson distributed with expectation:

$$D_{c,w,r} \cdot \alpha_{c,g} \cdot \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}} \cdot \frac{R_g}{R_r}. \quad (3)$$

403 Here, $N_{c,g}$ is the population size of age group g in country c and R_g is the IFR for age group g .
 404 Under this model, the maximum-likelihood estimate for $\alpha_{c,g}$, i.e. given the weekly death count
 405 time series, is given by:

$$\hat{\alpha}_{c,g} = \frac{\sum_w D_{c,w,g}}{\sum_w D_{c,w,r}} \frac{N_{c,r}}{N_{c,g}} \cdot \frac{R_r}{R_g}. \quad (4)$$

406 To avoid errors due to sampling noise, only weeks with at least 100 reported deaths were considered
 407 in the sums in Eq. (4). This threshold was chosen as a reasonable compromise between data quality

408 (requiring more deaths per week implies less sampling noise) and data quantity (requiring fewer
 409 deaths per week increases the number of weeks available for calibration). Further increasing this
 410 threshold to 200 deaths per week generally had negligible effects on the results (see examples in
 411 Supplemental Fig. S12). Note that $\alpha_{c,g}$ might also alternatively be estimated as the slope of the
 412 linear regression:

$$D_{c,w,g} \sim \alpha_{c,g} D_{c,w,r} \cdot \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}} \cdot \frac{R_{c,g}}{R_{c,r}}. \quad (5)$$

413 Estimates obtained via linear regression were nearly identical to those obtained using the aforemen-
 414 tioned Poissonian model, suggesting that the estimates are not very sensitive to the precise assumed
 415 distribution.

416 For purposes of evaluating the model's adequacy (explained below), this study also estimated the
 417 weekly number of infections in the reference age group, $I_{c,w,r}$, via maximum-likelihood based on a
 418 probabilistic model in which $D_{c,w,g}$ was Poisson-distributed with expectation:

$$\mathbb{E}\{D_{c,w,g}\} = R_g I_{c,w-4,r} \hat{\alpha}_{c,g} \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}}. \quad (6)$$

419 Under this model, the maximum-likelihood estimate for $I_{c,w-4,r}$ is given by:

$$\hat{I}_{c,w-4,r} = \frac{N_{c,r} \sum_g D_{c,w,g}}{\sum_g \hat{\alpha}_{c,g} R_g N_{c,g}}. \quad (7)$$

420 To evaluate the adequacy of the above stochastic model in explaining the original death count data,
 421 multiple hypothetical weekly death counts were simulated for each age group, and the distribution
 422 of simulated death counts was compared to the true death counts. Specifically, for each country c ,
 423 week w and age group g , 100 random death counts ($\tilde{D}_{c,w,g}$) were drawn from a Poisson distribution
 424 with expectation:

$$\mathbb{E}\{\tilde{D}_{c,w,g}\} = R_g \hat{I}_{c,w-4,r} \hat{\alpha}_{c,g} \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}}. \quad (8)$$

425 Median simulated death counts and 50 % and 95% equal-tailed confidence intervals, along with the
 426 original death counts, are shown for various countries and age groups in Supplemental Fig. S3. As

427 can be seen in that figure, the model's simulated time series are largely consistent with the original
428 data.

429 In the subsequent analyses, only infection risk ratios $\alpha_{c,g}$ for which the corresponding linear curve
430 (Eq. 5) achieved a coefficient of determination (R^2) greater than 0.5 were used (shown in Fig. 1),
431 to avoid less accurately estimated infection risk ratios (typically obtained from countries with low
432 death rates). Infection risk ratios meeting this quality threshold cover 15 countries: Argentina,
433 Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, United Kingdom, Hungary, India, Mex-
434 ico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Ukraine, United States.

435 **Estimating infection counts from total death counts**

436 Time series of total (non-age-stratified) nationwide cumulative reported death and case counts were
437 downloaded from the website of the World Health Organization ([https://covid19.who.int/
438 table](https://covid19.who.int/table)) on July 20, 2021. The last 7 days covered in the database were ignored to avoid potential
439 biases caused by delays in case and death reporting (Lipsitch et al., 2015). Cumulative death and
440 case counts were made non-decreasing and interpolated onto a weekly time grid as described above.
441 Only countries that reported at least one death per week for at least 10 weeks were included in the
442 analysis below. In addition, any country for which the strongest violation in monotonicity was
443 greater than 1% of the maximum reported total cumulative deaths in that country, or for which an
444 interpolation was needed (e.g., due to missing data) over a time span greater than 5 weeks (as done
445 above for the COVerAGE-DB data), was omitted. For each country c , week w and any particular
446 choice of age-specific infection risk ratios $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$ (uniquely covering all ages ≥ 20), the number
447 of infections was estimated as follows. Let N be the number of consecutive weeks for which total
448 deaths are reported. Let r denote some fixed reference age group with respect to which infection risk
449 ratios are defined, i.e., such that $\alpha_r = 1$ (here, ages 70–74 were used as reference). Let δ_k denote the
450 probability that a fatal infection will lead to death after k weeks, where $k = L_{\min}, \dots, L_{\max}$ and where
451 L_{\min} is the minimum and L_{\max} the maximum considered time lag. Let $L := L_{\max} - L_{\min} + 1$. Let

452 $I_{c,w,r}$ be the (a priori unknown) number of new infections occurring during week w in the reference
 453 age group. The number of COVID-19-induced deaths during week w in age group g , denoted
 454 $D_{c,w,g}$, was assumed to be Poisson-distributed with expectation equal to:

$$\mathbb{E} \{D_{c,w,g}\} = \sum_{k=L_{\min}}^{L_{\max}} I_{c,w-k,r} \delta_k R_g \alpha_g \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}}. \quad (9)$$

455 The total number of deaths in week w , $D_{c,w}$, is thus Poisson-distributed with expectation:

$$\mathbb{E} \{D_{c,w}\} = \sum_{k=L_{\min}}^{L_{\max}} I_{c,w-k,r} \delta_k \sum_g R_g \alpha_g \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}}. \quad (10)$$

456 As explained earlier, only age groups ≥ 20 years were included because infection risk ratios could
 457 not be reliably estimated for younger ages and because the contribution of younger ages to total death
 458 counts can be considered numerically negligible. Here, the δ_k were calculated using 1,000,000
 459 Monte Carlo simulations based on the log-normal distribution models fitted by [Linton et al. \(2020,](#)
 460 Table 2 therein) for the time lags between infection and disease onset and the time lags between
 461 disease onset and death, and assuming that the two time lags are independently distributed (see Sup-
 462 plemental Table S3). The minimum and maximum considered lags were $L_{\min} = 2$ and $L_{\max} = 6$
 463 weeks, since this range covers the bulk ($\sim 90\%$) of cases, and since further increasing L_{\max} or de-
 464 creasing L_{\min} increases the width of the convolution kernel, thus increasing the risk of introducing
 465 spurious fluctuations in the estimated $I_{c,w,r}$. Note that the considered $\delta_{L_{\min}}, \dots, \delta_{L_{\max}}$ were normal-
 466 ized to have sum 1, to maintain consistency with the total (i.e., summed over all time lags) IFR.

467 Given the above model, the goal is to estimate the unknown weekly infection counts in the ref-
 468 erence group, $I_{c,w,r}$ from the recorded weekly death counts $D_{c,w}$. Note that this is a classical de-
 469 convolution problem, since each $D_{c,w}$ results from the additive effects of infections from multiple
 470 preceding weeks. ([Mendel, 1990; Wiener, 1964](#)). Eq. (10) can be written abstractly in matrix form:

$$\mathbb{E} \{\mathbf{D}\} = \mathbb{K} \cdot \mathbf{I}, \quad (11)$$

471 where \mathbb{K} is a *convolution matrix* of size $N \times (N + L - 1)$:

$$\mathbb{K} := \begin{pmatrix} \delta_{L_{\max}} & \delta_{L_{\max}-1} & \dots & \delta_{L_{\min}} & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & \delta_{L_{\max}} & \dots & \delta_{L_{\min}+1} & \delta_{L_{\min}} & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & \delta_{L_{\min}+2} & \delta_{L_{\min}+1} & \delta_{L_{\min}} & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & \delta_{L_{\min}} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \sum_g R_g \alpha_g \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}}, \quad (12)$$

472 and \mathbf{D} is a column vector of size N listing the reported weekly death counts $D_{c,1}, \dots, D_{c,N}$

473 and \mathbf{I} is a column vector of size $N + L - 1$ listing the unknown weekly infection counts

474 $I_{c,1-L_{\max},r}, \dots, I_{c,N-L_{\min},r}$. Note that for notational simplicity the country index c is omitted from

475 the $\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbb{K}$, but keep in mind that $\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{D}, \mathbb{K}$ refer to a specific country. It is straightforward to show

476 that, under the above model, the log-likelihood of the observed weekly death counts (\mathbf{D}) is given

477 by:

$$\ln \mathcal{L} = \sum_{w=1}^N [D_w \ln(\mathbb{K}\mathbf{I})_w - (\mathbb{K}\mathbf{I})_w - \ln(D_w!)]. \quad (13)$$

478 In principle, one could estimate the unknown vector \mathbf{I} via maximum-likelihood. Indeed, the above

479 log-likelihood is maximized when the following condition is met:

$$\sum_{w=1}^N \mathbb{K}_{wv} = \sum_{w=1}^N \frac{\mathbf{D}_w \mathbb{K}_{wv}}{(\mathbb{K}\mathbf{I})_w}, \quad (14)$$

480 for all $v \in \{1, \dots, N + L - 1\}$. A sufficient condition for Eq. (14) is that $\mathbb{K}\mathbf{I} = \mathbf{D}$, in other words any

481 vector $\hat{\mathbf{I}}$ satisfying $\mathbb{K}\hat{\mathbf{I}} = \mathbf{D}$ is a maximum-likelihood estimate. Such an estimate can be obtained

482 using the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of \mathbb{K} , denoted \mathbb{K}^+ (Moore, 1920; Penrose, 1955): Since

483 \mathbb{K} has linearly independent rows, its pseudoinverse is $\mathbb{K}^+ = \mathbb{K}^T (\mathbb{K}\mathbb{K}^T)^{-1}$, and hence setting $\hat{\mathbf{I}} :=$

484 $\mathbb{K}^+ \mathbf{D}$ would satisfy $\mathbb{K}\hat{\mathbf{I}} = \mathbf{D}$. However, due to known issues with inverting convolution matrixes

485 such a naive estimation tends to introduce spurious fluctuations in the estimated \mathbf{I} . One approach

486 is to reduce the temporal resolution of the estimated \mathbf{I} , which effectively reduces the number of

487 estimated free parameters (Louca et al., 2019). Hence, instead of estimating $I_{c,w,r}$ separately for

488 each week, a coarser time grid was considered that has 4 times fewer time points than the original
 489 weekly time grid, i.e., such that the infection count $I_{c,w,r}$ is freely estimated only every 4-th week,
 490 while assuming linear variation between these time points. Note that this approach is a variant
 491 of constrained deconvolution using spline functions, pioneered by [Verotta \(1993\)](#) and reviewed by
 492 [Madden et al. \(1996\)](#), using linear splines and maximizing the likelihood function (thus accounting
 493 for the Poisson model described above) rather than minimizing the sum of squared residuals (which
 494 assumes normally distributed data). For example, for an original weekly time series spanning 100
 495 weeks, first the $I_{c,w,r}$ are estimated at about $100/4$ discrete time points, each 4 weeks apart, and then
 496 linear interpolation is used to obtain the remaining $I_{c,w,r}$. Denoting by \mathbf{J} the column vector listing
 497 the infection counts on this coarser time grid ($I_{c,1-L_{\max},r}, I_{c,1-L_{\max}+4,r}, \dots$), and by \mathbb{G} the matrix
 498 mapping \mathbf{J} to \mathbf{I} via linear interpolation (i.e., $\mathbf{I} = \mathbb{G}\mathbf{J}$), one thus obtains the following log-likelihood
 499 in terms of \mathbf{J} :

$$\ln \mathcal{L} = \sum_{w=1}^N [D_w \ln(\mathbb{K}\mathbb{G}\mathbf{J})_w - (\mathbb{K}\mathbb{G}\mathbf{J})_w - \ln(D_w!)] . \quad (15)$$

500 The corresponding-maximum likelihood estimate $\hat{\mathbf{J}}$ can no longer be obtained simply by solving
 501 the equation $\mathbb{K}\mathbb{G}\hat{\mathbf{J}} = \mathbf{D}$, because this linear problem is over-determined, i.e., it is unlikely that
 502 a $\hat{\mathbf{J}}$ can be found such that $\mathbb{K}\mathbb{G}\hat{\mathbf{J}} = \mathbf{D}$ is exactly satisfied. However an optimally approximate
 503 solution (in the least-squares sense), $\tilde{\mathbf{J}}$, can be obtained by setting $\tilde{\mathbf{J}} := (\mathbb{K}\mathbb{G})^+ \mathbf{D}$. In order to deter-
 504 mine the exact maximum-likelihood estimate $\hat{\mathbf{J}}$, i.e., the \mathbf{J} maximizing $\ln \mathcal{L}$ in Eq. (15), numerical
 505 optimization was used, as implemented in the R function `nloptr::nloptr`, while using the afore-
 506 mentioned approximation $\tilde{\mathbf{J}}$ as a starting point. Subsequently setting $\hat{\mathbf{I}} := \mathbb{G}\hat{\mathbf{J}}$ yielded an estimate
 507 for the weekly infections counts $I_{c,w,r}$. The corresponding total number of weekly infections, $\hat{I}_{c,w}$,
 508 can be calculated from the estimates $\hat{I}_{c,w,r}$ as follows:

$$\hat{I}_{c,w} = \hat{I}_{c,w,r} \sum_g \alpha_g \frac{N_{c,g}}{N_{c,r}} . \quad (16)$$

509 The corresponding cumulative number of total infections up until any given week can be obtained
 510 by summing the weekly infection counts.

511 Exponential growth rates over time were estimated from the weekly infection counts using a
 512 sliding-window approach, as follows. In every sliding window (spanning 5 consecutive weeks),
 513 an exponential function of the form $I(t) = Ae^{t\lambda}$ was fitted, where t denotes time in days and A
 514 and λ are unknown parameters (in particular, λ is the exponential growth rate in that window).
 515 The parameters A and λ were fitted via maximum likelihood, assuming that the total number of
 516 weekly infections, $I_{c,w}$, was Poisson distributed with expectation $Ae^{t_w\lambda}$. Under this model, the
 517 log-likelihood of the data (more precisely, of the previously estimated weekly infection counts) is:

$$\ln L = \sum_w \left[\hat{I}_{c,w} \ln A + \hat{I}_{c,w} \lambda t_w - Ae^{\lambda t_w} - \ln(\hat{I}_{c,w}!) \right], \quad (17)$$

518 where w iterates over all weeks in the specific sliding window. The maximum-likelihood estimates
 519 of A and λ are obtained by solving $\partial \ln L / \partial \lambda = 0$ and $\partial \ln L / \partial A = 0$, which quickly leads to the
 520 condition:

$$\frac{\sum_w e^{\hat{\lambda} t_w}}{\sum_g t_w e^{\hat{\lambda} t_w}} \cdot \sum_w t_w \hat{I}_{c,w} = \sum_w \hat{I}_{c,w}. \quad (18)$$

521 Eq. (18) was solved numerically using the bisection method to obtain the maximum-likelihood
 522 estimate $\hat{\lambda}$.

523 To assess estimation uncertainties stemming from sampling stochasticity and uncertainties in
 524 the infection risk ratios, the above estimations were repeated 100 times using alternative infection
 525 risk ratios (for each age group drawn randomly from the set of infection risk ratios previously
 526 fitted to various countries) and replacing the reported weekly death counts $D_{c,w}$ with values drawn
 527 from a Poisson distribution with mean $D_{c,w}$. Hence, rather than point-estimates, all predictions are
 528 reported in the form of medians and equal-tailed confidence intervals. Tables of all estimates for
 529 all considered countries up until June 25, 2021 are provided in Supplemental Files 1–5; a visual
 530 report is provided as Supplemental File 6.

531 **Assessing the robustness of COVerAGE-DB-based calibrations**

532 To examine whether the age harmonizations of COVerAGE-DB death counts have had a major
533 impact on the calibrated infection risk ratios ($\alpha_{c,g}$), the calibrations were also repeated using an
534 independent dataset of national age-stratified death counts obtained from the French National Insti-
535 tute for Demographic Studies, henceforth “INED”, at: <https://dc-covid.site.ined.fr/en/>
536 data/pooled-datafiles (accessed July 20, 2021). Only countries also included in the calibra-
537 tions described above, and meeting the same data size and quality criteria, were considered (United
538 States, Ukraine). Age groups g not intersecting with at least one finite age interval in the INED
539 database were also omitted from the comparison. Supplemental Fig. S9 shows the COVerAGE-
540 DB-based and INED-based calibrated infection risk ratios across all considered countries and age
541 groups; as can be seen, the two sets largely agree ($R^2 = 0.92$), suggesting that COVerAGE-DB’s
542 age harmonizations did not substantially compromise the model calibrations.

543 **Vaccination data**

544 Data on nationwide completed vaccinations per country over time were obtained from
545 the GitHub repository of the Johns Hopkins Centers for Civic Impact, at: https://github.com/govex/COVID-19/blob/master/data_tables/vaccine_data/global_data/time_series_covid19_vaccine_global.csv (accessed July 20, 2021). Cumulative
546 vaccination counts were monotonized and interpolated onto a weekly time grid as described above
547 for the death counts data.

550 **Declarations**

551 **Ethics approval and consent to participate**

552 Not applicable.

553 **Consent for publication**

554 Not applicable.

555 **Availability of data and materials**

556 All data used in this manuscript are publicly available at the locations described in the Methods sec-
557 tion. SARS-CoV-2 prevalences over time, as predicted in this study, are available in Supplemental
558 Files 1–5. A comprehensive visual report for all 165 countries is provided as Supplemental File 6.

559 **Competing interests**

560 The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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563 **Authors' contributions**

564 The entire manuscript was prepared by S.L.

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566 Not applicable.

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