

The Power of Synergy in Differential Privacy: Combining a Small Curator with Local Randomizers

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Abstract

Motivated by the desire to bridge the utility gap between local and trusted curator models of differential privacy for practical applications, we initiate the theoretical study of a hybrid model introduced by “Blender” [Avent et al., USENIX Security ’17], in which differentially private protocols of n agents that work in the local-model are assisted by a differentially private curator that has access to the data of m additional users. We focus on the regime where $m \ll n$ and study the new capabilities of this (m, n) -hybrid model. We show that, despite the fact that the hybrid model adds no significant new capabilities for the basic task of simple hypothesis-testing, there are many other tasks (under a wide range of parameters) that can be solved in the hybrid model yet cannot be solved either by the curator or by the local-users separately. Moreover, we exhibit additional tasks where at least one round of *interaction* between the curator and the local-users is necessary – namely, no hybrid model protocol without such interaction can solve these tasks. Taken together, our results show that the combination of the local model with a small curator can become part of a promising toolkit for designing and implementing differential privacy.

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
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1 Introduction

Data has become one of the main drivers of innovation in applications as varied as technology, medicine [33], and city planning [34, 52]. However, the collection and storage of personal data in the service of innovation by companies, researchers, and governments poses significant risks for privacy and personal freedom. Personal data collected by companies can be breached [22]; subpoenaed by law enforcement in broad requests [44]; mis-used by companies' employees [37, 21]; or used for purposes different from those announced at collection time [63]. These concerns alongside data-hungry company and government practices have propelled privacy to the frontier of individuals' concerns, societal and policy debates, and academic research.

The *local model of differential privacy* [65, 43] has recently emerged as one of the promising approaches for achieving the goals of enabling data-driven innovation while preserving a rigorous notion of privacy for individuals that also addresses the above challenges. The *differential privacy* aspect provides each participating individual (almost) with the same protection she would have, had her information not been included [26], a guarantee that holds even with respect to all powerful adversaries with access to multiple analyses and rich auxiliary information. The *local* aspect of the model means that this guarantee will continue to hold even if the curator's data store is fully breached. From the utility perspective, the deployment of local differential privacy protocols by Google, Apple, and Microsoft demonstrate that the local differential privacy model is a viable approach in certain applications, without requiring trust in the companies or incurring risks from hackers and intelligence agencies [28, 54, 35, 1, 23].

The adoption of the local model by major industry players has motivated a line of research in the theory of local differential privacy (e.g., [9, 8, 17, 58, 40, 42, 41]). Alongside algorithmic improvements, this body of work highlighted the wide theoretical and practical gap between utility achievable in the more traditional trusted curator model of differential privacy (where the curator ensures the privacy of its output but can perform computations on raw individual data) and that achievable in the local differential privacy model. In particular, the number of data points necessary to achieve a particular level of accuracy in the local model is significantly larger than what is sufficient for the same accuracy in the curator model (see, e.g., [11, 43, 55, 9]). This has negative consequences. First, data analysis with local differential privacy becomes the privilege of the data-rich, handicapping smaller companies and helping to cement monopolies. Second, in an effort to maintain accuracy the entities deploying local differential privacy are tempted to use large privacy loss parameters [59], ultimately putting into question the privacy guarantee [36].



■ **Figure 1** The hybrid model.

New models for differentially private computation have recently emerged to alleviate the (inevitable) low accuracy of the local model, of which we will discuss the *shuffle model* [38, 15, 20, 6, 5, 32] and the *hybrid model* [2].¹ In the shuffle model, it is assumed that the curator receives data in a manner disassociated from a user identifier (e.g., after the raw data has been stripped of identifiers and randomly shuffled). Recent work has proved that protocols employing shuffling can provide better accuracy than local protocols and sometimes match the accuracy of the curator model [20, 6, 5, 32].² Although the shuffle model is a promising approach for bridging the gap between the local model and the trusted curator model, it suffers from two weaknesses: it requires individuals' trust in the shuffler (which itself may be subject to breaches, subpoenas, etc., and the infrastructure for which may not exist), and, as highlighted by [6], its privacy guarantees to an individual rely on the assumption that sufficiently many other individuals do not deviate from the protocol.

The focus of this work is on a generalization of the hybrid model introduced by [2], where a majority of individuals that participate in a local differential privacy computation is augmented with a small number of individuals who contribute their information via a trusted curator. From a practical point of view, this separation is aligned with current industry practices, and the small number of individuals willing to contribute via a curator can be employees, technology enthusiasts, or individuals recruited as alpha- or beta-testers of products in exchange for early access to its features or decreased cost [47, 48, 50].

Furthermore, unlike Blender [2], in an effort to explore a rich trust and communication model, and anticipate development of future technologies and practices, we do not assume that the curator trusted by the opt-in users and the eventual data recipient (whom we call the referee) are the same entity (see Figure 1). The detailed discussion of the benefits of this modeling assumption appears after the formal model definition in Section 2.2.

1.1 This work: The power of the hybrid model

We initiate a theoretical study of the extent to which the hybrid model improves on the utility of the local model by addition of a small curator (and vice versa, improves on the utility of a small curator by addition of parties that participate in a local model computation). We ask whether there are tasks that cannot be computed privately by a small curator, or in the local model (even with many participants), but are feasible in a model that combines both. We answer this question in the affirmative.

¹ Approaches which weaken differential privacy itself or justify the use of large privacy loss parameters are outside our scope and deserve a separate discussion.

² Furthermore, the shuffle model provides new “privacy amplification” tools that can be used in the design of differentially private algorithms [27, 6].

A concatenation of problems (direct-sum)

Our first example is composed of two independent learning tasks, each task can be privately learned in one model, however, cannot be privately learned in the other model. Each data point is parsed as two points (x, y) that are labeled $(\text{Par}_k(x), \text{Thr}_t(y))$ where the former is a parity function $\text{Par}_k(x) = \langle k, x \rangle$ and the latter is a threshold function $\text{Thr}_t(y) = \mathbb{1}_{\{y \geq t\}}$ (see Section 2.4 for complete definitions). For a choice of parameters, known sample complexity bounds imply that the parity learning part of the task can be performed by the curator but cannot be privately computed in the local model with sub-exponential number of messages [43], and, conversely, that the threshold learning part cannot be performed by the curator [12, 30] but can be performed by the local model parties. It follows that for our choice of parameters the combined task cannot be performed neither by the curator nor by the local model with sub-exponential number of rounds (as the number of local agents is small, each agent in the local model must send many messages), but is feasible in the hybrid model without interaction (see the full version of this paper for a detailed analysis [10]).

Select-then-estimate

In our second example, each input point x is sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution over $\{-1, 1\}^d$. Letting $\mu = E[x]$, the goal is to output a pair $(i, \hat{\mu}_i)$ where i approximately maximizes μ_i (i.e., $\mu_i \geq \max_j \mu_j - \alpha$) and $\hat{\mu}_i$ approximates μ_i (i.e., $|\hat{\mu}_i - \mu_i| \leq \alpha'$), where $\alpha' < \alpha$. That is, once we found a good coordinate i , we want to approximate its quality with smaller error. A number of sample complexity bounds apply here (in particular, [60]; see also the full version of this paper [10]), yielding a wide range of parameters where the task cannot be performed by the curator alone, nor by the local model parties alone. The hybrid model, however, allows for a solution where the curator first identifies i such that $\mu_i \geq \max_j \mu_j - \alpha$ and the estimation of μ_i within accuracy α' is then performed by the local model parties (see the full version of this paper for a detailed analysis [10]).

The select-then-estimate problem is a sub-component of many statistical and data-mining applications [4, 57, 2]. It is also of core interest in genome-wide association studies (GWAS), where the inputs are genomes of patients affected by a particular disease and the goal is to (approximately) identify disease-related genome locations and estimate their significance [3, 66, 16]. Solving the problem while ensuring privacy is particularly challenging when the feature dimension is large compared to the number of available samples, which is the case for GWAS [14, 3, 39, 56]. As genomic data is particularly sensitive, the hybrid model of differential privacy appears appropriate for it from the privacy perspective – the majority of the data would be analyzed with the guarantee of local differential privacy, and only a small number of data points would be entrusted to a curator, whose analysis's output should also be differentially private [64]. As our example suggests, the hybrid model may be useful also from the utility perspective.

We next present and study tasks that require protocols with different interaction patterns involving both the curator and the local agents; that is, the referee needs to relay messages from the curator to the local model agents in one problem or vice versa in a second problem.

Learning parity XOR threshold

This task, which is a twist on the above concatenation of problems, combines two independent learning tasks. Rather than merely concatenating, in the learning parity XOR threshold problem points are labeled by $\text{Par}_k(x) \oplus \text{Thr}_t(y)$. A simple argument shows that (for specifically

chosen parameters) the task cannot be performed by the curator alone or by the local model agents with sub-exponential number of rounds. The task is, however, feasible in the hybrid model without interaction. Observe that the local model agents can complete the task once the parity part is done, and that $\text{Thr}_t(y) = 0$ for the lower half of the points y or $\text{Thr}_t(y) = 1$ for the upper half of the points y (or both). These observations suggest a protocol where the curator first performs two parity learning tasks (splitting points according to y values), and the task is then completed by the local model agents. This requires communication (as the referee needs to relay a message from the curator to the local model agents), and it may seem that this interaction is necessary for the task. However, in Section 3 we show that this is not the case, by demonstrating a non-interactive protocol where all parties send a message to the referee at the same round.

1-out-of- 2^d -parity

Our next task can be solved in the hybrid model (but neither by a small curator model nor in the local model with sub-exponential number of rounds). This task requires interaction, first with the local model agents and then with the curator. The task consists of a multitude of parity problems, only one of which – determined by the input – needs to be solved. The curator is capable of solving the parity task privately, however, the curator's limited number of samples does not allow solving all parity problems privately, nor does it allow distinguishing which problem to solve. The local model agents cannot solve parity (with sub-exponential number of rounds) [43] but can recover which problem needs to be solved (via a heavy hitters computation [17]). Thus, the referee needs to first interact with the local agents and then the curator. See Section 4.

Parity-chooses-secret

The third task in this part can be solved in the hybrid model (but neither with a small curator, nor in the local model with sub-exponential number of rounds). The task requires interaction in the reverse order from the previous task: first with the curator, then with the local model agents. The input to this task contains shares of a large collection of secrets and the goal is to recover one of these secrets. The secret that should be recovered is determined by the input as the solution to a parity problem. The curator can solve the parity problem but does not have enough information to recover any of the secrets. The local model agents receive enough information to recover all secrets, but doing so would breach privacy (as implied by [46]). They cannot solve the parity problem with sub-exponential number of rounds. In the hybrid model protocol, the curator first solves the parity problem privately, and relates the identity of the secret to be recovered through the referee to the local model agents who then can send enough information to recover the required secret. See Section 5.

The latter two tasks highlight information and private-computation gaps between the curator and the local model agents. The local model agents receive enough information to solve the task, but lack the ability to privately solve an essential sub-task (when they are not allowed to use exponentially many rounds). The curator does not receive enough information to solve the task (even non-privately), but can solve the hard sub-task.

When the hybrid model does not help much

Although most of the results in this work are on the positive side, demonstrating that cleverly utilizing a curator in synergy with local agents can allow for new capabilities, we also show that for one of the most basic tasks – namely, basic hypothesis testing – the hybrid model has

no significant advantage over what can be done separately in either the local model with m agents or in the curator model with database of size n . We show that if for two distributions \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 there is a private protocol in the hybrid model that given i.i.d. samples from \mathcal{D}_j correctly identifies j , then there is a private protocol with the same sample size either in the local model or in the curator model that correctly identifies j (with some loss in the success probability). We then consider two distributions \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 over the domain $\{0, 1\}$, where in \mathcal{D}_0 the probability of 1 is strictly less than $1/2$ and in \mathcal{D}_1 the probability of 1 is strictly greater than $1/2$ and identify values of m and n such that in the hybrid model, where the curator has m samples and there are n agents (each holding one sample), no protocol exists that can differentiate whether the $m + n$ inputs were sampled i.i.d. from \mathcal{D}_0 or from \mathcal{D}_1 . Since computing the sum of i.i.d. sampled bits from \mathcal{D}_0 or \mathcal{D}_1 can distinguish between these distributions, the above results imply that for computing the sum, the hybrid model is no better than each model separately. See Section 6.

A new lower bound for selection in the local model

As mentioned above, our analysis for the select-then-estimate task relies on lower bounds on the sample complexity of selection in the local model. In the selection problem, there is some distribution over vectors in $\{-1, 1\}^d$ and each agent gets an i.i.d. sample from this distribution; the goal is to select a coordinate such that the expected value of this coordinate is as large as possible. Ullman [60] gives a (tight) lower bound of $\Omega(\frac{d \log d}{\alpha^2 \epsilon^2})$ samples for the non-interactive case. In the full version of this paper [10], we show that for *interactive* local model protocols, the number of messages in such protocol is $\Omega(d^{1/3})$. For example, if the curator interacts with the local model parties so that each party sends t messages, then the number of parties must be at least $\Omega(d^{1/3}/t)$. The proof is by a generic reduction from any private PAC learning task to selection, which preserves sample complexity. The bound is obtained by applying the reduction from privately learning parity and applying bounds on the sample complexity of privately learning parity from [43].

1.2 Discussion and future work

Our results show that the combination of the local model with a small curator can become part of a promising toolkit for designing and implementing differential privacy. More work is needed to develop the theory of this model (and possibly introduce variants), and, in particular, characterize which tasks can benefit from it. From an algorithms design perspective, now that we know that the hybrid model can lead to significant improvements over both the curator and local models, an exciting open question is understanding what other non-trivial algorithms can be designed that take advantage of the synergy.

Selection bias

In this work we assume that the inputs for the curator and for the local model agents come from the same distribution. However, the recruitment of individuals for participating via a curator can create unintended differences between the input distributions seen by the curator and the entire population, and hence lead to biases, an issue which is outside the scope of the current work. Selection bias remains an important issue that needs to be addressed.

Approximate differential privacy

Our separations between the hybrid model and the curator and local models hold for pure differential privacy (i.e., ϵ -differential privacy). Specifically, we use lower bounds for ϵ -differential private learning of the threshold functions in the curator model [12, 30]; these lower bounds do not hold for (ϵ, δ) -differential private learning of the threshold functions [13, 18]. We also use lower bounds for ϵ -differential private learning of parity in the local model [43]; it is open whether these lower bounds hold for fully interactive (ϵ, δ) -differential private learning protocols of parity. Possible separations for (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy are left for future research.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Protocols for differentially private computations

Let X be a data domain. We consider a model where the inputs and the computation are distributed among parties P_1, \dots, P_n . Each party is an interactive randomized functionality: it can receive messages from the other parties, perform a randomized computation, and send messages to the other parties. At the beginning of a computation, each party P_i receives its input $\mathbf{x}_i = (x_{i,1}, \dots, x_{i,\ell_i}) \in X^{\ell_i}$. I.e., the input of party P_i consists of a sequence of $\ell_i \geq 0$ entries taken from the data domain X , and the entire joint input to the protocol is $(x_{1,1}, \dots, x_{1,\ell_1}, x_{2,1}, \dots, x_{2,\ell_2}, \dots, x_{n,1}, \dots, x_{n,\ell_n})$. The parties engage in a randomized interactive protocol $\Pi = (\Pi_{P_1}, \dots, \Pi_{P_n})$, where a message sent by a party P_i in some round is computed according to Π_{P_i} and depends on its input \mathbf{x}_i , its random coins, and the sequence of messages it has seen in previous rounds. When a party P_i halts, it writes its output to a local output register \mathbf{o}_{P_i} . The number of messages in a protocol is the number of rounds multiplied by the number of parties.

► **Definition 2.1.** *We say that $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_\ell) \in X^\ell$ and $\mathbf{x}' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_\ell) \in X^\ell$ are neighboring if they differ on at most one entry, i.e., there exists $i^* \in [\ell]$ such that $x_i = x'_i$ for $i \in [\ell] \setminus \{i^*\}$.*

► **Definition 2.2.** *We say that two probability distributions $\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1 \in \Delta(\Omega)$ are (ϵ, δ) -close and write $\mathcal{D}_0 \approx_{\epsilon, \delta} \mathcal{D}_1$ if $\Pr_{t \sim \mathcal{D}_0} [t \in T] \leq e^\epsilon \cdot \Pr_{t \sim \mathcal{D}_1} [t \in T] + \delta$ for all measurable events $T \subset \Omega$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$.*

We are now ready to define what it means for a protocol to be differentially private in a fully malicious setting, i.e., in a setting where an arbitrary adversary controls the behavior of all but one party. Intuitively, a protocol is differentially private in a fully malicious setting if there do not exist a party P_i and an adversary A controlling $P_1, \dots, P_{i-1}, P_{i+1}, \dots, P_n$ such that A can “trick” P_i to act non-privately. More formally, we model the adversary as an interactive randomized functionality. For a party P_i , define A_{P_i} to be a randomized functionality as follows.

1. An input of A_{P_i} consists of a sequence of ℓ_i entries taken from the data domain, $\mathbf{x} \in X^{\ell_i}$.
2. A_{P_i} simulates an interaction between party P_i with \mathbf{x} as its input, and A . The simulated P_i interacts with A following the instructions of its part in the protocol, Π_{P_i} . The adversary A interacts with P_i sending messages for parties $P_1, \dots, P_{i-1}, P_{i+1}, \dots, P_n$. However, A does not necessarily adhere to the protocol Π .
3. The simulation continues until A halts with an output \mathbf{o}_A , at which time A_{P_i} halts and outputs \mathbf{o}_A .

► **Definition 2.3** (Multiparty differential privacy [26, 43, 11, 61]). *A protocol Π is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private if for all $i \in [n]$, for all interactive randomized functionalities A , and all neighboring $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}' \in X^{\ell_i}$, $A_{P_i}(\mathbf{x}) \approx_{\epsilon, \delta} A_{P_i}(\mathbf{x}')$. When $\ell_1 = \ell_2 = \dots = \ell_n = 1$ we say that the protocol operates in the local model, and when $n = 1$ we say that the protocol (or the algorithm) operates in the curator model. We say that a protocol Π is ϵ -differentially private if it is $(\epsilon, 0)$ -differentially private.*

Comparison to previous definitions

In contrast to [11, 61], our definition applies also to a malicious adversary that can send arbitrary messages. The definition of [43] also applies to a malicious adversary, however it requires that each answer of an agent preserves ϵ -differential privacy (i.e., if there are d rounds, the protocol is $d\epsilon$ -differentially private). In contrast, the definitions of [11, 61] and our definition measures the privacy of the entire transcript of an agent.

Note that (i) Restricting the outcome \mathbf{o}_A to binary results in a definition that is equivalent to Definition 2.3. (ii) It is possible to consider a relaxed version of Definition 2.3 where the adversary A is “semi-honest” by requiring A to follow the protocol Π . (iii) Definition 2.3 differs from definitions of security in the setting of secure multiparty computation as the latter also state correctness requirements with respect to the outcome of the protocol. The difference between the setting is that secure multiparty computation implements a specified functionality³ whereas differential privacy limits the functionality to hide information specific to individuals, but does not specify it.

2.2 The hybrid model

A computation in the (m, n) -hybrid model is defined as the execution of a randomized interactive protocol $\Pi = (\Pi_C, \Pi_{P_1}, \dots, \Pi_{P_n}, \Pi_R)$ between three types of parties: a (single) curator C , n “local model” agents P_1, \dots, P_n , and a referee R . The referee has no input, the curator C receives m input points $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in X^m$ and the n “local model” agents P_1, \dots, P_n each receive a single input point $y_i \in X$. We use the notation \mathbf{D} to denote the joint input to the computation, i.e., $\mathbf{D} = (x_1, \dots, x_m, y_1, \dots, y_n)$.

The communication in a hybrid model protocol is restricted to messages exchanged between the referee R and the other parties C, P_1, \dots, P_n (i.e., parties C, P_1, \dots, P_n cannot directly communicate among themselves). Parties C, P_1, \dots, P_n have no output, whereas when the execution halts the referee R writes to a special output register \mathbf{o} . See Figure 1. We require the protocol $\Pi = (\Pi_C, \Pi_{P_1}, \dots, \Pi_{P_n}, \Pi_R)$ to satisfy differential privacy as in Definition 2.3.

The hybrid model is a natural extension of well-studied models in differential privacy. Setting $n = 0$ we get the trusted curator model (as C can perform any differentially private computation), and setting $m = 0$ we get the local model. In this work, we are interested in the case $0 < m \ll n$, because in this regime, the hybrid model is closest in nature to the local model. Furthermore, in many applications, once m is comparable to n it is possible to drop parties P_1, \dots, P_n from the protocol without a significant loss in utility.

Comparing with Blender [2], where the curator C and the referee R are the same party, we observe that the models are equivalent in their computation power – every differentially

³ Furthermore, secure multiparty computation is silent with respect to the chosen functionality, regardless whether it is “privacy preserving” or “secure”.

private computation in one model is possible in the other (however, the models may differ in the number of interaction rounds needed). Nevertheless, the separation between the curator and the referee has merits as we now discuss.

On the separation between the curator and referee

From a theory point of view, it is useful to separate these two parties as this allows to examine effects related to the order of interaction between the parties (e.g., whether the referee communicates first with the curator C or with the local model parties P_1, \dots, P_n).

Moreover, by separating the curator and referee, the hybrid model encapsulates a richer class of trust models than [2], and, in particular, includes a trust model where data sent to the curator is not revealed to the referee. In an implementation this may correspond to a curator instantiated by a publicly trusted party, or by using technologies such as secure multiparty computation, or secure cryptographic hardware which protects data and computation from external processes [49].

The curator-referee separation also makes sense from a practical point of view within a company. It is reasonable that only a small fraction of a company’s employees, with appropriate clearance and training, should be able to access the raw data of those who contribute their data to the trusted curator model, whereas the majority of employees should only see the privacy-preserving version of it [53].

► **Remark 2.4 (A note on public randomness).** Some of our protocols assume the existence of a shared random string. In an implementation, shared randomness can be either set up offline or be chosen and broadcast by the referee. We stress that the privacy of our protocols does not depend on the shared random string actually being random. Furthermore, all our lower bounds hold even when the local agents hold a shared (public) random string.

2.3 Parity and threshold functions

A *concept* $c : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a predicate that labels *examples* taken from the domain X by either 0 or 1. A *concept class* C over X is a set of concepts (predicates) mapping X to $\{0, 1\}$. Let $b, c \in \mathbb{N}$ be parameters. The following two concept classes will appear throughout the paper:

- $\text{Threshold}_b = \{\text{Thr}_t : t \in \{0, 1\}^b\}$ where $\text{Thr}_t : \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is defined as $\text{Thr}_t(x) = \mathbb{1}_{\{x \geq t\}}$, where we treat strings from $\{0, 1\}^b$ as integers in $\{0, \dots, 2^b - 1\}$.
- $\text{Parity}_c = \{\text{Par}_k : k \in \{0, 1\}^c\}$ where $\text{Par}_k : \{0, 1\}^c \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is defined as $\text{Par}_k(x) = \langle k, x \rangle = \bigoplus_{j=1}^c k_j \cdot x_j$.

2.4 Preliminaries from learning theory and private learning

We recall the probably approximately correct (PAC) model of [62]. Given a collection of labeled examples, the goal of a learning algorithm (or protocol) is to *generalize* the given data into a concept (called a “hypothesis”) that accurately predicts the labels of fresh examples from the underlying distribution. (See [62], or the full version of this paper [10], for formal definitions.) When the learner is a protocol, its *sample complexity* is the total number of labeled examples it operates on. That is, if there are n parties where party P_i gets as input ℓ_i labeled examples, then the sample complexity of the protocol is $\ell_1 + \dots + \ell_n$.

► **Definition 2.5.** The generalization error of a hypothesis $h : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ w.r.t. a target concept c and a distribution \mathcal{D} is defined as $\text{error}_{\mathcal{D}}(c, h) = \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{D}}[h(x) \neq c(x)]$. The empirical error of h w.r.t. a labeled sample $\mathbf{D} = (x_i, y_i)_{i=1}^m$ is $\text{error}_{\mathbf{D}}(h) = \frac{1}{m} |\{i : h(x_i) \neq y_i\}|$. The

empirical error of h w.r.t. an unlabeled sample $\mathbf{D} = (x_i)_{i=1}^m$ and a concept c is $\text{error}_{\mathbf{D}}(h, c) = \frac{1}{m} |\{i : h(x_i) \neq c(x_i)\}|$. Let $c : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a concept and let $\mathbf{D} \in (X \times \{0, 1\})^n$ be a labeled database. We say that \mathbf{D} is consistent with c if for every $(x, y) \in \mathbf{D}$ it holds that $y = c(x)$.

► **Definition 2.6.** Let C be a concept class over a domain X , and let Π be a protocol in which the input of every party is a collection of (1 or more) labeled examples from X . The protocol Π is called an (α, β) -empirical learner for C if for every concept $c \in C$ and for every joint input to the protocol \mathbf{D} that is consistent with c , with probability at least $1 - \beta$, the outcome of the protocol is a hypothesis $h : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ satisfying $\text{error}_{\mathbf{D}}(h) \leq \alpha$.

We will be interested in PAC-learning protocols that are also differentially private.

► **Definition 2.7** ([43]). A private learner is a PAC learner and that satisfies Definition 2.3. Similarly, a private empirical learner is a protocol Π that satisfies both Definitions 2.3 and 2.6.

Dwork et al. [25] and Bassily et al. [7] showed that if a hypothesis h is the result of a differentially private computation on a random sample, then the empirical error of h and its generalization error are guaranteed to be close. We will use the following multiplicative variant of their result [51], whose proof is a variant of the original proof of [7].

► **Theorem 2.8** ([25, 7, 51, 29]). Let $\mathcal{A} : X^n \rightarrow 2^X$ be an (ϵ, δ) -differentially private algorithm that operates on a database of size n and outputs a predicate $h : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Let \mathcal{D} be a distribution over X , let $S = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ be a database containing n i.i.d. elements from \mathcal{D} , and let $h \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(S)$. Then,

$$\Pr_{\substack{S \sim \mathcal{D}^n \\ h \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(S)}} \left[e^{-2\epsilon} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}} [h(x)] - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n h(x_i) > \frac{10}{\epsilon n} \log \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon \delta n} \right) \right] < O(\epsilon \delta n).$$

We next state known impossibility results for privately learning threshold and parity.

► **Fact 2.9** ([12, 30]). Let $b \in \mathbb{N}$. Any ϵ -differentially private (α, β) -PAC learner for Threshold_b requires $\Omega(\frac{b}{\epsilon \alpha})$ many samples.

► **Fact 2.10** ([43]). Let $c \in \mathbb{N}$. In any ϵ -differentially private (α, β) -PAC learning protocol for Parity_c in the local model the number of messages is $\Omega(2^{c/3})$. This holds even when the underlying distribution is restricted to be the uniform distribution.

Fact 2.10 implies, for example, that when there are $\text{poly}(c)$ agents the number of rounds is $2^{\Omega(c)}$. It is open whether there exists an ϵ -private protocol (or an (ϵ, δ) -private protocol) for learning Parity_c in the local model with $\text{poly}(c)$ agents and any number of rounds.

► **Remark 2.11.** The proof of Fact 2.10 in [43] is stated in a weaker model, where in each round the referee sends an ϵ_i -differentially private local randomizer to an agent and the agent sends the output of this randomizer on its input to the referee, such that $\epsilon_1 + \dots + \epsilon_\ell \leq \epsilon$. However, in their proof they only use the fact that $\epsilon_i \leq \epsilon$ in every round, thus, their lower bound proof also applies to our model.

Our protocols use the private learner of [43] for parity functions, a protocol of [8] for answering all threshold queries, a protocol of [17] for heavy hitters, and a protocol of [31] for approximating a quantile. These are specified in the following theorems.

► **Theorem 2.12** ([8]). Let $\alpha, \beta, \epsilon \leq 1$, and let $b \in \mathbb{N}$. There exists a non-interactive ϵ -differentially private protocol in the local model with $n = O\left(\frac{b^3}{\alpha^2 \epsilon^2} \cdot \log\left(\frac{b}{\alpha \beta \epsilon}\right)\right)$ agents in which the input of every agent is a single element from $\{0, 1\}^b$ and the outcome is a function $q : \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that for every joint input to the protocol $\mathbf{D} \in (\{0, 1\}^b)^n$, with probability at least $1 - \beta$, the outcome q is such that $\forall w \in \{0, 1\}^b$ we have $q(w) \in |\{x \in \mathbf{D} : x \leq w\}| / |\mathbf{D}| \pm \alpha$.

Theorem 2.12 does not appear explicitly in [8], but it is implicit in their analysis.

► **Theorem 2.13** ([43]). *Let $\alpha, \beta, \epsilon \leq 1$, and let $c \in \mathbb{N}$. There exists an ϵ -differentially private algorithm in the curator model that (α, β) -PAC learns and (α, β) -empirically learns Parity_c with sample complexity $O\left(\frac{c}{\alpha\epsilon} \log\left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right)\right)$.*

► **Theorem 2.14** (Heavy hitters protocol [17]). *There exist constants $\lambda_1, \lambda_2 > 0$ such that the following holds. Let $\beta, \epsilon \leq 1$ and X be some finite domain. There exists a non-interactive ϵ -differentially private protocol in the local model with n agents in which the input of each agent is a single element from X and the outcome is a list Est of elements from X such that for every joint input to the protocol $\mathbf{D} \in X^n$, with probability at least $1 - \beta$, every x that is an input of at least $\frac{\lambda_1}{\epsilon} \sqrt{n \log\left(\frac{|X|}{\beta}\right)}$ agents appears in Est , and vice versa, every element x in Est is an input of at least $\frac{\lambda_2}{\epsilon} \sqrt{n \log\left(\frac{|X|}{\beta}\right)}$ agents.*

3 Learning parity XOR threshold

In this section we present a learning task that cannot be solved privately in the curator model or in the local model, but can be solved in the hybrid model (without interaction). The task we consider in this section – parity XOR threshold – is similar to the simpler task of the direct product of parity and threshold discussed in Section 1.1. In this section we design a non-interactive protocol in the hybrid model for the parity XOR threshold task, which is more involved than the trivial protocol for the parity and threshold task. This demonstrates that non-interactive protocols in the hybrid model may have more power than one might initially suspect.

Fix $b, c > 0$, and let $k \in \{0, 1\}^c$ and $t \in \{0, 1\}^b$ be parameters. Define the function $f_{b,c}^{k,t} : \{0, 1\}^c \times \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as follows: $f_{b,c}^{k,t}(x, y) = \text{Par}_k(x) \oplus \text{Thr}_t(y) = \langle k, x \rangle \oplus \mathbb{1}_{\{y \geq t\}}$ (recall that we treat strings in $\{0, 1\}^b$ as integers in $\{0, 1, \dots, 2^b - 1\}$). Define the concept class ParityThresh as follows: $\text{ParityThresh}_{b,c} = \left\{ f_{b,c}^{k,t} : k \in \{0, 1\}^c \text{ and } t \in \{0, 1\}^b \right\}$.

We show that every differentially private algorithm (even in the curator model) for learning ParityThresh must have sample complexity $\Omega(b)$. See the full version of this paper for details [10].

► **Lemma 3.1.** *Every ϵ -differentially private algorithm for $(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4})$ -PAC learning $\text{ParityThresh}_{b,c}$ must have sample complexity $\Omega(b)$.*

We next show that no protocol in the local model can learn ParityThresh , unless the number of exchanged messages is very large.

► **Lemma 3.2.** *In every ϵ -differentially private protocol in the local model for $(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4})$ -PAC learning $\text{ParityThresh}_{b,c}$ the number of messages is $\Omega(2^{c/3})$.*

The proof of Lemma 3.2 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.1 (using Fact 2.10 instead of Fact 2.9).

So, privately learning $\text{ParityThresh}_{b,c}$ in the curator model requires $\Omega(b)$ labeled examples, and privately learning it in the local model requires $\Omega(2^{c/3})$ messages. We now show that $\text{ParityThresh}_{b,c}$ can be learned privately by a non-interactive protocol in the hybrid model with roughly $O(c)$ examples for the curator and with roughly $O(b^3)$ local agents. We will focus on the case where $c \ll b$. Recall that a function $f_{b,c}^{k,t}(x, y) \in \text{ParityThresh}_{b,c}$ is defined

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as $f_{b,c}^{k,t}(x, y) = \text{Par}_k(x) \oplus \text{Thr}_t(y)$. The difficulty in learning **ParityThresh** in the hybrid model is that we could only learn the threshold part of the target function using the local agents (since if $c \ll b$ then the curator does not have enough data to learn it), but the threshold label is “hidden” from the local agents (because it is “masked” by the parity bit that the local agents cannot learn). This false intuition might lead to the design of an *interactive* protocol, in which the referee first obtains some information from the curator and then passes this information to the local agents, which would allow them to learn the threshold part of the target function. We now show that such an interaction is not needed, and design a *non-interactive* protocol in which the local agents and the curator communicate with the referee only once, simultaneously.

► **Lemma 3.3.** *There exists a non-interactive ϵ -differentially private protocol in the (m, n) -hybrid model for (α, β) -PAC learning **ParityThresh** _{b, c} where $m = O\left(\frac{c}{\alpha^4 \epsilon} \log\left(\frac{1}{\alpha \beta}\right)\right)$ and $n = O\left(\frac{b^3}{\alpha^4 \epsilon^2} \cdot \log\left(\frac{b}{\alpha \beta \epsilon}\right)\right)$.*

Proof. We begin by describing a non-interactive protocol Π . The (joint) input to the protocol is a database \mathbf{D} where every point in \mathbf{D} is of the form $(x_i, y_i, \sigma_i) \in \{0, 1\}^c \times \{0, 1\}^b \times \{0, 1\}$. At a high level, the protocol works by using the local agents to obtain an approximation to the CDF of the (marginal) distribution on the y_i ’s (this approximation is given to the referee). In addition, the trusted curator solves $1/\alpha$ parity leaning problems. In more detail, the trusted curator sorts its database according to the y_i ’s, divides its database into $1/\alpha$ chunks, and then applies a private learner for parity functions on each of the chunks. The trusted curator sends the referee the resulting $1/\alpha$ parity functions. The referee then defines the final hypothesis h that, given a point (x, y) , first uses the approximation to the CDF (obtained from the local agents) to match this input point to one of the chunks, and then uses the parity function obtained for that chunk from the trusted curator to predict the label of the point.

The key observation here is that the threshold part of the target function is *constant* on all but at most one of the chunks defined by the trusted curator. As we show, applying a learner for parity on such a “consistent chunk” results in a good predictor for the labels of elements of that chunk. Hence, provided that the approximation for the CDF of the y_i ’s is accurate enough, this results in an accurate learner for **ParityThresh**. We now formally present the protocol Π .

- Local agents on a (distributed) input $D = (x_i, y_i, \sigma_i)_{i=1}^n \in (\{0, 1\}^c \times \{0, 1\}^b \times \{0, 1\})^n$: Run the protocol from Theorem 2.12 on the (distributed) database $\hat{D} = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)$ with privacy parameter ϵ and utility parameters α^2, β ; thereafter, the referee obtains a function $q : \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow [0, 1]$ that approximates all threshold queries w.r.t. \hat{D} .
- The curator on input $S = (x_i, y_i, \sigma_i)_{i=1}^m \in (\{0, 1\}^c \times \{0, 1\}^b \times \{0, 1\})^m$:
 - Sort S according to the y_i ’s in non-decreasing order.
 - Divide S into blocks of size αm : $S_1, S_2, \dots, S_{1/\alpha}$. For $\ell \in [1/\alpha]$ we denote $S_\ell = (x_{\ell,i}, y_{\ell,i}, \sigma_{\ell,i})_{i=1}^{\alpha m}$.
 - For every $\ell \in [1/\alpha]$, apply an $\alpha\epsilon$ -differentially private $(\alpha^2, \alpha\beta)$ -PAC learner for **Parity** on the database $\hat{S}_\ell = (x_{\ell,i} \circ 1, \sigma_{\ell,i})_{i=1}^{\alpha m} \in (\{0, 1\}^{c+1} \times \{0, 1\})^{\alpha m}$ to obtain a vector $k_\ell \in \{0, 1\}^{c+1}$ (using Theorem 2.13), and end $k_1, \dots, k_{1/\alpha}$ to the referee.
- The referee:
 - Obtain the function q and the vectors $k_1, \dots, k_{1/\alpha}$.
 - Define a hypothesis $h : \{0, 1\}^c \times \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as $h(x, y) = \langle x \circ 1, k_{I(y)} \rangle$, where $I(y) = \left\lceil \frac{q(y)}{\alpha} \right\rceil$ and output h .

The privacy properties of the protocol II are straightforward, as both the local agents and the curator apply ε -differentially private computations: the local agents apply the algorithm from Theorem 2.12, and the curator applies an $\alpha\varepsilon$ -differentially private computation on each of the blocks $S_1, \dots, S_{1/\alpha}$ (note that changing one element of S can change at most one element of each of these blocks).

We now proceed with the utility analysis. Fix a target function $f_{b,c}^{k^*,t^*} \in \text{ParityThresh}_{b,c}$ and fix a target distribution \mathcal{D} on $\{0,1\}^c \times \{0,1\}^b$. We use \mathcal{D}_c and \mathcal{D}_b to denote the marginal distributions on $\{0,1\}^c$ and $\{0,1\}^b$, respectively. We will make the simplifying assumption that \mathcal{D}_b does not give too much weight on any single point in $\{0,1\}^b$, specifically, $\Pr_{w \sim \mathcal{D}_b}[w = y] \leq \beta/m^2$ for every $y \in \{0,1\}^b$. This assumption can be enforced by padding every example with $O(\log(m/\beta))$ uniformly random bits.

Let S and D (the inputs to the curator and the local agents) be sampled i.i.d. from \mathcal{D} and labeled by $f_{b,c}^{k^*,t^*}$. We next show that w.h.p. the resulting hypothesis h has low empirical error on S . By standard generalization arguments, such an h also has low generalization error.

First observe that there is at most one index $\ell^* \in [1/\alpha]$ such that $\text{Thr}_{t^*}(y_{\ell^*,1}) \neq \text{Thr}_{t^*}(y_{\ell^*,\alpha m})$. In all other blocks S_ℓ we have that $\text{Thr}_{t^*}(\cdot)$ is constant on all the $y_{\ell,i}$'s of that block. We will show that w.h.p. the hypothesis h has small empirical error on every such block. Fix $\ell \neq \ell^*$, and let $\nu \in \{0,1\}$ be the value of $\text{Thr}_{t^*}(\cdot)$ on the $y_{\ell,i}$'s of the ℓ th block (that is, for every $i \in [\alpha m]$ we have $\text{Thr}_{t^*}(y_{\ell,i}) = \nu$). Recall that since the elements of S are labeled by $f_{b,c}^{k^*,t^*}$, for every $i \in [\alpha m]$ we have that

$$\sigma_{\ell,i} = f_{b,c}^{k^*,t^*}(x_{\ell,i}, y_{\ell,i}) = \langle k^*, x_{\ell,i} \rangle \oplus \text{Thr}_{t^*}(y_{\ell,i}) = \langle k^*, x_{\ell,i} \rangle \oplus \nu = \langle k^* \circ \nu, x_{\ell,i} \circ 1 \rangle.$$

Hence, the elements of \hat{S}_ℓ are all labeled by the parity function defined by $k^* \circ \nu$. Therefore, as k_ℓ is the outcome of the learner from Theorem 2.13 on \hat{S}_ℓ , for $m \geq O\left(\frac{c}{\alpha^2\varepsilon} \log(\frac{1}{\alpha\beta})\right)$, with probability at least $1 - \alpha\beta$ we have that $\text{error}_{\hat{S}_\ell}(\text{Par}_{k_\ell}) \leq \alpha^2$, that is, $\langle k_\ell, x \circ 1 \rangle$ is a good predictor for the label of the elements in block S_ℓ .

Recall that the hypothesis h matches inputs (x, y) to the vectors $k_1, \dots, k_{1/\alpha}$ using the function q obtained from the local agents, that is, on input (x, y) , the hypothesis uses $k_{\lceil q(y)/\alpha \rceil}$. Therefore, to complete the proof we need to show that most of the elements from block S_ℓ are matched by the hypothesis h to the vector k_ℓ . To that end, let $\#_S(w) = |\{(x, y, \sigma) \in S : y \leq w\}|$, and consider the following event $E_1 : \forall w \in \{0,1\}^b$ it holds that $|\langle q(w) - \frac{1}{m} \cdot \#_S(w) \rangle| \leq 4\alpha^2$.

We first conclude the proof assuming that Event E_1 occurs. Fix $\ell \neq \ell^*$, and recall that the elements of S (and in particular the elements of S_ℓ) are sorted in a non-decreasing order according to their y_i 's. Now fix $8\alpha^2m \leq i \leq \alpha m - 8\alpha^2m$. By our simplifying assumption (that the distribution \mathcal{D}_b does not put a lot of mass on any single point), we may assume that all the y_i 's in S are distinct, which happens with probability at least $1 - \beta$. In that case, we have that $\#_S(y_{\ell,i}) = \max\{0, \ell - 1\} \cdot \alpha m + i$, and hence, $\max\{0, \ell - 1\} \cdot \alpha + 8\alpha^2 \leq \frac{1}{m} \#_S(y_{\ell,i}) \leq \max\{0, \ell - 1\} \cdot \alpha + \alpha - 8\alpha^2$. By Event E_1 we get that

$$\max\{0, \ell - 1\} \cdot \alpha + 4\alpha^2 \leq q(y_{\ell,i}) \leq \max\{0, \ell - 1\} \cdot \alpha + \alpha - 4\alpha^2,$$

and so, $\left\lceil \frac{q(y_{\ell,i})}{\alpha} \right\rceil = \ell$. That is, for all but at most $16\alpha^2m$ elements of the block S_ℓ we get that $h(x_{\ell,i}, y_{\ell,i}) = \langle x_{\ell,i} \circ 1, k_\ell \rangle = \text{Par}_{k_\ell}(x_{\ell,i}, y_{\ell,i})$. Recall that Par_{k_ℓ} errs on at most α^2m elements of S_ℓ , and so the hypothesis h errs on at most $17\alpha^2m$ elements of the block S_ℓ . That is, h errs on at most $17\alpha^2m$ elements of every block S_ℓ for $\ell \neq \ell^*$, and might err on all of S_{ℓ^*} which is of size αm . So, h errs on at most $\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot 17\alpha^2m + \alpha m = 18\alpha m$ elements of S .

Standard generalization bounds now state that, except with probability at most β , we get that $\text{error}_{\mathcal{D}}(h, f_{b,c}^{k^*, t^*}) \leq O(\alpha)$ (in particular, this follows from the generalization properties of differential privacy; see Section 2.4 for more details). Overall, with probability at least $1 - O(\beta)$ the resulting hypothesis has generalization error at most $O(\alpha)$.

It remains to show that Event E_1 occurs with high probability. First, Theorem 2.12 ensures that for $n \geq O\left(\frac{b^3}{\alpha^4 \varepsilon^2} \cdot \log\left(\frac{b}{\alpha \beta \varepsilon}\right)\right)$ with probability at least $1 - \beta$ the function q is such that $\forall w \in \{0, 1\}^b$ it holds that $|q(w) - \frac{1}{n} \#_{\hat{D}}(w)| \leq \alpha^2$, where $\#_{\hat{D}}(w) = |\{y \in \hat{D} : y \leq w\}|$. Second, by standard generalization arguments, assuming that n and m are big enough, we would also have that $\frac{1}{n} \#_{\hat{D}}(w)$ and $\frac{1}{m} \#_S(w)$ are both within α^2 from $\Pr_{y \sim \mathcal{D}_b}[y \leq w]$. Specifically, by the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality [24, 45], assuming that n and m are at least $\Omega\left(\frac{1}{\alpha^4} \log\left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right)\right)$, this happens with probability at least $1 - \beta$. Assuming that this is the case, by the triangle inequality we have that Event E_1 holds. This shows that Event E_1 happens with probability at least $1 - 3\beta$, and completes the proof. \blacktriangleleft

We remark that it is possible to design a more efficient learner for **ParityThresh** (in terms of sample complexity) by constructing a protocol in which there are multiple rounds of communication between the referee and the local agents (but this communication is still independent from the message that the curator sends to the referee). See the full version of this paper for more details [10]. We summarize our possibility and impossibility results w.r.t. learning **ParityThresh** in the next theorem (which follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 and from Lemma 3.3).

► **Theorem 3.4.** *Let $c \in \mathbb{N}$ and $b = c^2$. Then there is a non-interactive $\frac{1}{4}$ -differentially private $(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4})$ -PAC learner for **ParityThresh** _{b,c} in the (m, n) -hybrid model with $m = O(c)$ samples for the curator and $n = O(c^6 \log c)$ local agents. However, every such learner in the local model with $o(2^{(n/\log n)^{1/6}})$ local agents requires $2^{\Omega((n/\log n)^{1/6})}$ rounds, and every such learner in the curator model requires $\Omega(m^2)$ samples.*

4 The 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task

In this section we describe a task that cannot be privately solved neither in the curator model nor in the local model with sub-exponential number of rounds. In the hybrid model, this task can only be solved with interaction, first with the local agents and then with the curator. In this task there are many instances of the parity problem and the referee needs to solve only one instance, which is determined by the inputs. The local agents can determine this instance (using a heavy hitters protocol) and the curator can now solve this instance. The curator cannot solve all instances since this will exceed its privacy budget, and by the definition of the task the curator will not have enough information to determine the instance; thus interaction with both the local agents and the curator is required.

► **Definition 4.1** (The 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task). *The inputs in the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task are generated as follows:*

1. **Input:** 2^d strings $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$, where $r_j \in \{0, 1\}^c$ for every $j \in \{0, 1\}^d$, and $m + 1$ elements $s_1, \dots, s_{m+1} \in \{0, 1\}^d$.
2. Set $s = s_1 \oplus \dots \oplus s_{m+1}$.⁴

⁴ The strings s_1, \dots, s_{m+1} are an $m + 1$ -out-of- $m + 1$ secret sharing of s , that is, together they determine s , but every subset of them gives no information on s .

3. Each sample x_1, \dots, x_m and y_1, \dots, y_n is generated independently as follows:

- with probability half choose $x \in_R \{0,1\}^c$ with uniform distribution and output $(x, (\langle x, r_j \rangle)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d})$ (that is, every point contains a string x of length c and 2^d bits which are the inner products of x and each of the r_j 's).
- with probability half choose $t \in_R [m+1]$ with uniform distribution and output (t, s_t) (that is, every point contains a number t and the t -th string s_t).

The goal of the referee in the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task is for every $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$ and s_1, \dots, s_{m+1} to recover r_s with probability at least $1 - \beta$, where the probability is over the generation of the inputs in Step 3 and the randomness of the parties in the protocol.

We design a protocol for this task and obtain the following lemma (see the full version of this paper for details [10]).

► **Lemma 4.2.** Let $\beta > 1/m$ and assume that $m = \Omega\left(\frac{c \log(1/\beta)}{\epsilon}\right)$ and $n = \Omega\left(\frac{m^2}{\epsilon^2} \log\left(\frac{m2^d}{\beta}\right)\right)$. The 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task can be solved in the (m, n) -hybrid model by an ϵ -differentially private protocol with three rounds, where in the first round each local agent sends one message to the referee (without seeing any other messages), in the second round the referee sends one message to the curator, and in the third round the curator sends one message to the referee.

We next prove that, unless the database is big, the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task requires interaction. To prove this result, we first convert a protocol for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task to a private algorithm in the trusted curator model that recovers all strings $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$. We then prove, using a simple packing argument, that, unless the database is “big”, such algorithm cannot exist. For our proof, we define the all- 2^d -parity task as the task in which all inputs are of the form $(x, (\langle x, r_j \rangle)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d})$ and the goal of the referee is to reconstruct all strings $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$.

► **Claim 4.3.** Let $m < n$. If there is an ϵ -differentially private protocol for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity problem in the (m, n) -hybrid model in which the curator and the referee can exchange many messages and then the referee simultaneously sends one message to each local agent and gets one answer from each agent, then there is an ϵ -differentially private algorithm in the trusted curator model for the all- 2^d -parity problem for a database of size $O(nd)$.

Proof. Let Π be an ϵ -differentially private protocol with the above interaction pattern for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task in the (m, n) -hybrid model in which the referee reconstructs r_s with probability at least $1 - \beta$. We construct, in three steps, an algorithm \mathcal{A} for the all- 2^d -parity task in the trusted curator.

First, we construct from Π a protocol Π' in the $(O(md), O(dn))$ -hybrid model that reconstructs r_s with error probability at most $\beta/2^d$ (e.g., execute Π with disjoint inputs $O(d)$ times and take the value r_s that is returned in the majority of the executions).

Next, we construct from protocol Π' a protocol Π'' for the the all- 2^d -parity task in the $(O(md), O(nd))$ -hybrid model (with error probability $\leq \beta$). In Π'' , the parties holding inputs of the all- 2^d -parity problem simulate Π' on inputs for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task as follows:

- The curator on input $(x_i, (\langle x_i, r_j \rangle)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d})_{i=1}^m$:
 - Chooses random $s_1, \dots, s_{m+1} \in_R \{0,1\}^d$.
 - For each $i \in [m]$, with probability $1/2$ replaces its i -th input by (t_i, s_{t_i}) for a uniformly distributed $t_i \in_R [m+1]$.
 - Exchanges messages with the referee as specified by Π' on the new input. In addition it sends to the referee s_1, \dots, s_{m+1} and an index ℓ such that (ℓ, s_ℓ) does not appear in its new input.

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- The referee after getting the message from the curator:
 - Chooses a set $A \subseteq [n]$ with uniform distribution.
 - For every $i \notin A$, sends its message in Π' to the i -th agent and gets an answer M_i from the agent.
 - For every $i \in A$, chooses a random $q_i \in_R [m+1]$. Let $B = \{i \in A : q_i = \ell\}$.
 - For every $i \in A \setminus B$, computes (without any interaction) its message in Π' to agent P_i and the answer M_i of agent P_i with input (q_i, s_{q_i}) .
 - For every $i \in B$ and $s \in \{0,1\}^d$, computes (without any interaction) its message in Π' to agent P_i and the answer $M_{i,s}$ of agent P_i with input $(\ell, s \oplus \bigoplus_{k \neq \ell} s_k)$.
 - For every $s \in \{0,1\}^d$, reconstructs r_s from the messages of the curator in Π' , $(M_i)_{i \notin B}$, and $(M_{i,s})_{i \in B}$.

As the curator holds m samples and there are $m+1$ values s_1, \dots, s_{m+1} , there exists an index ℓ such that (ℓ, s_ℓ) does not appear in the new input of the curator. Thus, the referee for every $s \in \{0,1\}^d$ can choose a value s'_ℓ such that it is consistent with the messages of the curator in Π' and $s = s'_\ell \oplus \bigoplus_{k \neq \ell} s_k$. Furthermore, each of $x_1, \dots, x_m, y_1, \dots, y_n$ is replaced with probability half with a value (t, s_t) for a uniformly distributed t , thus, these inputs are distributed as required for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task. This implies that for every $s \in \{0,1\}^d$ the referee reconstructs r_s from the messages of the curator in Π' , $(M_i)_{i \notin B}$, and $(M_{i,s})_{i \in B}$ with probability at least $1 - \beta/2^d$. By the union bound, the referee correctly reconstructs all $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$ with probability at least $1 - \beta$.

Finally, we construct the desired algorithm \mathcal{A} from Π'' . The trusted curator simply simulates the referee, the curator, and the agent in Π'' , that is, it takes its database with $O((m+n)d)$ samples and partitions it to $(x_1, \dots, x_{O(nd)})$ (the input of the curator) and $y_1, \dots, y_{O(nd)}$, computes without any interaction a random transcript of Π'' on these inputs, and reconstructs the output $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$. Since the transcript preserves ϵ -differential privacy and computing the output is post-processing, algorithm \mathcal{A} is ϵ -differential private. \triangleleft

► **Claim 4.4.** If there is exists an ϵ -differentially private algorithm in the trusted curator model for the all- 2^d -parity task with strings of length c , then $n = \Omega\left(\frac{c2^d + \ln(1-\beta)}{\epsilon}\right)$.

Proof. The proof is by a simple packing argument. For every strings $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$, with probability at least $1 - \beta$, the algorithm returns $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$ when the samples are generated with $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$. By the group privacy of ϵ -differential privacy, with probability at least $e^{-nc\epsilon}(1-\beta)$ the algorithm returns $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$ when the samples are generated with $(0^c)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$. As there are 2^{c2^d} options for $(r_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^d}$ and the above events are disjoint, $2^{c2^d}e^{-nc\epsilon}(1-\beta) \leq 1$, i.e., $n = \Omega\left(\frac{c2^d + \ln(1-\beta)}{\epsilon}\right)$. \triangleleft

► **Lemma 4.5.** Let $m < n$. If there is an ϵ -differentially private protocol for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task in the (m, n) -hybrid model with $\beta = 1/4$ in which the curator and the referee can exchange many messages and then the referee simultaneously sends one message to each local agent and gets one answer from each agent, then $n = \Omega(c2^d/d\epsilon)$.

Proof. By Claim 4.3, if there exists an ϵ -differentially protocol in the (m, n) -hybrid model for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task, then there exists an ϵ -differentially private algorithm in trusted curator model for the all- 2^d -parity task with database of size $O(dn)$. Thus, by Claim 4.4 with $\beta = 1/4$, $dn = \Omega\left(\frac{c2^d}{\epsilon}\right)$. \triangleleft

Lemma 4.5 is valid also if the local agents are allowed to hold a shared (public) random string as this string can be sent by the referee to each agent as part of its message (without adding extra rounds of communication). We summarize the possibility and impossibility results for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task in the following theorem, where, for convenience, we choose specific parameters that highlight these results.

► **Theorem 4.6.** *Let $\epsilon = 1/4$, $\beta = 1/4$. For every integer c , there are $d = \Theta(\log c)$, $m = \Theta(c)$, and $n = \Theta(c^2 \log c)$ such that*

1. *There exists an ϵ -differentially private protocol for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task with strings of length c in the (m, n) -hybrid model where first each local agent sends one message to the referee and then the referee exchanges one message with the curator.*
2. *There does not exist an ϵ -differentially private protocol for this task in the (m, n) -hybrid model in which the referee first exchanges messages with the curator and then simultaneously exchanges one message with the local agents.*
3. *In any ϵ -differentially private protocol for this task in the local model with n agents the number of rounds is $2^{\Omega(c)} = 2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n/\log n})}$.*
4. *There is no algorithm in the trusted curator model that solves this task with m examples.*

Proof. Item 1 follows directly from Lemma 4.2.

For Item 2, by Lemma 4.5, with $\epsilon = 1/4$, $\beta = 1/4$, and $d = 2 \log c + \log \log c$, it must hold that $n = \Omega(c2^d/(d\epsilon)) = \Omega(c^3)$, contradicting the choice of $n = \Theta(c^2 \log c)$.

For the impossibility result in Item 3, recall that by Fact 2.10 the number of messages sent to the referee in an ϵ -differentially private learning protocol in the local model for parity of strings of length c with respect to the uniform distribution is $2^{\Omega(c)}$. By simple simulation, an ϵ -differentially private protocol in the local model for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task implies an ϵ -differentially private protocol in the local model for learning parity with respect to the uniform distribution (with the same number of messages). Specifically, since the number of agents is $n = O(c^2 \log c)$, the number of rounds is $2^{\Omega(c)}/(c^2 \log c) = 2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n/\log n})}$.

For Item 4, observe that a curator receiving m input points obtains less than $m+1$ shares of s and hence obtains no information about r_s . Hence, such a curator cannot solve the 1-out-of- 2^m -parity task alone, even without privacy constraints. ◀

5 The parity-chooses-secret task

We now present another task that cannot be privately solved neither in the curator model nor in the local model with sub-exponential number of rounds. This task can be solved in the hybrid model; however, it requires interaction, this time first with the curator and then with the local agents. This task (as well as 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task) highlights both the information and private-computation gaps between the curator and the local model agents. The local model agents receive enough information to solve the task, but lack the ability to privately solve an essential sub-task. The curator does not receive enough information to solve the task (even non-privately), however the curator can be used to privately solve the hard sub-task. Once the hard sub-task is solved, this information is forwarded to the local agents, which now can solve the task.

► **Definition 5.1** (The parity-chooses-secret task). *The inputs in the parity-chooses-secret task are generated as follows:*

1. **Input:** A string $r \in \{0, 1\}^c$ and 2^c vectors of $m+1$ bits: a vector $(s_{j,1}, \dots, s_{j,m+1}) \in \{0, 1\}^{m+1}$ for every $j \in \{0, 1\}^c$.

2. Set $s_j = s_{j,1} \oplus \dots \oplus s_{j,m+1}$ for every $j \in \{0,1\}^c$, i.e., s_j is a random bit shared via an $m + 1$ -out-of- $m + 1$ secret-sharing scheme, with the shares being $s_{j,1}, \dots, s_{j,m+1}$.
3. Each sample x_1, \dots, x_m and y_1, \dots, y_n is generated independently as follows:
 - Choose $x \in_R \{0,1\}^c$ and $t \in_R [m+1]$ and output $(x, \langle x, r \rangle, t, (s_{j,t})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c})$ (that is, every point contains a string of length c , its inner product with r , an integer t , and the t -th share of each s_j).

The goal of the referee in the parity-chooses-secret task is for every $((s_{j,1}, \dots, s_{j,m+1}))_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$ and every r to recover s_r with probability at least $1 - \beta$, where the probability is over the generation of the inputs in Step 3 and the randomness of the parties.

We design a protocol for this task and obtain the following lemma (see the full version of this paper for details [10]).

► **Lemma 5.2.** *Let $\beta > 1/m$ and assume that $m = \Omega\left(\frac{c \log(1/\beta)}{\epsilon}\right)$ and $n = \Omega\left(\frac{m^2}{\epsilon^2} \log\left(\frac{n}{\epsilon}\right)\right)$. The parity-chooses-secret task can be solved in the (m, n) -hybrid model by an ϵ -differentially private protocol with three rounds, where in the first round the curator sends one message to the referee, in the second round the referee sends one message to the local agents, and in the third round each local agent sends one message to the referee.*

We next prove that, unless the database is big, the parity-chooses-secret task requires interaction. Furthermore, we rule-out protocols in which first the referee simultaneously sends one message to each local agent, then receives an answer from each local agent, and finally exchanges (possibly many) messages with the curator. In particular, we rule-out the communication pattern used in Lemma 4.2 for the 1-out-of- 2^d -parity task. To prove this result, we first convert a protocol Π for the parity-chooses-secret task with the above communication pattern to a protocol Π' in the hybrid model with the same communication pattern for a similar task (which we call the parity-chooses-secret' task, defined below). We then convert the protocol Π' to a non-interactive protocol Π'' in the local model for another related task, and complete the proof by showing an impossibility result for the related task.

We define the parity-chooses-secret' task as the task in which the input of the curator is generated as in the parity-chooses-secret task and the input of each local agent only contains shares, that is, it is of the form $(t, (s_{j,t})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c})$. The goal of the referee remains the same – to recover s_r .

► **Claim 5.3.** *Assume that $m = \Omega\left(\frac{c \log(1/\beta)}{\epsilon}\right)$. If there is an ϵ -differentially private protocol for the parity-chooses-secret task in the (m, n) -hybrid model with error at most β in which in the first round the referee simultaneously sends one message to each local agent, in the second round gets an answer from each agent, and then the referee and the curator exchange (possibly many) messages, then there is a 2ϵ -differentially private protocol for the parity-chooses-secret' task in the (m, n) -hybrid model with error at most 2β with the same communication pattern.*

Proof. Let Π be an ϵ -differentially private protocol for the parity-chooses-secret task in the (m, n) -hybrid model with the communication pattern as in the claim in which the referee reconstructs s_r with probability at least $1 - \beta$. We construct from Π a 2ϵ -differentially private protocol Π' with the same communication pattern for the the parity-chooses-secret' task in which the referee reconstructs s_r with probability at least $1 - 2\beta$. In Π' , each agent P_i , holding an input $(t, (s_{j,t})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c})$, chooses with uniform distribution a string $x_i \in_R \{0,1\}^c$ and sends two messages of Π , one message, denoted $M_{i,0}$, for the input $(x_i, 0, t, (s_{j,t})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c})$ and one message, denoted $M_{i,1}$, for the input $(x_i, 1, t, (s_{j,t})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c})$. In addition, the agent

sends x_i to the referee. The referee sends the messages that it gets from the local agents (i.e., $(x_i, M_{i,0}, M_{i,1})_{i \in [n]}$) and its random string to the curator. The curator does as follows:

- Privately learns r by executing the ϵ -differentially private algorithm of [43] (see Theorem 2.13) for learning parity with $\alpha = 1/4$, β , and the m inputs $(x, \langle x, r \rangle)$.
- For each agent P_i , computes $b_i = \langle x_i, r \rangle$ and $M_i = M_{i,b_i}$ (that is, the curator chooses the correct message from the two messages the agent sends).
- Simulates the communication between the curator and the referee in Π assuming that the curator gets the messages $(M_i)_{i \in [n]}$ in the first round and reconstructs s_r as the referee reconstructs it in Π .
- Sends s_r to the referee.

As each party executes two ϵ -differentially private algorithms on its input, the resulting protocol is 2ϵ -differentially private. Each agent P_i chooses x_i with uniform distribution (as in the parity-chooses-secret task). Furthermore, as m is big enough, with probability at least $1 - \beta$, the curator computes the correct value r . Thus, $(x_i, b_i, t, (s_{j,t})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c})$ is an input distributed as required in the parity-chooses-secret task, and the curator reconstructs s_r with probability at most $1 - 2\beta$. \triangleleft

We next state a result of [46] showing that the mutual information between the input and output of a differential private algorithm is low. In this result and in the proofs that follow, $H(X)$ is an entropy of a random variable and $I(X; Y)$ is the mutual information between the random variables X and Y .

► **Theorem 5.4** (Differential privacy implies low mutual information [46]). *Let $A : X^n \rightarrow Y$ be an ϵ -differentially private mechanism. Then for every random variable V distributed on X^n , we have $I(V; A(V)) \leq 1.5\epsilon n$.*

► **Lemma 5.5.** *Assume that $m = \Omega\left(\frac{c \log(1/\beta)}{\epsilon}\right)$. If there is an ϵ -differentially private protocol for the parity-chooses-secret task in the (m, n) -hybrid model with error at most β in which in the first round the referee simultaneously sends one message to each local agent, in the second round gets an answer from each agent, and then the referee and the curator exchange (possibly many) messages, then $n \geq \frac{(1-2\beta)2^c}{3\epsilon}$.*

Proof. We convert the protocol for the parity-chooses-secret task to a protocol Π'' in the local model with n agents, where the input of each agent contains 2^c bits $(s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$. If the inputs of all agents are equal, then for every $r \in \{0, 1\}^c$ the referee should output the bit s_r with probability at least $1 - \beta$. We will show at the end of the proof that such protocol can exist only if n is big.

By Claim 5.3, under the assumption of the lemma there is a 2ϵ -differentially private protocol Π' for the parity-chooses-secret task in the (m, n) -hybrid model with error at most 2β and communication pattern is as in the lemma. We construct the following protocol Π'' in the local model with n agents:

- **Input of each agent P_i :** $(s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$.
- The referee chooses with uniform distribution 2^c vectors of $m + 1$ bits: a vector $(s_{j,1}, \dots, s_{j,m+1}) \in_R \{0, 1\}^{m+1}$ for every $j \in \{0, 1\}^c$.
- The referee chooses with uniform distribution m indices $t_1, \dots, t_m \in_R [m + 1]^m$. Let ℓ be an index that does not appear in this list.
- The referee chooses with uniform distribution m strings $(x_1, \dots, x_m) \in_R (\{0, 1\}^c)^m$.
- The referee sends $((s_{j,1}, \dots, s_{j,m+1}))_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$ and ℓ to each agent.

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- Each agent P_i chooses with uniform distribution an index $t \in [m+1]$. If $t \neq \ell$, it sends to the referee its message in Π' on input $t, (s_{j,t})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$. If $t = \ell$, it sends to the referee its message in protocol Π' on input $\ell, (s_j \oplus \bigoplus_{k \neq \ell} s_{j,k})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$. Denote this message by M_i .
- For every $r \in \{0,1\}^c$, the referee does the following:
 - Computes (without interaction) the communication, denoted $M_{C,r}$, exchanged in Π' between the referee and the curator with input $(x_1, \langle x_1, r \rangle, t_1, (s_{j,t_1})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}), \dots, (x_m, \langle x_m, r \rangle, t_m, (s_{j,t_m})_{j \in \{0,1\}^c})$.
 - The referee reconstructs s_r from the messages $M_{C,r}, M_1, \dots, M_n$ using the reconstruction function of Π' .

Protocol Π'' is 2ϵ -differentially private, since Π' is 2ϵ -differentially private. Furthermore, if all the inputs of the local agents are equal, then $M_{C,r}, M_1, \dots, M_n$ are distributed as in Π' , thus, for every $r \in \{0,1\}^c$, the referee reconstructs s_r with probability at least $1 - \beta$.

We complete the proof by showing that n must be large enough in Π'' (hence, also in Π). Assume we execute protocol Π'' when $(s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$ is chosen with uniform distribution and denote its input by $(s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$ and its output by $(s'_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}$. As the output in Π'' is computed from the transcript of Π' , the post-processing property of differential privacy implies that the algorithm that first executes protocol Π' and then computes the output from the transcript is 2ϵ -differentially private. By Theorem 5.4,

$$I((s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}; (s'_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}) \leq 3\epsilon n. \quad (1)$$

On the other hand, $\Pr[s_{j_0} = s'_{j_0}] \geq 1 - 2\beta$ for a given $j_0 \in \{0,1\}^c$, thus $H(s_{j_0} | (s'_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}) \leq H(s_{j_0} | s'_{j_0}) \leq 2\beta$, and $H((s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c} | (s'_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}) \leq \sum_{j_0 \in \{0,1\}^c} H(s_{j_0} | (s'_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}) \leq 2\beta 2^c$. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} I((s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}; (s'_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}) &= H((s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}) - H((s_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c} | (s'_j)_{j \in \{0,1\}^c}) \\ &\geq 2^c - 2\beta 2^c = (1 - 2\beta)2^c. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Inequalities (1) and (2) imply that $(1 - 2\beta)2^c \leq 3\epsilon n$. ◀

We next summarize the possibility and impossibility results for parity-chooses-secret.

► **Theorem 5.6.** *Let $\epsilon = 1/4$, $\beta = 1/4$. For every integer c , there are $m = \Theta(c)$ and $n = \Theta(c^2 \log c)$ such that*

- There is an ϵ -differentially private protocol for the parity-chooses-secret task with strings of length c in the (m, n) -hybrid model where first the curator sends one message to the referee and then the referee simultaneously exchanges one message with each local agent.*
- There does not exist an ϵ -differentially private protocol for this task in the (m, n) -hybrid model in which the referee first simultaneously exchanges one message with the local agents and then exchanges messages with the curator.*
- In any ϵ -differentially private protocol for this task in the local model with n agents the number of rounds is $2^{\Omega(c)}$.*
- There is no algorithm in the trusted curator model that solves this task with m examples.*

Proof. Item 1 follows directly from Lemma 5.2. Item 2 is implied by Lemma 5.5, since $n \ll 2^c$. Item 3 follows from Fact 2.10 as in the proof of Theorem 4.6. For Item 4, observe that a curator receiving m input points obtains less than $m+1$ shares of (s_1, \dots, s_j) and hence obtains no information about s_r . That is, such a curator cannot solve the parity-chooses-secret task alone, even without privacy constraints. ◀

6 A Negative Result: Basic hypothesis testing

Here, we show that for one of the most basic tasks, differentiating between two discrete distributions \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 , the hybrid model gives no significant added power.

► **Definition 6.1** (The simple hypothesis-testing task). *Let $0 < \beta < 1$ be a parameter, X be a finite domain, and \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 be two distributions over X . The input of the hypothesis-testing task is composed of i.i.d. samples from \mathcal{D}_j for some $j \in \{0, 1\}$ and the goal of the referee is to output \hat{j} s.t. $\Pr[\hat{j} = j] \geq 1 - \beta$.*

► **Theorem 6.2.** *If there is an ϵ -differentially private protocol in the (m, n) -hybrid model for testing between distributions \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 with success probability $1/2 + \gamma$, then either there is an ϵ -differentially private protocol for this task in the curator model that uses m samples and succeeds with probability at least $1/2 + \gamma/4$ or there is an ϵ -differentially private protocol for this task in the local model with n agents that succeeds with probability at least $1/2 + \gamma/4$.*

Proof. Let Π be a protocol guaranteed by the theorem, that is, when the inputs of the curator and the local agents are drawn from \mathcal{D}_j , the referee in Π returns j with probability at least $1/2 + \gamma$. Consider an execution of the protocol when the inputs of the curator are drawn from \mathcal{D}_0 and the inputs of the local agents are drawn from \mathcal{D}_1 and let p be the probability that the referee in Π returns 1 in this case.

We first assume that $p \geq 1/2$ and show that there exists an ϵ -differentially private protocol Π^{local} for this task in the local model with n agents that succeeds with probability at least $1/2 + \gamma/4$. The referee in protocol Π^{local} with probability $\gamma/2$ outputs 1 and with probability $1 - \gamma/2$ draws m samples from \mathcal{D}_0 , executes protocol Π , where the referee simulates the messages of the curator using the m samples, and returns the output of Π .

We next analyze this protocol. If the inputs of the local agents are drawn from \mathcal{D}_1 , then the probability that the referee in protocol Π returns 1 is at least $1/2$ and the probability that the referee in Π^{local} returns 1 is at least $\gamma/2 + (1 - \gamma/2) \cdot 1/2 = 1/2 + \gamma/4$. If the inputs of the local agents are drawn from \mathcal{D}_0 , then the probability that the referee in Π^{local} returns 0 is at least $(1 - \gamma/2) \cdot (1/2 + \gamma) \geq 1/2 + \gamma/4$ (since $\gamma \leq 1/2$). For the case that $p < 1/2$, it can be shown, using an analogous construction, that there exists an ϵ -differentially private protocol Π^{curator} for this task in the curator model with m samples that succeeds with probability at least $1/2 + \gamma/4$. ◀

Recall that the *total variation distance* (also known as the statistical distance) of two discrete distributions $\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1$ over a domain X is $d_{\text{TV}}(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) = \sup_{T \subset X} |\mathcal{D}_1(T) - \mathcal{D}_0(T)| = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in X} |\mathcal{D}_1(x) - \mathcal{D}_0(x)|$. The *squared Hellinger distance* between two distributions $\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1$ over a domain X is defined as $d_{H^2}(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in X} \left(\sqrt{\mathcal{D}_0(x)} - \sqrt{\mathcal{D}_1(x)} \right)^2$. For the rest of the discussion in this section, fix the domain $X = \{0, 1\}$, and some $\alpha > 0$. We define two distributions \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 where under \mathcal{D}_1 we have $\Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_1}[x = 1] = \frac{1}{2}(1 + \alpha)$ and under \mathcal{D}_0 we have $\Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_0}[x = 1] = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha)$. It is a fairly simple calculation to see that $d_{\text{TV}}(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) = \alpha$ and $\frac{\alpha^2}{2} \leq d_{H^2}(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) \leq \alpha^2$. We prove that for some setting of the parameters n and m , the hypothesis-testing task between \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 is impossible in the (m, n) -hybrid model.

The following Theorem follows by combining Theorem 6.2 with [40, Theorem 5.3] and with [19, Theorem 3.5]. See the full version of this paper for more details. [10]

► **Theorem 6.3.** *There are constants c_0, c_1 such that in the (m, n) -hybrid model, with $m \leq c_0 \left(\frac{1}{\alpha^2} + \frac{1}{\epsilon^2 \alpha} \right)$ and $n \leq c_1 \cdot \frac{1}{\epsilon^2 \alpha^2}$, there is no ϵ -differentially private protocol that succeeds in determining whether all $m + n$ input points are drawn from \mathcal{D}_0 vs. \mathcal{D}_1 w.p. ≥ 0.75 .*

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