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## 7 **Using Computational Social Science Techniques to Identify Coordinated**

## 8 **Cyber Threats to Smart City Networks**

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10 Mustafa Alassad<sup>1</sup>, Billy Spann<sup>1</sup>, Samer Al-khateeb<sup>2</sup>, Nitin Agarwal<sup>1</sup>

11 <sup>1</sup>University of Arkansas, Little Rock, AR, USA

12 {mmalassad, bxspann, nxagarwal}@ualr.edu

13 <sup>2</sup>Creighton University, Omaha, NE, USA

14 SamerAl-Khateeb1@creighton.edu

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### 16 **Abstract**

17 Smart cities are increasingly facing cyber-attacks due to the endeavors they have made in technological  
18 advancements. The challenge for smart cities, that utilize complex digital networks to manage city systems and  
19 services, is that any device that relies on internet connectivity to function is a potential cyber-attack victim.  
20 Smart cities use smart sensors. Online Social Networks (OSNs) act as human sensors offering significant  
21 contributions to the amount of data used in smart cities. OSNs can also be used as a coordination and  
22 amplification platform for attacks. For instance, aggressors can increase the impact of an attack by causing  
23 panic in an area by promoting attacks using OSNs. Public data can help aggressors to determine the best timing  
24 for attacks, scheduling attacks, and then using OSNs to coordinate attacks on smart city infrastructure. This  
25 convergence of the cyber and physical worlds is known as cybernetics. Quantitative socio-technical methods  
26 such as deviant cyber flash mob detection (DCFM) and focal structure analysis (FSA) can provide  
27 reconnaissance capabilities that enable cities to look beyond internal data and identify threats based on active  
28 events. Assessment of powerful actors using DCFM detection methods can help to identify and prevent attacks.  
29 Groups of powerful hackers can be identified through FSA which is a model that uses a degree centrality method  
30 at the *node-level* and spectral modularity at *group-level* to measure the power of a focal structure (a subset of  
31 the network). DCFM and FSA models can help cyber-security experts by providing a better picture of the threat  
32 which will help to plan a better response.

33

### 34 **Keywords**

35 Online Social Networks, Focal Structure Analysis, Flash Mob Detection, Spectral Modularity, Degree  
36 Centrality, Network Clustering, Smart Cities, Cyber Security.

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### 38 **1. Introduction**

39 Transformation to smarter cities presents many challenges for researchers and engineers as they face new  
40 procedures, data management platforms, and operations. Building new and efficient smart systems open the  
41 door for many new issues such as privacy, security, big data coming from various sensors, public and private  
42 services, and social systems. Although these systems are being transformed into smart systems by connecting  
43 them to the internet A.K.A. the Internet of Things (IoT), it still needs more cybersecurity enhancements.

44 The critical infrastructure of smart cities should have monitoring capabilities for optimizing security  
45 methods, reducing vulnerability, increasing reliability. This will enhance the transportation systems, the  
46 security of smart power grids and various energy systems such as: petroleum refineries, health, and food  
47 systems. Such monitoring systems require data collection, real-time processing, analysis, and decision-making  
48 capabilities.

49 Today, various industries have services that monitor many malicious activities and threats, such as hackers  
50 who try to access crucial department databases to steal information or damage a provided service. In recent  
51

55 years, many malicious cyber activities across the world have been reported to cause enormous damage to  
56 various critical smart systems [1].

57 In this research, we are considering the massive growth of social media platforms in the recent years such  
58 as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and WeChat, and how many social applications must work with significant  
59 amounts of personal and public data. People use these tools to share information, opinions, and activities with  
60 their relatives, friends and other cultural organizations. However, in the last few years, the use of these platforms  
61 was changed by a few radical organizations. Malicious actors misused social media to amplify and share  
62 terrorist activities and malicious threats, information dissemination, propagating radical behaviors, spreading  
63 fake news, and conducting cyber-attacks on public and private online smart infrastructure networks [2].

64 Quantitative methods have been applied to help to analyze the complex social networks in recent years.  
65 Some of the most common approaches to quantitative network analysis use measures such centrality and  
66 modularity to help define network structure and model the networks. Node-based community detection  
67 algorithms using the degree centrality method [3], [4] and group-based community detection algorithms using  
68 the modularity method [5], [6], are considered in our research and presented in section 2. However, merely  
69 considering these two community detection categories alone, lacks the depth and insight into the most  
70 influential aggressors and network links that would maximize the damage to a smart city infrastructure grid.  
71 Therefore, we propose a mixed model, developing the node-level measure which considers the individual's  
72 centrality value, and then spectral modularity (group-level) is employed to measure the groups' influence at the  
73 Network-Level. The resultant model is a Bi-Level centrality-modularity maximization model called Focal  
74 Structure Analysis (FSA). These focal structures (sub network or sub graphs) are the hidden intensive groups  
75 that can influence maximum number of users in the network.

76 The contributions from the model in this research considers the shortcomings in the regular community  
77 detection algorithms, where the node-based methods cannot identify these groups, and the group-based method  
78 cannot cluster intensive small groups. We are proposing a mix of the node and group-based community  
79 detection algorithms, whereby we create a model consisting of two major sections: the bi-level optimization  
80 section, and the deviant cyber flash mob detection method. Other supplementary sections are also used to help  
81 in clustering the network. Finally, the model utilizes small real-world metrics to identify FSA sets and then  
82 evaluate them using the deviant cyber flash mob detection (DCFM) method to determine if the aggressors' and  
83 sets can influence the entire network.

84 Multiple case studies leveraged the two aforementioned approaches independently, such as Sen et al. [8],  
85 utilized a greedy model on a Facebook network and concluded that Facebook was used to mobilize crowds in  
86 2007 during the Egyptian Revolution [9]. The authors in [9] studied a Twitter network, where they identified a  
87 small influential set of users who are responsible for the 2011 Saudi Arabia women's right to drive campaign  
88 [9]. Alassad et al. [10] studied a network of commenters on YouTube that disseminated disinformation. He  
89 used a decomposition optimization model to identify small influential sets of commenters responsible for  
90 commenting on various videos.

91 For our practical implementation of this mixed-mode model that would extend to the smart city domain, we  
92 consider an ISIS dataset provided in a study conducted by the International Centre for the Study of  
93 Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) which shows a group of individuals who helped ISIS recruiters  
94 to disseminate their propaganda on Twitter and other social media platforms [7]. This mixed-mode model was  
95 also applied on a YouTube channel that was spreading fake news in the South China Sea [11].

## 96 1.1 Problem Statement

98 The aim of this study is to apply a *non-traditional cybersecurity network approach* to cluster and analyze  
99 influential sets of social media users. These users are highly central disseminators who can amplify information  
100 spread to a maximum number of individuals in the network. One of the big challenges that are facing network  
101 scientists is to identify and suspend such hidden coordinating groups of malicious users in complex social  
102 network. These focal structures of malicious users in the network can be influential and can disseminate their  
103 radical or terrorist propaganda to threaten smart cities' intelligent systems very effectively.

104 These sets of aggressors (focal structures) can coordinate attacks on various smart city infrastructures by  
105 utilizing well-known social media platforms, for example, they can post directions, locations, and other  
106 coordination activities on social media informing their followers. Since smart cities rely on internet services,  
107 the government would not want to shut down internet service across the entire smart city network and risk  
108 financial, economic, or security lose. The success of a deviant cyber flash mob targeting a smart city  
109 infrastructure would likely have a crippling effect on the smart city. Identifying hidden influential groups and  
110 suspending them without impacting the total infrastructure network is essential. In this research we use a

111 network of commenters who are posting radical directions on Twitter to paralyze infrastructure in smart cities.  
112 These FSAs could be responsible for organizing multi-cyber-attacks to maximize the damages to the network,  
113 spread fake news and convince other nodes in the network to participate in or create their own cyber-attacks.  
114 In this paper, we identify these malicious set of users, and then suspend them from their locations in the network  
115 to stop their influence without taking down the remaining network.

116 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data set and the research  
117 methodology. Section 3, we apply the proposed model to the dataset collected and demonstrate the model  
118 efficiency. Finally, we conclude with intended future work in section 4.

## 119 **2 Methodology**

120 The proposed model is designed to (1) overcome the shortcomings in regular community detection methods [4,  
121 10], (2) advance the FSA model proposed by Sen et al. [9, 12], and (3) use the DCFM model developed by Al-  
122 khateeb et al. [13] to identify a sets of powerful actors in complex social networks aiming to conduct deviant  
123 acts that can damage smart cities' infrastructures.

### 124 **2.1 Data Set**

125 In this research, we collected data of a Twitter network consisting of 1,453 nodes and 1,487 edges. An initial  
126 set of Twitter usernames were provided in a report published by the International Centre for the Study of  
127 Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) in which they provided a list of individuals who help ISIS  
128 disseminate their propaganda on Twitter and other social media platforms [16]. We crawled these usernames'  
129 friends and followers then cross-intersected them with another dataset collected during three beheading events  
130 conducted by ISIS in Egypt, Libya, and Palestine [17]. For the users in the resultant dataset, we calculated  
131 control, interest, and power to estimate the power of each node (user) in the network. We built the  
132 communication (retweets and mentions) network for these users then ran our model to determine the focal  
133 structures within the network. These FSAs are ranked based on the sum of power for all users within that focal  
134 structure.

### 135 **2.2 Node-Level & Group level Measures**

136 The first step in collecting the necessary measurements for the model after identifying the user network is to  
137 calculate node-level power, degree centrality (node-level measurements) and the clustering coefficient (group-  
138 level measurements). The power of each node is calculated using a collective action-based model developed  
139 by Al-khateeb et. al [18,19]. The degree centrality method is utilized to measure a node's sphere of influence  
140 [4]. Fig. 1 shows the average degree centrality for all 53 FSA sets. In addition to degree centrality, the model  
141 needs to consider the node's neighbors' friendship as well, to determine if the friends-of-friends are also his/her  
142 friend. Hence, we used the clustering coefficient as shown in Fig.2 to determine if a node exhibits this behavior  
143 or not [3, 4]. The final analysis uses not only the node's degree centrality, but also the network power calculated  
144 by the DCFM method.

145 The result of the two methods combined, i.e., the degree centrality and clustering coefficient, are ranked as  
146 sets of active local communities consisting of highly central nodes that have active neighbors (can communicate  
147 with each other). The measurements from these two methods will be exported to the Network-Level to measure  
148 their ability to maximize the network's sparsity or their communication to other aggressors' groups.

### 149 **2.3 Network-Level Analysis**

150 The spectral modularity method [6], is used to measure the graph's sparsity inheriting the nodes' sets from the  
151 Node-Level. The objective function as shown in the Network-Level in Fig 3, is to import sets from the previous  
152 level and then find sets that can maximize the graph's modularity value [10, 11]. The model is searching for  
153 sets of groups that can produce the maximum number of aggressors in the network [5, 10, 11, 14].

154 These focal structures include the maximum number of influential nodes in the network who have the power  
155 to convince other nodes in the network to participate in deviant actions, such as multi-cyber-attacks. Also, these  
156 nodes can be part of other groups (other focal structures, and can supervise other nodes, control information  
157 dissemination, and amplify their radical actions to other parts of the network.




Fig. 1: FSA Sets' average degree centrality values.




Fig. 2: FSA Sets' average clustering coefficient values.

## 2.4 FSA Evaluation and DCFM

165 Decomposition of the identified focal structures help to measure the sets characteristics from different points  
166 of views as follows:

### 2.4.1 Small Real-World Network Metrics

169 Our model used two measures, namely degree centrality and clustering coefficient to determine its output. The  
170 goal of the model is to find subsets in the network (called focal structures) that can maximize the average degree  
171 centrality of each node and the average clustering coefficient of these central nodes (to measure the members'  
172 connectivity within the sets). Fig 1 shows the identified focal structures (influential sets) average degree  
173 centrality values while Fig 2 shows the interaction between these subsets nodes by utilizing the clustering  
174 coefficient of the group.


### 2.4.2 DCFM Metrics

179 The DCFM phenomenon can be considered a form of a cyber-collective action that is defined as an action  
180 aiming to improve a group's conditions (such as, status or power). If we can identify those strong influential  
181 groups organizing DCFM, we can design counter measures to stop the aggressors from attacking smart city  
182 infrastructure. Previous work by Al-khateeb and Agarwal [13] developed a collective action based theoretical  
183 model which identified factors to predict success or failure of a Deviant Cyber Flash Mob (DCFM).

186 In their model, the identified factors are – Utility (U) (the benefits an individual gain if the DCFM success  
187 or fail), Interest (I) (how much interest an aggressor has based on the utility gained), Control (C) (how much  
188 control the aggressor has on the outcome of the DCFM), and Power (P) (how powerful an aggressor is in the  
189 group). In this study, we calculate the structural characteristics of our sample DCFM network and assess the  
190 impact of these collective action measurements (i.e., I, C, and P) using our Focal Structure Analysis (FSA)  
model.


## 3 Experimental Results

198 We applied our model to the ISIS Twitter network shown in Fig 4. The model identified the highly influential  
199 sets of aggressors in the dataset that maximizes the graph sparsity, influences maximum number of individuals,  
200 and includes members acting in different group as shown in Fig 5. Also, the interconnection between pairwise  
201 focal structure reveals a spoke and hub communication structure, where a set conveys information to other  
202 groups who then carry out operations as shown in Fig 5. The DCFM method calculated the sets' power  
203 (influence), whereby the more power they have the darker the sets' color as shown in Fig 5.



**Fig. 3:** Focal Structure Analysis (FSA) structure in Smart City, where social media is part of the smart city structure. The model will import the data constructed from the social media platforms such as Twitter.

198 To understand the focal structures' impact inside the network as shown in Fig 6, we employed two methods  
 199 as basis to make the evaluation. First, the Girvan-Neman modularity method [15], which returned a modularity  
 200 value of 0.645 and clustered 40 communities as shown in Fig 4. Second, Trajan et al. [16] found only one  
 201 weakly connected user in the network. These are the baseline network measurements for this collection of users  
 202 and their corresponding network structure.  
 203



**Fig. 4:** ISIS Twitter network clustered into 40 groups via modularity method.

**Fig. 5:** Commenters are clustered into 54 influential sets. The darker the color, higher the influence.

204 Moreover, Fig 7, shows the top twenty influential aggressors and the count of FSA sets containing each  
 205 aggressor. Since we identified that very powerful actors appear in multiple network sets, it enables the

authorities to measure, predict, and allocate the influential aggressors' active strategies, possible spots for information dissemination, and cyber-attacks' locations.




Fig. 6: Sets' power measured by DCFM method.




Fig. 7: Top 20 Influential aggressors measured by DCFM.

Table 1 shows the top twenty influential sets of aggressors, where the impact of each set on the modularity and connectivity were measured accordingly. We found that, each of these sets can maximize the graph modularity value into the interval of [0.7-0.83], and they can maximize the graph sparsity from 40 groups into [103-426] groups. This means that by removing the most influential users from the network, the clusters or communities within the network lose their connection to other parts of the network. That is, by removing the aggressors in any given FSA ID in Table 1, the overall network of users becomes isolated to other communities.

Table 1: Top 20 influential sets.

FSA ID	Sum of power	Count of users	# of Weakly conn. users	Count of comm.	Max modularity value	FSA allocation
5	1.86	42	408	426	0.83	19
2	1.7	41	401	423	0.82	13
7	1.58	21	287	313	0.78	9
49	1.53	47	256	280	0.81	15
9	1.52	21	268	290	0.78	9
54	1.52	130	278	300	0.82	20
8	1.5	21	330	352	0.8	13
6	1.47	11	273	298	0.76	9
39	1.41	13	241	268	0.75	12
50	1.4	49	261	286	0.78	15
1	1.37	19	270	292	0.77	7
52	1.36	54	230	254	0.8	19
37	1.25	13	145	175	0.72	5
3	1.22	7	165	189	0.7	5
35	0.91	12	161	187	0.74	8
47	0.87	32	73	103	0.72	10
46	0.83	25	161	190	0.73	8
53	0.81	76	115	142	0.76	20
30	0.78	9	131	191	0.71	4
36	0.77	12	174	198	0.72	5

In addition, based on Trajan et al. [16] the min-max numbers of weakly connected users caused by these sets increase from one to an interval between [73-408] weakly connected users. Most importantly, we were able to identify each FSA set's attack locations by identifying how many FSA sets each aggressor appeared in, (as shown in Fig. 7), proposing that each set of aggressors can attack multiple places at the same time. For example,

221 FSA (5), the top influential set consisted of 42 aggressors, they can influence 408 individuals, are able to attack  
222 19 different locations in the network and can divide the network into 426 other groups. Therefore, by removing  
223 the users within this FSA (5), the network is divided into 426 communities vs 40 communities with FSA (5)  
224 included, so aggressors would have to work harder to disseminate information across the network.

## 225 **4 Conclusion and Discussion**

226 In this research, we have studied social media cybersecurity risks at a network level using computational social  
227 science techniques, where aggressors utilize Twitter platforms to perform cyber attacks. Considering the  
228 shortcomings of regular community detection algorithms and taking a non-traditional cybersecurity approach,  
229 the proposed bi-level model was able to identify hidden influential sets of aggressors in the network. The  
230 proposed model was able to identify a spoke and hub communication structure, where a single influential FSA  
231 set conveys information to other sets who can carry out deviant behaviors. Such focal structures are more  
232 prevalent in terrorist networks.

233 Throughout this research, we were able to allocate the aggressors' activities, track all their possible cyber-  
234 attacks locations, provide an overview of the influential sets, and estimate the aggressors' influence in the  
235 network. Using this model could enhance and harden smart cities' strategies against cyber-attacks when they  
236 originate from social media platforms by suspending any of those focal aggressors' structures to prevent the  
237 massive damages that can be caused to a smart cities critical foundation.

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