

1 **EFFECTS OF NETWORK UNCERTAINTY ON SEISMIC VULNERABILITY**
2 **ASSESSMENT OF WATER PIPE NETWORKS**
3

4 Abhijit Roy¹; Mohsen Shahandashti²; and Jay M. Rosenberger³

5 ¹Graduate Student, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Texas at Arlington, 416 S.
6 Yates St., Arlington, TX 76019, email: abhijit.roy@mavs.uta.edu

7 ²Associate Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Texas at Arlington, 416 S.
8 Yates St., Arlington, TX 76019, email: mohsen@uta.edu

9 ³Professor, Department of Industrial, Manufacturing and Systems Engineering, University of
10 Texas at Arlington, email: jrosenbe@uta.edu

11

12 **ABSTRACT**

13 Past earthquakes revealed that earthquakes disrupt operations of underground water infrastructure
14 systems. Assessment of the seismic vulnerability of underground water pipe networks plays a
15 critical role in formulating preventive rehabilitation decision making to avoid high repair costs.
16 Although existing seismic vulnerability assessment methods are sensitive to water pipe network
17 uncertainties (e.g., uncertainties in nodal demand, reservoir head, pipe roughness coefficient), the
18 extent of the effects of these uncertainties on the post-earthquake serviceability of the networks
19 has not been examined. This research investigates the effects of water pipe network uncertainties
20 on the seismic vulnerability assessment of networks. Transient ground displacements due to
21 seismic wave propagation are considered for this investigation. The methodology includes seven
22 steps: uncertainty identification and quantification, design of experiments, integrated multi-
23 physics modeling, seismic repair rate calculations, Monte Carlo simulation, statistical analysis of
24 the data (Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), and Tukey tests), and sensitivity analysis. Uncertainties
25 in nodal demand, reservoir head, and pipe roughness coefficient were examined in this study. An
26 integrated multi-physics model was created to simulate hydraulic network behavior and seismic
27 vulnerability assessment. The approach was tested on two networks (New York Tunnel Network
28 and Oberlin Network). The statistical analysis results indicate that the combined impact of the
29 three selected water pipe network uncertainties on the seismic vulnerability assessment of
30 networks is statistically significant. Nodal demand and pipe roughness coefficient uncertainties do
31 not individually have a statistically significant effect. The individual effect of reservoir head

32 uncertainty is statistically significant. Sensitivity analysis determined the minimum value of the
33 coefficient of variation to have a statistically significant effect. Sensitivity analysis was divided
34 into three parts to investigate the individual and combined effects of network uncertainties. The
35 results from sensitivity analysis show that small uncertainty in reservoir head results in a
36 statistically significant effect on seismic vulnerability assessment. By contrast, the coefficient of
37 variation for uncertainties in nodal demand and pipe roughness has to be quite large to significantly
38 affect seismic vulnerability assessment. Statistical analysis and sensitivity analysis results show
39 that water pipe network uncertainties have a statistically significant impact on seismic
40 vulnerability assessment of networks. Hence, it is recommended to integrate water pipe network
41 uncertainties with existing methods for assessing seismic vulnerabilities.

42 **INTRODUCTION**

43 Water pipe networks are among the lifelines of modern cities (Eidinger and Avila 1999). Past
44 earthquakes (e.g., the San Fernando earthquake of 1971, the Northridge earthquake of 1994, the
45 Kobe earthquake of 1995) and some recent earthquakes (e.g., the Christchurch earthquake of 2011,
46 the East Japan earthquake of 2011, the Gorkha earthquake of 2015, and the Central Mexico
47 earthquake of 2017) have divulged the vulnerability of the underground water pipe networks
48 (Knight 2017; Thapa et al. 2016; O'Rourke et al. 2014; Maruyama et al. 2011; Cubrinovski et al.
49 2011; O'Rourke 1996). Residential, industrial, and commercial activities get disrupted due to the
50 damages to the water pipe networks. Any disruption in such networks can cause extensive direct
51 and indirect losses such as repair costs or disturbance in water distribution (Yerri et al. 2017; Piratla
52 et al. 2015). In the Northridge earthquake of 1994, utilities performed around 1400 repairs in water
53 pipes, of which approximately 100 repairs were carried out in pipes with large diameters
54 (O'Rourke 1996). About 50,000 people were disconnected from the drinkable water supply for
55 over seven days after the Northridge earthquake (Scawthorn et al. 2005). The Kobe earthquake
56 caused damages at 23 locations of the water pipeline (Yoo et al. 2016). Although an earthquake is
57 a rare event, it can significantly degrade the performance of water supply networks. Therefore,
58 assessing seismic vulnerability underground water pipe networks is crucial to ensure acceptable
59 post-earthquake serviceability.

60 In the current practice of vulnerability assessment of underground water pipe networks subjected
61 to seismic events, it is implicitly assumed that currently established hydraulic network analysis
62 models can accurately estimate reliability and serviceability measures. However, several studies

63 have identified significant shortcomings of the hydraulic models representing actual networks
64 (Sabzkouhi and Haghghi 2016; Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al. 2013; Lansey et al. 2001; Bargiela and
65 Hainsworth 1989). These shortcomings are mostly due to the high sensitivity of hydraulic models
66 to their input variables. The bottleneck is the highly limited knowledge about the actual input
67 values, which drive the hydraulic models. These values include nodal demands, pipe roughness
68 coefficients, reservoir head, pipe material, pipe age, and pipe diameter (Kang and Lansey 2009,
69 Shibu and Janga Reddy 2011). Sabzkouhi and Haghghi (2016) showed that a slight 15%
70 uncertainty in a demand and pipe's roughness coefficient could cause around 11% deviation in
71 predicted nodal pressures and 50% deviation in flow velocities. These results represent the high
72 sensitivity of network hydraulic analysis models to uncertainties. Therefore, it is crucial to
73 investigate the effects of water pipe network uncertainties on seismic vulnerability assessment of
74 the networks. This study investigates the effects of network uncertainties on seismic vulnerability
75 assessment considering transient ground displacements due to seismic wave propagation.

76 **RESEARCH BACKGROUND**

77 Component-level and system-level seismic vulnerability assessments are two broadly classified
78 categories of the methods for assessing the vulnerability of water pipe networks subjected to
79 seismic events. Individual components can be evaluated by component-level assessment models.
80 The seismic performance of an entire network can be evaluated by system-level assessment
81 models. The methods for assessing the vulnerability of individual pipes can be further divided into
82 two categories: analytical and empirical. Newmark and Rosenblueth (1971) proposed an analytical
83 method to investigate the response of an underground pipeline assuming negligible soil-pipe
84 interaction. Since then, these interactions have been studied using quasi-static analysis (Singhal
85 and Zuroff 1990; Wang et al. 1982), shell theory (Liu et al. 2004; Luco and De Barros 1994),
86 dynamic plain-strain modeling (Datta et al. 1984), finite element analysis (Saber et al. 2014;
87 Vazouras et al. 2010), probabilistic fault displacement hazard analysis and beam-type finite
88 element modeling (Melissianos et al. 2016), and nonlinear modeling of seismic response (Hosseini
89 and Tahamouli Roudsari 2010). Honegger and Eguchi (1992) estimated the failure rate of brittle
90 pipes subjected to permanent ground deformation. American Lifeline Airlines (ALA 2001)
91 formulated seismic fragility relations for a wide range of pipes based on 81 data points from 12
92 earthquakes. Christodoulou and Fragiadakis (2015) investigated the effects of a network's
93 historical performance on seismic vulnerability through the introduction of the number of observed

94 previous breaks (NOPB) risk factor. Although these component-level models are useful to gain a
95 good insight into failure mechanisms of small-scale cases, they are impractical for large-scale
96 vulnerability assessment (Hosseini and Tahamouli Roudsari 2010).

97 While it is necessary to understand the performance of individual pipes, their network resilience
98 depends on these pipes' dynamic interactions. Advancements in network simulation, probabilistic
99 modeling, and computational engineering have helped researchers to conduct system-level seismic
100 vulnerability assessments of networks (Pudasaini et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2010; Shi 2006).
101 Individual pipe failure probabilities are used to generate damages in pipes for system-level
102 vulnerability assessment (Pudasaini and Shahandashti 2020b). Damages were integrated with
103 hydraulic models using Monte Carlo simulation. Shi (2006) combined fragility relations with
104 hydraulic principles to model the seismic response of water networks. Shi's methodology was
105 further expanded to generate various system serviceability and reliability indices (Wang et al.
106 2010; Huang et al. 2008). System serviceability index (SSI) was used by Wang et al. (2010) to
107 measure the performance of a water pipe network susceptible to seismic damages. SSI was used
108 to locate the critical pipes of the network and rank them accordingly. Fragiadakis and
109 Christodoulou (2013) proposed a methodology for assessing the reliability of water pipe networks
110 combining data of past non-seismic damage and the vulnerability of network's components against
111 seismic loading. Fragiadakis et al. (2013) created an assessment method considering data of past
112 non-seismic damage, the vulnerabilities of the network components against seismic loading, and
113 the topology of a water pipe network. Farahmandfer et al. (2017) proposed a metric that quantifies
114 resilience of water pipe networks. Networks' spatial distributions and correlations related to
115 ground motion intensities were not taken into consideration in their analysis. Few recent studies
116 considered these spatial distributions and correlations (Shahandashti and Pudasaini 2019;
117 Pudasaini and Shahandashti 2018). Most recently, Boskabadi et al. (2020) developed a two-stage
118 stochastic programming approach for enhancing seismic resilience of water pipe networks.
119 Pudasaini and Shahandashti (2020a) identified topological surrogates for computationally efficient
120 seismic robustness optimization of water pipe networks. Mazumder et al. (2020a) proposed a
121 methodology to calculate seismic repair rate. This study proposed a renewal strategy addressing
122 the vulnerability of pipelines from the topological viewpoint. Mazumder et al. (2020b) presented
123 a framework to evaluate both component-level and system level seismic resilience of water pipe
124 networks considering time-variant corrosion of pipeline. Despite all advancements in assessing the

125 vulnerability networks due to seismic events, the impacts of uncertainties on these seismic
126 vulnerability assessments are not known.

127 Although the impacts of uncertainties on the seismic vulnerability assessments are unknown,
128 uncertainty quantification and analysis have been applied to study the effects of water pipe network
129 uncertainties on their no-hazard design and operation procedures. For example, Seifollahi-
130 Aghmiuni et al. (2011) combined a shuffled frog algorithm with Monte Carlo simulation to
131 examine water network efficiency considering the uncertainty of demand. Their study was
132 primarily focused on identifying the effects of demand uncertainty on operation using a
133 probabilistic normal distribution. They concluded that network efficiency decreases if demand
134 uncertainty is not considered while operating a network. Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al. (2013) used a
135 similar methodology to examine water network performance in its operational period considering
136 pipe roughness uncertainty. They concluded that if pipe roughness uncertainty increases, network
137 performance decreases. Xu and Goulter (1998) proposed a methodology for assessing water pipe
138 networks considering uncertainties in pipe capacity, nodal demands, and reservoir/tank levels.

139 Lansey et al. (1989) developed a methodology to determine an optimal design process for water
140 pipe networks. They considered several network uncertainties, such as pressure head requirements,
141 future demands, and pipe roughness. They illustrated that uncertainties in those parameters have
142 substantial effects on the network design process. Kapelan et al. (2005) defined the water
143 distribution design problem as a multi-objective optimization problem under uncertainty. They
144 considered pipe roughness coefficient and water consumption as uncertain variables. Probability
145 density functions were used to model the uncertain variables. The obtained results demonstrated
146 that the proposed methodology could identify robust Pareto optimal solutions in spite of the
147 considerably less calculation effort. Sabzkouhi and Haghghi (2016) introduced a methodology to
148 analyze water pipe networks considering uncertainty based on fuzzy set theory. They showed that
149 uncertainties in network input parameters lead to imprecise hydraulic responses. Implementing the
150 method in a real-time network revealed that a 15% change in the nodal demand and pipes'
151 roughness could result in -41.7% to +50.1% uncertainty in the pipe velocities and -11.2% to +6.4%
152 uncertainty in the nodal pressures.

153 Existing methods for assessing the seismic vulnerability of water pipe networks did not consider
154 the network uncertainties. Hence, a methodology was created in this study to investigate the effects
155 of water pipe network uncertainties on the seismic vulnerability assessment of the networks.

156 **METHODOLOGY**

157 The methodology includes seven steps: uncertainty identification and quantification, design of
158 experiments, integrated multi-physics modeling, seismic repair rate calculations, Monte Carlo
159 simulation, statistical analysis of the data (ANOVA test and Tukey Test), and sensitivity analysis.

160 Figure 1 demonstrates the methodology adopted for this study.

161 **Uncertainty Identification and Quantification**

162 Sources of water pipe network uncertainties were identified and quantified based on the literature.
163 Probability and possibility models were used to characterize pipe network uncertainties. Table 1
164 summarizes the previous efforts to characterize the network uncertainties. Normal and uniform
165 distributions were two widely used probability models (Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al. 2013; Lansey
166 et al. 2001). Alternatively, fuzzy logic was used as a possibility model (Sabzkouhi and Haghghi
167 2016; Shibu and Janga Reddy 2011).

168 Through a thorough literature review, three water pipe network uncertainties were selected: nodal
169 demand, pipe roughness coefficient, and reservoir head. These uncertainties are widely
170 acknowledged in the literature as critical sources of uncertainties for performance modeling and
171 analysis of the water pipe networks (Table 1). It is assumed nodal demands, pipe roughness
172 coefficient, and reservoir head to be normally distributed. The coefficient of variation (CoV) was
173 used to investigate the effect of uncertainty. CoV is the ratio between the mean and standard
174 deviation. The mean value associated with the selected three network parameters were considered
175 equals to the design value. The design value was collected from water distribution system research
176 database. The value of standard deviation was calculated using the mean and the assumed CoV.
177 The assumption of value of CoV was relaxed by conducting a sensitivity analysis to investigate
178 and determine the minimum value of CoV to have a statistically significant impact. The value of
179 CoV was initially assumed to be 0.2 (Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al. 2013; Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al.
180 2011). The initial value of CoV was selected based on Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al. (2013) and
181 Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al. (2011). Later, different values of CoV were used to conduct the
182 sensitivity analysis.

183 **Design of Experiments**

184 The experiments were designed as a full factorial design. Each of the three parameters considered
185 in this study was studied at two levels: including uncertainty and excluding uncertainty. The levels
186 were coded as +1 (including uncertainties) and -1 (excluding uncertainties). The +1 (including
187 uncertainties) were the experiments considering normal distribution using mean values plus one
188 standard deviation and mean minus one standard deviation of uncertainties. The -1 (excluding
189 uncertainties) were performed considering the mean values. Table 2 shows selected water pipe
190 network uncertainties with their levels for the experiment.

191 It is essential to analyze all the two-factor interactions to identify the effects of all three selected
192 water pipe network uncertainties. Therefore, a 2^3 full factorial design was chosen for this
193 experiment. The coded design for the experiment is shown in Table 3.

194 **Seismic Repair Rate Calculation**

195 Figure 2 illustrates the steps to calculate the seismic repair rate for each pipe.

196 At the beginning of the seismic repair rate calculation, an earthquake scenario was identified based
197 on deaggregation analysis using USGS (2018b) considering the spatial relationship among seismic
198 intensities (Zanini et al. 2017; Zanini et al. 2016; Weatherill et al. 2013; Jayaram and Baker 2009;
199 Adachi 2007). Deaggregation maps were generated using USGS (2018b). Deaggregation analysis
200 was conducted using the spectral acceleration of 1.0-s. The earthquake that had the highest
201 percentage of contribution was selected from the deaggregation analysis.

202 Next, for the selected earthquake scenario, peak ground velocity (PGV) was determined. PGV was
203 used as the intensity parameter because of its direct relationship with the induced transient strains
204 in the soil during a seismic event. These induced strains are major causes of underground pipe
205 damages (Pineda-Porras and Najafi 2010).

206 A spatially correlated peak ground velocity field was produced using the ground motion prediction
207 equation (GMPE) (Abrahamson and Silva 2007, Zanini et al. 2016, Zanini et al. 2017). The general
208 equation is given by Eq. (1).

209 $\log_{10} (PGV_{ab}) = f(M_a, R_{ab}, \theta_a) + \sigma_B v_a + \sigma_w \varepsilon_{ab}$ (1)

210 where PGV_{ab} = value of peak ground velocity at location b from source a ; R_{ab} = distance between
211 location a and location b ; M_a = earthquake magnitude; θ_a = fault geological parameters at location

212 *a.* $\sigma_B v_a$ is the interevent residual, and $\sigma_w \varepsilon_{ab}$ is the intra-event residual. Initially, the peak ground
 213 velocity map, i.e., $f(M_a, R_{ab}, \theta_a)$ was created based on Abrahamson and Silva (2007). A peak
 214 ground velocity map was created using the scenario shake map calculator (Field et al. 2005). In
 215 the following step, the interevent and intra-event variabilities were incorporated in this map. E_{ab}
 216 and v_a are random variables with normal distribution which has a mean value (K) of 0 and standard
 217 deviations of σ_B and σ_w . The value of ε_{ab} was calculated using Eq. (2) (Zanini et al. 2016;
 218 Weatherill et al. 2013).

219
$$\varepsilon = K + \mathbf{Z}^* \mathbf{L} \quad (2)$$

220 where $K = 0$; \mathbf{L} = Lower triangular matrix; \mathbf{Z} = vector of random variables with normal distribution.
 221 The value of \mathbf{L} was calculated by applying the Cholesky decomposition method, such that $\mathbf{L} \mathbf{L}^T = \mathbf{P}$. \mathbf{P} is the positive-definite covariance matrix. The value of \mathbf{P} can be calculated using Eq. (3).

223
$$\mathbf{P} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 6(d_{1,2}) & \cdots & 6(d_{1,N}) \\ \vdots & 1 & \cdots & 6(d_{2,N}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ sym & \vdots & \cdots & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

224 where $6(d_{a,b})$ is a correlation coefficient between intra-event residuals for location a and location
 225 b . N is the total number of locations. The value of $6(d_{a,b})$ can be calculated using Eq. (4) (Jayaram
 226 and Baker 2009).

227
$$6(d_{a,b}) = e^{\left(\frac{-3d_{a,b}}{h}\right)} \quad (4)$$

228 where $d_{a,b}$ = distance between location a and location b . h is the intersite distance among which
 229 spatial relationships can be neglected. According to Wang and Takada (2005), when peak ground
 230 velocity is used to calculate spatial correlation, the value of h can be considered between 20 km to
 231 40 km. For this study, the value of h was selected to be 30 km. This process was repeated for M
 232 times to create M random peak ground velocity fields (Zanini et al. 2017). The value of PGV for
 233 each pipe was calculated. Seismic pipe repair rates were then determined based on ALA (2001)
 234 using Eq. (5).

235
$$RR_{k,m} = C * 0.00187 * PGV_{k,m} \quad (5)$$

236 where $RR_{k,m}$ is the seismic repair rate per 1000 ft of pipe k for the m th seismic PGV field, C is the
 237 modification factor, and $PGV_{k,m}$ is the peak ground velocity at the location of pipe k for the m th

238 seismic PGV field (in./s). The modification factor (C) adjusts the value of the repair rate
239 considering the corrosivity of soil, pipe diameter, pipe material, and pipe joint characteristics.

240 **Integrated Multi-physics Modeling and Monte Carlo Simulation**

241 System Serviceability Index (SSI) database was created using Monte Carlo simulation. SSI is a
242 post-earthquake serviceability indicator that measures the serviceability of a water network after a
243 seismic event. SSI is the ratio between demand fulfilled after a seismic incident and the total
244 demand of the network at the regular operational period (Wang et al. 2010; Shi 2006). For this
245 study, it was assumed that the demand is fulfilled at a node if the pressure at that node is more than
246 a threshold pressure. Using the definitions, SSI is formulated as Eq. (6).

247
$$SSI = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{TN} x_n * D_n}{\sum_{n=1}^{TN} D_n} \quad (6)$$

248 subject to

249
$$x_n = 1 \text{ if } P_n \geq P_{threshold}$$

250
$$x_n = 0 \text{ if } P_n < P_{threshold}$$

251 where SSI is the system serviceability index; D_n is the demand at node n ; TN is the nodes in the
252 network; $P_{threshold}$ is the minimum pressure required at the node, which is selected by the demand
253 for firefighting, and P_n is the pressure at node n . Hydraulic pressure of 20 psi (0.14 MPa) was used
254 as the $P_{threshold}$ (Trautman et al. 2013).

255 Seismic damages (breaks and leaks) were modeled using the Poisson process. The location of the
256 p^{th} damage (break or leak) in a pipe k was determined by Eq. (7).

257
$$l_{k,p} = l_{k,p-1} - \frac{1}{RR_{k,m}} * \ln(1 - Q1) \quad \text{where } l_{k,0} = 0 \quad (7)$$

258 where $l_{k,p}$ is the distance of p^{th} damage (break or leak) in pipe k from its start node, $RR_{k,m}$ is the
259 seismic repair rate of pipe k , and $Q1$ is a uniformly distributed random number. The value of $Q1$
260 ranges from 0 to 1. If the distance of initial damage (break or leak), i.e., $l_{k,1}$ was less than the total
261 length of pipe k , then another random number ($Q2$) between 0 and 1 was generated. The value of
262 $Q2$ classifies the damage as either a leak or a break. If the value of $Q2$ was not more than 0.8, it
263 was considered a leak; otherwise, it was considered a break (Shi 2006). The diameter of each leak
264 was determined by further classifying those leaks based on Shi (2006).

265 The process can be explained using the following numerical example. Let's assume a 300-feet
266 ductile iron pipe (Pipe p) and a repair rate of 0.02 in/s. A uniformly distributed random number
267 ($Q1$) between 0 and 1 was generated. Let's assume the number is 0.001. The value of $l_{k,p}$ for the
268 first iteration ($l_{k,1}$) is 50.01 feet using Eq. (7) ($l_{k,0} = 0$). The value of $l_{k,1}$ is less than the total
269 length of the pipe. So, another uniformly distributed random number ($Q2$) between 0 and 1 is
270 generated. Let's assume 0.5 as the value of $Q2$. As the value of $Q2$ is less than 0.8, this is a leak.
271 To calculate the diameter of the leak, another uniformly distributed random number was generated
272 between 0 and 1. The leak scenario was then classified into five categories based on the random
273 number and pipe material: annular disengagement, round crack, longitudinal crack, local loss of
274 pipe wall, and local tear of pipe wall. The diameter of the leaks was then calculated based on Shi
275 (2006). This process was repeated until the value of $l_{k,p}$ is more than the total length of the pipe.

276 After locating all the damages (breaks and leaks) and determining the diameters of all leaks for
277 each pipe of the network for the present Monte Carlo simulation, the damages (breaks and leaks)
278 were combined into the hydraulic model of the original network. Pressure at each node (P_n) was
279 determined. Pressure-driven steady-state hydraulic analysis was used to calculate the pressure at
280 each node. The demand-driven analysis considers that the demand at every node is obtained, and
281 this consideration is not a valid consideration for water networks disrupted by seismic events (Shi
282 2006; Cheung et al. 2005). To investigate the performance of actual networks after earthquakes,
283 the following two assumptions are necessary according to Shi (2006):

- 284 • water demand at each node is not always met. In other words, immediately after the
285 earthquake, demand of every node cannot be met fully due to leaks and breaks in the pipe.
- 286 • nodes cannot have negative pressure.

287 These two assumptions are necessary to investigate the performance of a water pipe network as
288 they imitate the performance of actual networks after earthquakes (Shi 2006). An open-source
289 package software, EPANET 2.0, was used for the pressure-driven steady-state hydraulic analysis.
290 This software is recommended by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for hydraulic
291 simulation of water networks. For every run of the Monte Carlo simulation, the following steps
292 were followed:

- 293 1) Analyzing hydraulic model of the network including seismic damages (breaks and leaks)
- 294 2) Removing any nodes having negative pressure

295 3) Step 1 and step 2 were repeated if there is any node with negative pressure.

296 Hydraulic pressure at each node (P_n) was calculated and recorded. SSI was calculated based on
297 the demand at available nodes after removing all nodes with negative pressure for the predefined
298 maximum Monte Carlo runs using Eq. (8):

299
$$SSI_r = \frac{1}{M} * \sum_{m=1}^M SSI_m \quad (8)$$

300 where SSI_r is the average value of SSI for r^{th} Monte Carlo simulation; SSI_m is the value of SSI
301 calculated using Eq. (6) for the m^{th} PGV field; M is the total number of PGV fields generated for
302 the selected earthquake scenario.

303 The value of SSI for each Monte Carlo run was then recorded to create the SSI database. The SSI
304 database was used for statistical analysis (ANOVA test and Tukey test). The steps of the Monte
305 Carlo simulation to create the database are shown in Figure 3.

306 **Statistical Analysis of the SSI Database**

307 The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the Tukey test were used for statistical analysis
308 of the SSI database. ANOVA is a statistical tool that determines any significant difference between
309 the means of SSI of individual experiment groups. The following null hypothesis is tested:

310
$$H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2 = \mu_3 = \dots = \mu_k \quad (9)$$

311 where μ is the mean of the individual experiment group, and k is the total number of individual
312 experiment groups. If the result is significant from the ANOVA test, the null hypothesis is rejected,
313 which implies that a minimum of two individual experiment groups are statistically different from
314 each other.

315 The one-way ANOVA cannot determine which specific experiment groups are statistically
316 different from each other. A Tukey test was performed to determine which particular groups
317 differed from each other.

318 **APPLICATION AND RESULTS**

319 Two different networks were selected to demonstrate the application of the methodology. The first
320 network was the New York Tunnel network (Water Distribution System Research Database),
321 having 42 pipes, 19 junctions, and one reservoir. The second network was the Oberlin network
322 (Water Distribution System Research Database), having 289 pipes, 262 junctions, and one

323 reservoir. The Oberlin network is in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. These two networks were available
324 to download from an open-source website. These two networks were selected from two different
325 classification of networks: medium size networks and large size networks. We demonstrated the
326 application of the methodology on two different classifications of networks to identify the impacts
327 of network uncertainties on seismic vulnerability assessment of different classification of
328 networks.

329 The material of pipes having diameters less than 12 inches (300 mm) was assumed to be cast iron.
330 The joint type for the cast-iron pipe was considered lead joints. If the diameter of the pipes were
331 greater than 12 inches (300 mm), then the material was ductile iron. The joint type for the ductile
332 iron pipe was considered rubber-gasketed joints. These assumptions were necessary to calculate
333 the pipe repair rate based on ALA (2001). The pipe modification factor (C) depends on the types
334 of material and joint type. The mean value and standard deviation of the selected three normally
335 distributed network uncertainties were not impacted by this assumption of pipe material. These
336 values were selected based on network design values.

337 In order to select an earthquake scenario to thoroughly analyze the impact of uncertainties on the
338 seismic vulnerability assessment, networks' centroid was presumed to be in Pasadena, California
339 (34.146267° N, 118.144040° W) for the deaggregation analysis. Deaggregation analysis was
340 conducted using USGS (2018b). For the deaggregation analysis, the return period was selected to
341 be 2,475 years. From the deaggregation results conducted in Pasadena, California, an earthquake
342 at the Raymond fault was selected as the scenario earthquake (magnitude 7.13) for this study as it
343 had the highest contribution ratio (13.96%).

344 In the following step, a peak ground velocity field was generated using scenario shake-map
345 calculator (Abrahamson and Silva 2007; Field et al. 2005). Inter-event and intra-event residuals
346 were not considered in the shake-map calculator. The generated peak ground velocity field is
347 shown in Figure 5. Figure 6 shows the same peak ground velocity field magnified to the scale of
348 the network for New York Tunnel network. Figure 7 shows the peak ground velocity field
349 magnified to the scale of the network for Oberlin network.

350 Each junction and four equally spaced nodes along the length of each pipe were chosen to generate
351 the intra-event and inter-event residuals. These residual vectors were combined with a peak ground
352 velocity field to generate twenty random PGVs ($M=20$). The value of M was selected based on

353 literature (Zanini et al. 2016; Zanini et al. 2017; Shahandashti and Pudasaini 2019). The average
354 PGV was quantified for each pipe using the PGV determined at the start junction of the pipe, at
355 the end junction of the pipe, and four intermediate points along the pipe. The average PGV of each
356 pipe was then used to measure the SSI of the network.

357 A convergence study was conducted to determine the suitable number of Monte Carlo runs (Figure
358 8). Oberlin network (Water Distribution System Operations) was selected to conduct the
359 convergence study. Experiment 8, for the selected earthquake, was selected for the convergence
360 study. The same number of Monte Carlo runs that was found from the convergence study was used
361 both for both New York Tunnel network and the Oberlin network (Water Distribution System
362 Operations). From the convergence study result shown in Figure 8, it was concluded that 3000
363 Monte Carlo runs were sufficient for this study.

364 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted (considering a 5% level of significance) to determine if
365 the experimental results were statistically significant. Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the mean
366 and variance of SSI for each experiment for the New York Tunnel network and Oberlin network,
367 respectively.

368 For the ANOVA test, a null hypothesis (H_0) and an alternative hypothesis (H_1) were selected.

369 Null hypothesis, $H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2 = \dots = \mu_8$

370 Alternative hypothesis, H_1 : Not all μ are equal

371 Level of Significance: 5%

372 From the ANOVA test results, the p -values for New York Tunnel and Oberlin networks were
373 much less than 0.05. Therefore, there were significant differences between the means of SSI in
374 different groups or different experiments. The ANOVA test could not determine which specific
375 experiments were statistically different from each other. It only implies that at least two
376 experiments were. The Tukey test that is often used for multiple pairwise comparisons was
377 conducted to determine which experiments have significantly different means. As this study was
378 only considering the effects of uncertainty, the Tukey test was conducted only for seven pairs,
379 comparing no-uncertainty experiment (Com_Exp 1) with the other experiments: (Com_Exp 1,
380 Com_Exp 2); (Com_Exp 1, Com_Exp 3); (Com_Exp 1, Cop_Exp 4); (Com_Exp 1, Com_Exp 5);
381 (Com_Exp 1, Com_Exp 6); (Com_Exp 1, Com_Exp 7); (Com_Exp 1, Com_Exp 8). Table 6 and

382 Table 7 summarize the results of the Tukey test for the New York Tunnel network and Oberlin
383 network, respectively.

384 The Tukey test results of both the New York Tunnel network and Oberlin network show that
385 demand uncertainty (Com_Exp 2) and pipe roughness coefficient uncertainty (Com_Exp 3) do not
386 have statistically significant individual effects; the null hypothesis could not be rejected. For all
387 other pairwise comparisons, the null hypothesis was rejected, and it was concluded that the effects
388 of uncertainty are significant considering a 5% level of significance.

389 From the ANOVA and Tukey test results, it can be concluded that uncertainty of demand and pipe
390 roughness coefficient uncertainty do not have statistically significant effects. On the other hand,
391 the effects of reservoir head uncertainty are statistically significant. The combined effect of the
392 three selected water pipe network uncertainties is statistically significant for the selected value of
393 CoV. In the next part of the study, sensitivity analysis was conducted to find the minimum value
394 of CoV to create a statistically significant effect.

395 **SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS**

396 Sensitivity analysis was conducted to find the minimum value of the coefficient of variation (CoV)
397 for which water pipe network uncertainties were statistically significant. Sensitivity analysis was
398 divided into three major parts based on the effect of water pipe network uncertainties:

- 399 (i) Effect of uncertainties in demand, pipe roughness coefficient, and reservoir head
400 individually
- 401 (ii) Combined effects of uncertainties in
 - 402 (a) demand and pipe roughness coefficient;
 - 403 (b) pipe roughness coefficient and reservoir head;
 - 404 (c) demand and reservoir head
- 405 (iii) Combined effect of uncertainties in demand, reservoir head, and pipe roughness
406 coefficient

407 **Effect of Individual Water Pipe Network Uncertainties**

408 All three water pipe network uncertainties were studied individually for both networks. The results
409 for both the networks are shown graphically in Table 8.

410 From the sensitivity test result of both the networks, the minimum value of CoV for reservoir head
411 uncertainty is 0.01, indicating that a small uncertainty in reservoir head results in a statistically
412 significant SSI change in both networks. By contrast, the CoV value for uncertainties in nodal
413 demand and pipe roughness has to be quite large, more than the 0.2 value assumed in the literature
414 (Seifollahi-Aghmiuni et al. 2013), to significantly affect mean SSI.

415 **Joint Effect of Water Pipe Network Uncertainties**

416 Two water pipe network uncertainties were considered together here:

417 (i) Joint effect of uncertainties in demand and pipe roughness coefficient
418 (ii) Joint effect of uncertainties in pipe roughness coefficient and reservoir head
419 (iii) Joint effect of uncertainties in demand and reservoir head

420 While considering the joint effect of water pipe network uncertainties, the selected two parameters
421 (among demand, pipe roughness coefficient, and reservoir head) were considered normally
422 distributed. The other parameter was considered equal to the mean value associated with that. The
423 The analysis result of all three sections for both the networks are shown graphically from Figure
424 9(a) to Figure 9(f). The marked zone indicates the area inside which the joint effect of the water
425 pipe network uncertainties is not statistically significant.

426 Figure 9(a) and Figure 9(b) show that the minimum value of CoV for either uncertainty of demand
427 or uncertainty of pipe roughness coefficient has to be high to results in a statistically significant
428 change in SSI for both networks. By contrast, while checking the combined effects with reservoir
429 head, the minimum value of CoV does not depend on the pipe roughness coefficient or demand to
430 result in statistically significant SSI change for both networks as the value of SSI changes for any
431 uncertainty in reservoir head.

432 **Combined Effect of Three Water Pipe Network Uncertainties**

433 All three water pipe network uncertainties were considered here. The results of the sensitivity
434 analysis for both the networks are shown in Figure 10(a) and Figure 10(b). The marked zone
435 indicates the zone inside which the combined effect of the water pipe network uncertainties is not
436 statistically significant.

437 Figure 10(a) and Figure 10(b) show that the minimum value of CoV to have a statistically
438 significant effect on the value of SSI does not depend on the uncertainty of demand and pipe

439 roughness coefficient. A small uncertainty in reservoir head results in a statistically significant
440 change in SSI for both networks.

441 CONCLUSIONS

442 A methodology has been proposed to identify the effects of water pipe network uncertainties on
443 seismic vulnerability assessment of networks. Three water pipe network uncertainties were
444 selected: uncertainties in nodal demand, reservoir head, pipe roughness coefficient. Two different
445 networks were used to apply the proposed methodology.

446 The statistical analysis results show that the individual effect of uncertainty of demand and
447 uncertainty of pipe roughness coefficient on seismic vulnerability assessment of water pipe
448 networks can be ignored for the fixed value of coefficient of variation ($CoV = 0.2$). On the contrary,
449 the individual effect of uncertainty of reservoir head is statistically significant for the selected
450 value of CoV ($CoV = 0.2$). The combined effect of uncertainty of the selected water pipe network
451 uncertainties on the post-earthquake serviceability is statistically significant.

452 Based on the results from sensitivity analysis, the individual effect of uncertainty of reservoir head
453 on seismic vulnerability assessment is found to be statically significant, even at low levels of
454 uncertainty (minimum value of $CoV = 0.01$). By contrast, the individual effects of demand and
455 pipe roughness coefficient uncertainties are statistically significant for higher levels of
456 uncertainties (CoV ranges from 0.03 to 1).

457 Based on the results of statistical analysis and sensitivity analysis, it can be concluded that selected
458 water pipe network uncertainties have statistically significant effects on the post-earthquake
459 serviceability. Therefore, it is highly recommended that water pipe network uncertainties be
460 integrated with seismic vulnerability assessment of water pipe networks. Future studies are
461 recommended to investigate the impact of other water pipe network uncertainties that were not
462 considered in this study.

463 The results correspond to a single high-intensity scenario selected based on deaggregation analysis.
464 Further analysis is recommended to identify whether these parameters remain statistically
465 significant in case the earthquake randomness is considered.

466 DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

467 Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available from the
468 corresponding author upon reasonable request.

469 **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

470 This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant
471 CMMI-1926792. Hence, the authors are grateful to the National Science Foundation for this
472 support.

473 **REFERENCES**

474 Abrahamson, N. A., & Silva, W. J. (2007). "Abrahamson-Silva NGA ground motion relations for
475 the geometric mean horizontal component of peak and spectral ground motion
476 parameters." *Berkeley, CA: Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center, Univ. of California*.

477 Adachi, T. (2007). *Impact of cascading failures on performance assessment of civil infrastructure*
478 *systems* (Doctoral dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology).

479 ALA (American Lifelines Alliance). (2001). *Seismic fragility formulations for water*
480 *systems*. Washington, DC: ALA.

481 Bargiela, A., & Hainsworth, G. D. (1989). "Pressure and flow uncertainty in
482 water systems." *Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management*, 115(2), 212-229.

483 Boskabadi, A., Rosenberger, J. M., & Shahandashti, M. (2020). A Two-Stage Stochastic
484 Programming Approach for Enhancing Seismic Resilience of Water Pipe Networks. In IIE Annual
485 Conference. Proceedings (pp. 495-500). Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineers (IISE).

486 Braun, M., Piller, O., Deuerlein, J., Mortazavi, I., & Iollo, A. (2020). "Uncertainty quantification
487 of water age in water supply systems by use of spectral propagation." *Journal*
488 *of Hydroinformatics*, 22(1), 111-120.

489 Cheung, P., J. E. Van Zyl, and R. L. F. Reis. (2005). "Extension of EPANET for pressure driven
490 demand modeling in water distribution system." In Vol. 1 of Proc., Int. Conf. Computer and
491 Control in Water Industry, 203–208. Exeter, UK: Univ. of Exeter.

492 Christodoulou, S. E., and Fragiadakis, M. (2015). "Vulnerability assessment of water distribution
493 networks considering performance data." *Journal of Infrastructure Systems*, 21(2), 04014040.

494 Cubrinovski, M., Bradley, B., Wotherspoon, L., Green, R., Bray, J., Wood, C., & Taylor, M.
495 (2011). "Geotechnical aspects of the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake." *Bulletin of the*
496 *New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering*, 44(4), 205-226.

497 Datta, S. K., Shah, A. H., & Wong, K. C. (1984). "Dynamic stresses and displacements in buried
498 pipe." *Journal of engineering mechanics*, 110(10), 1451-1466.

499 Dongre, S. R., & Gupta, R. (2017). "Optimal design of water distribution network under hydraulic
500 uncertainties." *ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems, Part A: Civil Engineering*, 3(3), G4017001.

502 Eidinger, J. M., & Avila, E. A. (Eds.). (1999). *Guidelines for the seismic evaluation and upgrade*
503 *of water transmission facilities* (Vol. 15). ASCE Publications.

504 Farahmandfar, Z., Piratla, K. R., and Andrus, R. D. (2017). "Resilience evaluation of water supply
505 networks against seismic hazards." *Journal of Pipeline Systems Engineering and Practice*, 8(1),
506 04016014.

507 Field, E. H., Seligson, H. A., Gupta, N., Gupta, V., Jordan, T. H., and Campbell, K. W.
508 (2005). "Loss estimates for a Puente Hills blind-thrust earthquake in Los
509 Angeles, California." *Earthquake Spectra*, 21(2), 329–338.

510 Fragiadakis, M., and Christodoulou, S. E. (2014). "Seismic reliability assessment of urban water
511 networks." *Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics*, 43, 357-374.

512 Fragiadakis, M., Christodoulou, S. E., and Vamvatsikos, D. (2013). "Reliability assessment of
513 urban water distribution networks under seismic loads." *Water Resources Management*, 27(10),
514 3739-3764.

515 Haghghi, A., & Asl, A. Z. (2014). "Uncertainty analysis of water supply networks using the fuzzy
516 set theory and NSGA-II." *Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence*, 32, 270-282.

517 Honegger, D. G., and R. T. Eguchi. (1992). "Determination of the relative vulnerabilities to
518 seismic damage for San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) water transmission pipelines."
519 Washington, DC: FEMA.

520 Hosseini, M. and Tahamouli Roudsari, M. (2010). "A study on the effects of surface transverse
521 waves on buried steel pipelines considering the nonlinear behavior of soil and pipes." *Proc. of the*
522 *ASCE Pipelines 2010 Conference*, Keystone, Colorado, pp.1078-1087.

523 Huang, J. J., McBean, E. A., & James, W. (2008). Multi-objective optimization for monitoring
524 sensor placement in water distribution systems. In *Water Distribution Systems Analysis*
525 *Symposium 2006* (pp. 1-14).

526 Jayaram, N., and J. W. Baker. (2009). "Correlation model for spatially distributed ground-motion
527 intensities." *Earthquake Eng. Struct. Dyn.* 38 (15): 1687–1708.

528 Kang, D., & Lansey, K. (2009). "Real-time demand estimation and confidence limit
529 analysis for water distribution systems." *Journal of Hydraulic Engineering*, 135(10), 825-837.

530 Kapelan, Z. S., Savic, D. A., & Walters, G. A. (2005). "Multi objective design of water distribution
531 systems under uncertainty." *Water Resources Research*, 41(11).

532 Knight, B. (2017). Mexico City earthquake reconnaissance – day 3. *What's Happening*.
533 Retrieved from <http://www.wrkengrs.com/mexico-city-earthquake-reconnaissance-day-4/>

534 Lansey, K. E., Duan, N., Mays, L. W., & Tung, Y. K. (1989). "Water distribution system
535 design under uncertainties." *Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management*, 115(5), 630-
536 645.

537 Lansey, K. E., El-Shorbagy, W., Ahmed, I., Araujo, J., & Haan, C. T. (2001). "Calibration
538 assessment and data collection for water distribution networks." *Journal of Hydraulic
539 Engineering*, 127(4), 270-279.

540 Liu, A. W., Hu, Y. X., Zhao, F. X., Li, X. J., Takada, S., & Zhao, L. (2004). "An equivalent-
541 boundary method for the shell analysis of buried pipelines under fault movement." *Acta
542 Seismologica Sinica*, 17(1), 150-156.

543 Luco, J. E., & De Barros, F. C. P. (1994). "Seismic response of a cylindrical shell embedded in a
544 layered viscoelastic half-space. I: Formulation." *Earthquake engineering & structural
545 dynamics*, 23(5), 553-567.

546 Maruyama, Y., K. Kimishima, and F. Yamazaki. (2011). "Damage assessment of buried pipes due
547 to the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in Japan." *J. Earthquake Tsunami* 5 (1): 57–70.

548 Mazumder, R. K., Fan, X., Salman, A. M., Li, Y., and Yu, X. (2020a). "Framework for seismic
549 damage and renewal cost analysis of buried water pipelines." *Journal of Pipeline Systems
550 Engineering and Practice*, 11(4), 04020038.

551

552 Mazumder, R. K., Salman, A. M., Li, Y., and Yu, X. (2020b). "Seismic functionality and resilience
553 analysis of water distribution systems." *Journal of Pipeline Systems Engineering and Practice*,
554 11(1), 04019045.

555 Melissianos, V. E., Korakitis, G. P., Gantes, C. J., & Bouckovalas, G. D. (2016). "Numerical
556 evaluation of the effectiveness of flexible joints in buried pipelines subjected to strike-slip fault
557 rupture." *Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering*, 90, 395-410.

558 Newmark, N. M., & Rosenblueth, E. (1971). "Fundamentals of Earthquake Engineering. Prentice-
559 Hall, Inc." *Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey*.

560 O'Rourke, T.D. (1996). "Lessons learned for lifeline engineering from major urban earthquakes."
561 In *Proc., 11th World Conf. of Earthquake Engineering*. Tokyo: International Association for
562 Earthquake Engineering.

563 O'Rourke, T. D., S. S. Jeon, S. Toprak, M. Cubrinovski, M. Hughes, S. Van Ballegooij, and
564 D. Bouziou. (2014). "Earthquake response of underground pipeline networks in Christchurch,
565 NZ." *Earthquake Spectra* 30 (1): 183–204.

566 Pandey, P., Dongre, S., & Gupta, R. (2020). "Probabilistic and fuzzy approaches for uncertainty
567 consideration in water distribution networks—a review." *Water Supply*, 20(1), 13-27.

568 Pineda-Porras, O., and Najafi, M. (2010). "Seismic Damage Estimation for Buried
569 Pipelines: Challenges after Three Decades of Progress." *Journal of Pipeline Systems Engineering
570 and Practice*, 1(1), 19–24.

571 Piratla, K. R., Yerri, S. R., Yazdekhasti, S., Cho, J., Koo, D., & Matthews, J.C. (2015).
572 "Empirical analysis of water-main failure consequences." *Procedia Engineering*, 118, 727–734.

573 Pudasaini, B., & Shahandashti, S. M. (2018). "Identification of critical pipes for
574 proactive resource-constrained seismic rehabilitation of water pipe networks." *Journal of
575 Infrastructure Systems*, 24(4), 04018024.

576 Pudasaini, B., & Shahandashti, M. (2020a). Topological surrogates for computationally efficient
577 seismic robustness optimization of water pipe networks. *Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure
578 Engineering*, 35(10), 1101-1114.

579 Pudasaini, B., & Shahandashti, S. M. (2020b). Seismic Resilience Enhancement of Water Pipe
580 Networks Using Hybrid Metaheuristic Optimization. In *Pipelines 2020* (pp. 428-436). Reston,
581 VA: American Society of Civil Engineers.

582 Pudasaini, B., Shahandashti, S. M., & Razavi, M. (2017). "Identifying critical links in
583 water supply systems subject to various earthquakes to support inspection and renewal decision
584 making." *Computing in Civil Engineering*, 2017, 231– 238.

585 Saberi, M., Halabian, A. M., & Vafaian, M. (2011). "Numerical analysis of buried steel pipelines
586 under earthquake excitations." In *Pan-Am CGS Geotechnical Conference*.

587 Sabzkouhi, A. M., & Haghghi, A. (2016). "Uncertainty analysis of pipe-network hydraulics
588 using a many-objective particle swarm optimization". *Journal of Hydraulic Engineering*, 142(9),
589 04016030.

590 Scawthorn, C., Eidinger, J. M., & Schiff, A. (Eds.). (2005). *Fire following earthquake* (Vol. 26).
591 ASCE Publications.

592 Seifollahi-Aghmiuni, S., Haddad, O. B., Omid, M. H., & Mariño, M. A. (2013). "Effects of
593 pipe roughness uncertainty on water distribution network performance during its operational
594 period." *Water resources management*, 27(5), 1581-1599.

595 Seifollahi-Aghmiuni, S., Haddad, O. B., Omid, M. H., & Mariño, M. A. (2011). "Long-term
596 efficiency of water networks with demand uncertainty." In *Proceedings of the Institution of Civil
597 Engineers-Water Management* (Vol. 164, No. 3, pp. 147-159). Thomas Telford Ltd.

598 Shahandashti, S. M., & Pudasaini, B. (2019). "Proactive seismic rehabilitation decision-
599 making for water pipe networks using simulated annealing." *Natural Hazards Review*, 20(2),
600 04019003.

601 Shi, P. (2006). *Seismic response modeling of water supply systems*. Ithaca, NY:
602 Cornell University.

603 Shibu, A., & Reddy, M. J. (2011). "Uncertainty analysis of water distribution networks by fuzzy-
604 cross entropy approach." *World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology*, 59, 494-502.

605 Singhal, A. C., & Zuroff, M. S. (1990). "Analysis of underground and underwater space frames
606 with slip joints." *Computers & structures*, 35(3), 227-237.

607 Sivakumar, P., Prasad, R. K., & Chandramouli, S. (2016). "Uncertainty analysis of looped water
608 distribution networks using linked EPANET-GA method." *Water resources management*, 30(1),
609 331-358.

610 Thapa, B. R., H. Ishidaira, V. P. Pandey, and N. M. Shakya. (2016). "Impact assessment of Gorkha
611 earthquake 2015 on potable water supply in Kathmandu valley: Preliminary analysis." *J. Jpn. Soc.
612 Civ. Eng., Ser. B1 (Hydraul. Eng.)* 72 (4): I_61–I_66.

613 Trautman, C. H., M. M. Khater, T. D. O'Rourke, and M. D. Grigoriu. (2013). "Modeling
614 water supply systems for earthquake response analysis." In *Structures and stochastic methods*,
615 215. New York: Elsevier.

616 USGS. (2018a). "U.S. quaternary faults and folds database." Accessed May 10, 2020.
617 <https://usgs.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=5a6038b3a1684561a9b0aadf88412fcf>.

619 USGS. (2018b). "Unified hazard tool." Earthquake Hazards Program.
620 Accessed May 10, 2020. <https://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/interactive>.

621 Vazouras, P., Karamanos, S. A., & Dakoulas, P. (2010). "Finite element analysis of buried steel
622 pipelines under strike-slip fault displacements." *Soil Dynamics and Earthquake
623 Engineering*, 30(11), 1361-1376.

624 Wang, L. R., Pikul, R. R., & O'Rourke, M. J. (1982). "Imposed ground strain and buried
625 pipelines." *Journal of the Technical Councils of ASCE*, 108(2), 259-263.

626 Wang, M., and T. Takada. (2005). "Macrospatial correlation model of seismic ground motions."
627 *Earthquake Spectra* 21 (4): 1137–1156.

628 Wang, Y., Au, S.-K., & Fu, Q. (2010). "Seismic risk assessment and mitigation of water
629 supply systems." *Earthquake Spectra*, 26(1), 257–274.

630 Water Distribution System Operations. (2013). "Database." Accessed September 1, 2019.
631 <http://www.uky.edu/WDST/database.html>.

632 Weatherill, G., V. Silva, H. Crowley, and P. Bazzurro. (2013). "Exploring strategies for portfolio
633 analysis in probabilistic seismic loss estimation." In Proc., Vienna Congress on Recent Advances
634 in Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics, 28–30. Vienna, Austria: Vienna Univ. of
635 Technology.

636 Xu, C., & Goulter, I. C. (1998). "Probabilistic model for water distribution reliability." *Journal*
637 *of Water Resources Planning and Management*, 124(4), 218-228.

638 Yerri, S. R., Piratla, K. R., Matthews, J. C., Yazdekhasti, S., Cho, J., & Koo, D. (2017).
639 "Empirical analysis of large diameter water main break consequences." *Resources, Conservation,* and Recycling, 123, 242– 248.

640 *and Recycling*, 123, 242– 248.

641 Yoo, D. G., Jung, D., Kang, D., Kim, J. H., & Lansey, K. (2016). "Seismic hazard assessment
642 model for urban water supply networks." *Journal of Water Resources Planning and*
643 *Management*, 142(2), 04015055.

644 Zanini, M. A., C. Vianello, F. Faleschini, L. Hofer, and G. Maschio. (2016). "A framework for
645 probabilistic seismic risk assessment of NG distribution networks." *Chem. Eng. Trans.* 53: 163–
646 168.

647 Zanini, M. A., F. Faleschini, and C. Pellegrino. (2017). "Probabilistic seismic risk
648 forecasting of aging bridge networks." *Eng. Struct.* 136: 219–232.