

## Geospatial Vulnerability Framework for Identifying Water Infrastructure Inequalities

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**Abstract:** Recent infrastructure failures in the United States have brought attention to the ways and extent to which water security is unevenly distributed in urban areas. For many marginalized communities, infrastructure interdependencies (e.g., water, wastewater, stormwater, transportation) have created significant vulnerabilities in the face of aging or inadequate water treatment and delivery systems. In these communities, cascading failures precipitated by environmental hazards such as flooding often propagate across multiple infrastructure systems, sometimes resulting in poor water quality and/or lack of access to water for significant periods. However, little is known about how specific environmental and social factors combine with water infrastructure vulnerability and interdependencies to create enduring infrastructure inequalities. This paper presents a geospatial vulnerability framework for identifying water infrastructure inequalities, using the City of Tampa, Florida to demonstrate the framework. For this framework, we integrate GIS analysis of environmental hazards, a factor analytic model of socio-demographic data, and a network topology-based performance indicator for the water distribution network. The resulting framework models the environmental and social vulnerabilities, quantifies hydraulic vulnerability and infrastructure interdependence, and maps their distributions across the urban environment. We find that the highest levels of social and environmental vulnerabilities in Tampa are present in low-income areas and communities of color that have high hydraulic vulnerability and infrastructure interdependency, which creates pockets of low resilience capacity.

**Author Keywords:** Environmental hazards; Social vulnerability; Infrastructure interdependency; Water insecurity; Geographic information systems; Marginalized communities

1     **Introduction**

2         Access to a reliable and affordable supply of safe and clean water is essential for human  
3         wellbeing (UNESCO 2019). While continuous efforts through the United Nations Millennium  
4         Development Goals and, more recently, the Sustainable Development Goals, have succeeded in  
5         improving water quality and providing water access to millions of people globally (Dar and  
6         Khan 2011; UNICEF & WHO 2019), 2.1 billion people still lack access to potable water, mostly  
7         in developing countries (Mihelcic et al. 2017). At the same time, although high-income  
8         economies have made significant progress toward universal access to water through advances in  
9         treatment technologies and rapid expansion of water infrastructure networks (Sedlak 2014),  
10        recent infrastructure failures have exposed the growing problem of water insecurity for many  
11        marginalized communities in developed nations (Graham 2010). Recent studies in the U.S. and  
12        Canada, for example, reveal chronic and systemic failures of infrastructure systems and  
13        organizational management in communities of color, low-income communities in both urban  
14        (e.g., *colonias*) and rural (e.g., agricultural) settings as well as tribal communities (Allaire et al.  
15        2018; Butler et al. 2016; Deitz and Meehan 2019; Jepson and Vandewalle 2016; Leker and  
16        Gibson 2018; Meehan et al. 2020).

17        In metropolitan areas, these failures are often attributed to aging infrastructure, dwindling  
18        resources, and lack of political will to address problems in minority and high-poverty  
19        communities (AWWA 2018; Butler et al. 2017; Steele and Legacy 2017). For example, from  
20        2014-2015, lead leaching from municipal water pipes in Flint, Michigan exposed approximately  
21        99,000 residents of mostly low-income, minority communities to elevated levels of lead, *E. coli*,  
22        and *Legionella* bacteria (Clark 2018). In this case, dual failures of both infrastructure and its  
23        management were to blame (Pauli 2019). Moreover, as cities become smarter and more

24 connected, water and other utilities have become increasingly interdependent, creating a varied  
25 array of infrastructural vulnerabilities (Mohebbi et al. 2020). Water treatment and distribution  
26 failure, for instance, can be precipitated by power outages (electricity infrastructure) and road  
27 maintenance (transportation infrastructure). Research has shown that infrastructures in densely  
28 built environments are often physically interdependent because of their high degree of physical  
29 colocation (e.g., water/wastewater pipes and roadways), which makes them vulnerable to  
30 cascading failures (Abdel-Mottaleb and Zhang 2020). The social, economic, and political  
31 relations between infrastructure institutions coupled with the connectivity of information systems  
32 also result in social and cyber interdependencies that influence the resilience of infrastructures  
33 (Wells et al. 2019).

34 In many cases, the impacts of infrastructure failures reveal infrastructure inequalities between  
35 communities, particularly for marginalized populations in middle- and high-income economies  
36 (Deitz and Meehan 2019). In these settings, infrastructural conditions, interdependencies, and  
37 sociopolitical decisions intersect, leading to water inequalities and insecurity across socio-  
38 economic divides such as race, class, and citizenship (Switzer and Teodoro 2017). For instance,  
39 in border towns in south Texas, low-income migrants receive significantly inadequate water  
40 services (Jepson and Vandewalle 2016). Another study investigating the relationship between  
41 race and water services in North Carolina found that the probability of having community water  
42 services is lowest in census blocks with 100% Black residents (Leker and Gibson 2018). These  
43 examples join a growing number of studies that specifically recognize the social dimensions of  
44 hydraulic vulnerabilities (Linton and Budds 2014).

45 In addition to race and class inequities in the distribution of water provision, flooding from  
46 climate-induced extreme weather events has exposed the vulnerability of water infrastructures

47 (due to age and interdependencies) and further increase the severity of cascading failures,  
48 especially in coastal cities. For example, flooding (stormwater infrastructure) caused by  
49 Hurricane Katrina led to road closures (transportation infrastructure) and made it inaccessible to  
50 water and wastewater treatment facilities for repairs; over 1,000 drinking water supply systems  
51 and 172 wastewater treatment plants were impacted (Mohebbi et al. 2020). In such  
52 circumstances, studies have shown that low-income and minority groups disproportionately  
53 endure the burden of infrastructural failures. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, for instance, the  
54 poor in primarily Black, highly concentrated districts did not have an opportunity to escape and  
55 remained stranded in their homes without access to water (Scheper-Hughes 2005). Here, social  
56 and political systems intersected with environmental hazards to produce infrastructure  
57 inequalities.

58 In sum, a growing number of studies demonstrate many instances in which marginalized  
59 communities lack access to potable water or are forced to rely on inadequate infrastructure  
60 systems and processes, creating water service inequalities across racial and socioeconomic  
61 categories. Methodological innovations in quantitative and qualitative research, including  
62 geospatial approaches, are becoming increasingly useful for documenting these kinds of  
63 challenges (Jepson et al. 2017; Wutich et al. 2017; Young et al. 2019). However, there has been  
64 very little research examining the extent to which environmental, social, and infrastructural  
65 vulnerabilities synergistically contribute to water infrastructure inequalities that create  
66 intermittent (i.e., sporadic or periodic) water insecurity and low levels of resilience. The lack of  
67 understanding about the collective influence of these factors on the overall vulnerability of  
68 communities means state and non-state actors have limited capacity to assess the social and  
69 economic impacts of temporary infrastructural failures on local communities (Boin and

70 McConnell 2007). The significant challenge in evaluating the effects of infrastructural  
71 inequalities on society, then, lies in understanding the contexts in which these failures occur. To  
72 address this issue, in this study we use a network analysis approach to model water infrastructure  
73 vulnerability and situate it within the environmental and social context of an urban environment  
74 (the City of Tampa, Florida) using factor analysis within a geospatial framework. Our primary  
75 research question is, in what ways and to what extent are water infrastructure vulnerabilities  
76 associated with social and environmental vulnerabilities, and how can publicly available data be  
77 used to model these associations? The greater goal of this effort is to develop an analytical  
78 framework for producing actionable information that communities can use to explore and explain  
79 socio-hydraulic inequalities to policymakers.

80

## 81 **Methods**

### 82 *Study context*

83 Tampa is a ca. 150-year old, mid-sized, coastal city in the southeastern United States with a  
84 population of approximately 400,000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2019). Its location on Tampa Bay  
85 makes transportation, water, and stormwater infrastructure vulnerable to storm surge from the  
86 Gulf of Mexico (e.g., Weisberg and Zheng 2006). While the city has only experienced three  
87 direct hits from hurricanes over the past century (in 1921, 1960, and 1968), hurricanes elsewhere  
88 in the region and annual local tropical storms regularly cause significant flooding throughout the  
89 city and storm-force winds impact critical infrastructures including the power grid (Bigger et al.  
90 2009). These conditions threaten the city's aging water infrastructure (established in 1924),  
91 which draws on surface water from the Hillsborough River and serves over 620,000 connections  
92 within the city and adjacent regions (Park et al. 2010). During Hurricane Irma in 2017, for

93 instance, strong winds (up to 185 km/h) uprooted trees causing main breaks throughout the city  
94 that interrupted both water delivery and transportation. Similar to many U.S. cities of comparable  
95 size and age, deferred maintenance in the infrastructure network over the years has contributed to  
96 frequent infrastructure failures (Folkman 2018; Graham 2010; Patz et al. 2008). For example,  
97 city officials reported at least 1200 water main breaks between 2017 and 2018, normalized as 55  
98 breaks per 100 miles of pipeline per year (WFTS 2019). While the main breaks interrupted water  
99 services to many residents across the city, they also caused widespread flooding that closed  
100 roadways and temporarily displaced families.

101 As our research shows, many of these infrastructure failures occurred in Black and Hispanic  
102 communities characterized by high poverty and low homeownership rates, which we refer to as  
103 marginalized communities (Lehigh et al. 2020; Wakhungu 2020; Wells et al. 2020). Tampa has  
104 an overall poverty rate of 20% compared to the national average of 12% (U.S. Census Bureau  
105 2017). Likewise, homeownership in Tampa is 48%, which is below the national average of 64%.  
106 As of 2019, the racial composition of the city was 45% White, 26% Hispanic or Latino, and 24%  
107 Black (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). As in many metropolitan regions in the U.S., a large  
108 proportion of the low-income, minority population is concentrated in distinct neighborhoods  
109 (Curley 2005; Wilson 2012). The settlement pattern for marginalized communities in Tampa is  
110 partly an outcome of historical segregation laws that delineated neighborhoods based on race and  
111 ethnicity (Jackson 2020; Mirabal 1993), and has resulted in six marginalized communities in the  
112 eastern and western portions of the city: East Tampa, Jackson Heights, Ybor City, Sulphur  
113 Springs, West Tampa, and West Hyde Park.

114

115 ***Data modeling***

116 To understand how environmental, social, and infrastructural conditions intersect to create or  
117 amplify water insecurity in these Tampa communities, we draw on the place-based vulnerability  
118 framework of Cutter (1996), which accounts for three components of vulnerability:  
119 environmental, social, and infrastructure. We present our overall analytical framework in Fig. 1,  
120 which is described in more detail below.

121

122 [insert Figure 1 here]

123

124 ***Environmental Vulnerability***

125 While there are many factors that constitute “environmental vulnerability” (e.g., air and  
126 water quality, chemical exposure risk, etc.), for this study we characterize it as proximity to  
127 physical or environmental hazards such as floods, contaminated properties (e.g., brownfields),  
128 and hazardous waste following research reported by several studies that link these variables to  
129 marginalized communities (Borden et al. 2007; Cutter 1996; Cutter et al. 2008; Sapir and Lechat  
130 1986; Wisner et al. 2012). We also selected these factors because the data are publicly available  
131 in the United States and relatively easy to access, thus permitting reproduction of our analytical  
132 framework in other contexts. In this study, we combined quantitative modeling and GIS to assess  
133 the spatial distribution of environmental vulnerability using census block groups as the  
134 geographic units of analysis. We considered two drivers of environmental vulnerability for this  
135 coastal environment: flooding and proximity to brownfields and hazardous waste.

136 To compute a Flood Vulnerability Index (FVI) in ArcGIS Pro (Version 10.3, manufactured  
137 by ESRI), we relied on U.S. FEMA flood zone classification and data from the National Flood  
138 Hazard Layer (NFHL), created and maintained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

139 (2016). One-hundred-year flood zones or Special Flood Hazard Areas have a high probability of  
140 flooding. Thus, census block groups marked Zone A or Zone V (and their variants) were  
141 assigned a FVI score of (3), the highest in our classification. Census block groups in five-  
142 hundred-year flood zones (labeled Zone B or Zone X) have a moderate risk of flooding, and  
143 were assigned a FVI of (2). Census block groups in Zone C that have minimal risk of flooding  
144 were assigned a FVI of (1).

145 We also computed a Hazardous Waste Proximity Index (HWPI) for each census block group  
146 in the city using data obtained from the Florida Brownfields Redevelopment Atlas (Center for  
147 Brownfields Research and Redevelopment 2020), which records the locations of documented  
148 brownfields and Superfund sites in the state and includes hazardous waste disposal permit data  
149 from the U.S. EPA Environmental Justice Screening Tool (U.S. Environmental Protection  
150 Agency 2016). These data indicated the proximity of block groups to hazardous waste sites in  
151 percentiles. We used quartiles to classify these percentiles and assigned a HWPI score for each  
152 census block group. In the end, the flooding and hazardous waste proximity indices were  
153 aggregated with equal weighting into an Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI). While equal  
154 weighting makes sense in this case study (as indicated by simulations of different weights across  
155 the study area that produced similar results), this may not be the case in other places. Different  
156 weighting schemes may thus be appropriate elsewhere.

157

### 158 ***Social Vulnerability***

159 In addition to the environmental conditions discussed previously, the susceptibility to harm  
160 or potential social disruptions posed by hazardous events at a particular location are created by  
161 socio-economic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race, education, income, unemployment,

162 housing, disability, and household size) that limit the ability of people in a particular place to  
 163 respond and recover from hazards and disasters (Adger 2006; Borden et al. 2007; Cutter 1996;  
 164 Cutter et al. 2003, 2008). Vulnerability studies have shown that impacts of these environmental  
 165 hazards as well as infrastructure failures are also disproportionately located between social  
 166 categories (Bjarnadottir et al. 2011; Sweeney 2006). Drawing on the social dimension of the  
 167 place-based model (Cutter 1996), we evaluated the social vulnerability of census block groups in  
 168 Tampa, in which we view social vulnerability as the disproportionate inability to respond and  
 169 recover to environmental and infrastructural disruptions because of one's social position in  
 170 society (see Clark et al. 1998; Wisner et al. 2012). Table 1 provides a summary of significant  
 171 social factors used in our model that contribute to social vulnerability in Tampa.

172

173 **Table 1.** Social vulnerability variables

174

Variable	Source
<i>Social Class</i>	Adger (2006); Bjarnadottir et al. (2011);
%Households below Poverty Level	Cutter (1996); Cutter et al. (2008);
%Less than High School Diploma	Flanagan et al. (2011); Fothergill et al. (1999); Morrow (1999); Reid et al. (2009)
Population per Acre	
<i>Household Composition &amp; Sensitive Population</i>	Clark et al. (1998); Cutter et al. (2003); Flanagan et al. (2011); Morrow (1999); Reid et al. (2009); Tate (2013)
Average Household Size	
%Population under 14 years	
%Population over 64 years	
%Population 20-64 with Disability	
<i>Minority</i>	Clark et al. (1998); Flanagan et al. (2011); Fothergill et al. (1999); Sweeney (2006)
%Limited English-Speaking Households	
%Minority Race	
<i>Housing Tenure</i>	Borden et al. (2007); Clark et al. (1998); Deitz and Meehan (2019); Flanagan et al. (2011); Morrow (1999)
%Renter Occupied	
%Occupied Units	
%Multi-family Units	

*Quality of Life* Emrich (2005); Flanagan et al. (2011)  
 Travel Time to Work  
 %Households with No Internet Access

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175

176 The data for these variables were obtained from the 2016 American Community Survey  
 177 (with 2017-2019 updates) and the U.S. Census Bureau (2017). Some of the factors we  
 178 considered are similar to those used by the University of South Carolina and the Centers for  
 179 Disease Control and Prevention, which created social vulnerability indexes for the U.S. using  
 180 2010-2014 data at the county level. Similarly, we considered factors used by the Utility  
 181 Resilience Index (URI) of the American Water Works Association (AWWA 2013), which  
 182 examines vulnerabilities at the system level. For our index, however, we used the census block  
 183 group as the geographic unit of analysis because block groups are smaller and more homogenous  
 184 subdivisions of census tracts and provide a granular evaluation of social vulnerability in city  
 185 neighborhoods (see Harlan et al. 2012). Our social vulnerability model consisted of 14 variables  
 186 shown in Table 2. The descriptive statistics of the variables in Table 2 corresponded with recent  
 187 U.S. census data on social class, household composition, race, and housing tenure in Tampa  
 188 (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). Because none of the 14 variables were perfectly correlated, they  
 189 were all included in our model. Some of the block groups were missing values for some  
 190 variables; our model therefore considered 309 valid census block groups.

191

192 **Table 2.** Social vulnerability indicators for census block groups in the Tampa

Category/ Indicator	n	Mean	Std. Dev
<i>Social Class</i>			
%Households below Poverty Level (2016)	309	20.3	17.0
%Less than High School Diploma (2017)	310	8.9	7.4
Population per Acre (2016)	311	8.3	5.4

*Household Composition & Sensitive Population*

Average Household Size (2016)	311	2.5	0.6
%Population under 14 years (2017)	310	17.3	9.5
%Population over 64 years (2016)	311	0.1	0.1
%Population 20-64 with Disability (2016)	311	11.7	9.1
<i>Minority</i>			
%Limited English-Speaking Households (2017)	309	7.1	9.7
%Minority Race (2017)	310	33.9	27.8
<i>Housing Tenure</i>			
%Renter Occupied (2017)	310	47.7	26.6
%Occupied Units (2017)	310	89.1	8.8
%Multi-family Units (2016)	309	30.2	31.5
<i>Quality of Life</i>			
Travel Time to Work (2017)	311	474.2	283.5
%Households with No Internet Access (2017)	309	20.5	17.8

193

194 Since social vulnerability is a latent variable, we used R-mode factor analysis (SPSS v. 25) to  
 195 derive a Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) for each census block group. The factor analysis  
 196 empirically reduced our large number of sociodemographic variables into a small set of linear  
 197 components derived from a correlation matrix that explain a large proportion of the variation in  
 198 the data, but also addressed the problem of multicollinearity. Such an approach is necessary for  
 199 how we use the resulting factor scores, which is not possible with other statistical decomposition  
 200 techniques. Using the Kaiser criterion, we retained four components with eigenvalues greater  
 201 than 1. Each of the four component scores was weighted by the percentage of variance  
 202 explained, then aggregated into a cumulative factor score. For ease of interpretation, the  
 203 cumulative factor scores were grouped into quartiles, scored, and mapped with ArcGIS Pro  
 204 (Version 10.3; manufactured by ESRI). Here, the higher the cumulative factor score, the higher  
 205 the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) score. The SVI data table was spatially mapped using block  
 206 group IDs obtained from the US Census 2017 Tiger shapefile (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). By

207 calculating the placement of each block group on the component distribution, it was possible to  
208 assess the vulnerability of a census block group relative to others. In hazards research, Borden et  
209 al. (2007), Reid et al. (2009), and Harlan et al. (2012) have used this type of factor analysis in a  
210 similar way to determine the social vulnerability of states, census tracts, and census block  
211 groups.

212

### 213 ***Infrastructure Vulnerability***

214 Aging infrastructure, a warming climate, increasing population, and decreasing budgetary  
215 resources are some of the drivers of water insecurity in Tampa (Abdel-Mottaleb and Zhang 2020;  
216 Park et al. 2010). There are many ways of characterizing vulnerable water distribution network  
217 (WDN) components related to these challenges (Christodoulou and Fragiadakis 2015; Hernandez  
218 and Ormsbee 2021; Laucelli and Giustolisi 2015; Maiolo et al. 2018; Soldi et al. 2015; Wéber et  
219 al. 2020; Yazdani and Jeffrey 2012). In this study, we evaluated the hydraulic vulnerability of  
220 WDN segments based on how reachable a segment is to water sources when other segments are  
221 isolated. A segment is the minimum isolatable unit of a WDN that can contain several pipes or  
222 only part of a single or multiple pipes. Many end users reside along the pipes in a segment. When  
223 failures occur in WDNs, segments must be isolated (from water flow) for repairs to take place.  
224 An unintended isolation is when a segment is unintentionally isolated, resulting in the end users  
225 within it not receiving water, in the process of repairing another segment. In Tampa, many pipes  
226 in the network are severely aged, and there can be as many as 50 breaks in a single day (Tampa  
227 Bay Times 2019). For this reason, it is important to evaluate how vulnerable segments are to  
228 unintended isolation so that the unsupplied demands for end users can be minimized.

229 A vulnerability score for each segment is calculated from the reachability matrix of a given  
230 WDN as described in Abdel-Mottaleb and Walski (2020). First, segments are identified using  
231 WaterGEMS (Bentley Systems 2019). Then, the segment-valve (or dual) representation is  
232 constructed in python using the *networkx* package, where nodes are segments and edges are the  
233 valves that separate them. The reachability matrix (**R**) is constructed using python, with rows  
234 corresponding to isolated segments and columns corresponding to affected segments. Values are  
235 assigned to the matrix cells as follows. If an isolated segment ( $S_m$ ) (row  $m$ ) results in loss of  
236 connection of the segment  $S_n$  (column  $n$ ) to any water source, a value of 2 is assigned to  $\mathbf{R}[S_m,$   
237  $S_n]$ . If the isolation of  $S_m$  results in loss of connection of  $S_n$  to a reservoir but maintains a  
238 connection to a tank, a value of 1 is assigned to  $\mathbf{R}[S_m, S_n]$ . If  $S_n$  is connected to the water  
239 reservoir regardless of  $S_m$ 's isolation, a value of 0 is assigned. The existence of a connection, or  
240 flow path, between source(s) and segments is evaluated using the *has\_path()* function in the  
241 *networkx* package. The sum of the values in column  $n$  is the vulnerability score of segment  $S_n$ ,  
242 and indicates how vulnerable segment  $S_n$  is to other segments' isolation. For this study, the GIS  
243 data for the WDN model were provided by the City of Tampa. The City of Tampa Water  
244 Department is responsible for pumping 257,000 m<sup>3</sup>/day of water through approximately 134,000  
245 pipes to about 600,000 customers (Abdel-Mottaleb et al. 2019; Park et al. 2010). There is one  
246 reservoir in the network and five storage tanks. The WDN model was a skeletonized version of  
247 the field-validated model used by the city at the time of our research, consisting of 1978  
248 segments and all isolation valves were assumed to be operable.

249 Census block group polygon features were overlaid with the segment line features, as shown  
250 in Fig. 2 so that the length of segments within given census block groups could be determined.  
251 The vulnerability score for a segment  $i$ ,  $S_{v,i}$ , was weighed with the ratio of its length within a

252 given census block,  $L_{b,i}$ , to its total length,  $L_i$ . The hydraulic vulnerability per polygon was  
 253 calculated using the *summarize within* geoprocessing tool within GIS by aggregating the  
 254 weighed vulnerability scores of the segments contained in the polygon according to equation 1,  
 255 where  $k$  is the number of segments in a given census block. The higher the vulnerability scores of  
 256 segments in a census block group, the higher the Hydraulic Vulnerability Index (HVI) score of  
 257 that census block group.

$$258 \quad HVI_b = \sum_{i=1}^{i=k} S_{v,i} \times \frac{L_{b,i}}{L_i} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

259

260 [insert Figure 2 here]

261

262 It is important to note that not all aspects of hydraulic vulnerability are accounted for or  
 263 considered by this method since this study focuses on vulnerability due to the network  
 264 configuration. Namely, this method does not consider the likelihood or consequence of failure,  
 265 and implicitly assumes that all segments have an equal probability of failing (or being isolated).  
 266 Finally, only one segment at a time was simulated as isolated. In reality, there could be different  
 267 types of failures simultaneously in WDNs. These are model limitations that need to be  
 268 considered in future research on our framework.

269 To account for infrastructure interdependencies that can lead to cascading failures, we  
 270 evaluated the vulnerability of the potable water network based on its physical colocation with  
 271 other infrastructure networks under the assumption that increasing colocation can contribute to  
 272 the propagation of failure (but does not determine vulnerability). While this assumption may be  
 273 generally appropriate for this study of a dense, urban environment, it may not be so for rural  
 274 contexts where areas with lower levels of colocation could be equally or more vulnerable

275 because of their greater difficulty to access in emergencies (Clar 2019). Our model considered  
276 four infrastructure networks: potable water, sewer, stormwater, and roads, all of which are  
277 completely separate systems in Tampa. All data were provided by our partners in the City of  
278 Tampa. The data layers for each infrastructure were imported into GIS and the multi-layer sets  
279 for a single infrastructure were merged (e.g., gravity and pressurized pipes). Each pair of  
280 infrastructures (line features) were intersected to provide point features indicating colocation  
281 between the pair of infrastructures. The six colocation point layers were merged into a single  
282 feature class, which was used to calculate the density of co-located infrastructures within each  
283 census block group. The point densities were then used to assign an Infrastructure Colocation  
284 Index (ICI), where census block groups with higher ICI were considered more vulnerable in the  
285 context of infrastructure interdependencies. However, it must be noted that, while this approach  
286 views infrastructure colocation as a vulnerability, the model does not provide a complete  
287 representation of the interdependencies between infrastructures. Moreover, this approach also  
288 does not take into account the potential impacts of weather-related events, such as roadway  
289 flooding, which can impede access to broken systems and therefore increase vulnerability (Wang  
290 et al. 2019). In the end, the hydraulic vulnerability and colocation indices were aggregated with  
291 equal weighting into a Water Infrastructure Vulnerability Index (WIVI).

292 Finally, we used the identified environmental and social vulnerabilities to compute an  
293 aggregate Vulnerability of Place Index (VPI), which allowed us to map the spatial distribution of  
294 combined environmental and social vulnerabilities across the city. Despite the breadth of  
295 scientific literature on place-based vulnerability, many studies fail to consider the effect of the  
296 infrastructural vulnerability on the overall vulnerability of communities (see Borden et al. 2007;  
297 Cutter et al. 2003). We therefore sought to situate water infrastructure vulnerability within place-

298 based models. This required a GIS intersect of the VPI and WIVI layers to identify highly  
299 vulnerable urban spaces within environmental, social, and infrastructural context.

300

### 301 **Results and Discussion**

302 Our quantitative models described previously yielded four main vulnerability indices, which  
303 we mapped in GIS. In this section, we discuss the Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI), the  
304 Social Vulnerability Index (SVI), the Vulnerability of Place Index (VPI), and the Water  
305 Infrastructure Vulnerability Index (WIVI). We conclude with observations on the aggregation of  
306 VPI and WIVI layers.

307

#### 308 ***Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI)***

309 Our assessment of environmental vulnerability considered the risk of flooding across the city.  
310 Our GIS model shows that the southeast parts of the city are highly vulnerable to flooding (Fig.  
311 3). This region includes the area surrounding MacDill Air Force Base, Sun Bay South, Palma  
312 Ceia, and Davis Islands. We also found a high risk of flooding for neighborhoods such as  
313 Temple Crest, Sulphur Springs, Seminole Heights, and Tampa Heights, which are all situated  
314 along the Hillsborough River. Perhaps due to their proximity to the Lower Hillsborough  
315 Wilderness Preserve and surrounding wetlands, neighborhoods farther north such as Tampa  
316 Palms, New Tampa, and Pebble Creek were also highly vulnerable to flooding.

317

318 [insert Figure 3 here]

319

320 While the risk of flooding cuts across the city, we found that marginalized communities in  
321 eastern parts of the city were more vulnerable to the dangers posed by the proximity to hazardous  
322 waste sites compared to surrounding communities. As shown in Fig. 3, there was a distinct  
323 corridor of census block groups with high hazardous waste proximity and a higher number of  
324 brownfields running from the southeast to the northeast parts of Tampa. Our model suggests that  
325 the most affected neighborhoods in southeast Tampa were around the Port of Tampa Bay (with  
326 several Superfund sites), historic Ybor City (with several brownfields), and the historically Black  
327 community of East Tampa. Other neighborhoods farther north include Jackson Heights, Sulphur  
328 Springs, North Tampa, Temple Crest, and University Square — all low-income, predominantly  
329 Black or Hispanic communities. Within the context of flooding and proximity to hazardous  
330 waste sites, we found that the corridor running from the southeast to the northeast part of the city  
331 had more census block groups with a high Environmental Vulnerability Index. However, there  
332 are pockets of environmental vulnerability in Forest Hill and Carrollwood, both in the northwest  
333 of the city.

334

### 335 ***Social Vulnerability Index (SVI)***

336 Our factor analytic model yielded four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, which  
337 together accounted for approximately 66% of the variance for the 14 social vulnerability  
338 variables. As shown in Table 3, the first component accounted for 26.4% of the variability, and  
339 was strongly correlated with households below the poverty line, lower education levels, a high  
340 number of people living with disabilities, minority races, rental units, and households with no  
341 access to the internet. The second component correlated strongly with population characteristics

342 (high population density, large household sizes, and multi-family housing units) and accounted  
 343 for 16.5% of the variance. The last two factors accounted for 13.6% and 9.8% of the variance.

344

345 **Table 3.** Factor analysis of social vulnerability indicators

Variable	Component			
	1 (26.4)	2 (16.5)	3 (13.6)	4 (9.8)
Factor Loadings				
<i>Social Class</i>				
%Households below Poverty Level (2016)	.877	-	-	-
%Less than Highschool Diploma (2017)	.548	-	-	-
Population per Acre (2016)	-	.411	-	-
<i>Household Composition &amp; Sensitive Population</i>				
Average Household Size (2016)	-	.649	-	-
%Population under 14 years (2017)	-	-	.678	-
%Population over 64 years (2016)	-	-	-.685	-
%Population 20-64 with Disability (2016)	.686	-	-	-
<i>Minority</i>				
%Limited English-Speaking Households (2017)	-	-	-	.704
%Minority Race (2017)	.733	-	-	-
<i>Housing Tenure</i>				
%Renter Occupied (2017)	.669	-	-	-
%Occupied Units (2017)	-	-	-	.400
%Multi-family Units (2016)	-	.875	-	-
<i>Quality of Life</i>				
Travel Time to Work (2017)	-	-	-	.507
%Households with No Internet Access (2017)	.801	-	-	-

346

347 The component scores were weighted by variance and summed into a cumulative  
 348 vulnerability score. The cumulative scores for the 309 valid block groups ranged between -63 to  
 349 131, with a mean of .2 and a median of -.5. Based on standard deviation (36), skewness (.7), and  
 350 kurtosis (.4), the vulnerability scores had a normal distribution. For ease of interpretation, the

351 scores were re-coded into social vulnerability indices between 1-4, with (1) representing census  
352 block groups below the 25th percentile and (4) for those above the 75th percentile (Fig. 4).

353

354 [insert Figure 4 here]

355

356 As with environmental vulnerability, we found pockets of high social vulnerability in the  
357 eastern parts of the city and a few neighborhoods to the west. Some of the areas with high social  
358 vulnerability in the eastern parts of the city included Ybor City, East Tampa, Jackson Heights,  
359 Temple Crest, Sulphur Springs, and North Tampa. West and North Hyde Park, Drew Park, Plaza  
360 Terrace, and Old West Tampa were areas with high social vulnerability in the western parts of  
361 Tampa. The block groups with high ( $\geq 4$ ) indices (n=80) correspond to communities that have a  
362 majority of households living below the poverty level. These neighborhoods had a poverty rate  
363 of 46% or higher compared to the city's overall rate of 20%.

364 We observed that areas with a large proportion of minority races (68% or higher) also had  
365 high social vulnerability indices. The influence of race and class was no surprise, given the  
366 strong positive correlation with the first factor in our factor analysis results. More importantly,  
367 studies have shown that income and race/ethnicity significantly influence how people cope with  
368 and respond to environmental, social, and infrastructural disruptions (e.g., Borden et al. 2007;  
369 Cutter 1996; Cutter et al. 2003; Flanagan et al. 2011; Sweeney 2006).

370

### 371 ***Vulnerability of Place Index (VPI)***

372 When taken together, environmental conditions and social makeup intersect to produce a  
373 distinctive corridor of high vulnerability in the eastern parts of the city (Fig. 5). The corridor

374 begins in Ybor City, extends northward to the University Community area, and then west to  
375 neighborhoods around Nebraska Avenue. There is also a distinct pocket of high VPI around  
376 West and North Hyde Park, Drew Park, Plaza Terrace, and Old West Tampa in the northwest  
377 part of the city. Interestingly, these northwest parts are separated from the eastern corridor with a  
378 narrow band of low overall vulnerability.

379

380 [insert Figure 5 here]

381

382 ***Water Infrastructure Vulnerability Index (WIVI)***

383 Whereas vulnerability of place (due to environmental and social conditions) shows an eastern  
384 and northwestern bias, the results in Fig. 6 reveal that vulnerability of water infrastructures is far  
385 less distinct. Besides the neighborhoods in the north-central part of the city, such as Sulphur  
386 Springs and Old Seminole Heights, block groups with high WIVI were mostly spread out in the  
387 southeast and southwest parts of the city. These included some parts of Ybor City, Tampa  
388 Heights, and North Hyde Park. The WIVI pattern was much like that observed from the  
389 distribution of infrastructure colocation indices.

390

391 [insert Figure 6 here]

392

393 Many of the block groups with high infrastructure colocation are in the southeast parts of the  
394 city (including East Tampa and Ybor City), Tampa Heights, Downtown Tampa, and Old West  
395 Tampa. The high ICI levels were expected in these densely built areas of the city (Ouyang 2014;  
396 Rinaldi et al. 2001). Because of the high ICI, water infrastructures in these areas are highly

397 interdependent and vulnerable to cascading failures from transportation, stormwater, and  
398 wastewater infrastructures. However, the most hydraulically vulnerable census block groups  
399 regarding reachability to water sources are located in East Tampa, New Tampa, and near the Port  
400 of Tampa. They have the highest HVI values because there are non-redundant paths between  
401 these locations and the water sources. In addition, there is a lack of redundancy inherent within  
402 the census block groups of these locations. It is interesting to note that the same community  
403 could have census block groups with both high and low HVI values. This is likely due to the  
404 redundancies in connectivity being concentrated in certain census block groups over others. The  
405 census block groups with the lowest vulnerability scores are located in New Tampa, South  
406 Tampa, Downtown Tampa, Seminole Heights, and University Square.

407

#### 408 ***Environmental, Social, and Water Infrastructure Vulnerabilities***

409 To understand the spatial distribution of water infrastructure vulnerability within the  
410 environmental and social context, we aggregated the WIVI and VPI layers in GIS (Fig. 7), which  
411 enabled us to identify highly vulnerable areas across the city that were also highly susceptible to  
412 water infrastructure failures. The results indicate that 11% of the 309 census block groups had a  
413 high WIVI and High VPI. In other words, these block groups were environmentally and socially  
414 vulnerable and had a high risk of water infrastructure failure. These block groups were primarily  
415 in the eastern neighborhoods of the city, including North Tampa, Sulphur Springs, Old Seminole  
416 Heights, Terrace Park, and Temple Crest (to the north), and East Tampa and Ybor City (to the  
417 south). We did not find block groups with High WIVI and VPI in South Tampa and New Tampa.

418

419 [insert Figure 7 here]

420

421 The intersection of place vulnerability and water insecurity reveals three key insights about  
422 water infrastructure inequalities in marginalized communities in Tampa. First, residents in the  
423 eastern parts of the city are disproportionately susceptible to the impacts of environmental  
424 hazards. Although the risk of flooding has a northwest and southeast bias, the proximity to  
425 brownfields and sites producing hazardous wastes contributes to the overall environmental  
426 vulnerability of the neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city, which represent predominantly  
427 low-income Black communities. The unequal distribution of environmental risks reveal long-  
428 standing environmental injustices where studies have shown that people of color in low-income  
429 communities often bear the greatest burden when it comes to environmental pollution and  
430 contamination (Mohai et al. 2009).

431 Second, we find that social vulnerability was unequally distributed in the eastern and western  
432 areas of the city, which consist of neighborhoods that have been racially segregated following  
433 the passing of segregation laws in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. One such community is Sulphur Springs,  
434 which also has a high level of environmental vulnerability. Although it was once a tourist hub for  
435 visitors across the city and state, years of racial segregation and out-migration of wealthy  
436 residents in the 1980s turned it into a minority and low-income neighborhood (Jackson 2020).  
437 Other areas that have been racially segregated and have a high degree of social vulnerability  
438 include West Tampa, West Hyde Park, East Tampa, and Ybor City. Studies have shown that  
439 federal housing policies such as Section 8 assistance and the Hope VI project concentrated low-  
440 income residents and people of color in these racially segregated communities (Greenbaum et al.  
441 2008).

442 Third, our study finds that the overall risk of communities becoming disconnected from  
443 water sources in events that require segment isolation (e.g., pipe maintenance, failure, repair, and  
444 replacement) is lower in socially vulnerable areas. Environmental and social conditions in  
445 Tampa intersect with water infrastructure vulnerabilities to create pockets of infrastructure  
446 inequality. In other words, residents in environmentally and socially vulnerable areas such as  
447 Sulphur Springs, North Tampa, North Hyde Park, West Tampa, Old Seminole Heights, Terrace  
448 Park, Temple Crest, East Tampa, and Ybor City are predisposed to the impacts of segment  
449 isolation and potential cascading failures from co-location interdependencies. Densely built areas  
450 of the city potentially have highly interdependent infrastructures and are more susceptible to  
451 cascading failures. Therefore, addressing water infrastructure inequality in Tampa requires  
452 attention to infrastructure interdependencies in the densely built areas of the city.

453 Finally, given the age of the city's water distribution network and years of underinvestment  
454 in new water infrastructure, high hydraulic vulnerability might be expected in the oldest  
455 neighborhoods of the city. However, due to the high level of redundancies compared to  
456 surrounding areas, the results of our hydraulic vulnerability model indicate that some of the  
457 oldest communities are less vulnerable to disconnection from water sources in events of segment  
458 isolation. In the future, infrastructure improvement efforts should pay close attention to  
459 environmentally and socially vulnerable neighborhoods that also have high water infrastructure  
460 vulnerability (identified in Fig. 7). At the time of this study, for example, the city began planning  
461 for an infrastructure renewal initiative called Progressive Infrastructure Planning to Ensure  
462 Sustainability (PIPES, <https://www.tampagov.net/initiatives/pipes>), which includes creation of a  
463 \$2.9 billion, 20-year plan to upgrade water and sewer infrastructures (WFTS 2019). Through our  
464 National Science Foundation CRISP ("Critical Resilient Interdependent Infrastructure Systems

465 and Processes") project, which supported the research for this study, we are working with the  
466 city's water department to share the results of our simulations and modeling with the goal of  
467 informing their capital improvement plan, especially as it relates to the city's underserved  
468 communities.

469

## 470 Conclusion

471 Mapping water infrastructure inequalities within environmental and social contexts is crucial  
472 for assisting stakeholders in prioritizing resources by identifying areas of low resilience. Our  
473 study adds to the growing body of work on environmental and social injustice by showing how  
474 the unequal distribution of water infrastructure vulnerability is linked to race, social class, and  
475 environmental hazards. The framework we use examines environmental hazards with GIS and  
476 uses a factor analytic approach with weighted component scores for computing a cumulative  
477 vulnerability score to account for the varied contributions of different variables to social  
478 vulnerability in each community. The framework also draws on network analysis of a water  
479 distribution network to evaluate the reachability to water sources under failure scenarios to  
480 assess vulnerability and uses GIS to examine the physical colocation of infrastructures to identify  
481 interdependencies. Taken together, these analyses provide a reproducible, geospatial  
482 vulnerability framework that quantifies and maps environmental, social, and infrastructure  
483 vulnerability to identify water infrastructure inequality in marginalized urban communities,  
484 which can be utilized in the development of a community's capital improvement and asset  
485 management plans.

486 **Data Availability Statement**

487 All data, models, and code that support the findings of this study are available from the  
488 corresponding author upon reasonable request.

489

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498

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738

739 List of Figures

740

741 **Fig. 1.** Analytical framework for assessing the confluence of environmental, social, and  
742 infrastructure vulnerability.

743

744 **Fig. 2.** An overlay of segments with volumes on census block groups in Tampa.

745

746 **Fig. 3.** Spatial distribution of hazardous waste proximity, flooding, and environmental  
747 vulnerability in Tampa.

748

749 **Fig. 4.** Spatial distribution of poverty, minority race, and social vulnerability in Tampa.

750

751 **Fig. 5.** Vulnerability of Place Index for census block groups in Tampa.

752

753 **Fig. 6.** Spatial distribution of hydraulic vulnerability, infrastructure colocation, and water  
754 infrastructure vulnerability in Tampa.

755

756 **Fig. 7.** Environmentally and socially vulnerable census block groups with high water  
757 infrastructure vulnerability, revealing the uneven distribution of water infrastructure inequality in  
758 Tampa.













