

1    **Ecological and evolutionary challenges for wildlife vaccination**

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3    KM Barnett<sup>1\*</sup> and David J Civitello<sup>1</sup>

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5    <sup>1</sup>Department of Biology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA USA 30322

6    \*Correspondence: [katherine.mary.barnett@emory.edu](mailto:katherine.mary.barnett@emory.edu) (KM Barnett)

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9

10    **ABSTRACT**

11        Wildlife vaccination is of urgent interest to reduce disease-induced extinction and  
12        zoonotic spillover events. However, several challenges complicate its application to  
13        wildlife. For example, vaccines rarely provide perfect immunity. While some protection  
14        may seem better than none, imperfect vaccination can present epidemiological,  
15        ecological, and evolutionary challenges. While anti-infection and anti-transmission  
16        vaccines reduce parasite transmission, anti-disease vaccines may undermine herd  
17        immunity, select for increased virulence, or promote spillover. These imperfections  
18        interact with ecological and logistical constraints that are magnified in wildlife, such as  
19        poor control and substantial trait variation within and among species. Ultimately, we  
20        recommend approaches such as trait-based vaccination, modeling tools, and methods to  
21        assess community- and ecosystem-level vaccine safety to address these concerns and  
22        bolster wildlife vaccination campaigns.

23 **The potential of wildlife vaccines**

24 Vaccination, the process of exposing the immune system to an antigen to induce  
25 pathogen resistance, is a powerful tool for controlling disease. The benefits of vaccination  
26 are twofold: recipients are directly protected against infection and unvaccinated hosts are  
27 indirectly protected through **herd immunity (Glossary)**, which reduces transmission and  
28 parasite-mediated harm to host populations [1]. Vaccination has been vastly successful  
29 for humans and livestock [2,3]. Successful vaccination campaigns against rabies in  
30 raccoons (*Procyon lotor*), red foxes (*Vulpes vulpes*), gray foxes (*Urocyon*  
31 *cinereoargenteus*), and coyotes (*Canis latrans*) suggest that vaccination efforts could be  
32 directed towards emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) that cause devastating host  
33 declines, e.g., amphibian chytridiomycosis, white nose syndrome, Tasmanian devil  
34 facial-tumor disease, and Ebola [4–10]. The success of vaccination in human and  
35 livestock populations, the pressing need for disease control tools in wildlife conservation,  
36 and the ever-increasing threat of zoonotic **spillover** events support a clear need to  
37 develop vaccination as an intervention tool for wildlife disease control. However, several  
38 outstanding challenges and questions remain before vaccination can emerge as a reliable  
39 tool for wildlife disease control. We argue that accounting for the limitations of imperfect  
40 vaccines, host and non-host ecology, and individual physiology in the development of  
41 vaccination campaigns is vital for harnessing the potential of wildlife vaccines  
42 successfully.

43 **Objectives of wildlife vaccination**

44 Biodiversity conservation and the prevention of pathogen spillover are two urgent  
45 concerns of wildlife disease control. Emerging diseases of wildlife threaten population

46 and species persistence and contribute significantly to the ongoing loss of biodiversity  
47 [11]. Additionally, wildlife populations are **reservoir hosts** for many **zoonotic**  
48 **pathogens** such as rabies, Nipah virus, and coronaviruses that threaten the health of  
49 humans [12].

50 Controlling disease in wildlife reservoir populations can reduce spillover  
51 transmission, but complete prevention of spillover risk from a known pathogen requires  
52 elimination or eradication of a parasite within a reservoir host to prevent zoonotic  
53 transmission. Vaccines may be able to achieve this objective, but given the inherent  
54 antigenic specificity of all known vaccines, they will not prevent novel pathogen  
55 emergence. Theory underlying eradication often identifies a critical level of vaccine  
56 coverage, which drives the **effective reproductive ratio ( $R_{eff}$ )** of a pathogen below the  
57 threshold value of one [1]. Combating rinderpest virus reintroduction during the  
58 eradication campaign exemplifies the intense effort needed for eradication [3].

59 In contrast, vaccination for conservation aims to maximize the persistence of host  
60 populations and communities by decreasing the risk of disease-induced extinction, rather  
61 than through achieving parasite elimination. Wildlife populations can generally withstand  
62 small-scale disease outbreaks, and so conservation-motivated vaccination does not  
63 always require pathogen eradication [13]. Thus, vaccination coverage required for  
64 conservation-motivated disease control tends to be lower than that required for spillover  
65 prevention. For example, modeling estimates suggest that maintaining low vaccination  
66 coverage, between 20-40%, will stave off rabies-induced extinction of Ethiopian wolves  
67 (*Canis simensis*)[13].

68

69 **Vaccine efficacy and modes of imperfection**

70       Despite their potential for controlling wildlife disease, vaccines rarely provide  
71       perfect immunity, which can compromise herd immunity or contribute to the evolution of  
72       increased **parasite virulence** [14]. For example, a prototype vaccine partially protects  
73       amphibians from *Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis*; vaccination decreases, but does not  
74       eliminate, parasite proliferation [15]. In contrast, a theoretically perfect vaccine would  
75       provide permanent and complete resistance to infection for all recipients, but vaccines  
76       considered for wildlife often fall short of this definition [14]. Three broad aspects of  
77       vaccine imperfection are often discussed in the literature: waning, leaky, and partial  
78       immunity. However, “leaky” immunity is used inconsistently and imprecisely, generating  
79       confusion. One reason for this is that modeling frameworks, such as *Susceptible-Infected-*  
80       *Resistant* (SIR) compartment models can make it difficult to incorporate some types of  
81       vaccine imperfections. Therefore, we suggest a clarified categorization based on **waning**,  
82       **binary** and **partial immunity**. Importantly, these categories are not mutually exclusive,  
83       and we discuss the impacts of these varying levels of immunity on wildlife populations,  
84       vaccine efficacy, modeling frameworks.

85

86 *Waning immunity*

87       Waning describes the loss of resistance to infection over time. Individuals can  
88       vary in their waning rate, and immunity can be restored by subsequent exposures, i.e.,  
89       “boosters”. Vaccine-induced immunity often wanes faster than immunity generated from  
90       natural infection, which can leave vaccinated individuals at higher risk during recurrent  
91       or cyclical epidemics [16]. For example, Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus vaccination in

92 sandhill (*Grus americana*) and whooping cranes (*Grus canadensis*) waned rapidly,  
93 requiring booster vaccination within 30 days [17]. Life history traits, immune boosting  
94 sources, and waning rate interact to determine vaccine utility [18]. Waning immunity is  
95 routinely and relatively easily incorporated into SIR compartment models by allowing  
96 resistant individuals to reenter the susceptible class.

97

98 *Binary immunity*

99 Binary immunity occurs when vaccination does not induce immunity in all  
100 recipients [19]. This generates a binary outcome, wherein hosts are either resistant or  
101 susceptible, with no intermediate outcome. Binary outcomes of immunization have also  
102 been described as an “all-or-nothing qualitative response” [20]. For example, high rates  
103 of binary vaccine outcomes for the varicella vaccine in humans prompted the  
104 recommendation for a second dose within months of the first [21]. Differences in vaccine  
105 **immunogenicity, adjuvants**, vaccine storage, dosage, administration, host infection  
106 status, competence of the host’s immune system, and host genetics can all shape binary  
107 immunity [19,22]. Random binary immunization outcomes are often incorporated into  
108 SIR models by effectively lowering vaccination coverage by the proportion of binary  
109 failure [23]. However, if certain host types are more prone to vaccine failure, then it  
110 might be critical to address how these different failure rates among different host class  
111 affect disease dynamics [24].

112

113 *Partial immunity*

114 In contrast to binary efficacy, which assumes a vaccine either succeeds in  
115 inducing an acquired immune response or fails, vaccines that provide partial immunity  
116 may not completely prevent infection, disease symptoms, or transmission in an  
117 immunized host. Partial immunity allows for vaccine efficacy to be measured on a  
118 proportional gradient from 0-1, rather than as a qualitative all-or-nothing response  
119 [25,26]. One critical complication is that partial immunity may impact a number of  
120 infection outcomes, such as resistance to infection, disease attributed to infection, and  
121 infectiousness [27]. The functional consequences of these changes are detailed below.  
122 Partial immunity is less easily incorporated into SIR-type models and has therefore been  
123 relatively neglected compared to other modes of imperfection. Individual-based models  
124 (IBMs), which explicitly track individual traits and histories may be much better suited to  
125 investigate this vaccine imperfection.

126

## 127 **Functional mechanisms and consequences of imperfect vaccines**

128 Different resistance responses to imperfect vaccines have unique ecological and  
129 evolutionary consequences. Imperfect immunization can confer the following three  
130 phenotypic types of resistance responses: 1) anti-disease, 2) anti-infection, and 3) anti-  
131 transmission (**Figure 1**). These are also not mutually exclusive, and they can be assessed  
132 using either binary (qualitative) or partial (quantitative) metrics [26,28,29]. Because the  
133 majority of vaccines are imperfect, anticipating and addressing their potential deleterious  
134 consequences is a priority in determining vaccination feasibility in a wildlife context. For  
135 example, the **imperfect-vaccine hypothesis** postulates that partial immunity upon  
136 vaccination could drive the evolution of increased pathogen virulence, and the risk of

137 vaccine-driven virulence evolution is dependent on the vaccination phenotype and  
138 efficacy [29].

139

140 *Anti-disease vaccines*

141 Anti-disease vaccines reduce virulence (i.e., increase **host tolerance**) without  
142 necessarily reducing the risk of infection or subsequent transmission. Therefore, these  
143 vaccines directly benefit recipients, but can counteract herd immunity if the infectious  
144 period is lengthened. Studies on Marek's disease in poultry and helminth and tuberculosis  
145 **coinfections** in African buffalo show that interventions which reduce the mortality of  
146 infected hosts, without decreasing infection or transmission rates, increase parasite  
147 transmission in populations by extending the infectious period [29,30]. Despite this  
148 potential for increased transmission, anti-disease vaccines may still be effective for  
149 conservation if their net effect reduces total parasite-induced mortality or reproductive  
150 costs. A prototype anti-*Chlamydia pecorum* vaccine for koala (*Phascolarctos cinereus*)  
151 conservation offers potential as a therapeutic vaccine as it reduces disease in unexposed  
152 and infected koalas, with some reduction in infection incidence and loads [31]. However,  
153 anti-disease vaccines are unlikely to reduce spillover risk, precisely because they can  
154 promote transmission.

155 Evolutionarily, lengthening the infectious period through anti-disease vaccination  
156 is theorized to relax selection against high virulence [27,29]. This prediction, derived  
157 from the **transmission-virulence trade-off hypothesis**, arises because limiting host  
158 death allows for otherwise highly virulent genotypes to persist and even be favored by  
159 selection [29]. While experimental evidence explicitly demonstrating increased virulence

160 driven by vaccination is lacking, a recent study on house finches (*Haemorhous*  
161 *mexicanus*) parasitized by the bacteria *Mycoplasma gallisepticum* demonstrated that an  
162 anti-disease phenotype conferred by a natural primary infection facilitated a two-fold  
163 increase in the fitness advantage of a high virulence strain during secondary infections  
164 [32]. However, anti-disease vaccines that vary in degree of protection among immunized  
165 individuals may be less risky for vaccine-driven virulence evolution, as variance in host  
166 protection will not uniformly favor the evolution of increased parasite virulence [27].

167

#### 168 *Anti-infection and anti-transmission vaccines*

169 Vaccines that prevent or reduce parasite establishment in an immunized host are  
170 considered anti-infection vaccines. Anti-transmission vaccines, on the other hand, may  
171 permit infection but prevent or reduce onward transmission from the recipient. Both  
172 phenotypes contribute to herd immunity, and epidemiological models predict that parasite  
173 elimination can be achieved with high rates of coverage and efficacy [28]. Thus, both  
174 anti-infection and anti-transmission vaccines can be effective for spillover prevention and  
175 conservation. The *Mycobacterium bovis* bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine, used to  
176 prevent spillover of *M. bovis* into livestock, confers anti-infection resistance in Australian  
177 brushtail possums (*Trichosurus vulpecula*), and the transmission-reducing prototype  
178 *Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis* vaccine offers promise for use in amphibian  
179 conservation [15,33].

180 The evolutionary consequences of these vaccines depend crucially on the mode of  
181 imperfection. Binary anti-infection or anti-transmission vaccines do not favor virulence  
182 evolution and can, at times, even reduce selection for parasite virulence, by preventing

183 coinfections for example [28,34]. Conversely, partial anti-infection or anti-transmission  
184 vaccines can select for increased virulence [25]. Partial anti-infection and anti-  
185 transmission phenotypes effectively increase the exposure dose required for  
186 establishment (i.e. infectious dose), which can select for increases in parasite  
187 reproduction rate [25,28]. Theory suggests that this type of anti-infection resistance  
188 favors virulence evolution by encouraging the increase in intrinsic parasite reproduction  
189 for successful infection establishment [25].

190

### 191 **Ecological and logistical challenges of vaccination exacerbated in wildlife**

192 Vaccines have strong potential to achieve disease control in wildlife. However,  
193 imperfect vaccines must also overcome physiological, behavioral, and ecological factors  
194 to succeed. Thus, complications arise from two primary factors: vaccine imperfections  
195 and vaccine administration. Lack of control and intraspecific, interspecific, and  
196 environmental heterogeneity are central sources of uncertainty in vaccine delivery,  
197 uptake, and response (**Box 1**). Vaccination success hinges on high coverage of doses that  
198 induce a durable immune response without harming recipients [1]. In complex ecological  
199 communities, indirect deployment (i.e., oral baiting) campaigns risk simultaneously over-  
200 and under-dosing many organisms because wildlife can vary in 1) the amount of  
201 inoculum consumed or encountered and 2) their physiological response to a given dose.

202 Heterogeneity in host behavior, morphology, and habitat use all influence  
203 infection risk, and probability of vaccine exposure [35–37]. Assessing vaccine exposure  
204 in target and non-target wildlife can be done using biomarkers, such as fluorescent  
205 Rhodamine b [38]. Moreover, the immunological traits of most wildlife hosts remain

206 poorly known, and even closely related species can exhibit marked variation in response  
207 to vaccination [39]. In vaccination campaigns using indirect deployment, assessing  
208 vaccine safety and impact on non-target hosts and non-hosts is a critical step to  
209 anticipating and preventing harmful unintended consequences on ecological communities  
210 and ecosystem functioning. **Dose-response profiles** are a useful and routine tool for  
211 assessing consequences of over- and under-dosing wildlife. Specifically, dose-response  
212 profiles can be useful for quantifying differences in dose-specific immune responses for  
213 distinct classes of hosts (e.g., species identity, developmental stage, age class, genotype).  
214 Additionally, the effect of vaccination on non-target wildlife can be evaluated by tracking  
215 community diversity metrics (e.g. abundance, richness, and evenness) and ecosystem  
216 function pre- and post-administration in both placebo and vaccinated environments [38].  
217 Furthermore, **trait-based vaccination** may help to overcome issues related to patchy  
218 coverage and dosing.

219

## 220 **Trait-based vaccination**

221 Which hosts should be prioritized for vaccination? Host factors such as age,  
222 immunity, behavior, and genetics all influence **host competence** [40]. These  
223 heterogeneous factors contribute significantly to disparities in parasite susceptibility and  
224 transmission between hosts, leading to relatively few individuals being responsible for  
225 most parasite transmission in a population [41]. This observation can be harnessed to  
226 tailor control methods using trait-based vaccination.

227 Random mixing is a fundamental assumption of classic vaccination and  
228 transmission models, but network analyses of wildlife show that traits such as

229 territoriality or sociality often reveal non-random contacts, elevating the importance of  
230 accounting for contact and home range heterogeneity in vaccination [42,43]. Targeted  
231 vaccination of **superspreaders** has been continually proposed as a method to reduce  
232 required immunization coverage [44,45]. For example, targeted vaccination of socially-  
233 central chimpanzees, determined by detailed behavioral data or approximated using trait-  
234 based estimates, can significantly reduce the vaccination coverage threshold [44].  
235 Incorporating contact networks into **transmissible vaccine** models, using an individual-  
236 based approach, could assess if behaviors associated with superspreading, such as  
237 gregariousness or boldness, increase vaccine transmission [46,47]. Alternatively,  
238 vaccination for conservation could target individuals that are disproportionately  
239 important to population growth or persistence [48].

240

#### 241 **Modeling wildlife vaccination**

242 Susceptible-Infected-Resistant (SIR) models are the most common models used  
243 for predicting vaccination outcomes [27]. While valuable for modeling waning and  
244 binary modes of imperfection, SIR models cannot capture the complexities of partial  
245 immunity, especially when spatial dynamics, social interactions or individual history are  
246 important [23,27,49]. Limitations of modeling partial immunity using ordinary  
247 differential equations (ODEs) can be overcome using individual-based models (IBMs),  
248 which are able to incorporate different host immune responses and space-based behaviors  
249 such as territoriality and migration [49]. For example, in the case of fox rabies control in  
250 Europe, IBM predictions recommended the use of a lower coverage vaccination strategy  
251 relative to an SIR model [50]. This lower coverage strategy was carried out successfully

252 and saved considerable resources [49]. While the simplicity and analytical tractability of  
253 ODE models can offer considerable advantages, we advocate for the increased  
254 consideration of IBMs in the study of wildlife disease because they can represent  
255 individual-level physiology, connect seamlessly with transmission networks or spatially-  
256 explicit movement models, and accommodate individual history and heterogeneity [49].

257

## 258 **Concluding Remarks**

259 Vaccines can advance biodiversity conservation and spillover control. However,  
260 vaccine imperfections can substantially compromise the achievement of herd immunity  
261 or promote the evolution of increased virulence, yet they are not always accounted for in  
262 theory, planning, or analysis of vaccine use in wildlife. Wildlife vaccination offers a  
263 frontier to explore advancing questions in eco-immunology, imperfect immunity, and  
264 disease control innovation. The biological factors shaping vaccination success, feasibility,  
265 and efficacy should be as central to decisions regarding wildlife vaccination as logistical  
266 limitations and financial resources (**Outstanding Questions**). Thorough empirical  
267 assessment of the vaccine-host-parasite biology can both 1) prevent impractical  
268 vaccination campaigns and 2) ameliorate challenges regarding vaccine dose and  
269 coverage, saving time and limiting adverse outcomes.

270 Disentangling potential modes of imperfection is critical for predicting outcomes  
271 of vaccination. Incorporating these effects into models and experiments can predict  
272 otherwise counterintuitive deleterious outcomes, such as increased transmission caused  
273 by anti-disease resistance. We suggest that IBMs should be selected for vaccines  
274 conferring partial immunity or systems in which space-based behaviors drive disease

275 dynamics. Additionally, vaccination outcomes should be simultaneously studied across  
276 ecological scales and evolutionary time. Imperfect vaccines impose subtle tension  
277 between individual- and population-level benefits, and deeper theoretical examination  
278 can help prevent the implementation of unfeasible or potentially harmful vaccines.

279 Furthermore, wild hosts and parasites are inherently heterogeneous and poorly  
280 controlled. Dose-response profiles and community diversity metrics should be used to  
281 account for heterogeneity when calculating safe and effective vaccine doses for wildlife  
282 individuals, populations, communities, and ecosystems. Trait-based vaccination  
283 approaches could prioritize hosts that disproportionately contribute to population  
284 persistence or parasite transmission thus minimizing coverage required for parasite  
285 eradication or host population viability. Ecological complexities and evolutionary  
286 consequences of imperfect immunity provide an abundance of challenges when  
287 vaccinating wildlife; but pursuing wildlife vaccination for use in conservation or spillover  
288 prevention is by no means foolish if informed by the system's underlying physiology and  
289 ecology.

290

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299

300 **Glossary**

301 **Herd immunity:** indirect protection of susceptible hosts by resistant hosts.

302 **Spillover:** transmission of parasites from a non-human host species to humans.

303 **Reservoir host:** a population of organisms that serve as an infection source for another  
304 host population.

305 **Zoonotic pathogens:** a parasite able to be transmitted from non-human animals to  
306 humans.

307 **Effective reproductive ratio ( $R_{eff}$ ):** the number of secondary infections a primary  
308 infection contributes in a population with resistant individuals.

309 **Parasite virulence:** host death or pathology induced by infection.

310 **Resistance phenotype:** categories of incomplete immunity, including anti-disease  
311 immunity, anti-infection immunity, and anti-transmission immunity.

312 **Immunogenicity:** a vaccine's ability to induce an acquired immune response.

313 **Adjuvants:** vaccine additives to increase its immunogenicity.

314 **Imperfect-vaccine hypothesis:** theory suggesting that, depending on the phenotype of  
315 resistance, partial vaccination may select for increased parasite virulence.

316 **Host tolerance:** decreased mortality or pathology in response to infection.

317 **Transmission-virulence trade-off hypothesis:** hypothesis derived from the assumption  
318 that transmission rate and virulence are correlated, predicting that an intermediate level of  
319 virulence is favored by selection.

320 **Coinfections:** two or more parasite species simultaneously infecting the same host.

321 **Dose-response profiles:** quantifying an organism's physiological response to varying

322 doses of vaccine.

323 **Trait-based vaccination:** vaccine distribution prioritizing individuals with specific

324 characteristics.

325 **Host competence:** the relative ability of a host to become infected by and transmit a

326 parasite.

327 **Superspreaders:** an individual that disproportionately contributes to parasite transmission

328 within a given population.

329 **Transmissible vaccine:** vaccines that autonomously spread from treated to untreated

330 individuals.

331 **Enzootic:** a pathogen endemic in non-human animals.

332

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
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
480 **Figure 1.** Imperfect vaccines can be categorized by the phenotypic resistance effects on  
 481 vaccinated hosts, such as anti-infection, anti-disease, and anti-transmission. Each of these  
 482 non-exclusive categories can influence epidemiology and pathogen evolution.

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486 **Box 1. Canid rabies vaccination campaigns: limitations to control**



487 **Figure 2.** Rabies vaccination on a gradient of wildness.

488 Rabies vaccination of canids has been used to both prevent spillover transmission into  
489 human populations and protect endangered wildlife [51]. Rabies vaccination of domestic  
490 dogs, stray dogs, and wild canids demonstrates vaccination across a gradient of control  
491 and wildness (Figure 2). Globally, domestic dogs are the main source of rabies  
492 transmission to humans [52]. Consequently, owned dog vaccination is used to interrupt  
493 dog-to-human transmission and, largely due to the control afforded by ownership, has  
494 been successful in eliminating **enzootic** canine rabies in the U.S [53]. However, the  
495 unconstrained movement of stray dogs allows contact with wildlife, owned dogs, and  
496 humans, amplifying their importance in rabies transmission [54]. Difficulty catching stray  
497 dogs contributed to poor coverage, and hence failure, in a mass rabies vaccination  
498 campaign in Bangkok, Thailand [55]. Furthermore, high population growth, turnover, and  
499 translocation rates of stray dogs intensifies the challenge of achieving and maintaining  
500 vaccination coverage sufficient for herd immunity [54–56]. Combining vaccination with  
501 neutering can combat these challenges [57].

502 Vaccination of wildlife against rabies to prevent spillover into humans and domestic  
503 animals have also been hugely successful campaigns; locally eliminating rabies in red  
504 foxes and coyotes, while decreasing its prevalence in gray foxes [4–6]. This success is  
505 undoubtedly driven by the advent of oral bait vaccines, which can be distributed across  
506 large geographic scale [6]. Yet, although oral vaccination reduces the need for wildlife  
507 control via capture and handling and increases the geographic scale of administration,  
508 successful oral vaccination requires ecological knowledge of target and non-target  
509 foraging behaviors and home ranges for baiting, population turnover rates for estimating  
510 length of vaccination protection, and species-specific immunological responses [6,58,59].  
511 Rabies vaccination has also been implemented as a conservation measure for endangered  
512 wild canids, such as the Ethiopian wolf (*Canis simensis*) and African wild dogs (*Lycaon*  
513 *pictus*) [56,60].  
514 In these canid vaccination campaigns, control at the individual level, such as compliance,  
515 handling, and capture, prove most challenging. Thus, strategies that prioritize population-  
516 level measures, i.e., economic incentives through government support for owned dog  
517 vaccination, managing stray dog populations through neutering, and oral baiting of free-  
518 roaming and wild canids, significantly enhance vaccination success.