

Article

Self-Supervised Learning for Online Anomaly Detection in High-Dimensional Data Streams

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Abstract: In this paper, we address the problem of detecting and learning anomalies in high-dimensional data-streams in real-time. Following a data-driven approach, we propose an online and multivariate anomaly detection method that is suitable for the timely and accurate detection of anomalies. We propose our method for both semi-supervised and supervised settings. By combining the semi-supervised and supervised algorithms, we present a self-supervised online learning algorithm in which the semi-supervised algorithm trains the supervised algorithm to improve its detection performance over time. The methods are comprehensively analyzed in terms of computational complexity, asymptotic optimality, and false alarm rate. The performances of the proposed algorithms are also evaluated using real-world cybersecurity datasets, that show a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art results.

Keywords: anomaly detection; change detection; online learning; self-supervised learning; sequential analysis



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1. Introduction

Anomaly detection, that can be summarized as detecting unexpected data patterns [1], has many real-world applications, such as cybersecurity [2–4], hardware security [5], medical health care [6], surveillance videos [7], aviation [8], transportation [9], power systems [10], and time series problems [11]. A detected anomaly may be a sign of an unwanted and often actionable event, such as a cyber-attack, suspicious human behavior, system failure, etc. In many applications, the timely and accurate detection of abnormal data patterns is crucial as it allows for proper countermeasures to be taken in a timely manner to counteract any possible harm. For example, the quick detection of an abnormal behavior observed in the telemetry observations of a spacecraft could prevent a catastrophic loss [12].

The online learning of anomalies in a self-supervised fashion, as they are detected, can facilitate the fast and accurate detection of the same anomaly type when it happens again. Such self-supervised training without requiring human-labeled instances can greatly improve the detection performance over time. While deep neural network-based methods have been quite popular in many machine learning tasks, including anomaly detection [13–15], they are not amenable for continually learning new anomaly types in an online fashion due to catastrophic forgetting [16]. As they try to learn new patterns in an incremental fashion, they tend to forget the previously learned patterns. However, statistical methods that require lightweight training, such as neighbor-based methods, can continually learn new patterns in an online fashion [17].

In this work, we consider the timely detection and learning of anomalies in high-dimensional data-streams. Multivariate anomaly detection techniques can detect anomalies that are manifested in the interactions between several data-streams that cannot be detected by the univariate detection methods [18]. For instance, detecting and mitigating a stealthy distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack requires the joint monitoring of multiple data-streams [4,19]. This in turn, leads to the high-dimensionality challenge, i.e., an

effective anomaly detection technique that needs to be scalable for high-dimensional data in real time.

Motivated by the aforementioned reasons, we propose a *neighbor-based, online, multivariate anomaly detection (NOMAD)* technique that can handle high-dimensional and heterogeneous data in real-time, and that lends itself to a performance analysis.

Contributions: Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:

- Two variations of a data-driven, neighbor-based, and sequential anomaly detection method called NOMAD are proposed for both semi-supervised and supervised settings depending on the availability of the data;
- The computational complexity and asymptotic false alarm rate of NOMAD are analyzed, and a procedure for selecting a proper decision threshold to satisfy a desired false alarm rate is provided;
- A self-supervised online learning scheme that can effectively detect both known and unknown anomaly types by incorporating the newly detected anomalies into the training set is introduced;
- Finally, the performance of the proposed methods are evaluated in two real-world cybersecurity datasets.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related works are discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, the mathematical formulation of the considered anomaly detection problem and the relevant background information are provided. We present the proposed anomaly detection and learning methods, along with the theoretical analysis of the performance and the computational complexities in Section 4. The experiments are presented in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.

2. Related Work

Anomaly detection has been extensively studied in various domains. For instance, an SVM-based approach for anomaly detection was proposed in [20]; several theoretical information measures were proposed in [21] for the intrusion detection problem; and two new information metrics for DDoS attack detection were introduced in [3]. With the new challenges, such as high-dimensionality, heterogeneity, and real-time detection posed by emerging applications (e.g., internet of things, smart city, intelligent transportation systems, etc.), there is still a significant need for studying the new challenging aspects of the anomaly detection problem.

Real-time detection can be better addressed by sequential anomaly detection techniques compared to the outlier detection techniques [1]. As opposed to considering each instance independently, sequential methods also take the history of observations into account. The cumulative sum (CUSUM) detector [22] is a well-known sequential change detection technique that assumes probabilistic models for nominal and anomalous data points, and computes the cumulative log-likelihood-ratio (LLR) over time, declaring an anomaly if the statistic exceeds a predefined threshold. The accuracy of assumed models, as well as the estimated parameters, are the key factors in the performance of CUSUM and more general parametric methods. CUSUM is the minimax optimum under the condition that the probability distributions before and after the change are completely known [23]. However, this is not possible in many real-world applications with *a priori* knowledge of the underlying distributions. Estimating the probability distributions quickly becomes intractable for high-dimensional data that includes many unknowns, such as the anomaly onset time, the subset of anomalous dimensions, etc., in addition to the parameters of the nominal and anomalous models. To tackle this complexity, ref. [24] proposed a relaxed version of CUSUM, in which each data-stream is assumed to be independent of others. However, this univariate method is not suitable for detecting changes in the correlation between data-streams. A sequential test for detecting changes in the correlation between variables, as well as localizing the highly correlated variables in high-dimensional data-streams was proposed in [25]. This is a parametric method based on the assumption that the observed vectors are multivariate Gaussian distributed. It is proposed solely for the

detection of correlation changes between data-streams and does not generalize for other changes in the distribution. In this paper, we are interested in detecting general changes in unknown distributions, including the changes in the correlation structure.

Neighbor distance-based methods are geometric methods that are based on the assumption that anomalous data instances occur far from the nominal instances. For instance, refs. [26,27] have proposed non-parametric outlier detection techniques based on the minimum volume set (MVS) of the nominal data. MVS corresponds to the region of greatest probability density with minimum data volume, and is known to be useful for anomaly detection [28] based on the assumption that anomalies occur in the less concentrated regions of the nominal dataset. These non-parametric outlier detection methods estimate the MVS of nominal training samples using neighbor graphs, and declare a data point as anomalous if it lies outside the MVS. Despite being scalable to high-dimensional and heterogeneous data, they do not consider the temporal anomaly information, and thus are prone to higher false alarm rates compared to sequential anomaly detection methods. Similarly, ref. [29] proposed a neighbor graph-based method that computes an anomaly score for each observation and declares an anomaly by thresholding the score value. In this paper, as opposed to the outlier detection methods that treat a single outlier as an anomaly, we consider an anomaly to consist of persistent outliers and investigate the sequential and non-parametric detection of such anomalies using the temporal information in data-streams. Recently, ref. [30] proposed a non-parametric neighbor-based sequential anomaly detection method for multivariate observations. This method computes the test statistic based on the number of neighbor edges at different splitting points within a window and stops the test whenever the test statistics exceed a threshold. Due to its window-based nature, this method has inherent limitations in achieving small detection delays. It also recomputes the neighbor graphs at every time instance and for every splitting point; therefore, its computational complexity is not suitable for real-time applications. In another recent work, [31] proposed a distance-based and CUSUM-like change detection method for attributed graphs. Attributed graphs are first mapped into numeric vectors, and then the distance between the mean response of an observation window and the mean response of the training data are computed via a CUSUM-like sequential algorithm. In addition to the limitations arising from the window-based nature of the method, the local relations between samples are disregarded due to considering only the mean response of the training set. As a result, in the cases where training data have a multimodal distribution, this method will not be effective. As compared to [31], we take into account the local relations between the data instances.

In addition to classical machine learning techniques, such as the PCA-based [32], KNN-based [30,33], exponential weighted moving average [34], and feature bagging networks [35], deep neural networks have recently become popular in anomaly detection, as in other machine learning fields. For instance, a deep auto encoder-based detection method was proposed in [36]. The deep auto encoder, that first encodes the inputs to a compressed representation, and then decodes the original inputs from the representations, is trained on nominal data and is expected to have small reconstruction errors when faced with nominal data during testing. Interestingly, for anomalous data, it is expected to produce statistically larger errors. It raises alarm if the majority of the instances within a window have reconstruction errors larger than a threshold and are marked as anomalous. Another auto encoder-based anomaly detection method was proposed in [37]. A generative adversarial network (GAN) is an effective deep neural network architecture for learning to generate samples from a complex probability distribution. In [38], the authors used a convex combination of reconstruction error and discriminator error of the GAN to compute an anomaly score for each instance. Similarly, the MAD-GAN algorithm proposed in [39] uses a combination of reconstruction and discriminator errors of the LSTM-based GAN.

3. Problem Formulation

Suppose that a system is observed through d -dimensional observations $\mathcal{X}_t = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_t\}$ in time. The objective is to detect an anomaly occurring at an unknown time τ as soon as possible while satisfying a false alarm constraint. This problem can be formulated as a change detection problem as follows:

$$f = f_0, t < \tau, \quad f = f_1 (\neq f_0), t \geq \tau, \quad (1)$$

where f is the true probability distribution of observations and f_0 and f_1 are the nominal and anomaly probability distributions, respectively. The objective of the problem is to find the anomaly time T that minimizes the average detection delay while satisfying a false alarm constraint, i.e.,

$$\inf_T E_\tau[(T - \tau)^+] \quad \text{subject to} \quad E_\infty[T] \geq \beta, \quad (2)$$

where E_τ represents the expectation given that change occurs at τ , $(\cdot)^+ = \max(\cdot, 0)$, and E_∞ denotes the expectation given that no change occurs, i.e., $E_\infty[T]$ denotes the expectation of the false alarm period.

Lorden's minimax problem is a commonly used version of the above problem [40], in which the goal is to minimize the worst-case average detection delay subject to a false alarm constraint:

$$\inf_T \sup_{\tau} \text{ess sup}_{\mathcal{X}_\tau} E_\tau[(T - \tau)^+ | \mathcal{X}_\tau] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad E_\infty[T] \geq \beta, \quad (3)$$

where "ess sup" denotes the essential supremum. In simple words, the minimax criterion minimizes the average detection delay for the least favorable change-point and the least favorable history of measurements up to the change-point while the average false alarm period is lower-bounded by β .

4. Proposed Methods

Neighbor-based methods maintain their popularity due to their competitive performance, computational efficiency, analyzability, and interpretability [41,42]. In this section, we present our k -nearest-neighbor (k NN) based NOMAD algorithm, extensively analyze its computational complexity, and provide an asymptotic upper bound on its false alarm rate. Then, we also propose a supervised extension for NOMAD for the cases where training data are available for some anomaly settings. Finally, we introduce a unified framework for the two NOMAD detectors.

The intuition behind using k NN distance for anomaly detection is the similarity between the inverse k NN distance and likelihood. Specifically, for $f(x_i) \geq f(x_j)$, $x_i, x_j \in \mathcal{X}$, it is expected that the distance $g_k(x_i)$ of x_i to its k th nearest neighbor in $\mathcal{X}$ is smaller than that of x_j . This probability increases with the size of $\mathcal{X}$, i.e., $\lim_{|\mathcal{X}| \rightarrow \infty} P(g_k(x_i) \leq g_k(x_j)) = 1$. This, in turn provides grounds for using the difference of k NN distances in NOMAD to approximate the log-likelihood ratio.

4.1. NOMAD Algorithm

In the training phase, assuming a training set $\mathcal{X}_N$ consists of N nominal data instances using the k NN distances $\{g_k(x_m)\}$ between each node $x_m \in \mathcal{X}_N$ and its k nearest neighbors, NOMAD finds a baseline statistic that represents a boundary between the observations under nominal operations and the tail events under nominal operations at significance level α . Then, in the test phase, it compares the k NN distances $g_k(x)$ between test data instance x and its k nearest neighbors in $\mathcal{X}_N$ with the boundary statistic to compute negative/positive anomaly evidence for observation x , and accumulates it over time for reliable detection. Roughly, the greater $g_k(x)$ is, the less likely x comes from the same distribution f_0 as the nominal points.

Specifically, in the training phase, NOMAD ranks the points in $\mathcal{X}_N$ in ascending order $\{\mathbf{x}_{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{(N)}\}$ in terms of the total distance:

$$L_m = \sum_{n=1}^k g_n(\mathbf{x}_m)^\gamma, \quad (4)$$

where $g_n(\mathbf{x}_m)$ is the distance between point $\mathbf{x}_m \in \mathcal{X}_N$ and its n th nearest neighbor in $\mathcal{X}_N$, k controls the nearest neighbors in the calculation of the total distance, and $\gamma > 0$ is the weight. The first K points with the smallest total distances $\{L_{(1)}, \dots, L_{(K)}\}$ represents the denser parts of the data distribution, and the $L_{(K)}$ is selected as the borderline total distance, separating the dense area from the tail evenly. K is chosen as $K = \lfloor N(1 - \alpha) \rfloor$, where $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$ is the floor operator.

In the test phase, for each data instance $\mathbf{x}_t$, NOMAD firstly computes the total distance L_t with respect to the training set $\mathcal{X}_N$, as in Equation (4). Then, it computes the anomaly evidence that could be either positive or negative by comparing L_t with the borderline total distance $L_{(K)}$

$$D_t = \log L_t^d - \log L_{(K)}^d, \quad (5)$$

where d is the number of data dimensions. D_t is a measure of how well the observation fits the nominal distribution. Finally, it updates a detection statistic Δ_t that accumulates the anomaly evidence D_t over time, and raises an anomaly alarm the first time Δ_t crosses a predefined threshold,

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_t &= \max\{\Delta_{t-1} + D_t, 0\}, \quad \Delta_0 = 0, \\ T &= \min\{t : \Delta_t \geq h\}. \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The NOMAD procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 The proposed NOMAD procedure

- 1: *Input:* $\mathcal{X}_N, k, \alpha, h$
 - 2: *Initialize:* $\Delta \leftarrow 0, t \leftarrow 1$
 - 3: *Training phase:*
 - 4: For each $\mathbf{x}_m \in \mathcal{X}_N$ compute L_m as in Equation (4)
 - 5: Find $L_{(K)}$ by selecting the K th smallest L_m
 - 6: *Test phase:*
 - 7: **while** $\Delta < h$ **do**
 - 8: Get new data $\mathbf{x}_t$ and compute D_t as in Equation (5)
 - 9: $\Delta = \max\{\Delta + D_t, 0\}$
 - 10: $t \leftarrow t + 1$
 - 11: **Declare Anomaly**
-

4.2. Analysis of NOMAD

Theorem 1. As $N \rightarrow \infty$, for a given threshold h , the false alarm period of NOMAD is asymptotically lower-bounded by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_\infty[T] &\geq e^{\omega_0 h}, \\ \omega_0 &= v_d - \theta - \frac{1}{B} \mathcal{W}(-B\theta e^{-B\theta}), \\ \theta &= \frac{v_d}{e^{v_d L_{(K)}^d}}, \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where $\omega_0 > 0$, $\mathcal{W}(\cdot)$ is the Lambert–W function, $v_d = \frac{\pi^{d/2}}{\Gamma(d/2+1)}$ is the constant for the d -dimensional Lebesgue measure (i.e., $v_d L_{(K)}^d$ is the d -dimensional volume of the hypersphere with radius $L_{(K)}$), and B is the upper bound for D_t .

Proof. See Appendix A. $\square$

The bound B for D_t is obtained from the training data. The Lambert–W function is easily computed with built-in functions in popular programming languages, such as Python and MATLAB. Note that Equation (7) gives an upper bound on the false alarm rate (FAR) since

$$\text{FAR} = E_\infty[T]^{-1} \geq e^{-\omega_0 h},$$

which can be used to select a threshold value h to satisfy a false alarm constraint β :

$$h = -\log \beta / \omega_0. \quad (8)$$

Due to its sequential nature, the parameters of NOMAD control the fundamental trade-off between minimizing the average detection delay and false alarm rate. Parameter k determines how many nearest neighbors to take into account when computing the total distance L_m , given by Equation (4). A smaller k would result in it being more sensitive to the anomaly, hence it supports the earlier detection, but at the same time it causes it to be more prone to the false alarms due to nominal outliers. A larger k would result in the opposite. $0 < \gamma < d$ is the weight that determines the emphasis on the difference between the distances.

The alarm threshold h in Equation (6) directly controls the trade-off between minimizing the detection delay and false alarm rate. Decreasing h will yield smaller detection delays, i.e., earlier detection, but also more frequent false alarms. It is typically selected to satisfy a false alarm constraint, as shown in Equation (8). The significance level α is at a secondary role supporting h . For a fixed h , a larger α would result in smaller detection delays, but also more frequent false alarm, since more nominal data points will lie outside the selected dense area.

Complexity: Next, we analyze the computational complexity of our proposed method. The training phase of NOMAD requires the k NN distances between each pair of the data points in the training data to be computed. Therefore, the time complexity of the training phase is $O(N^2d)$, where d and N are the dimensionality and size of the training data, respectively. The space complexity of the training is $O(dN)$, since N points are stored for testing. Note that training is performed once offline, thus, the time complexity of online testing is usually critical for scalability. In the test phase, computing the k NN distance of a test point to all points in the training data takes $O(dN)$ computations. Since the test statistic is updated recursively, the space complexity of testing is not significant. Consequently, the proposed NOMAD algorithms linearly scale with the number of data dimensions d in both training and testing. It also linearly scales in the online testing with the number of training points.

Computing the nearest neighbors of a query point is the most computationally expensive part of the algorithm, as the distance to every other point in the train data needs to be computed before the k smallest of them is selected as the k nearest neighbor. As the dimensionality increases and the training size grows, the algorithm becomes less efficient in terms of the running time. The computational complexity of the algorithm can be reduced by approximating the k NN distance rather than computing the exact value. Due to the inaccuracy introduced at the approximated k NN distances, NOMAD's performance will drop compared to that of when using the exact k NN distances. However, depending on the system requirements, e.g., the sampling rate and importance of timely detection, and the gain from the improvement in running time by employing k NN approximation can compensate for the exact distances. To evaluate the performance of the method, in approximate and exact k NN scenarios, we adopted a k NN approximation algorithm [43] that is scalable for high dimensional data.

In a simulated experiment, we evaluate the performance and computation time of our algorithm in both scenarios. The experiments are carried out in MATLAB on an Intel 3.60 GHz processor with 16 GB RAM. In simulations, the data dimensionality is 50, and the training size is 500,000. The anomaly is manifested by a shift in the mean of the observations

by three standard deviations in 10% of the dimensions. The performance of the original and efficient NOMADs are shown in Figure 1. The average computation time (computation of Equations (5) and (6) per observation) for both is also summarized in the Table 1. As shown by results, approximating the k NN distance decreases the computational overhead; however, at the cost of a small loss in the performance. In the experiment, the average running time per observation using the approximation method dropped by a factor of 14. The versions with exact and fast k NN computations can run in real-time at a speed of 13 samples per second and 185 samples per second, respectively.




Figure 1. Comparison between the performance of NOMAD by computing the exact k NN distance and approximating the k NN distance.

Table 1. Average computation overhead of the original and efficient NOMAD per sample.

Average Execution Time (s)	
Exact k NN	Fast k NN
0.075	0.0054

4.3. An Extension: NOMADs

In this section, we consider the case of having an additional anomaly training dataset along with the previously discussed nominal dataset. Next, we extend the NOMAD method to take advantage of the anomaly dataset in order to improve its performance. Consider an anomaly training set $\mathcal{X}'_{M'} = \{x'_1, x'_2, \dots, x'_{M'}\}$ in addition to the nominal set $\mathcal{X}_N = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\}$. In this case, the anomaly evidence for each instance can be computed by comparing the total distance L_t with respect to the nominal dataset with the total distance L'_t with respect to the anomalous dataset. Thus, there is no need to learn the borderline total distance $L_{(K)}$ in training to be used as a baseline for L_t in testing (cf. Equation (5)). That is, no training is needed for NOMADs. However, before testing, a pre-processing might be required to remove the data points that are similar to the nominal training set. The reason for cleaning the anomaly dataset rather than the nominal dataset is that usually, the anomaly dataset is obtained by collecting observations from a known anomalous event that may typically include nominal observations too. For instance, in

a network intrusion detection system (IDS), after the occurrence of an attack, several observations could still be of nominal nature. The cleaning step is carried out by finding and removing the data points of the anomaly training set that lie in the dense area of the nominal training set,

$$\mathcal{X}_M^{\text{clean}} = \mathcal{X}'_{M'} \setminus \{\mathbf{x}'_m \in \mathcal{X}'_{M'} : L_{\mathbf{x}'_m} \leq L_{(K)}\}, \quad (9)$$

where $L_{\mathbf{x}'_m}$ is the total distance of $\mathbf{x}'_m$ with respect to the nominal points in $\mathcal{X}_N$. Hence, the training procedure of NOMAD that finds $L_{(K)}$, can be used for preprocessing the anomalous training data.

While testing for each testing data instance $\mathbf{x}_t$, the anomaly evidence is calculated by

$$D_t = d(\log L_t - \log L'_t) + \log(N/M), \quad (10)$$

where L_t and L'_t are the total distances of $\mathbf{x}_t$ computed using Equation (4) with respect to the points in $\mathcal{X}_N$ and $\mathcal{X}_M^{\text{clean}}$, respectively; and N and M are the number of points in the nominal and (cleaned) anomalous training sets. The statistic update and decision rule of NOMADs are the same as in NOMAD, given by Equation (6). In the NOMADs procedure, and different from Algorithm 1, Equation (10) is used in line 9 to compute the anomaly evidence D_t .

In practice, there is a typical imbalance between the sizes of the nominal and anomaly training sets due to the inherent difficulty of obtaining anomaly samples. Since the total k NN distances in a dense nominal set $\mathcal{X}_N$ are expected to be smaller than those in a sparse anomaly dataset, for an anomalous data point, L_t can be smaller than L'_t , resulting in negative anomaly evidence, that can lead to poor detection. In order to deal with the imbalance of datasets, the term $\log(N/M)$ in Equation (10) acts as a correction factor. Specifically, for $N > M$, $\log(N/M) > 0$ compensates for L_t being unfairly small compared to L'_t . This correction factor naturally appears in the asymptotic optimality proof, as shown next.

Theorem 2. *When the nominal distribution $f_0(\mathbf{x}_t)$ and anomalous distribution $f_1(\mathbf{x}_t)$ are finite and continuous, as the training sets grow, the NOMADs statistic D_t , given by Equation (10), converges in probability to the log-likelihood ratio,*

$$D_t \xrightarrow{p} \log \frac{f_1(\mathbf{x}_t)}{f_0(\mathbf{x}_t)} \quad \text{as } M, N \rightarrow \infty, \quad (11)$$

i.e., NOMADs converges to CUSUM, which is the minimax optimum in minimizing the expected detection delay while satisfying a false alarm constraint.

Proof. See Appendix B. $\square$

4.4. Unified Framework for Online Learning

The availability of the labeled training data is a major limiting factor for improving the performance of anomaly detection techniques. In several applications, obtaining a comprehensive and accurate labeled training dataset for the anomaly class is very difficult [1]. In contrast, in most applications, a typically sufficient amount of comprehensive nominal training data is available. Semi-supervised techniques, including NOMAD, constitute a popular class of anomaly detection methods that require labeled training data only for the nominal class. These techniques try to build a model of nominal operation/behavior. Hence, anomaly detection is performed by detecting data that significantly deviate from the constructed nominal model. Supervised techniques, moreover, assume availability of both nominal and anomalous datasets, and build models for classifying unseen data into nominal vs. anomaly classes. NOMAD, as a supervised technique, outperforms the semi-supervised NOMAD technique for the known anomaly types, as shown in Section 5. However, NOMADs, and in general supervised anomaly detectors, may fall short of de-

detecting unknown anomaly types while NOMAD, and in general semi-supervised anomaly detectors, can easily handle new anomaly patterns as they do not depend on assumptions about the anomalies.

Combining the strengths of NOMAD and NOMADs, we propose a self-supervised online learning scheme called NOMADo, that is capable of detecting new anomaly types and at the same time is capable of improving its performance for detecting the previously seen anomaly types. Particularly, in the unified NOMAD method, both NOMAD and NOMADs run in parallel to detect anomalies, and the anomalous data instances first detected by NOMAD are included in the anomalous training set of NOMADs in order to empower the detection of similar anomaly types. Since the NOMADs procedure involves all of the necessary elements for NOMAD, there is no further computation overhead induced by the unified approach. Keeping track of the cumulative decision statistics of NOMAD and NOMADs, the unified NOMAD scheme, NOMADo, stops the first time either NOMAD or NOMADs stops:

$$\Delta_t^{(1)} = \max\{\Delta_t^{(1)} + D_t^{(1)}, 0\}, \quad (12)$$

$$\Delta_t^{(2)} = \max\{\Delta_t^{(2)} + D_t^{(2)}, 0\}$$

$$T = \min\{t : \Delta_t^{(1)} \geq h_1 \text{ or } \Delta_t^{(2)} \geq h_2\}, \quad (13)$$

where $D_t^{(1)}$ and $D_t^{(2)}$ are the anomaly evidences given by Equations (5) and (10), respectively, and h_1 and h_2 are the decision thresholds for NOMAD and NOMADs. For the known anomaly patterns on which NOMADs is trained in a self-supervised fashion, it is expected that $\Delta_t^{(2)} \geq h_2$ happens earlier, whereas $\Delta_t^{(1)} \geq h_1$ is supposed to detect new anomaly types. If the alarm is raised by NOMAD, then the anomaly onset time is estimated as the last time instance the NOMAD statistic was zero, i.e., $\hat{t} = \max\{t < T : \Delta_t^{(1)} = 0\}$, and the data instances $\{x_{\hat{t}+1}, \dots, x_T\}$ between $\hat{t}$ and T are added to the anomaly training set of NOMADs. For reliable enhancement of the NOMADs anomaly training set with the newly detected instances, the NOMAD threshold h_1 needs to be selected sufficiently high to prevent false alarms by NOMAD, and thus false inclusions into the NOMADs training set. Obviously, large h_1 will increase the detection delays for previously unseen anomaly types, however, avoiding false training instances is a more crucial objective.

5. Experiments

5.1. N-BaIoT Dataset

We evaluate the proposed NOMAD algorithms using the N-BaIoT dataset, that consists of real IoT data traffic observations, including botnet attacks. These data are collected from nine IoT devices, including doorbells, thermostats, baby monitors, etc., infected by the Mirai and BASHLITE malware [36,44]. Here, we only consider the Mirai attack dataset. The benign and attack datasets for each device are composed of 115 features summarizing traffic statistics over different temporal windows. The dataset is collected for each device separately, and lacks a timestamp. The number of instances is varied for each device and attack type. Therefore, we formed the training and testing sets by randomly choosing data instances from each device. To form a network-wide instance for multivariate detection, we stack the chosen instances from nine devices into a single vector of 1035 dimensions. This way, we obtain a nominal training set with $N = 10,000$ instances. We also build an anomalous training set with $M = 5000$ instances for the Ecobee thermostat device (device 3). To test the performance of NOMADs for both known and unknown attack types, we let NOMADs train only on attack data from device 3, and test under two scenarios:

- (i) Device 3 (Ecobee Thermostat) is compromised (known anomaly type);
- (ii) Device 6 (Provision PT-838 security camera) is compromised (unknown anomaly type).

We form the testing data in similar fashion to the training data, assuming that the respective device is compromised and starts sending malicious traffic at $t = 101$. In the NOMAD algorithms, we set the parameters as $k = \gamma = 1$, $\alpha_1 = 0.05$, $\alpha_2 = 0.1$.

NOMAD is able to detect the attack with zero detection delay and zero false alarm in all trials in both known and unknown attack scenarios (Figure 2). As for NOMADs that trains also on attack data from device 3, in the known attack scenario, zero detection delay with zero false alarm in all trials is achieved, similar to NOMAD. Figure 2 demonstrates the average performance of both variants for the detection of attack when device 6 is compromised, i.e., an unknown anomaly type for NOMADs. In this scenario, although NOMADs is not trained on this anomaly type, it is still able to detect it, yet with a slight degradation in performance as compared to the known anomaly case. The detection of unknown anomaly types by NOMADs is not guaranteed to happen in general, and it depends on whether the anomalous observations are relatively similar to the nominal dataset or to the anomalous dataset. Both the unsupervised and supervised NOMAD algorithms achieve much quicker detection than the state-of-the-art sequential detectors NEWMA [34] and nearest neighbor (NN) based change detection methods in [30]. NEWMA [34] is an online and multivariate change detection algorithm that is based on the exponential weighted moving average method. The NN method [30] is based on the two-sample test method proposed in [45,46], which, given two sample sets, determines whether they belong to the same distribution by employing a k NN similarity graph. We tried different window sizes for NEWMA and NN, and found the optimum for both to be 50.




Figure 2. Performance comparison between NOMAD, NOMADs, and the existing methods in the unknown attack scenario for the N-BaIoT dataset.

We also compare the performance of NOMAD with the deep auto encoder-based detection method, that was proposed in the paper that presented the N-BaIoT dataset [36], as they both train only on the nominal data. The auto encoder method marks each observation instance as nominal or anomalous, and employs majority voting on a moving window of size ws^* (to control the false positive rate), raising alarm only if the majority of instances within the window are marked as anomalous. Due to its window-based majority rule, the sample detection delay (i.e., the number of anomalous instances observed before the detection) is at least $\lfloor \frac{ws^*}{2} \rfloor + 1$. Whereas, the sequential nature of NOMAD enables the immediate detection together with zero false alarm, as demonstrated in Figures 3 and 4. Following the analysis in [36] for each device, the sample detection delay and the false positive rate of both methods are compared in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. The optimum window sizes reported in [36] for each device are used for the auto encoder method.

Online Learning Scheme (NOMADo): Here, we present the experiment results to demonstrate the practical advantage of the self-supervised online learning framework NOMADo, proposed in Section 4.4. Following the experiments of Section 5.1, we train the algorithms on the nominal data and anomaly data for a specific attack type. For the N-BaIoT dataset, we repeat the Scenario 2 test, in which device 6 (Provision PT-838 security camera) starts sending malicious traffic while only the attack data from device 3 is used to train NOMADs.




Figure 3. Average detection delay of the auto encoder method [36] and NOMAD in terms of the number of samples for each device attack scenario.




Figure 4. False positive rate of the auto encoder method [36] and NOMAD for each device attack scenario.

Figure 5 shows the average detection delay by NOMADs for a constant false alarm rate of 0.01, versus the number of the data points from the new anomaly type added to the anomaly training set. As the number of confirmed instances added to the anomaly training set grows, NOMADs detection delay decreases. The confirmation can be through either a human expert or a sufficiently high decision threshold for NOMAD that avoids false alarms, as explained in Section 4.4. Although in general NOMADs may not detect an unknown anomaly at the first encounter, it is able to detect the unknown anomaly in the N-BaIoT dataset at the first encounter with an average delay of 0.79, and the average delay converges to zero as the training set is enhanced with instances from the new anomaly type. In this way, NOMADo, in general, detects the unknown anomaly types through NOMAD, and over time learns the pattern of new anomalies, and improves its detection performance through NOMADs.




Figure 5. Average detection delay of NOMADs vs. the number of the new anomaly instances added to the training set for the N-BaIoT dataset.

5.2. Cyber Physical System: SWaT Data Set

We further analyze our algorithm on an operational test bed setup called the secure water treatment (SWaT) system. The data were collected with Singapore's Public Utility Board to ensure the resemblance of the system to real systems in the field. The data were collected for 11 days with the system being operational for the entire day. During the last 4 days of the data collection process, a total of 36 attacks were launched with cyber physical sensors, such as water level sensors, actuators, and valves as the primary target points. The attacks did not conform to any pattern with respect to intent or lasting duration, with some attacks lasting for an entire hour. The details of the SWaT system is publicly available on its website (<https://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/testbeds/secure-water-treatment-swat/>, last accessed on 23 April 2023). The SWaT dataset is a high dimensional, multivariate system with data streaming from 51 sensors and actuators. In all, 496,800 samples were collected under normal working conditions and another 449,919 samples were collected with the system under attack. Our proposed NOMAD algorithm is compared with several other algorithms in Table 2: the PCA-based method in [32], KNN-based method in [33], feature bagging (FB) [35], auto encoder-based (AE) method in [37], EGAN [38], multivariate generative adversarial network based anomaly detection method (MAD-GAN) [39], BeatGAN [47], and deep auto encoding Gaussian mixture model (DAGMM) [48]. As seen in the table, we achieve the best result in terms of precision, recall, and F1 score.

Table 2. Performance comparison of NOMAD on the SWaT dataset with various algorithms.

Algorithm	Pre	Rec	F1
PCA	24.92	21.63	0.23
KNN	7.83	7.83	0.08
FB	10.17	10.17	0.10
AE	72.63	52.63	0.61
EGAN	40.57	67.73	0.51
MAD-GAN	98.97	63.74	0.77
BeatGAN	64.01	87.46	73.92
DAGMM	89.92	57.84	70.40
Ours	99.76	64.7	0.783

6. Conclusions

In this paper, we proposed an algorithm, called NOMAD, that is suitable for quick and accurate anomaly detection in high dimensional systems that require the multivariate (i.e., joint) monitoring of system components. Our proposed anomaly detection method is generic and applicable to various contexts as it does not assume specific data types, probability distributions, and anomaly types. It only requires a nominal training set. We analyzed its computational complexity and asymptotic false alarm rate, that yielded a closed-form expression for setting its decision threshold. We also showed how to benefit from available anomalous data (NOMADs), and presented an online learning scheme (NOMADo) that detects unknown anomaly types, and over time improves its performance by learning on-the-fly. We evaluated the performance of our method in the context of cyber-attack detection using real datasets. The experiments verified the advantage of the proposed online learning method, and also showed that the proposed NOMAD methods significantly outperform the state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods in terms of detection accuracy, average detection delay, and false alarm rate. The proposed algorithms assume a static nominal behavior and a static set of data dimensions. Extending it to dynamic settings with changing nominal behavior remains an important future research direction.

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Data Availability Statement: The N-BaIoT dataset is publicly available at https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/detection_of_IoT_botnet_attacks_N_BaIoT (last accessed on 23 April 2023). The SWaT dataset is publicly available at <https://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/testbeds/secure-water-treatment-swat/> (last accessed on 23 April 2023).

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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1

We firstly derive the asymptotic distribution of the anomaly evidence D_t in Equation (5) in the absence of anomalies. Since

$$Pr[D_t \leq x] = P(\log L_t^d \leq \log L_{(K)}^d + x),$$

it is sufficient to find the probability distribution of $\log L_t^d$ and the d th power of k NN at time t . Independent d -dimensional instances $\{x_t\}$ over time form a Poisson point process. The nearest neighbor ($k = 1$) distribution for a Poisson point process [49] is given by

$$Pr[L_t \leq r] = 1 - \exp(-\Lambda(\mathcal{S}(x_t, r))),$$

where $\Lambda(\mathcal{S}(x_t, r))$ is the arrival intensity (i.e., Poisson rate measure) in the d -dimensional hypersphere $\mathcal{S}(x_t, r)$ centered at x_t with radius r . Asymptotically, for a large number of training instances as $N \rightarrow \infty$, under the null (nominal) hypothesis, the nearest neighbor distance L_t of x_t takes small values, defining an infinitesimal hyper-ball with homogeneous intensity $\lambda = 1$ around x_t . Since for a homogeneous Poisson process the intensity is written as $\Lambda(\mathcal{S}(x_t, r)) = \lambda |\mathcal{S}(x_t, r)|$ [49], where $|\mathcal{S}(x_t, r)| = \frac{\pi^{d/2}}{\Gamma(d/2+1)} r^d = v_d r^d$ is the Lebesgue

measure (i.e., d -dimensional volume) of the hyper-ball $\mathcal{S}(x_t, r)$, we rewrite the nearest neighbor distribution as

$$\Pr[L_t \leq r] = 1 - \exp(-v_d r^d),$$

where $v_d = \frac{\pi^{d/2}}{\Gamma(d/2+1)}$ is the constant for the d -dimensional Lebesgue measure. Now, applying a change of variables, we can write the cumulative density of L_t^d as

$$\Pr[L_t^d \leq x] = 1 - \exp(-v_d x). \quad (\text{A1})$$

From Equation (A1) we find $\Pr[\log L_t^d \leq x]$ as

$$\Pr[\log L_t^d \leq x] = 1 - \exp(-v_d e^x) \quad (\text{A2})$$

and from Equation (A2) we find $\Pr[D_t \leq x]$ as

$$\Pr[D_t \leq x] = \Pr[\log L_t^d \leq \log L_{(K)}^d + x] = 1 - \exp(-v_d e^{\log L_{(K)}^d + x}) \quad (\text{A3})$$

By taking the derivative of the above CDFs, we find the probability density function of D_t as

$$f_{D_t}(x) = \frac{\partial}{\partial x} [1 - \exp(-v_d L_{(K)}^d e^x)] = v_d L_{(K)}^d e^x \exp(-v_d L_{(K)}^d e^x) \quad (\text{A4})$$

In [50] (p. 177), for CUSUM-like algorithms with independent increments, such as ODIT, a lower bound on the average false alarm period is given as follows

$$E_\infty[T] \geq e^{\omega_0 h},$$

where h is the detection threshold, and $\omega_0 \geq 0$ is the solution to $E[e^{\omega_0 D_t}] = 1$. Using the probability density derived in Equation (A4), $E[e^{\omega_0 D_t}] = 1$ can be written as:

$$1 = \int_{-\infty}^B e^{\omega_0 x} [v_d L_{(K)}^d e^x \exp(-v_d L_{(K)}^d e^x)] dx$$

where $-\infty$ and B are the lower and upper bounds for $D_t = \log L_t^d - \log L_{(K)}^d$. The lower bound occurs when $L_t^d = 0$ and the upper bound B is obtained from the training set. With a simple change of variable, $u = e^x$ we can rewrite the above equation as

$$1 = \int_0^{e^B} u^{\omega_0} [v_d L_{(K)}^d \exp(-v_d L_{(K)}^d u)] du \quad (\text{A5})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{v_d L_{(K)}^d} &= \int_0^{e^B} u^{\omega_0} \exp(-v_d L_{(K)}^d u) du \\ &= \frac{1}{(v_d L_{(K)}^d)^{\omega_0}} \int_0^{e^B} (v_d L_{(K)}^d u)^{\omega_0} e^{-(v_d L_{(K)}^d u)} du. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A6})$$

The integral in above equation is a special integral known as lower incomplete gamma function, which is defined as

$$\gamma(s, x) = \int_0^x t^{(s-1)} e^{-t} dt. \quad (\text{A7})$$

Equation (A6) is then simplified into

$$\frac{1}{v_d L_{(K)}^d} = \frac{\gamma(w_0 + 1, v_d L_{(K)}^d e^B)}{(v_d L_{(K)}^d)^{w_0 + 1}} \quad (\text{A8})$$

As $N \rightarrow \infty$, since the d th power of $(1 - \alpha)$ th percentile of the nearest neighbor distances in the training set goes to zero, i.e., $L_{(K)}^d \rightarrow 0$. The asymptotic behavior of the lower incomplete gamma function is $\frac{\gamma(s, x)}{x^s} \rightarrow \frac{1}{s}$ as $x \rightarrow 0$; therefore, we have

$$\frac{1}{w_0 + 1} = \frac{1}{(e^B)^{w_0 + 1} v_d L_{(K)}^d} \quad (\text{A9})$$

$$w_0 + 1 = e^{B(w_0 + 1)} v_d L_{(K)}^d. \quad (\text{A10})$$

We next rearrange the terms to obtain the form of $e^{Bx} = a_0(x + \theta)$ where $x = w_0 + 1$, $a_0 = \frac{1}{v_d L_{(K)}^d}$, and $\theta = 0$. The solution for x is given by the Lambert–W function [51] as $x = -\theta - \frac{1}{B} \mathcal{W}(-Be^{-B\theta}/a_0)$, hence

$$w_0 = -1 - \frac{1}{B} \mathcal{W}(-Bv_d L_{(K)}^d). \quad (\text{A11})$$

The bound B for D_t is obtained from the training data. Lambert–W function is easily computed with built-in functions in popular programming languages, such as Python and MATLAB.

Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2

Consider a hypersphere $S_t \in \mathbb{R}^d$ centered at $\mathbf{x}_t$ with radius $g_k(\mathbf{x}_t)$, the k NN distance of $\mathbf{x}_t$ with respect to nominal set $\mathcal{X}_N$. The maximum likelihood estimate for the probability of a point being inside S_t under f_0 is given by k/N . It is known that, as the total number of points grows, this binomial probability estimate converges to the true probability mass in S_t in the mean square sense [52], i.e., $k/N \xrightarrow{L^2} \int_{S_t} f_0(\mathbf{x}) d\mathbf{x}$ as $N \rightarrow \infty$. Hence, the probability density estimate $\hat{f}_0(\mathbf{x}_t) = \frac{k/N}{V_d g_k(\mathbf{x}_t)^d}$, where $V_d g_k(\mathbf{x}_t)^d$ is the volume of S_t with the appropriate constant V_d converges to the actual probability density function $\hat{f}_0(\mathbf{x}_t) \xrightarrow{p} f_0(\mathbf{x}_t)$ as $N \rightarrow \infty$, since S_t shrinks and $g_k(\mathbf{x}_t) \rightarrow 0$. Similarly, we can show that $\frac{k/M}{V_d g'_k(\mathbf{x}_t)^d} \xrightarrow{p} f_1(\mathbf{x}_t)$ as $M \rightarrow \infty$, where $g'_k(\mathbf{x}_t)$ is the k NN distance of $\mathbf{x}_t$ in the anomalous training set $\mathcal{X}'_M$. Hence, we conclude with $\log \frac{\frac{k/M}{V_d g'_k(\mathbf{x}_t)^d}}{\frac{k/N}{V_d g_k(\mathbf{x}_t)^d}} = d[\log g_k(\mathbf{x}_t) - \log g'_k(\mathbf{x}_t)] + \log(N/M) \xrightarrow{p} \log \frac{f_1(\mathbf{x}_t)}{f_0(\mathbf{x}_t)}$ as $M, N \rightarrow \infty$, where $L_t = g_k(\mathbf{x}_t)$ and $L'_t = g'_k(\mathbf{x}_t)$ for $s = \gamma = 1$.

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