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47

48 **Abstract**

49 Funding available to support conservation must be invested effectively given declines in biodiversity and
50 ecosystem services. Unfortunately, conservation dollars often come with restrictions on where they can
51 be spent. We introduce a method to demonstrate to supporters of conservation how much more could
52 be achieved if they allow greater flexibility over conservation funding. Specifically, we calculate
53 conservation exchange rates that summarize gains in conservation outcomes available if funding
54 originating in one location can be invested elsewhere. We illustrate our approach by considering NGO
55 funding and major federal programs within the United States and a range of conservation objectives
56 focused on biodiversity and ecosystem services. We show that large improvements in biodiversity and
57 ecosystem service provision are available if geographic restrictions on conservation funding can be
58 loosened. We demonstrate how conservation exchange rates can be used to spotlight promising
59 opportunities for relaxing geographic funding restrictions.

60

61 **In a nutshell**

62 1. Funding for biodiversity and ecosystem services would have greater impact with fewer geographic
63 constraints on conservation dollars.

64 2. If donors to a U.S. NGO require conservation funding to be spent in their home state, it costs 68% of
65 the improvement in biodiversity that would have been possible absent such restrictions.

66 3. We introduce a new approach that demonstrates by how much allowing a small amount of flexibility
67 increases conservation impact.

68 4. We summarize this information in 'conservation exchange rates', analogous to exchange rates
69 between financial currencies.

70 5. Spatial exchange rates demonstrate large biodiversity gains are available from relaxing constraints on
71 conservation funding.

72 **Introduction**

73

74 Expanding protected area networks provides a renewed focus for the international conservation
75 community with the development of a post-2020 framework for protecting biodiversity and related
76 initiatives led by national governments (Convention on Biological Diversity 2020; Haaland et al. 2021).

77 Already, governments, multilateral organizations, NGOs, businesses and other groups invest on the
78 order of USD \$100 billion each year to arrest declines in biodiversity (Organization for Economic
79 Cooperation and Development 2020; Seidl et al. 2020). The severity of ongoing losses of species and
80 habitats (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 2019)
81 demand that available funding is used effectively. Fortunately, there are still conservation bargains to be
82 had. These are locations rich in biodiversity where protection can be achieved relatively cheaply and
83 where ecosystems will be threatened if action is not taken, meaning the value added by conservation
84 efforts would be large (Conde et al. 2015). However, financial support for conservation often comes
85 with restrictions on where funds can be used. This can result in the most promising opportunities to
86 improve conditions for biodiversity missing out on funding (Waldron et al. 2013).

87

88 Geographic limitations on conservation funding are commonplace. In private land conservation, large
89 financial donations not associated with a particular project or initiative are unusual (Clark 2007) and
90 downstream effects on the geographic availability of funds can shape spending on land protection over
91 large spatial scales (Larson et al. 2016). People's motivations for donating to charitable causes including
92 conservation vary but can include both purely altruistic reasons as well as motivations tied to benefits
93 enjoyed by the individual (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Some motivations are more compatible with
94 supporting distant projects than others and willingness-to-pay studies show the amount people are
95 willing to give to support conservation activities declines with distance (Yamaguchi and Shah 2020;

96 Glenk et al. 2020) and across geographic borders (Dallimer and Strange 2015; Haefele et al 2019).
97 Geographic restrictions on spending are also embedded in public funding programs. In the U.S., the
98 federal government gives grants to states to support land conservation. Many of these federal programs
99 follow prescribed funding formulas that may not align with where the greatest conservation
100 opportunities are found (Southwick Associates 2013; Congressional Research Service 2019).

101

102 Large conservation gains would be possible if funders could be persuaded to allow greater flexibility
103 over where money to support conservation can be spent. But how can this be achieved? Public and
104 private funders are unlikely to be moved simply by growing the existing chorus of appeals for more
105 flexible conservation dollars (e.g., Kark et al. 2009, Jeanson et al. 2020). As a practical way forward, we
106 provide a means to demonstrate to organizations, programs and individuals supporting conservation the
107 potential efficiency gains available were they to allow greater flexibility over funding. We express these
108 as 'conservation exchange rates' that show how much greater conservation gains could be if dollars to
109 support conservation came with fewer geographic restrictions. We provide a means to tailor these
110 exchange rates to particular funders by quantifying them for different combinations of funder and
111 potential investment opportunities. This includes showing how much more could be done to advance
112 biodiversity goals if funders in one location allowed their conservation dollars to be directed towards a
113 particular joint initiative shared with a neighboring region, perhaps one tied to a transboundary
114 ecosystem or migratory species (Vogdrup-Schmidt et al. 2019b; Mason et al. 2020).

115

116 We illustrate our methods with an application to funding allocations among states in the conterminous
117 United States (U.S.), where funding is to be used to establish new protected areas. We first describe
118 exchange rates that result when prioritizing protected areas to support species conservation before
119 broadening also to include ecosystem services. Conservation studies applying spatial optimization to

120 prioritize future areas for protection (Groves and Game 2016), including applications to the U.S. (Withey
121 et al. 2012; Kroetz et al. 2014), provide important antecedents for our analyses. However, these
122 analyses typically assume conservation resources can be re-allocated freely across space, but see Kark et
123 al. (2009), Ando and Shah (2010) and Pouzols et al. (2014) for exceptions. Beyond conservation, our
124 approach builds on several literature precedents, including efforts to encourage 'effective altruism'
125 (MacAskill 2015; Freeling and Connell 2020).

126

127 **Conservation exchange rates and how to calculate them**

128

129 We based our definition of exchange rates in conservation on the concept of financial exchange rates
130 between currencies. Assuming no arbitrage, financial exchange rates reflect the ratio of prices for an
131 identical basket of goods in two currencies. Because it seemed more relevant to conservation
132 applications, we used the reciprocal measure (how much can conservation objectives be advanced for a
133 given level of investment) to calculate conservation exchange rates. E.g., if considering conservation
134 funding originating in New York being invested in Texas, the relevant exchange rate would be

135

$$136 \frac{\text{Conservation gain per dollar in Texas}}{\text{Conservation gain per dollar in New York}}$$

137

138 To derive our exchange rates, we need a representation of the available funding landscape for
139 conservation and how this compares to the landscape of conservation priorities. When seeking to
140 represent the current funding landscape in the U.S., we first rely on data on philanthropic giving to a
141 major conservation NGO (The Nature Conservancy, TNC; Fishburn et al. 2013). We then consider funding
142 programs for conservation run by the U.S. federal government (Southwick Associates 2013;
143 Congressional Research Service 2019).

144

145 To represent the landscape of conservation priorities, we calculate the conservation gain per dollar
146 offered by investing in different places. We base our exchange rate estimates on funding being allocated
147 according to an optimization model. Specifically, we solved an optimization problem where the goal was
148 to allocate available conservation funds to deliver the shared national conservation goal while subject to
149 constraints on where funds could be spent. Initially, we assumed funds could only be spent in the state
150 where they originated. While admittedly a stringent assumption, funding constraints of this type are
151 commonly encountered in conservation (Pouzols et al. 2014). By examining optimal solutions to this
152 spatially constrained problem, we can calculate the marginal gain in the national conservation objective
153 available if a state's budget constraint can be relaxed by a small amount. We represent exchange rates
154 between pairs of states as ratios of these marginal gain statements. Most prior studies have emphasized
155 potential gains if conservation funding can be freely reallocated in space (e.g., Underwood et al. 2009a),
156 which seems unlikely. In contrast, spatial exchange rates calculate potential conservation gains from
157 allowing even a small amount of additional flexibility, e.g., a donor or funding program allowing a
158 portion of a planned gift to be allocated to a conservation project in a neighboring region, where it could
159 still benefit shared species or ecosystems.

160

161 We first derived exchange rates when focused on terrestrial vertebrate species currently assessed as
162 being vulnerable to extinction or worse by IUCN. Our optimization framework involved allocating the
163 budget to different counties where funds were used to acquire new protected areas. While we
164 recognize the value in applying our methods over different spatial extents and grains, our chosen
165 illustration required patterns of relative variation in conservation return on investment between U.S.
166 states. For that purpose, working with county-grain variation suffices. For our optimizations, we adapted
167 an existing framework that focuses on prioritizing counties based on how investing in them will affect

168 the number of species expected to persist in 2040 in light of projected land cover change (Webpanel 1,
169 Armsworth et al. 2020). This framework accounts for species persistence, ecological complementarity
170 and the ecological contribution of private land, as well as spatially heterogeneous conservation costs
171 and conversion threats. We extended this existing framework by imposing state-level budget
172 constraints, allowing us to calculate conservation exchange rates between states. A full specification of
173 the optimization problem is given in Webpanel 1, which also describes the behavior of the optimal
174 solution and numerical techniques we used to find it. The optimal solution shares characteristics with
175 the efficient design of emissions trading systems when abatement costs and environmental damages are
176 spatially heterogeneous (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009). In the optimal solution, available funding within
177 each state is shared among counties offering the largest gains in the national biodiversity objective per
178 dollar spent, in such a way as to equalize marginal gains across these counties within the state. State
179 funding constraints prevent these marginal gains from also being equalized across states, as would be
180 optimal if no state funding constraints applied.

181

182 To parameterize our optimization model, we integrated data on ranges of terrestrial vertebrate species
183 (birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibians; IUCN 2016; Birdlife International and Handbook of the Birds
184 of the World 2016); on costs faced by TNC and public agencies in the U.S. when protecting land (Le
185 Bouille et al., submitted); and on the threat of future habitat conversion (Wear 2011). For the initial
186 analysis, we included data on spatial variation in philanthropic giving to U.S. conservation, using TNC as
187 an example (Fovargue et al. 2019). Later we used data on state and federal funding for conservation
188 (Southwick Associates 2013; Congressional Research Service 2019).

189

190 We examined the sensitivity of the exchange rates to the choice of conservation objective. To do so, we
191 considered six additional conservation objectives. First, we used the same framework but considered all

192 terrestrial vertebrate species not only those considered vulnerable. Next, we examined conservation
193 objectives that equally weighted ecosystem services and biodiversity goals, using our focus on
194 vulnerable vertebrate species to represent the latter. For ecosystem service benefits, we first included
195 avoided losses of forest carbon due to land conversion for agriculture and development. Next we
196 considered a set of ecosystem service indicators that emphasized investing near to people: improving
197 recreational opportunities and open space amenities near people; maintaining natural land cover near
198 withdrawal points for water for public supply or domestic use; and an additional benefit function that
199 valued both recreation and maintaining water quality in this way while emphasizing benefits to low-
200 income households. For comparability with the biodiversity models, we focused on improving these
201 outcomes in 2040 drawing on land cover, population and income projections to do so. Finally, to
202 examine the degree to which our results were a consequence of relying on the same cost and
203 conversion threat data across scenarios, we included an optimization focused on avoiding habitat
204 conversion without considering the importance of remaining habitats for biodiversity or ecosystem
205 services.

206

207 **Conservation exchange rates reveal potential biodiversity gains**

208

209 We illustrate our conservation exchange rate approach by first considering an application to
210 philanthropic giving to TNC, a large, nonprofit land trust, and to conserving vulnerable terrestrial
211 vertebrate species through land protection. If donors require conservation funding be spent in their
212 home state (Fig. 1a) instead of being directed towards top priorities for protection (Fig. 1b), it would
213 cost 68% of the potential improvement in conservation status of vulnerable vertebrates that could have
214 been achieved had no such geographic restriction applied (Fig. 2a). Focusing on state-level budget
215 constraints makes sense for this application. TNC is structured into semi-autonomous state chapters

216 that play a key role in soliciting gifts from donors and in protecting land (Fishburn et al. 2013). As one
217 might expect therefore, the amount TNC spends on land protection in different states correlates
218 strongly with philanthropic giving to the organization from within states (Spearman's $r_s=0.54$, $p < 10^{-4}$,
219 $n=48$).

220

221 Even if unwilling to give completely unconstrained gifts, funders could still greatly increase the
222 biodiversity impact of their giving by allowing financial support to be used for particular shared regional
223 programs. Our exchange rates highlight obvious candidates, as shown by arrows in Figure 1(c) for
224 neighboring states. For example, a donor in Washington, a state which gives at a relatively high rate,
225 could be asked to support a Lower Snake River catchment program, allowing funds to be invested in
226 western Idaho. Donors in Washington state could multiply their biodiversity impact by a factor of 11.5
227 by supporting such a program with potential gains from Oregon donors being larger still.

228

229 The more geographic flexibility donors allow, the greater the biodiversity impact that is possible and Fig.
230 3a shows exchange rates for all pairs of states, not just neighboring ones. To understand why some
231 exchange rates are larger and others smaller, we need to examine spatial covariation between available
232 funding and conservation priorities in more detail. For the TNC application, coastal states like California
233 and New York are among the top givers (11.7% and 10.6% of overall donations respectively), although
234 large donations also come from the area around Chicago, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Jackson Hole and other
235 cities (Fig. 1a). These are not places that offer the highest return on conservation investment when
236 focused on vulnerable vertebrate species. Instead, the greatest conservation impact would be made if
237 able to invest in parts of the southern U.S., particularly in Texas and coastal Louisiana (Fig. 1b), where
238 vulnerable endemic species overlap areas where land can be protected relatively cheaply. These
239 differences manifest as striping in Fig. 3a. Horizontal striping indicates states that emerge as consistently

240 higher (red) or lower (blue) priorities for investment. Vertical striping indicates consistent improvements
241 (red) if funding originating in some states could be directed towards places that represent higher
242 conservation priorities.

243

244 Having used this first example to illustrate the idea of conservation exchange rates, we explored the
245 generality of our approach and of the particular exchange rates obtained through two sets of sensitivity
246 tests (Webpanel 2). First, we recalculated conservation exchange rates when assuming six alternative
247 objectives that conservation organizations and their funders might pursue. Exchange rates for these
248 alternative objectives are highly correlated to those for vulnerable species protection (Fig. 2c).

249 Moreover, the direction of exchange favored between pairs of states remained unchanged in 72-81% of
250 cases (Fig. 2d). Some consistency in exchange rates should be expected because of correlations built into
251 the assumed benefit functions themselves and because of the role of the shared covariates of cost and
252 threat (black bar in Figs. 2cd). The results indicate some states (e.g., Texas) are consistently high
253 priorities for funding for the different conservation objectives (Fig. 3). At the same time, exchange rates
254 are more variable in magnitude when pursuing some conservation objectives than others, reflecting
255 differences in patterns of spatial variability in underlying conservation benefit measures (Fig. 2b).
256 Constraining funding to be spent in states where it was given again imposes a large efficiency cost
257 compared to having full flexibility over where funds can be allocated. These efficiency costs range from
258 77-86% for the additional objectives we consider and are somewhat larger than they are when focused
259 only on vulnerable vertebrate species (Fig. 2a).

260

261 Our second set of sensitivity tests examined how considering different sources of conservation funding
262 would change our exchange rate estimates. We calculated exchange rates when considering one
263 particular federal conservation program (the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) (Congressional

264 Research Service 2019) as well as for federal conservation funding in aggregate (Southwick Associates
265 2013). Our exchange rate estimates proved very insensitive to the source of funding data we used. This
266 lack of sensitivity in exchange rates applied even though the overall conservation budgets involved were
267 large enough to result in diminishing returns in conservation benefits on offer in some states (Webpanel
268 2).

269

270 **Putting conservation exchange rates into practice**

271

272 Exchange rates can help inform: individual donors seeking to enhance the impact of their giving to
273 conservation; NGOs planning future philanthropy and conservation campaigns; policy debates over
274 public funding programs; and prioritization of possible of transboundary initiatives. Taking first the
275 example of philanthropy, NGOs tailor messaging to potential donors to align with individuals'
276 motivations for giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Some donors are motivated by benefits realized
277 within their local communities, while others are motivated more by how effectively their gifts are being
278 used to achieve an organizations' mission (Kolhede and Gomez-Arias 2022). Messaging using
279 conservation exchange rates is well-suited for donors in this second category. Figure 4 provides an
280 example of what this might look like. It presents an infographic illustrating trade-offs involved in
281 requiring donations be used in state versus allowing them to be used for conservation projects in
282 adjoining states. The infographic is tailored for potential donors in Colorado, interested in conserving
283 vulnerable species and providing ecosystem services to low-income communities. When soliciting a gift,
284 philanthropy staff typically present potential donors with alternative projects needing funding.
285 Communication products like Figure 4 provide a justification for including projects in neighboring
286 regions within the menu of opportunities presented to those donors who are motivated by evidence on
287 the efficacy of potential gifts.

288

289 Geographical constraints on where conservation funding can be spent have other implications. For
290 example, these constraints impose some dispersion on allowed funding patterns, meaning locations that
291 might not have otherwise been priorities at least receive some conservation investment. As well as
292 broadening the set of species, ecosystems and human communities that benefit from conservation
293 (Kareiva and Marvier 2003), more dispersed funding strategies may also move a larger pool of donors to
294 give. The history and structure of large conservation organizations both responds to and reinforces
295 these dynamics. For example, TNC's state chapter structure positions the organization to reach potential
296 donors across the breadth of its geographic footprint. Conservation NGOs must balance spreading
297 projects out to encourage more people to give against targeting available funds more narrowly towards
298 locations where they will have the greatest impact (Ando and Shah 2010). Spatial exchange rates can
299 help when balancing trade-offs like this. Developing more ways to connect data on conservation needs
300 and effectiveness with information on the different ways people are motivated to give will enable more
301 effective conservation philanthropy strategies.

302

303 Conservation exchange rates are also relevant to how public funding for conservation is allocated, with
304 intergovernmental grant-giving providing an obvious example. State governments in the U.S. receive
305 funding to support conservation projects from the federal government through State and Tribal Wildlife
306 Grants (US Fish and Wildlife Service 2020), the LWCF (Congressional Research Service 2019) and other
307 programs. Intergovernmental grant programs like these often follow fixed funding formulas. The LWCF,
308 for example, allocates some funding on an equal basis across states and some based on a state's
309 population relative to the U.S. population, while imposing a restriction that no more than 10% of total
310 funding can go to a single state (Congressional Research Service 2019). Spatial exchange rates can

311 inform policy debates about adjusting these funding formulas or how best to complement them with
312 any additional funding that can be allocated more flexibly.

313

314 Another potential application of our conservation exchange rates is to inform the design of boundary
315 spanning initiatives. Because ecological systems can stretch across administrative boundaries,
316 governments and NGOs establish transboundary initiatives to encourage cooperation in delivering
317 conservation priorities (Mason et al. 2020). These initiatives also enable some sharing of resources.

318 Exchange rates provide a means to evaluate in what places the ecological gains available from
319 establishing a boundary spanning initiative would be greatest. For our application, the Lower Snake
320 River watershed in the Pacific Northwest mentioned earlier is one potential candidate (Figure 1c). The
321 exchange rates indicate the central Appalachians to be another (Figure 1c). Again, this is a region where
322 the greatest conservation priorities (endemic species in Virginia and West Virginia) do not align with the
323 greatest funding base. Indeed, the central Appalachians have provided a focus for recent transboundary
324 initiatives in the public and NGO sector (e.g., Appalachian Landscape Conservation Cooperative 2021;
325 TNC 2018).

326

327 **Conclusions and next steps**

328

329 Conservation efforts are under-funded relative to the scale of losses of biodiversity and ecosystem
330 services, a problem exacerbated because conservation organizations are unable to deploy available
331 funding where it will have most impact. We provide a method - conservation exchange rates - to
332 demonstrate to interested funders how much greater their impact will be if they allow more flexibility in
333 where funds can be invested. While many funding programs and private donors will be unmoved by
334 generic appeals for more flexibility, some may find more compelling data that showed they could have

335 three times the impact with their conservation support if they allowed funds to be targeted towards
336 shared regional priorities. Our method identifies numerous opportunities for regional conservation
337 programs that would meet this standard.

338

339 Various extensions of our work would be worthwhile. We based our calculation of exchange rates on
340 buying unconverted land to establish protected areas. It would be interesting to consider other
341 conservation approaches, including habitat restoration, which are characterized by distinct spatial
342 patterns of benefits and costs (Bodin et al. 2022). Also, while we focused here on conservation funding,
343 there are other ways people support conservation, such as through donating easements (Baldwin and
344 Leonard 2015) or volunteering (Armsworth et al. 2013), which are more spatially constrained than are
345 financial donations. Another interesting extension therefore would be to explore how exchange rates
346 could inform strategies for blending different types of support in conservation projects. We also focused
347 our discussion on larger conservation organizations, whose work spans administrative boundaries. But
348 conservation success also depends critically on the contributions that local communities and smaller
349 organizations make (Kothari 2006, Land Trust Alliance 2020). For these groups, exchange rates could
350 suggest priorities for forming partnerships to bridge gaps between where support for conservation is
351 most available and where conservation projects are most needed.

352

353 A particularly important next step would be to generalize our methods beyond the US so they can
354 inform global conservation funding discussions. Countries with the most financial resources to support
355 conservation are not those where the combination of biodiversity need, conservation cost, threat and
356 institutional capacity promise the greatest conservation ROI (Waldron et al. 2013; Butchart et al. 2015).
357 Yet, institutional constraints often require resources to support biodiversity conservation be used inside
358 countries' own borders (Pouzols et al. 2014). Extending our approach to derive global conservation

359 exchange rates therefore will be important. Once again, the most immediate opportunities to relax
360 constraints on funding may well come from promoting shared regional or thematic programs (Dallimer
361 and Strange 2015, Vogdrup-Schmidt et al. 2019a). For example, biodiversity gains supported by U.S.
362 funding sources would be even greater than those we found if they were to encompass thematic
363 connections like: California donors being asked to support a program focused on Mediterranean-type
364 ecosystems (Underwood et al. 2009b), donors in southern Florida being asked to support a wider
365 Caribbean program (Maunder et al. 2008), or East Coast donors being asked to support an Atlantic
366 Americas Flyway program (Kirby et al. 2008).

367

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558

559 **Figure Captions**

560

561 Figure 1

562 Counties ranked by (a) donation levels to a major NGO and (b) conservation return-on-investment when
563 seeking to protect vulnerable, terrestrial vertebrate species. Redder counties receive more donations in
564 (a) and are a higher priority for investment in (b). (c) Conservation exchange rates between neighboring
565 states (arrows), assuming states allocate funds to priority counties within their borders. Direction of
566 arrows indicates movement of funds improves conservation outcomes and arrow color shows size of
567 exchange rate.

568

569 Figure 2

570 a) Efficiency cost when funds are spent in donor state, as percentage of gain possible without this
571 constraint. Conservation objectives: biodiversity only (vulnerable species – white; all species - light grey);
572 biodiversity and avoiding losses of forest carbon (striped) or ecosystem services that depend on
573 proximity to people (recreation, water quality, and benefits to low income communities - dark grey);
574 averted habitat loss considering only cost and threat (black). b) Variation in relevant exchange rates. c)
575 Correlation of log exchange rates and d) direction agreement when protecting vulnerable species (white
576 bars in ab)) versus remaining objectives. Significance in b): $p < 0.001$ (***).

577

578 Figure 3

579 Log of conservation exchange rates for all pairs of states. Conservation objectives: biodiversity only for
580 (a) vulnerable species or b) all species); biodiversity and c) avoiding losses of forest carbon (striped) or
581 ecosystem services that depend on proximity to people (specifically: d) recreation, e) water quality, and
582 f) benefits to low income communities); g) averted habitat loss considering only cost and threat.


583 Exchange rates show how much larger or smaller the conservation gain per dollar would be if funds
584 generated in one state (horizontal axis) were spent in another (vertical axis).

585

586 Figure 4

587 Infographic illustrating how exchange rates can be used by donors and by philanthropy staff at an NGO.
588 Example formatted for donors in eastern Colorado interested in improving conservation of vulnerable
589 species and providing ecosystem service benefits to low-income households and who would consider
590 investing in conservation opportunities in adjoining states. Numerical values are exchange rates when
591 transferring funds from Colorado. E.g., if Colorado donors allowed gifts to be used in Nebraska instead
592 of Colorado, each dollar could have 6.1 times greater conservation impact. Text descriptions based on
593 the relevant state-constrained optimization. Image credits: NE – D. Menke; OK – E. Hornbaker; CO, KS,
594 NM – R. Hagerty.

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
596

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599 Counties ranked by (a) donation levels to a major NGO and (b) conservation return-on-investment when
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
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622 Figure 3


623

624 Log of conservation exchange rates for all pairs of states. Conservation objectives: biodiversity only for
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633 Figure 4

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