

1 **Risk-based public health impact assessment for drinking water contamination**
2 **emergencies**

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8

9 **Abstract:**

10 Chemical spills in surface waters pose a significant threat to public health and the environment.
11 This study investigates the public health impacts associated with organic chemical spill
12 emergencies and explores timely countermeasures deployable by drinking water facilities. Using
13 a dynamic model of a typical multi-sourced New England drinking water treatment facility and
14 its distribution network, this study assesses the impacts of various countermeasure deployment
15 scenarios, including source switching, enhanced coagulation via poly-aluminum chloride (PACl),
16 addition of powdered activated carbon (PAC), and temporary system shutdown. This study
17 reveals that the deployment of multiple countermeasures yields the most significant reduction in
18 total public health impacts, regardless of the demand and supply availability. With the
19 combination PAC deployed first with other countermeasures proving to be the most effective
20 strategies, followed by the combination of facility shutdowns. By understanding the potential
21 public health impacts and evaluating the effectiveness of countermeasures, authorities can
22 develop proactive plans, secure additional funding, and enhance their capacity to mitigate the
23 consequences of such events. These insights contribute to safeguarding public health and

24 improving the resilience of drinking water systems in the face of the ever-growing threat of
25 chemical spills.

26

27 **Key Words:** Drinking water treatment; Chemical spill; Emergency scenario; Disability adjusted
28 life years; Drinking water countermeasures; Public health assessment.

29

30 **1. Introduction**

31 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) estimates that approximately 200
32 million pounds of toxic chemicals are released into surface waters through chemical spills each
33 year (USEPA, 2022a), with roughly 15% of the spills occurring within the proximity of local
34 drinking water facility intakes (Brett Walton, 2021). These spills can have detrimental
35 environmental impacts and can lead to public health emergencies. To mitigate the impact
36 associated with these emergencies, the Congress enacted the American Water Infrastructure Act
37 in 2018 (H.R. 115, 2018), requiring all community drinking water facilities to undergo an
38 extensive analysis of their municipality and identify all potential emergencies which may impact
39 their ability to provide their community with safe drinking water and the countermeasures that
40 they can deploy to mitigate the emergencies' effects. While this procedure does assist
41 municipalities in understanding how to respond to potential threats, it does not require them to
42 fully understand the sustainable tradeoffs associated with the countermeasures selected.

43

44 The quality of drinking water depends on the interplay of three main components: source water,
45 treatment, and distribution. Although many studies have focused on the risks associated with
46 source water contamination and its impact on public health (Azizullah et al., 2011; Currie et al.,
47 2013; Fabro et al., 2015; Horzmann et al., 2017; Nordberg, 1990) and treatment technologies for
48 addressing chronic pollutions (Glassmeyer et al., 2023; Zamri et al., 2021), little attention has
49 been given to the actions that drinking water managers can take to prevent that contamination
50 from reaching their customers in an acute setting. On the other side of the treatment process,
51 most studies focus on the distribution system, which has been highlighted as being particularly
52 vulnerable to contamination (Besner et al., 2011; Davis Michael J. AND Janke, 2016; Murray et

53 al., 2006; Xin et al., 2012). Many of these studies place particular emphasis on network monitors
54 (Davis and Janke, 2009; Perelman and Ostfeld, 2010; Poulin et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2009) and
55 isolation methods (Afshar and Najafi, 2013; Poulin et al., 2008) to better understand the
56 movement of contamination through the network in the hopes of reducing the contaminant
57 amount which reaches the customers. While such studies recognize the challenges posed by
58 source water contamination and distribution network management, they overlook the role of
59 treatment facilities and the timely measures that operators can take to mitigate the impact of
60 contamination events. Although some studies have examined the entire drinking water system in
61 the context of past events, such as the Elk River chemical spill (Thomasson et al., 2017; Whelton
62 et al., 2015) or the Flint, Michigan water crisis (Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016), these investigations
63 have limited applicability beyond those specific emergencies. Studies that have explored a
64 multitude of drinking water systems have focused on implementing safety and risk management
65 plans (Baum et al., 2015; Tang et al., 2013), which were shown to enhance a system's water
66 quality, regulatory compliance, and public health protection. However, these studies have not
67 fully explored the specific procedures embedded in the safety and risk management plans during
68 contamination events.

69

70 To fill in these gaps, this study aims at investigating the public health impact associated with an
71 organic chemical spill emergency under various emergency action scenarios, using a typical New
72 England small-scale drinking water facility with multiple water sources as a test site. A dynamic
73 model that mimics the water intake, treatment, and distribution processes was developed to
74 estimate the carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic impacts associated with various response
75 scenarios, including source switching, enhanced coagulation, powdered activated carbon, or


76 system shutdown. The results of this study will provide valuable insights for drinking water
77 facility operators and policy makers to make timely and informed decisions about the tradeoffs
78 associated with different response strategies in the event of an organic chemical spill emergency.

79

80 **2. Surrogate Drinking Water System and Contamination Event Overview**

81 The surrogate drinking water facility (DWF) is a typical small community water system in New
82 England that serves a population of approximately 15,000 individuals, treating a daily average of
83 2,000 m³ of water through a four-step treatment process illustrated in Figure 1. The DWF's
84 distribution system consists of 30 miles of pipelines, 3 storage tanks, and over 259 nodes
85 representing buildings and neighborhoods. Water is drawn by DWF from three distinct sources:
86 (1) Surface Water A, high-quality river water; (2) Surface Water B, relatively low-quality
87 reservoir water independent of Surface Water A; and (3) Ground Water, high-quality
88 groundwater. Surface Water A serves as the primary drinking water source; however, it is subject
89 to withdrawal restrictions to ensure its downstream flow is maintained, necessitating blending
90 with the other sources under low flow and/or high demand conditions. In this study, a
91 contamination spill event was assumed to occur in Surface Water A to simulate the most severe
92 impact on the DWF and its serving community.

93




94 **Figure 1:** Process flow diagram outlining the treatment process in the modeled treatment facility with the water
95 entering the facility, passing through the rapid and slow mixing flocculation tanks before being clarified and passing
96 through the rapid dual media filters. This filtered water then enters the chlorine contact tanks before distribution to the
97 local community.

98

99 **3. Methods**

100 Figure 2 outlines the modeling framework developed to assess the DWF's resiliency against
101 chemical spill events. The framework is comprised of four sub-models, which are: (A) an intake
102 sub-model that simulates the contaminant concentration at the intake of the DWF, (B) a
103 treatment sub-model that simulates the treatment/removal of the contaminant throughout the
104 treatment train under both normal operation and emergency (with countermeasure application)
105 scenarios, (C) a distribution sub-model that characterizes the quantity and quality of water
106 transported through the distribution network, leveraging the Water Network Tool For Resilience
107 (WNTR) Python package (USEPA, 2017), and (D) a public health impact sub-model that
108 estimates the contamination event's carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic effects from oral
109 consumption of the polluted water on consumers. The model was developed in Python for a
110 chemical spill event which occurred within a 7-day study period, with a timestep of 1-minute.
111 After the 7-day period, we assumed that the DWF would take the action to flush out any
112 remaining contaminant within the system.



113

114 **Figure 2:** An outline of the modeling framework developed to assess the resiliency of a typical New England drinking
 115 water treatment plant against chemical spill events. Red shapes represent the sub-models of: (A) Intake,
 116 (B) Treatment, (C) Distribution, (D) Public Health Impacts. Blue shapes represent the movement of water,
 117 grey boxes represent chemical movement or treatment, yellow shapes represent different countermeasures which can be
 118 applied, and green represents the distribution network data.

119

120 **3.1. Sub-model (A): Intake**

121 The intake sub-model seeks to simulate the contaminant concentration at the intake of the water
 122 treatment plant under various seasonal and contaminant toxicity scenarios. To obtain the typical
 123 ranges of the carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic impacts of chemicals commonly found in
 124 chemical spill events, we first identified a list of 335 organic chemicals that have impacts
 125 associated with oral consumption in the USEPA's Integrated Risk Information System's (IRIS)
 126 database (USEPA, 2020a). This list was cross checked with the USEPA's Treatability Database
 127 (USEPA, 2020b) narrowing this initial list to 30 organic chemicals with known treatment
 128 processes. To identify the chemicals which would represent the upper and lower bounds of

129 public health effects, we ranked these chemicals by their carcinogenic slope factors and non-
130 carcinogenic severity weights associated with oral consumption, normalized by each chemical's
131 Freundlich treatability values. From this list we selected four chemicals representing the highest
132 and lowest normalized carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic effects, respectively. Details regarding
133 the selected chemicals and the selection process can be found in Table 1 in Section A.1 of the
134 supporting information (SI).

135 **Table 1:** The four organic chemicals selected in this study to represent the higher and lower bounds of carcinogenic
136 and non-carcinogenic impacts associated with oral consumption.

| Chemical Category | Chemical Density (g/ml) | Freundlich adsorption isotherm (k_f) (Crittenden et al., 2012; USEPA, 2020b) | Freundlich adsorption isotherm (1/n) (Crittenden et al., 2012; USEPA, 2020b) | Carcinogenic slope factor (mg/kg-day) (USEPA, 2020a) | Non-carcinogenic severity weight (WHO, 2004) |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| High Carcinogenic Effect | 1.387 | 7.326 | 0.613 | 30.000 | 0.200 |
| High Non-Carcinogenic Effect | 1.80 | 10.030 | 0.5369 | 0.070 | 0.591 |
| Low Carcinogenic Effect | 1.14 | 710.989 | 0.063 | 0.000 | 0.108 |
| Low Non-Carcinogenic Effect | 1.46 | 28.000 | 0.62 | 0.046 | 0.000 |

137
138 In our simulation, we assumed the emergency event occurred as a result of a 30-m³ truck
139 transporting an organic chemical tipped over and spilled its entire contents 1.6-km upstream of
140 the DWF's inlet pipe in Surface Water A. It was assumed that the chemical content was released
141 all at once within the first 30 minutes of the facility's first operating window during the 7-day
142 study period. The spill time was intentionally chosen to be close to the facility's operating
143 window to mimic the highest impact on the community regardless of DWF's operational
144 schedule.

145
146 Equation 1 (Rathbun, 2000) was used to determine the contaminant's concentration at DWF's
147 inlet pipe using data related to the river's slope, depth, and velocity (USGS, 2022) (SI Section

148 A.2). It has to be noted that river depth and velocity change based on the scenarios specified in
149 Section 3.2.

150

151
$$C_{(x,t)} = \left(\frac{\rho O}{d_t \times w \times \sqrt{4\pi t \frac{0.058 V_T \times d_T \times w}{S_w}}} \right)^{-\frac{(x - V_T t)^2}{4t \frac{0.058 V_T \times d_T \times w}{S_w}}} \quad (\text{Equation 1})$$

152 Where:

153 $C_{(x,t)}$ = Concentration of the spilled chemical at x distance downstream of the spill
154 location, kg/m³;

155 ρ = Chemical density, kg/m³;

156 O = Volume of chemical spill (FMCSA, 2022), 30 m³;

157 d_T = River depth at the time of the year T (USGS, 2022), m (Figure 1 of the SI);

158 V_T = River velocity at the time of the year T (USGS, 2022), m/minute (Figure 1 of the
159 SI);

160 w = Average river width (USGS, 2022), 30 m;

161 S = River slope, 0.06 (Fenoff, 2021);

162 T = Time of the year t , minute;

163 t = Time since spill, minute; and

164 X = Distance from initial spill site to drinking water inlet, assumed to be 1,609 m.







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166 **3.2. Sub-model (B): Treatment**

167 Historical water quality and quantity data from DWF and the simulated Surface Water A was
168 evaluated to assess the influence of seasonality on the pollutant flow and treatment. From these
169 datasets, two periods of surface water flow and facility demand data were selected, representing
170 a high-water demand / low river flow scenario (HDLS) and a low water demand / high river flow

171 (LDHS) scenario. Each scenario is further split into a summer and a winter scenario based on the
172 DWF's historical data, which maintain water quality and flow patterns but alter the temperature
173 of the intake water (Table 2). The variable temperature scenarios influence the contaminant
174 removal efficiency and the amount of chemicals required to treat the water. Each scenario spans
175 7 days starting from midnight on the first day. Total Organic Carbon (TOC) was used as a
176 surrogate to calculate the contaminant removal efficiencies within each treatment step (Shetty
177 and Goyal, 2022; Wang et al., 2021).

Table 2: Identification of the facility demand, supply, and temperature scenarios which form the upper and lower bounds of chemical contamination impacts.

| Scenarios | Facility Demand and Operating Windows (m^3/day) | | River Flow (m^3/min) (USGS, 2022) | | Temperature (C°) | | |
|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------|---|------|
| | Temporal | Average | Temporal | Average | Temporal | Average | |
| High Demand Low Supply Scenario (HDLS) | Summer |  | 6.6 |  | 14.8 |  | 22.6 |
| | Winter | | | | | | |
| Low Demand High Supply Scenario (LDHS) | Summer |  | 3.2 |  | 719.6 |  | 4.5 |
| | Winter | | | | | | |

180 Once the water is withdrawn, it is first dosed with potassium permanganate (KMnO₄; oxidant),
181 poly-aluminum chloride (PACl; coagulant), and sodium hydroxide (NaOH; pH adjustment)
182 before entering the two operating rapid mix tanks, which were followed by the two operating
183 slow mixing tanks. It was assumed that unless a countermeasure is activated, these chemical
184 dosages follow the historical patterns under the HDLS and the LDHS scenarios.

185

186 While chemical reactions begin to occur during the rapid and slow mixing step, it was assumed
187 that contaminants are removed during the clarification step. The effluent rates from the rapid and
188 slow mixing tanks were modeled after a continually stirred batch reactor (Table 3) (Crittenden et
189 al., 2012). After the rapid and slow mixing, the drinking water is combined in a central trough
190 before being equally distributed to the two operating clarification tanks using plate settling. Each
191 clarification tank has a volume of 232.9 m³ and contains 114 inclined plates to better facilitate
192 the flocculation and sedimentation process. The clarification tanks were modelled as plug flow
193 reactors for estimating chemical removal (Crittenden et al., 2012). After clarification, water is
194 combined into another trough before being evenly distributed to three rapid dual media filters
195 (RDMFs). These filters are designed with 0.91 m of anthracite coal on top of 0.25 m of sand. As
196 with the clarification tanks, the RDMFs operate as plug flow reactors (Crittenden et al., 2012).

197

198 To maintain TOC removals, the DWF has established three conditions that trigger backwashing
199 of the RDMFs: (1) a continuous 20-minute head loss of greater than 1.52 m, (2) 20 consecutive
200 minutes of breakthrough turbidity of greater than 0.2 NTU, or (3) a cumulative runtime of 96
201 hours. Detailed equations for calculating the terminal head loss and breakthrough can be found in
202 the SI Section A.3 (Crittenden et al., 2012). When a filter backwash is triggered, the facility

203 diverts all flow away from the affected filter. Chlorinated water is pumped from the backwash
 204 storage tanks and is passed up through the spent media for roughly 26 minutes followed by a 5-
 205 minute filter to waste ripening period. This spent water is collected via the backwash troughs to
 206 the drying lagoons outside. Expended backwash water within the lagoons is reintroduced into the
 207 facility at no more than 10% of the raw water inflow.

208

209 When the backwash is complete, the filter inlet is opened once again. Immediately following the
 210 backwash activities, the flow from the rapid dual media filters is diverted away from the
 211 disinfection tanks, this diverted water is used to recharge the backwash supply tanks. After the
 212 filtration step, the treated water is collected in a central trough where sodium hypochlorite,
 213 measured as chlorine dosage, is added for disinfection before being transported to one of two
 214 serpentine chlorine contact tanks. Equations in Table 3 guide the calculation of the treatment
 215 performances and effluent rates in each treatment step.

216

217 **Table 3:** Breakdown of the treatment steps, the total number of tanks operating per step, treatment equations
 218 dictating the removal of TOC within each treatment step and the equations governing the effluent mass from each
 219 step.

| Treatment Step [Number of tanks operating / number of tanks available] | Total Organic Carbon Removal | Reference | Effluent Mass Estimation |
|--|--|---------------------------|---|
| Rapid and Slow Mixing [2/3] | No Reduction | N/A | $E_M = \frac{C_{M,t}}{Q_t/O} \times \frac{Q_t}{O}$ <p>Where, $E_{M,t}$ = Effluent TOC mass from the tank, mg/min $C_{M,t}$ = Influent TOC concentration to tanks, mg/L-min; V = Tank volume, 93.5 L; Q_t = Flow through the facility, L/min; O = Number of tanks operating; and t = Current time step, min.</p> |
| Clarification [2/3] | $C_{R,C,t} = (C_{I,C,t} \times F_{DOC}) - C_{eq,t} + NDOC_t$ <p>Where,</p> | (Crittenden et al., 2012) | $E_{M,t} = (C_{I,(t-R_t)} - C_{R,t}) * V$ |

| | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| | $C_{R,C,t}$ = TOC concentration reduction from the coagulation and flocculation process, mg/L-min; $C_{I,C,t}$ = Influent TOC concentration, mg/L-min; F_{DOC} = Fraction of TOC which is dissolved organic carbon (DOC), assumed to be 0.9; $C_{eq,t}$ = Equilibrium aqueous phase DOC concentration, mg/L-min (SI Section A.3); $NDOC_t$ = Influent non-dissolvable organic carbon concentration, mg/L-min (SI Section A.4); and t = Current time step, min. | | Where, $E_{M,t}$ = Effluent TOC mass from the tank, mg/min; t = Current time step, min; R_t = Retention time within the tank, min; C_I = Influent TOC concentration to treatment tank, mg/L-min; $C_{R,t}$ = Mass of organics removed during treatment process, mg/L-min; and V = Volume of tank, L. |
| Rapid Dual Media Filtration [3/4] | $C_{R,F,t} = C_{I,F,t} - C_{E,F,t}$ $C_{E,F,t} = (0.76093 * C_{I,F,t}) + 0.27689$ Where, $C_{R,F,t}$ = TOC concentration reduction from the filtration step, mg/L-min; $C_{I,F,t}$ = Influent TOC concentration to the filter, mg/L-min; $C_{E,F,t}$ = Effluent TOC concentration from the filter, mg/L-min; and t = Current time step, min. | Regression equation based on historical data (SI Section A.5) | $R_t = \frac{V}{Q_t}$ R_t = Retention time within the tank, min; Q_t = Flow entering the facility, L/min; V = Volume of the tank, L; and t = Current time step, min. |
| Disinfection [1/2] | $C_{R,D,t} = 0.06 \times C_{I,D,t}$ Where, $C_{R,D,t}$ = TOC concentration reduction after the disinfection step, mg/L-min; $C_{I,D,t}$ = Influent TOC concentration entering the disinfection tanks, mg/L-min; and t = Current time step, min. | Equation estimated using historic data | |

220

221 Beyond normal operation, DWF identified four effective countermeasures to combat source
 222 water contamination. These include 1) the increased dosage of PACl for enhanced coagulation to
 223 maintain pre-event TOC removal efficiencies; 2) the addition of PAC at the rapid and slow
 224 mixing step to reach an average of 95% TOC removals (AWWA, 2021; Carroll, 2009). The mass
 225 of PAC entering the RDMF was also estimated, which further informs the breakthrough and the
 226 backwashing of the RDMF; 3) switching water source from Surface Water A to an equal mixture
 227 of Surface Water B and Ground Water, which alters the PACl and orthophosphate dosage; and 4)
 228 shutting down the treatment facility, in which the community still have access to the surplus
 229 water stored in the distribution network and storage tanks before it runs out. Table 4 provides the
 230 equations utilized for estimating the additional treatment chemical requirement when various

231 countermeasures are applied. Unlike the addition of PACl and PAC , orthophosphate does not
 232 directly influence the concentration of TOC within DWF.

233 **Table 4:** Equations governing the mass addition and corresponding equations for treatment chemicals within DWF as
 234 a result of the activation of various countermeasure actions.

| Countermeasure | Source | Corresponding Equations |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| Poly-aluminum chloride (PACl) (Equations applicable for Countermeasures 1 and 3) | Regression analysis (SI Section A.7) | $M_{PA,t} = Q_{T,t} \times C_{PA,t} = Q_{T,t} (C_{P,t} - C_{PB,t})$ $C_{P,t} = 30.87 + 1.59 \times T - 6.01 \times P + 169.46 \times UV_{254} - 4.50 \times 10^{-5} \times Q_{SW,B,t} - 7.60 \times 10^{-5} \times Q_{SW,A,t} - 1.02 \times 10^{-4} \times Q_{GW,t} + 6.70 \times 10^{-5} \times Q_{T,t}$ <p>Where: $M_{PA,t}$ = Additional mass of PACl added to water in relation to the contaminant, mg/L-min; $Q_{T,t}$ = Total flow entering the facility, L/min; $C_{PA,t}$ = Additional concentration of PACl added to water in relation to the contaminant, mg/L-min; $C_{PB,t}$ = Baseline reported concentration of PACl added to water, mg/L-min; $C_{P,t}$ = Concentration of PACl added to water, mg/L-min; t = Current time step, min; T = Temperature, $^{\circ}\text{C}$; P = Water pH; UV_{254} = Ultraviolet 254 reading, nm; $Q_{SW,B,t}$ = River B flow into facility, L/min; $Q_{SW,A,t}$ = River A flow into facility, L/min; $Q_{GW,t}$ = Groundwater flow into facility, L/min; and $Q_{T,t}$ = Total flow into facility, L/min.</p> |
| Powdered Activated Carbon (PAC) (Equations applicable for Countermeasure 2) | (Crittenden et al., 2012) | $M_{PAC,t} = \frac{C_{IC,t} - (C_{IC,t} \times IR)}{k_f (C_{IC,t} \times IR)^{\frac{1}{n}}} Q_{T,t} t_{CR}$ <p>Where: $M_{PAC,t}$ = Mass of PAC applied, kg/min; $C_{IC,t}$ = Concentration of organic pollutant entering the clarification tanks, mg/L-min; IR = Ideal removal percentage to be achieved by countermeasure, 95%; k_f = Freundlich constants (Table 1), mg/kg; $1/n$ = Freundlich constants (Table 1), unitless; $Q_{T,t}$ = Total flow entering the facility, L/min; t_{CR} = Clarification tank retention time, min (Table 3); and t = Current time step, min.</p> |
| Orthophosphate (Equations applicable for Countermeasure 3) | Regression Analysis (SI-008) | $M_{PO_4} = Q_{T,t} \times C_{PO_4,t}$ $C_{PO_4,t} = 10.77 + 1.58 \times \frac{Q_{SW,B,t}}{Q_{T,t}} + 0.04 \times \frac{Q_{GW,t}}{Q_{T,t}} - 9.64 \times 10^{-7} \times Q_{T,t} - 0.04\sigma + 4.48 \times UV_{254} + 3.38 \times C_{Mn,t}$ <p>Where: $M_{PO_4,t}$ = Mass of Orthophosphate added, mg/min $Q_{T,t}$ = Total flow entering the facility, L/min;</p> |

$C_{PO4,t}$ = Concentration of Orthophosphate added, mg/L;
 $Q_{SW,B,t}$ = Flow entering facility from Surface Water B, L/min;
 $Q_{GW,t}$ = Flow entering facility from Ground Water source, L/min;
 σ = Specific conductance of the influent, μ S/cm;
 UV_{254} = Ultraviolet 254 reading, nm;
 $C_{Mn,t}$ = Concentration of manganese in influent water, mg/L; and
 t = Current time step, min.

235

236 Each countermeasure can be utilized independently or in conjunction with one another. We
 237 designed 10 scenarios as per the DWF's recommendations (Table 5). During the contamination
 238 event, it was assumed that once each countermeasure is activated, it remains active for the
 239 duration of the event unless the facility is shut down or the source water is switched. We also
 240 assumed that only one countermeasure could be activated per 30-minute interval. However,
 241 countermeasures can be triggered at any of the 30-min intervals during the 7-day window. If
 242 DWF is offline during a countermeasure's activation, it is assumed that the countermeasure
 243 would be applied within the next available DWF operating window (Table 2).

244

245 **Table 5:** Countermeasure combinations can include the increase in poly-aluminum chloride (PACl) concentrations,
 246 addition of powdered activated carbon (PAC), total facility shutdown, or switch away from the polluted source water.
 247 The numbers under each countermeasure represent the order in which they are deployed.

| Combination Number | PACl | PAC | Shutdown | Source Water Switch | Number of Runs | |
|--------------------|------|-----|----------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | | | | | HDLS | LDHS |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 736 per combination | 945 per combination |
| 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | |
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | |
| 5 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 33,488 per combination | 53,360 per combination |
| 6 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | | |
| 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | |
| 8 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | | |
| 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | |

248

249 **3.3. Sub-model (C): Distribution**

250 Water flow through the distribution network was modeled using each pipeline's dimensions,
 251 material, and roughness as well as each node's specific demand intensities and patterns. A model

252 of this network has been built using EPANET, which calculates flow of water and contamination
253 using pressure driven equations (Rossman, 1999). The EPANET distribution network model was
254 combined with the treatment facility model via WNTR, a Python package (USEPA, 2017). It
255 was assumed that all chemical propagation through the network follows zero order reaction
256 kinetics with the residual chlorine in the water, biofilm, and pipe materials.

257

258 The node demand and use patterns utilized by EPANET represent the number of people living at
259 each node and their daily water usage activities, respectively. The model multiplies the node
260 intensity by the demand pattern to determine the amount of water demanded by each node at
261 each time step. For simplicity, each node was assumed to have the same baseline use pattern
262 which was adjusted to match the reported facility demand for the HDLS and LDHS scenarios
263 (Table 2) using the methodology outlined in the Supplemental Information Section A.9.

264

265 **3.4. Sub-model (D): Public Health Impact**

266 Each scenario has been evaluated for its potential public health carcinogenic and non-
267 carcinogenic impacts, considering both the direct contributions via the consumption of
268 contaminated water by the public and the indirect contributions associated with the
269 countermeasure strategies employed.

270

271 The public health impact of the contamination event was evaluated using the Disability Adjusted
272 Life Years (DALY) metric (Equation 2) (Bixler et al., 2021; Seidel et al., 2014), which considers
273 the direct impacts across the 7-day time horizon. These were determined by summing the mass

274 of pollutant consumed by all nodes in the network as calculated within the distribution sub-
275 model.

276

277 $DALY_{Total} = (DALY_C + DALY_{NC})$ (Equation 2)

278 Where:

279 $DALY_{Total}$ = Total health impact resultant from both carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic
280 effects, days;

281 $DALY_C$ = Carcinogenic disability adjusted life years lost resulted from direct consumption
282 of contaminated water, years;

283 $DALY_{NC}$ = Non-carcinogenic disability adjusted life years lost direct consumption of
284 contaminated water, years;

285

286 The total carcinogenic impact associated with the contamination event and countermeasure
287 scenario is estimated using Equation 3 (Seidel et al., 2014), which utilizes the cancerous slope
288 factors (USEPA, 2022b) reported for each spilled chemical (Table 1) and the weight-adjusted
289 mass of chemical consumption per person. This calculation is performed for all nodes within the
290 community which are summed to obtain the total carcinogenic impact associated with the direct
291 consumption of contaminated water across the 7-day event horizon.

292

293 $DALY_C = \sum_{n=0}^N F \times M_W \times L \times ED \times P_N$ (Equation 3)

294 Where:

295 $DALY_C$ = Carcinogenic disability adjusted life years lost resulted from direct
296 consumption of contaminated water, years per event;

297 F = Cancerous slope factor (USEPA, 2022b), $(\text{mg/kg-day})^{-1}$;

298 N = Total number of nodes within the distribution network; 259 nodes

299 n = Node index;

300 M_W = Weight adjusted mass of chemical consumption per event, $\text{mg/kg-event-person}$;

301 L_p = Mean loss of life due to cancer, 20 years/person which is the average mean loss of
302 life across all carcinogenic ailments as reported by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2004);

303 ED = Percentage of event duration out of the expected lifetime, 0.0027 years; and

304 P_N = Residents per node, number of people;

305

306 The weight-adjusted mass of chemical consumption per person per event was calculated using
307 Equation 4. The distribution network sub-model was used to determine the mass of chemical
308 consumed per person, which was then added up across the event.

309

310
$$M_W = \sum_{t=0}^T \frac{C \times V}{W} \quad (\text{Equation 4})$$

311 Where:

312 M_W = Weight adjusted mass of chemical consumption, $\text{mg/kg-event-person}$;

313 T = Final timestep of contamination event, 10,080 min;

314 t = time, min;

315 C = Concentration of contamination at node, mg/m³-min;

316 V = Volume of water consumed, m³/min; and

317 W = The average weight of each person, 70 kg. (Seidel et al., 2014).

318

319 Equation 5 (Seidel et al., 2014) is used to estimate the non-carcinogenic impacts resulting from
320 the consumption of contaminated water. Like the carcinogenic impacts, the non-carcinogenic
321 impacts utilize the weight-adjusted mass of chemical consumption (Equation 4).

322

323 $DALY_{NC} = \sum_{n=0}^N I_R \times \frac{M_W}{D \times U} \times S \times L_p \times P_N$ (Equation 5)

324

325 Where:

326 $DALY_{NC}$ = Non-carcinogenic disability adjusted life years lost resulted from direct
327 consumption of contaminated water, years per event.

328 N = Total number of nodes within the distribution network; 259 nodes

329 n = Node index;

330 I_R = Incidence rate for noncancerous diseases caused by direct ingestion of toxic
331 chemicals, assumed to be 1% according to (Dourson et al., 1996);

332 M_W = Weight adjusted mass of chemical consumption per event, mg/kg-event-person;

333 D = Reference dose (USEPA, 2022b), ng/kg-day;

334 U = Uncertainty factor (USEPA, 2022b), dimensionless;

335 S = Non-carcinogenic severity factor (USEPA, 2022b), dimensionless;

336 ED = Percentage of event duration out of the expected lifetime, 0.0027 years; and

337 P_N = Residents per node, number of people.

338

339 **4. Results and Discussion**

340 **4.1. Health Impacts When No Action Is Taken During the Contamination Event**

341 Figure 3 shows the temporal variation of the cumulative TOC masses in each treatment step

342 within the DWF under both the HDLS and LDHS scenarios. A clear differentiation between the

343 baseline TOC level with no contamination and the TOC level under the contamination event can

344 be seen. This differentiation results in an average 4.6% and 15.3% higher organic load under the

345 contamination scenario during HDLS and LDHS, respectively. A clear propagation of the

346 pollutant through the facility can also be seen through the separation between the solid and

347 dashed lines representing the contaminated and non-contaminated runs of the model. Times

348 which see a larger spread between the two lines represent the periods in which the contamination

349 is exiting that treatment stage. This is best seen during HDLS before and after the dotted vertical

350 line which represents the first instance of contamination entering the facility. Before this moment


351 the data in both the contaminated and non-contaminated runs are the same. However, following

352 this time the two datasets exhibit a clear separation. This pre and post contamination trend is not

353 as prevalent under LDHS because during HDLS the river flow is so low that it takes nearly 11

354 times longer for the spill front to reach the facilities intake. This highlights the importance of
355 early detection of chemical spills and early implementation of countermeasures.

356



357


358 **Figure 3:** A comparison between the cumulative total organic carbon effluent mass from each treatment step (RMT:
359 Rapid and Slow Mixing Tanks; CT: Clarification Tanks; RDMF: Rapid Dual Media Tanks) with and without
360 contamination under low demand high supply and high demand low supply scenarios. The vertical dashed line
361 indicates the time at which the spill occurs and the vertical dotted line represents when the contaminant first enters
362 the facility.

363

364 Figure 4 shows the cumulative average DALY impacts associated with the chemical spill events
365 under the LDHS and HDLS with no countermeasures deployed. Interestingly, under the LDHS
366 scenario the community experiences over 2 times higher DALY impacts despite having 48%
367 lower average demand as compared to the HDLS scenario. This can be attributed to the
368 difference in the percentage of total water drawn from the polluted Source Water A. Under
369 LDHS, all water drawn by the DWF comes from Source Water A, whereas this source represents
370 only 7% of the average daily volume during HDLS. Such trends highlight the importance of not

371 only having multiple source waters, but also using a blend of them under normal operations as it
372 can reduce the cumulative impact on the community if a pollution event goes unnoticed.

373



374

375 **Figure 4:** Graph showing the average cumulative disability adjusted life years experienced by the community across
376 the 7-day event horizon under both the LDHS and HDLS scenarios.

377

378 **4.2. Health Impacts Under Emergency Actions**

379 Figure 5 presents the influence of countermeasures on the public health impacts (DALY) per
380 1,000 customers. Out of all countermeasures, PAC with facility shutdown has the highest effect
381 in reducing the DALY experienced by the community. This is a result of both the high treatment
382 efficiency associated with the PAC which can reduce the majority of the pollutant inflow as well
383 as the facility shutdown which can prevent the pollutant peak from entering into the network.
384 However, it should be noted that shutting down the facility can lead to broader public impacts
385 resultant from water supply shortages, and hence its duration needs to be minimized.


386

387 Alternatively, increasing coagulant via PACl has the least impact to total DALY given its
388 minimal treatment efficiency which is compounded with the marginal increase in the average
389 TOC influent concentrations as compared to the no-contamination data, 13.3% and 4.5% under
390 the LDHS and HDLS, respectively. Thus, under contamination the DWF will only slightly
391 increase the levels of PACl added to maintain the pre-contamination TOC removal trends.
392 Similarly, source switching follows as the second least effective countermeasure under both
393 LDHS and HDLS. This is primarily driven by the fact that treatment chemicals within the facility
394 are dosed in accordance with the influent water parameters. Thus, when switching from the
395 polluted source to the other two sources, the average TOC influent concentration is significantly
396 changed. This results in an overall change in the treatment parameters in the tanks, which can
397 cause increased pollutant loads if the contamination is within the rapid and slow mixing and / or
398 coagulation tanks.

399

400 If shutting down the facility is not feasible, the next best option is to combine the application of
401 PAC with source switching. This approach avoids under-treating the contaminated water during
402 source switching, as PAC is applied within the tanks rather than at the inlet like PACl, thus
403 enabling this combination to capture any residual contaminant within the rapid and slow mixing
404 tanks regardless of the alteration in source water treatments.

405



406

407 **Figure 5:** Comparison of the average disability adjusted life years resultant from the deployment of one or two
 408 countermeasures during the contamination event under both the LDHS and HDLS scenarios. Boxes and whiskers
 409 show the means and standard deviations of the DALY impacts. Countermeasures are denoted as following; PAC :
 410 Powdered Activated Carbon; PACI : Poly-Aluminum Chloride; FSD : Facility Shutdown; and SS : Source Switching.

411


412 Overall, combining countermeasures is generally more effective than applying individual
 413 countermeasures reducing the total DALY across all scenarios, 78% in LDHS scenario and 50%
 414 in the HDLS scenario. This highlights the importance of investing in diverse countermeasure
 415 options. Alternatively, if the DWF has the capacity to only implement one countermeasure, the
 416 most effective action is to shut down the system. This results in a 68% reduction in health impact
 417 as compared to taking no action in the HDLS scenario and an 84% average reduction in the
 418 LDHS scenarios. However, during HDLS this approach may result in a 32% unmet demand or
 419 152 m³ of water loss experienced by the community during the 7-day time. Conversely, under
 420 LDHS there is no loss in service to the community as there is ample supply in the network to
 421 meet the lower demand.

422

423 **4.3. The Impact of Temporal Variations in Countermeasure Applications**

424 In Figure 6, the impact of deploying countermeasures across the contamination event is
 425 demonstrated. Across both scenarios the application of PACl represents the lowest sensitivity to
 426 timing actions, followed by facility shutdown and PAC. This is because PACl has a low
 427 effectiveness in pollutant reduction. Alternatively, the use of source switching is the most
 428 sensitive to the time of deployment with many times resulting in higher DALY impacts
 429 experienced by the community than when no countermeasure is applied, indicated by the
 430 horizontal dotted line. This high sensitivity to timing is a result of the alteration of source water
 431 treatment which changes the removal performances within the clarification tanks. This may
 432 result in a non-ideal system especially if the pollutant peak has already entered into those tanks.

433



434


435 **Figure 6:** The cumulative total Disability Adjusted Life Years resultant from deploying a single countermeasure at
 436 various points across the contamination event horizon. Countermeasures are denoted as following; PAC : Powdered
 437 Activated Carbon; PACl : Poly-Aluminum Chloride; FSD : Facility Shutdown; and SS : Source Switching.

438

439 Figure 7 highlights the influence that timing has on the cumulative DALY experienced by the
 440 community when the facility deploys two countermeasures. Each point in the figure represents

441 the total DALY experienced by the community based on the average countermeasure
442 deployment times. Like the use of a single countermeasure, the deployment of two
443 countermeasures is sensitive to the timing of implementation, with the highest benefits being
444 experienced with earlier activation, on average. Although sensitive to timing, under the LDHS
445 scenario a combination of countermeasures greatly reduces the public health impact to the
446 community, with only 1% of deployments resulting in a higher DALY than in the no-action
447 scenario. Amongst the trendlines, the application of PACl and source switching has the highest
448 sensitivity to timing followed by the application of both PACl and PAC, whereas the application
449 of PACl with facility shutdown results in the lowest sensitivity to timing. This is primarily
450 because PACl has a minimal effect on the reduction of the pollutant. The effect that PACl has on
451 the reduction of sensitivity can also be seen under the PACl+PAC countermeasure.

452



453

454 **Figure 7:** The cumulative total Disability Adjusted Life Years resultant from deploying 2 countermeasures at various
 455 points across the contamination event horizon for both the low demand high supply and high supply low demand
 456 scenarios. Dashed lines represent the average DALY experienced by the community if the DWF does not implement
 457 any countermeasures. Countermeasures are denoted as following; PAC: Powdered Activated Carbon; PACI: Poly-
 458 Aluminum Chloride; FSD: Facility Shutdown; and SS: Source Switching.

459

460 Alternatively, in the HDLS scenario 10% of the combinations result in a higher DALY impact
461 than no countermeasure scenario, again represented by the dotted horizontal line. These
462 combinations have a higher DALY value due to most of them utilizing PACl as their primary
463 countermeasure, which as we discussed earlier is not as efficient as the others, even when
464 combined. Amongst the trendlines, the application of PACl with PAC has the have the highest
465 sensitivity to timing, followed by PAC with facility shutdown, while PACl with facility
466 shutdown combination has the lowest sensitivity to timing for similar reasons as explained
467 above.

468

469 As shown in these results the use of PAC in combination with other countermeasures increases
470 the sensitivity of the action to timing across the contamination event. This is primarily due to the
471 high treatment efficiency of PAC, as identified in Section 4.2, which is only applicable when the
472 bulk of the contaminate is within the rapid and slow mix tanks. After which the use of PAC has
473 little benefit as the contamination has already passed its operational window.

474

475 **5. Concluding Remarks**

476 Chemical spills are detrimental events, especially when occurring within the source water of
477 drinking water treatment facilities. This study conducted a public health tradeoff analysis to
478 investigate the benefits to the public health that result from the deployment of a variety of
479 countermeasures under drinking water contamination. Our findings show that the deployment of
480 powdered activated carbon either alone or with facility shutdowns resulting in the lowest direct
481 impact to the community. The results have also underscored the importance of having a quick

482 response time as earlier countermeasure applications can significantly reduce the cumulative
483 public health impact.

484

485 It is important to acknowledge several limitations of this study. While the investigation explored
486 the range of impacts from organic chemical spills, further research examining spill durations and
487 locations across different water sources - both surface and groundwater - could provide valuable
488 insights. Furthermore, all chemicals investigated in this study were assumed to have a direct
489 correlation to TOC trends, which may overestimate the actual pollutant removals. Although the
490 study focused on countermeasures recommended by the drinking water facility (DWF),
491 additional countermeasures exist and warrant further investigation to assess their public health
492 tradeoffs comprehensively. Along with additional countermeasures, varying public responses
493 and adjustments in water usage patterns could also provide valuable insights into optimizing
494 emergency response strategies and minimizing public health risks effectively. The present study
495 can also be expanded to include additional source water and community demand settings to
496 understand how these parameters influence the efficacy of countermeasures in reducing impacts.

497

498 Despite these limitations, our findings highlight the importance of early detection and early
499 action. If alerted promptly, the DWF can enact most countermeasures and effectively avoid the
500 majority of public health impacts experienced by their community. However, if a significant
501 delay occurs, it may be imperative that drinking water authorities prepare by implementing
502 multiple countermeasures such as the use of PAC with either source switching or facility
503 shutdown to reduce public health impacts.

504

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510

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