

# Not Everybody Has an Inner Voice: Behavioral Consequences of Anendophasia



Johanne S. K. Nedergaard<sup>1</sup>  and Gary Lupyan<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen, and <sup>2</sup>Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Psychological Science

1–18

© The Author(s) 2024

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/09567976241243004

www.psychologicalscience.org/PS



## Abstract

It is commonly assumed that inner speech—the experience of thought as occurring in a natural language—is a human universal. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the experience of inner speech in adults varies from near constant to nonexistent. We propose a name for a lack of the experience of inner speech—anendophasia—and report four studies examining some of its behavioral consequences. We found that adults who reported low levels of inner speech ( $N = 46$ ) had lower performance on a verbal working memory task and more difficulty performing rhyme judgments compared with adults who reported high levels of inner speech ( $N = 47$ ). Task-switching performance—previously linked to endogenous verbal cueing—and categorical effects on perceptual judgments were unrelated to differences in inner speech.

## Keywords

inner speech, rhyme judgments, categorization, task switching, verbal working memory, individual differences, open data, open materials

Received 7/17/23; Revision accepted 3/5/24

Everyone, it is often said, has an inner voice: “Daily, human beings are engaged in a form of inner dialogue, which enables them to [engage in] high-level cognition, including self-control, self-attention and self-regulation” (Chella & Pipitone, 2020, p. 287); “We all hear a voice inside our brain, commonly called ‘inner voice’, ‘inner speech’ or referred to as ‘verbal thoughts’” (Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014, p. 220). Most people do report experiencing inner speech (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Morin et al., 2018), and because we often assume that our experiences mirror those of others, the majority experience comes to be viewed as universal (Lupyan et al., 2023). The assumption that everyone has an inner voice has served as a stepping stone for research into the functions of inner speech—if everyone has it, it must be important. Speculations have ranged from the idea that natural language constitutes (at least some types of) thought (Bermúdez, 2007; Carruthers, 2002; Clark, 1998; Frankish, 2018; Gauker, 2011) or is necessary for self-awareness (Morin, 2018) to investigations of connections between inner speech and specific processes such as cognitive control (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough,

2015; Cragg & Nation, 2010; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Morin et al., 2018), behavioral control (e.g., Nedergaard, Christensen, & Wallentin, 2023), and planning and problem-solving (Lidstone et al., 2010; Morin et al., 2018; Wallace et al., 2017). But not everyone experiences inner speech. This is attested by personal narratives such as “What It’s Like Living Without an Inner Monologue” (Soloducha, 2020) and “People With No Internal Monologue Explain What It’s Like in Their Head” (Felton, 2020), as well as more systematic investigations both targeting variation in inner speech (Alderson-Day et al., 2018; Brinthaup, 2019; Hurlburt et al., 2013) and auditory imagery, which has sometimes been used as a proxy for inner speech (Dawes et al., 2020; Hinwar & Lambert, 2021). In the current study, we use the terms “inner speech” and “inner voice” interchangeably, but we are not committed to the view that inner speech has all the same auditory and articulatory

## Corresponding Author:

Johanne S. K. Nedergaard, Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen  
 Email: jskn@hum.ku.dk

features as overt speech (Langland-Hassan, 2018; for a recent overarching review, see Fernyhough & Borghi, 2023). Importantly, inner speech displays variation both in terms of its form (e.g., dialogic vs. condensed) and modality (e.g., inner speech as hearing a voice vs. experiencing the imagined articulation of speech; Alderson-Day et al., 2018; Grandchamp et al., 2019; Gregory, 2016; Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014). There is evidence that the different modalities of inner speech involve different neural and cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Nalborczyk et al., 2023; Tian et al., 2016).

## The Current Study

We recruited participants differing in subjectively reported inner speech and tested them on four behavioral tasks. These tasks were chosen on the basis of prior theoretical claims that suggested performance on them may differ as a function of inner speech. First, just as visual imagery has been predicted (and sometimes found) to be linked to visual memory, we tested whether inner speech predicted memory for verbal material. We focused on memory for sets of words that were either phonologically similar and orthographically different or orthographically similar and phonologically different. Less inner speech was predicted to be associated with poorer overall memory for verbal material, but to the extent that phonological similarity creates memory confusion (Baddeley, 1966; Murray, 1968), less inner speech may be associated with a reduced phonological similarity effect. Second, participants completed a rhyme-judgment task: Participants saw pairs of images and needed to indicate whether their names rhymed or not. We reasoned that although participants with low inner speech would have no trouble naming the objects, a reduced reliance on inner speech would make it harder to compare the names in memory—necessary for making a rhyme judgment (Geva et al., 2011; Langland-Hassan et al., 2015). Third, there is substantial evidence that inner speech is often recruited for behavioral control when participants have to switch between different tasks (Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Laurent et al., 2016; Miyake et al., 2004). For example, when asked to switch between adding and subtracting numbers, participants show a selective impairment if they undergo articulatory suppression, but no such impairment is found if the cues are exogenously provided (e.g., a symbol or color cue is used to inform participants whether they should add or subtract; for a systematic review of verbal interference effects, see Nedergaard, Wallentin, & Lupyán, 2023). We reasoned that people who do not habitually use inner speech might be selectively impaired when they have to rely on self-generated cues to keep track of which

## Statement of Relevance

Most adults report experiencing an inner voice and believe that it plays an important role in their daily lives. However, others report that they do not experience such an inner voice. Although these differences are stable, we do not know whether they have any consequences for how people solve problems and act in the world. In this article, we found that adults with less inner speech differed from adults with more inner speech on some tasks that we thought would involve inner speech but not others. It is important to understand such individual differences in inner speech use because it has consequences for how we discuss the role of inner speech generally in human life.

task they should be doing. On the other hand, it is possible that they have learned to rely on other strategies, in which case no difference would be found. Our fourth task involved examining category effects in perception. There is considerable evidence that language induces more categorical representations from basic perception onward (Forder & Lupyán, 2019; Perry & Lupyán, 2014; Winawer et al., 2007). In a study examining the effects of conceptual categories, Lupyán et al. (2010) showed that—controlling for visual differences—people's ability to tell whether two stimuli were physically the same was affected by the categorical status of those stimuli. For example, it took longer to distinguish two cats than an equally visually similar cat and dog. We wondered whether such category effects, insofar as they may be in part induced by feedback from verbal labels, may be reduced in people with less inner speech. For all four experiments, we were also interested in whether performance differed by whether participants reported talking out loud during the task.

## Open Practices Statement

The experiment code, materials, data, and analysis scripts can be accessed at <https://github.com/johan nedergaard/anendophasia>. The studies were not preregistered.

## Method

### **Measurement of inner speech**

We measured subjectively experienced inner speech using the previously developed and validated Internal Representations Questionnaire (IRQ; Roebuck &

**Table 1.** Comparisons of Demographic Characteristics of the Group With More Inner Speech and the Group With Less Inner Speech

Measure	More inner speech	Less inner speech	Test for difference
Age, in years	$M = 36.91$ , $Mdn = 37$ , range = 18–67	$M = 37.56$ , $Mdn = 39$ , range = 18–70	$t(88.43) = -0.19$ , $p = .85$
Gender	22 females, 25 males	19 females, 26 males	$\chi^2(1, 93) = 0.05$ , $p = .82$
Native English speaker	47 native speakers, 0 nonnative speakers	41 native speakers, 4 nonnative speakers	$\chi^2(1, 93) = 2.49$ , $p = .11$
Dyslexia	46 nondyslexic, 1 self-diagnosed	44 nondyslexic, 1 self-diagnosed	$\chi^2(1, 93) < 0.01$ , $p > .99$
Education level	12 high school diploma, 14 some college—no degree, 6 associate's degree, 14 bachelor's degree, 1 master's degree	1 less than high school; 14 high school diploma; 8 some college—no degree; 7 associate's degree; 11 bachelor's degree; 2 master's degree; 2 doctorate, law, or medical degree	$t(84.46) = -0.23$ , $p = .82$

Lupyan, 2020). This questionnaire is broadly similar to other surveys of inner speech (e.g., the General Inner Speech Questionnaire: Racy et al., 2020; the Self-Talk Scale: Brinthaupt et al., 2009; the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire, or VISQ: McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough, 2011), and its verbal factor is most closely related to dialogic inner speech as measured by the VISQ ( $r \sim .7$ ). Two advantages of the IRQ are that its inner speech questions are more inclusive than those on the other scales and the same instrument can be used to assess other individual differences such as visual and orthographic imagery. As is true of other scales, the IRQ measures propensities rather than abilities. Geva and Warburton (2019) suggested that inner speech could be objectively measured using behavioral tasks such as silent-rhyme judgments; however, the authors did not actually show whether differences in inner speech are associated with differences in performance on silent-rhyme-judgment tasks—a limitation we address in the current work.


## Participants

Before beginning the study, we had administered the IRQ to university undergraduates and crowd workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk as part of unrelated studies. From this original pool of 1,037 participants, we contacted participants with scores  $\leq 3.5$  (bottom 30th percentile) or  $\geq 4.25$  (top 20th percentile) on the verbal factor of the questionnaire, which is largely centered on the propensity to experience and rely on inner speech. For example, one item with a high loading on the verbal factor was “I think about problems in my mind in the form of a conversation with myself.” One item with a high loading on the visual factor was “I

often enjoy the use of mental pictures to reminisce” (for all verbal-factor items, see the Supplemental Material available online). The percentile cutoffs were asymmetric because the distribution in verbal scores on the IRQ is negatively skewed. The final sample included participants from the bottom 20th percentile and the top 29th percentile (for histogram with cutoff values, see the Supplemental Material). Because of a recruiting error, three participants recruited for the “more inner speech” group had verbal scores slightly below 4.25 (4.17). We received ethical approval from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Ten participants were excluded for responding randomly, missing at least one experiment, or clearly not complying with task instructions. Our final sample included 47 participants with relatively high verbal-factor scores on the IRQ and 46 participants with relatively low verbal-factor scores. The two groups were balanced in terms of age, gender, education level, dyslexia, and first language. See Table 1. Because of a technical error, demographic data for one participant in the low inner speech group was missing. We were interested in detecting medium to large effects. Our sample size allowed us to detect effect sizes ( $d$ ) of approximately .6 at 80% power or .7 at 91% power (two-tailed  $t$  test of mean difference between two independent groups). Power was lower for the reported interactions, so we urge caution in interpreting them.

## Verbal working memory

We used word sets from Baddeley (1966) that were designed to vary in phonological and orthographic similarity while holding constant other psycholinguistic



**Fig. 1.** Schematic of the procedure showing a trial with phonologically related words. Each trial had five words.

factors. The phonologically similar set contained the words “bought,” “sort,” “taut,” “caught,” and “wart.” The orthographically similar set contained the words “rough,” “cough,” “through,” “dough,” and “bough.” The control set contained the words “plea,” “friend,” “sleigh,” “row,” and “board.” On a given trial, participants saw five written words in random order from one of the sets. The words were presented sequentially (see Fig. 1). After the last word, participants were asked to type the five words they just saw in the order they saw them. Participants began the task by completing two practice trials with full feedback (correct/incorrect and the stimulus words—drawn from a different set than the ones used in the real experiment—shown in order). Participants then performed 24 trials in total with eight trials from each of the three word sets. The order of both set type and words within a trial were randomized. There was no limit to how long participants could spend on reproducing the words on a given trial.


### Rhyme judgments

We constructed a set of rhyme pairs with 20 orthographic pairs (e.g., “sock” and “clock”) and 20 nonorthographic pairs (e.g., “drawer” and “door”). For the

full set of images, associated words, and name-agreement scores, see the Supplemental Material. The images were selected from the MultiPic database (Duñabeitia et al., 2018) and from Rossion and Pourtois (2004) because these image sets contained simple images (objects with no background) that had relatively high name agreement. On each trial, participants saw two images of items presented simultaneously and were asked to judge whether the names of the items rhymed or not. Participants completed 60 rhyme judgments in randomized order (20 orthographic rhymes, 20 nonorthographic rhymes, and 20 no-rhyme control trials). There was a 5,000-ms response deadline. See Figure 2.

### Task switching

On each block, participants were shown 30 randomly selected integers between 13 and 96 and asked to add or subtract 3 from each. All participants completed five blocks beginning with blocked addition or blocked subtraction, followed by (in a counterbalanced order) a block in which problems alternated between addition and subtraction with the operation marked by color (red/blue), marked with a symbol (+/−), or not marked. The unmarked block required participants to remember



**Fig. 2.** Sketch of a rhyme-judgment trial. The stimuli here exemplify an orthographic rhyme—"bone" and "cone"—and the correct answer would therefore be "Rhyme."

which operation they had just done. In the switching conditions, a response was counted as correct if it was the correct arithmetic and if the operation was switched from the previous trial (from addition to subtraction or vice versa). See Figure 3.

### Same/different judgments

This experiment used three different black silhouettes of cats and three different black silhouettes of dogs. Participants completed two blocked conditions: making physical-identity judgments (same means physically identical) and making category judgments (same means same category). We were interested only in the physical-identity judgments here. Participants completed 200 total trials and received feedback after incorrect responses ("incorrect" in red font). See Figure 4.


### Questionnaire

After completing the four experiments, participants answered a series of questions about their experience with inner speech (e.g., "How often do you have songs stuck in your head?" and "Do you ever rehearse a conversation before you have it in real life where you simulate what you will say and how the other person will respond?") and completed the revised version of the VISQ (VISQ-R; Alderson-Day et al., 2018). The

VISQ-R measures the extent to which inner speech is experienced as dialogic (e.g., "I talk back and forward to myself in my mind about things") and condensed (e.g., "My thinking in words is shortened compared to my normal out-loud speech") as well as whether the participant experiences the voices of other people. The questionnaire also measures the perceived functions of inner speech by asking about inner speech as an evaluative and regulatory tool (e.g., "I think in inner speech about what I have done, and whether it was right or not"). For the full set of custom questions, see the Supplemental Material.

### Data analysis

All analyses were conducted in R Version 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022). Participants and items (where appropriate) were modeled as random intercepts; random slopes were included for within-subjects factors unless it prevented convergence. All predictors were centered. Reaction times (RTs) were log-transformed to yield a more normal distribution. Accuracies were modeled using logistic regression. For ease of interpretation, the figures show the two inner speech groups as distinct, but all the statistical models used verbal score (average score on the verbal-representation items on the IRQ) as a continuous predictor. Error bars on all figures represent within-subjects 95% confidence intervals (CIs) around




**Fig. 3.** Sketch of the three switched conditions in the task-switching experiment. Four (a) color-cued, (b) symbol-cued, and (c) uncued switch trials with correct answers are shown.

the mean (adjusted for repeated measures), and the thin, relatively transparent lines represent individual participants. All four experiments were conducted using custom-written software with the JavaScript package jsPsych Version 6 (De Leeuw, 2015), and the data and code can be found at <https://github.com/johannenedergaard/anendophasia>.

## Results

### Verbal working memory

In the verbal working memory experiment, we tested whether the number of words that participants were able to correctly recall (the dependent variable) was



**Fig. 4.** Sketch of the two conditions of the category-judgment experiment. In the correct category-judgment trial (a), the participant responds that the cat and dog silhouettes represent different animals. In the incorrect identity-judgment trial (b), the participant responds that the two dogs are identical.

**Table 2.** Descriptive Statistics by Group in the Verbal Working Memory Experiment


Group	Word set	Score—item and position	95% CI—item and position	Score—item only	95% CI—item only
More inner speech	Control set	4.19	[4.06, 4.32]	4.51	[4.43, 4.59]
More inner speech	Orthographic similarity set	3.72	[3.58, 3.86]	4.18	[4.08, 4.28]
More inner speech	Phonological similarity set	3.43	[3.37, 3.59]	4.11	[4.01, 4.21]
Less inner speech	Control set	3.69	[3.54, 3.84]	4.17	[4.06, 4.28]
Less inner speech	Orthographic similarity set	3.52	[3.37, 3.67]	4.10	[3.99, 4.21]
Less inner speech	Phonological similarity set	3.02	[2.87, 3.17]	3.81	[3.70, 3.92]

Note: CI = confidence interval.


predicted by participants' verbal score on the IRQ and the type of word set (control set, orthographic similarity set, phonological similarity set).

**Descriptive statistics by group.** Participants with more inner speech recalled more words correctly. This advantage was evident both when we scored only correctly ordered responses as correct as well as when we scored correctly recalled items regardless of their position (see Table 2 and Fig. 5).

**Statistical models.** Participants remembered phonologically similar words significantly worse ( $M = 3.22$ ) than orthographically similar words ( $M = 3.62$ ),  $b = -0.72$ ,  $SE = 0.08$ ,  $t(90.93) = -8.84$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = -0.22$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.33, -0.11]$ , which were in turn remembered worse than the dissimilar words ( $M = 3.94$ ),  $b = -0.33$ ,  $SE = 0.08$ ,  $t(91.13) = -3.98$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = -0.47$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.57, -0.36]$ . Collapsing across the three types of word lists, greater inner speech was associated with better performance,  $b = 0.27$ ,  $SE = 0.10$ ,  $t(90.3) = 2.60$ ,  $p = .011$ ,  $\beta = 0.17$ , 95% CI =  $[0.04, 0.30]$ .



**Fig. 5.** Score on the verbal working memory task by word set.



**Fig. 6.** Verbal working memory performance by whether participants reported talking out loud to help them remember or not.

0.31]. This effect remained significant when we ignored the recalled order of the words, counting only whether they recalled the correct words,  $b = 0.19$ ,  $SE = 0.08$ ,  $t(89.62) = 2.57$ ,  $p = .012$ ,  $\beta = 0.18$ , 95% CI = [0.04, 0.32].

There were no interaction effects (all  $ps > .10$ ), although numerically the effect of inner speech was smallest for orthographically similar words (see Fig. 5).

**Strategies.** The groups with more and less inner speech were similar in their reported use of talking out loud as a strategy for remembering the words—10 of 47 in the group with more inner speech and 13 of 46 in the group with less inner speech,  $\chi^2(1, 93) = 0.29$ ,  $p = .59$ . Nevertheless, talking out loud was associated with performance in different ways between the two groups (see Fig. 6). As Figure 6 indicates, there was an interaction effect between talking out loud and verbal score on recall,  $b = -0.50$ ,  $SE = 0.23$ ,  $t(89.25) = -2.19$ ,  $p = .031$ ,  $\beta = -0.14$ , 95% CI = [-0.26, -0.01]. Participants with less inner speech who reported using overt language during the task performed similarly to participants with more inner speech, suggesting that what mattered for performance was the use of speech, either covert or overt.

## Rhyme judgments

In the rhyme-judgment experiment, we tested whether the speed and accuracy with which participants made rhyme judgments (the dependent variables) were

predicted by participants' verbal score on the IRQ and the type of rhyme (orthographic rhyme, nonorthographic rhyme, and no rhyme). We also tested whether participants' rhyme-judgment performance differed by whether they reported talking out loud to remember the words. Five image pairs of rhyming objects—bin/chin, cab/crab, rake/cake, wave/cave, and park/shark—were incorrectly judged to not rhyme on at least half the trials. This was most likely because participants did not name one or both of the images with the intended names ( $M = .58$ , range = .05–1.0). We therefore excluded these trials from further analysis. In addition, we trimmed RTs below 200 ms and excluded trials that timed out after 5,000 ms (68 trials; 1.4%).

**Descriptive statistics by group.** Participants who reported having more inner speech were numerically both faster and more accurate than participants who reported having less inner speech on all three types of trials. See Table 3 and Figure 7.

**Statistical models.** Participants took longer to make rhyme judgments on no-rhyme trials ( $M = 1,981$  ms) compared with orthographic trials ( $M = 1,730$  ms),  $b = 0.12$ ,  $SE = 0.04$ ,  $t(48.06) = 3.01$ ,  $p = .005$ ,  $\beta = 0.1$ , 95% CI = [0.04, 0.17]. Nonorthographic trials ( $M = 1,823$  ms) did not differ significantly from orthographic trials,  $b = 0.05$ ,  $SE = 0.04$ ,  $t(48.77) = 1.18$ ,  $p = .24$ ,  $\beta = 0.04$ , 95% CI = [-0.03,


**Table 3.** Descriptive Statistics on Rhyming Accuracy and Reaction Time by Group and by Rhyme Type

Group	Type of rhyme trial	Reaction time, ms	95% CI—reaction time	Accuracy, %	95% CI—accuracy
More inner speech	Nonorthographic rhyme	1,853	[1,802, 1,904]	83.75	[80.94, 86.56]
More inner speech	No rhyme	1,931	[1,878, 1,984]	98.45	[97.32, 99.58]
More inner speech	Orthographic rhyme	1,719	[1,664, 1,774]	91.99	[89.62, 94.36]
Less inner speech	Nonorthographic rhyme	1,976	[1,922, 2,030]	77.75	[74.59, 80.91]
Less inner speech	No rhyme	2,027	[1,967, 2,087]	95.57	[93.92, 97.22]
Less inner speech	Orthographic rhyme	1,859	[1,799, 1,919]	84.48	[81.32, 87.64]


Note: CI = confidence interval.

0.11]. Higher name agreement was associated with faster RTs,  $b = -0.04$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ ,  $t(49) = -2.22$ ,  $p = .031$ ,  $\beta = -0.03$ , 95% CI = [-0.05, 0.00]. Reported inner speech had no effect on the speed of correct rhyme judgments,  $b = -0.02$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ ,  $t = -0.81$ ,  $p = .42$ ,  $\beta = -0.01$ , 95% CI = [-0.05, 0.02]. There were no interactions between rhyme type and inner speech (both  $ps > .31$ ) or between inner speech and the effect of name agreement on accuracy ( $p > .96$ ).

Participants were more accurate when judging no rhyme trials as not rhyming ( $M = 97.03\%$ ) than on orthographic rhyme judgments ( $M = 88.28\%$ ),  $b = 1.67$ ,  $SE = 0.32$ ,  $z = 5.15$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = 1.67$ , 95% CI = [1.04, 2.31], and were less accurate on nonorthographic rhyme judgments ( $M = 80.8\%$ ) than on orthographic rhyme judgments,  $b = -0.59$ ,  $SE = 0.28$ ,  $z = -2.07$ ,  $p = .039$ ,  $\beta = -0.59$ , 95% CI = [-1.14, -0.03]. Importantly, a higher



**Fig. 7.** Reaction time and accuracy across groups by rhyme type.



**Fig. 8.** Reaction time and accuracy by whether participants indicated that they had talked out loud to make the rhyme judgments.

verbal score was associated with greater accuracy,  $b = 0.34$ ,  $SE = 0.12$ ,  $z = 2.81$ ,  $p = .005$ ,  $\beta = 0.34$ , 95% CI = [0.1, 0.58]. Name agreement did not affect accuracy ( $p > .13$ ). There were no significant interactions between rhyme type and inner speech (both  $ps > .22$ ) or between inner speech and the effect of name agreement on accuracy ( $p = .51$ ).

**Strategies.** When asked about their strategies, similar proportions of participants in both groups reported naming the pictures out loud—23 of 47 in the higher inner speech group and 21 of 46 in the lower inner speech group,  $\chi^2(1, 93) = 0.01$ ,  $p = .91$ . We observed a similar interaction here as with the memory task (compare Figs. 6 and 8). For people who did not report speaking out loud, less habitual inner speech was associated with lower accuracy; for people who did, it was not—orthographic rhymes:  $b = -0.78$ ,  $SE = 0.36$ ,  $z = -2.19$ ,  $p = .028$ ,  $\beta = -0.39$ , 95% CI = [-0.74, -0.04]; nonorthographic rhymes:  $b = -0.75$ ,  $SE = 0.34$ ,  $z = -2.24$ ,  $p = .025$ ,  $\beta = -0.37$ , 95% CI = [-0.7, -0.05]. This finding suggests once again that speech use—whether covert or overt—is associated with higher accuracy.

### Task switching

In the task-switching experiment, we tested whether the speed and accuracy of performing simple arithmetic

operations (adding and subtracting) were predicted by participants' reported inner speech (verbal score on the IRQ) as a function of how they were cued to alternate between the two operations: by a symbol, by a color, or having to rely on their memory of which operation they just did. We excluded trials with RTs over 10 s (73 trials; 0.5%). We also recalculated the accuracy measure so that a failure to switch did not render all subsequent trials incorrect as long as the participant proceeded to switch appropriately and obtain the arithmetically correct answer.

**Descriptive statistics.** As can be seen from Table 4 and Figure 9, accuracy was high in all conditions, and RTs were comparable across the two groups of participants.

**Statistical models.** Participants responded less accurately in the symbol-cued switch condition ( $M = 97.2\%$ ), color-cued switch condition ( $M = 95.4\%$ ), and uncued switch condition ( $M = 93.9\%$ ) compared with the blocked addition condition ( $M = 98.1\%$ )—addition versus symbol cue:  $b = -0.42$ ,  $SE = 0.18$ ,  $z = -2.32$ ,  $p = .020$ ,  $\beta = -0.42$ , 95% CI = [-0.77, -0.07]; addition versus color cue:  $b = -0.97$ ,  $SE = 0.17$ ,  $z = -5.84$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = -0.97$ , 95% CI = [-1.30, -0.65]; addition versus uncued:  $b = -1.27$ ,  $SE = 0.16$ ,  $z = -7.92$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = -1.27$  [-1.59, -0.96]. Accuracy did not differ between blocked subtraction ( $M = 97.7\%$ ) and



**Table 4.** Descriptive Statistics of Reaction Time and Accuracy on the Task-Switching Experiment


Group	Condition	Reaction time, ms	95% CI—reaction time	Accuracy, %	95% CI—accuracy
More inner speech	Blocked addition	2,287	[2,240, 2,334]	97.94	[97.11, 98.77]
More inner speech	Color-cued switch	2,775	[2,713, 2,837]	95.64	[94.48, 96.8]
More inner speech	Blocked subtraction	2,528	[2,474, 2,582]	97.65	[96.76, 98.54]
More inner speech	Symbol-cued switch	2,564	[2,510, 2,618]	97.72	[96.86, 98.58]
More inner speech	Uncued switch	2,679	[2,620, 2,738]	94.59	[93.3, 95.88]
Less inner speech	Blocked addition	2,312	[2,266, 2,358]	98.32	[97.56, 99.08]
Less inner speech	Color-cued switch	2,781	[2,718, 2,844]	95.08	[93.82, 96.34]
Less inner speech	Blocked subtraction	2,573	[2,518, 2,628]	97.80	[96.92, 98.68]
Less inner speech	Symbol-cued switch	2,640	[2,584, 2,696]	96.72	[95.69, 97.75]
Less inner speech	Uncued switch	2,710	[2,646, 2,774]	93.19	[91.72, 94.66]

Note: CI = confidence interval.

blocked addition ( $p = .24$ ). More inner speech was not associated with different accuracy ( $p = .55$ ), and there were no interaction effects between inner speech and block type (all  $ps > .07$ ). Numerically, verbal score interacted with the uncued condition and cancelled out the very slight (nonsignificant) RT advantage of a higher verbal score.

Participants responded faster in the blocked addition condition ( $M = 2,300$  ms) compared with the blocked subtraction condition ( $M = 2,550$  ms),  $b = 0.09$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ ,  $t(90.79) = 8.41$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = 0.08$ , 95% CI = [0.06, 0.10], the symbol-cued switch condition ( $M = 2,601$  ms),  $b = 0.12$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ ,  $t(91.45) = 9.69$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = 0.10$ , 95% CI = [0.08, 0.13], the color-cued switch condition

**Fig. 9.** Reaction time and accuracy across conditions in the task-switching experiment.



**Fig. 10.** Reaction time (ms) and accuracy in the task-switching experiment by whether participants reported talking out loud to remember the correct rule or not.

( $M = 2,778$  ms),  $b = 0.19$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ ,  $t(90.84) = 12.23$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = 0.17$ , 95% CI = [0.14, 0.19], and the uncued switch condition ( $M = 2,694$  ms),  $b = 0.15$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ ,  $t(90.87) = 9.39$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = 0.13$ , 95% CI = [0.11, 0.16]. More reported inner speech did not predict RTs ( $p = .81$ ), and there were no interaction effects (all  $p > .51$ ).


**Strategies.** There was no significant difference between how many participants with more inner speech (20 of 47) and how many participants with less inner speech (13 of 46) reported that they had talked to themselves out loud during the task-switching experiment,  $\chi^2(1, 93) = 1$ ,  $p = .32$ . There were no obvious differences between the effects that talking out loud had on these two groups (for accuracy and RTs, see Fig. 10).

### Same/different judgments

In the same/different judgment experiment, we tested whether the speed with which participants made correct same/different judgments was predicted by participants' verbal score on the IRQ and the type of judgment (same

category of animal or same image). We excluded trials with RTs above 5 s (123 trials; 0.7%) and below 200 ms (12 trials; 0.07%). Overall accuracy was high (95.53%) and did not differ between the group with more inner speech (95.58%) and the group with less inner speech (95.48%). In subsequent RT analyses, we include only correct trials.

**Statistical models.** The key test for this experiment was whether the two groups behaved differently when giving correct "DIFFERENT" responses on identity trials when the two images belonged to the same category. That is, we expected participants with more inner speech to be slower to make correct "DIFFERENT" responses when both stimuli were from the same category but physically different (e.g., dog<sub>1</sub> vs. dog<sub>2</sub>). Within-categories trials were generally associated with significantly slower RTs ( $M = 923$  ms) than between-categories trials ( $M = 843$  ms),  $b = -0.08$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ ,  $t(86.81) = -7.71$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\beta = -0.09$ , 95% CI = [-0.11, -0.06]. See Figure 11. However, there was no interaction between level of inner speech and category type—interaction effect:  $b = < 0.01$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ ,  $t = -0.06$ ,  $p = .95$ ,  $\beta = < 0.01$ , 95% CI = [-0.02, 0.02].



**Fig. 11.** Reaction time on identity trials in which the correct response was “DIFFERENT” either because the two silhouettes were from different categories or different images from the same category.

**Strategies.** There was no significant difference between how many participants with more inner speech (9 of 47) and how many participants with less inner speech (4 of 46) reported that they had talked to themselves out loud during the task,  $\chi^2(1, 93) = 1.33, p = .25$ . There were no differences between the effects that talking out loud had on these two groups.

### Intertask correlations

In addition to finding (or not finding) differences in task performance as a function of inner speech, it is often informative to see whether correlations between tasks and conditions show a different pattern in people with more versus less inner speech (Keogh et al., 2021). For a visualization of how performance on the tasks correlated within the participant groups with more or less inner speech, see Figure 12. The dark blue clusters near the diagonal show that for both groups performance within tasks (e.g., RTs on the different types of task-switch trials) was strongly correlated, and similarly so for both groups. When it comes to relationships between tasks, however, we found several intriguing differences. Participants with less inner speech showed a positive correlation ( $r = .48$ ) between verbal recall accuracy and nonorthographic rhyme accuracy. This group also showed moderate correlations ( $rs$  between .30 and .50) between uncued task-switch accuracy and various measures of verbal recall accuracy. In contrast, participants with more inner speech showed weaker relationships ( $rs$  between .16 and .30) between these measures.


### Questionnaire measures

Responses to many of the included questions differed substantially as a function of inner speech. For reasons of space, however, we report only a few selected ones here (for further correlations, see the Supplemental Material). Data from one participant were missing, so we report questionnaire data from 47 participants with more inner speech and 45 participants with less inner speech. The questions with the clearest differences concerned rehearsing and revising conversations in which the participants with more inner speech reported doing so much more often than the participants with less inner speech did—revise past conversation:  $t(87.95) = 5.93, p < .001$ ; practice future conversation:  $t(89.33) = 5.33, p < .001$ . Of the VISQ factors, the IRQ verbal representation score was mostly related to the dialogicality of inner speech,  $r(90) = .70, p < .001$ .

Participants who reported more inner speech estimated that more people experience their thoughts in the form of a conversation with themselves,  $b = 5.08, SE = 2.00, t(90) = 2.55, p = .013, \beta = 0.26, 95\% \text{ CI} = [0.06, 0.46]$ , and that more people hear words in their “mind’s ear” when they read,  $b = 5.09, SE = 2.07, t(90) = 2.46, p = .016, \beta = 0.25, 95\% \text{ CI} = [0.05, 0.45]$ . They did not, however, estimate that more people were able to see vivid images in their “mind’s eye,”  $b = 1.17, SE = 2.25, t(90) = 0.52, p = .61, \beta = 0.05, 95\% \text{ CI} = [-0.15, 0.26]$ .

### Discussion

Our study is, to our knowledge, the first to conduct a systematic investigation of whether differences in inner



**Fig. 12.** Intertask correlations. The upper triangle shows correlations for the group with more inner speech; the lower triangle shows correlations for the group with less inner speech. Colored squares represent significant correlations at  $p < .01$  ( $|r| > .38$  given the sample size).

speech have behavioral consequences. Participants who reported experiencing less inner speech (our sample targeted those at or below the 20th percentile of the verbal score on the IRQ) performed worse when judging whether the names of two images rhymed, and they had poorer verbal working memory. Interestingly, in both the rhyming experiment and the verbal working memory experiment, performance differences between the two groups disappeared when participants reported talking out loud to solve the problems, suggesting that the efficacy of using covert and overt speech in these cases was equivalent. Inner speech differences did not predict performance in task switching, indicating that

although inner speech can be used as a behavioral self-cue, other and equally effective strategies may be available. Last, categorical effects on perceptual discrimination were similar for the two groups, suggesting either that the categorical effects in such tasks are not language-based or that the accelerated nature of such tasks lessens reliance on inner speech (and language more generally). An examination of intertask correlations indicated that participants with less inner speech were more likely to rely on a common mechanism when performing rhyme judgments, verbal recall, and task switching without an extrinsic cue (requiring them to remember what they just did). Our finding of

stronger intertask correlations for participants with less inner speech is conceptually similar to Keogh et al.'s (2021) finding of stronger relationships between different visual working memory tasks in participants with aphantasia compared with those with typical visual imagery.

### ***Anendophasia: a lack of inner speech***

People's self-reports cannot always be taken at face value (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt, 2011; Hurlburt et al., 2013). But when people report that they rarely or never experience inner speech, they are not just confabulating. This is evident both in the consistency of their subjective responses (Roebuck & Lupyan, 2020), and, as we report here, differences in objective performance. When investigating unusual human experiences, it helps to have a label. For example, the coining of "aphantasia" to the lack of visual imagery (Zeman et al., 2010) is both helpful for research—providing a useful keyword—and for self-identification; its introduction led to the creation of an online community with more than 60,000 members (r/aphantasia). We would therefore like to propose a name for the phenomenon of a lack of inner speech: anendophasia—*an* (lack) + *endo* (inner) + *phasia* (speech). This term was developed in consultation with individuals who identify as lacking inner speech and has the benefit of including the familiar Greek root *phasia* (aphasia, paraphasia, etc.). Furthermore, "endophasia" has precedent in being used to refer to inner speech (Bergounioux, 2001; Lœvenbruck et al., 2018). The term also avoids subsuming inner speech under aphantasia (Monzel et al., 2022) because inner speech is both auditory and articulatory in nature (whether it is better termed "inner hearing" or "inner speaking" is debated) and because the linguistic properties of inner speech are likely not reducible to auditory and articulatory features. For these reasons, we also do not believe the previously proposed term "anauralia" is appropriate (Hinwar & Lambert, 2021).

### ***Relations to visual imagery, auditory imagery, and "unsymbolized" thought***

Can anendophasia be thought of simply as a lack of auditory imagery? We think not. First, many who lack inner speech report being able to engage in musical imagery (although they report "earworms"—intrusive musical imagery—less often than people with typical levels of inner speech). Second, although inner speech is often experienced as having phonological features—one of the reasons people often perceive it as speech (Langland-Hassan, 2018)—it can also involve an articulatory-motor dimension (Geva, 2018; Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014). The current work was not designed

to investigate the separate contributions of auditory and articulatory dimensions. Paradoxically, some people also claim to experience "wordless" inner speech akin to a series of tip-of-the-tongue states (Hurlburt et al., 2013).

When asked to reflect on what form their thoughts take, people who score low on both inner speech and visual imagery claim that they "think in concepts." What it means to think in concepts without relying on language is not clear. Beyond informal self-reports, the existence of such nonverbal and nonperceptual phenomenal experiences is supported by Descriptive Experience Sampling (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). When participants are probed at random times and asked to report on their mental states, approximately 22% of the time their reports are consistent with what Hurlburt and colleagues have called "unsymbolized thinking." In such episodes, people feel that they think "a particular, definite thought without awareness of that thought being conveyed as words, images, or any other symbols" (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008, p. 802). Unsymbolized thinking is a slippery construct that tends to be defined in terms of what it is not. For example, Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) described it as "a thinking, not a feeling, not an intention, not an intimation, not a kinesthetic event, not a bodily event" (p. 1366). A telling example is a participant wondering whether her friend will arrive in a car or pickup truck but not experiencing any words or images; rather, the question is experienced as a single undifferentiated whole.

It is possible that such unsymbolized thinking is subserved by the same processes as inner speech but simply lacks the conscious auditory or articulatory features of inner speech (Vicente & Martinez-Manrique, 2016). Alternatively, it may correspond to a genuinely different form of experience in which people entertain more abstract conceptual representations that are less accessible to people with higher levels of inner speech and imagery. Anendophasia as we define it pertains to the subjective experience of inner speech. Our current measurements cannot distinguish whether differences in the experience of inner speech are due to a difference in the cognitive processes subserving inner speech or a difference in the metacognitive awareness of generated phonetic or articulatory features.

### ***Limitations***

One limitation of our work is its reliance on wholly subjective questions for measuring inner speech. Considering that our focus is on differences in phenomenology, this is appropriate. At the same time, there is reason to be skeptical of people's assessments of their inner experiences. People can be wrong about what they think they experience (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011). It would therefore be helpful to supplement

subjective assessments with objective ones of the sort becoming possible for differences in visual imagery (Kay et al., 2022). Relatedly, because inner speech is known to vary not just between people but also across situations (Fernyhough, 2004; Grandchamp et al., 2019; Oppenheim & Dell, 2010), it is worth examining whether people who report having little inner speech experience more of it if placed in situations that, for example, benefit from verbal rehearsal. We believe our results to be relatively generalizable across age, gender, and educational status given the composition of our participant sample, but whether any of the relationships we report are specific to English speakers or Westerners is an open question.

Another limitation is the remaining possibility that the differences we ascribe to inner speech come from a third factor such as a general difference in introspection and/or conscientiousness. Although we cannot rule out all such possible confounds, it is worth noting that differences in inner speech, although correlated with, for example, visual imagery, are dissociable from it. There is also no evidence that inner speech was associated with across-the-board differences in performance. Our effects were specific to certain task and condition combinations. That said, to obtain greater confidence in the specific causal role of inner speech on performance, it may be possible to manipulate it via interference or by instructing participants to use it in specific ways.

A further limitation is that our measurement of inner speech does not distinguish between its prevalence in one's conscious experience and one's ability to control its deployment. In ongoing work, we have found that people who report experiencing more inner speech (measured as in the current studies) report having a harder time shutting it off. (Anecdotally, one reported benefit of mindfulness meditation is precisely this ability; for someone with less inner speech to begin with, there is less to shut off.) At the same time, we suspect that there is a wide range in ability to regulate one's inner speech, perhaps related to more domain-general differences in cognitive control.

Last, although the term “anendophasia” connotes a lack of inner speech, many of the participants in our low inner speech group reported having some inner speech. Screening a larger group to identify people who do not endorse having any inner speech would help determine whether the cognitive consequences of having less inner speech are continuous with having none.

## Conclusion

Some people report not experiencing an inner voice, and these reports appear to be related to measurable differences in behavior. We proposed a name for a lack

of inner speech: anendophasia. We found that people who experience less inner speech were worse at making rhyme judgments in response to images and remembering lists of words. Task-switching performance was not, however, either slower or less accurate, and there were no differences in category effects on perceptual discrimination. Taken together, our experiments suggest that there are real behavioral consequences of experiencing less or more inner speech and that these differences may often be masked because people with anendophasia use alternate strategies to achieve similar overall performance.

## Transparency

*Action Editor:* Rachael Jack

*Editor:* Patricia J. Bauer

*Author Contributions*

**Johanne S. K. Nedergaard:** Conceptualization; Data curation; Formal analysis; Investigation; Methodology; Software; Validation; Visualization; Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing.

**Gary Lupyan:** Conceptualization; Investigation; Methodology; Resources; Software; Supervision; Validation; Writing – review & editing.

### Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

### Funding

This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant 2020969 (to G. Lupyan).

### Open Practices

This article has received the badges for Open Data and Open Materials. More information about the Open Practices badges can be found at <http://www.psychologicscience.org/publications/badges>.



## ORCID iD

Johanne S. K. Nedergaard  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6381-2901>

## Supplemental Material

Additional supporting information can be found at <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/09567976241243004>

## References

Alderson-Day, B., & Fernyhough, C. (2015). Inner speech: Development, cognitive functions, phenomenology, and neurobiology. *Psychological Bulletin*, 141(5), 931–965.

Alderson-Day, B., Mitrenga, K., Wilkinson, S., McCarthy-Jones, S., & Fernyhough, C. (2018). The varieties of inner speech questionnaire–revised (VISQ-r): Replicating and refining links between inner speech and psychopathology. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 65, 48–58.

Baddeley, A. (1966). Short-term memory for word sequences as a function of acoustic, semantic and formal similarity. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 18(4), 362–365.

Baddeley, A., Chincotta, D., & Adlam, A. (2001). Working memory and the control of action: Evidence from task switching. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 130(4), 641–657.

Bergounioux, G. (2001). Endophasie et linguistique: Décomptes, quotes et squelette [Endophasia and linguistics: Quantification, quotes, and outline]. *Langue Française*, 132, 106–124.

Bermúdez, J. L. (2007). *Thinking without words*. Oxford University Press.

Brinthaupt, T. M. (2019). Individual differences in self-talk frequency: Social isolation and cognitive disruption. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10, Article 1088. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01088>

Brinthaupt, T. M., Hein, M. B., & Kramer, T. E. (2009). The self-talk scale: Development, factor analysis, and validation. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 91(1), 82–92.

Carruthers, P. (2002). The cognitive functions of language. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 25(6), 657–674.

Chella, A., & Pipitone, A. (2020). A cognitive architecture for inner speech. *Cognitive Systems Research*, 59, 287–292.

Clark, A. (1998). Magic words: How language augments human computation. In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (Eds.), *Language and thought: Interdisciplinary themes* (pp. 162–183). Cambridge University Press.

Cragg, L., & Nation, K. (2010). Language and the development of cognitive control. *Topics in Cognitive Science*, 2(4), 631–642.

Dawes, A. J., Keogh, R., Andrillon, T., & Pearson, J. (2020). A cognitive profile of multi-sensory imagery, memory and dreaming in aphantasia. *Scientific Reports*, 10, Article 10022. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-65705-7>

De Leeuw, J. R. (2015). jsPsych: A JavaScript library for creating behavioral experiments in a Web browser. *Behavior Research Methods*, 47, 1–12.

Duñabeitia, J. A., Crepaldi, D., Meyer, A. S., New, B., Pliatsikas, C., Smolka, E., & Brysbaert, M. (2018). MultiPic: A standardized set of 750 drawings with norms for six European languages. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 71(4), 808–816.

Emerson, M. J., & Miyake, A. (2003). The role of inner speech in task switching: A dual-task investigation. *Journal of Memory and Language*, 48(1), 148–168.

Felton, J. (2020, November 10). People with no internal monologue explain what it's like in their head. *IFLScience*. <https://www.iflscience.com/people-with-no-internal-monologue-explain-what-its-like-in-their-head-57739>

Fernyhough, C. (2004). Alien voices and inner dialogue: Towards a developmental account of auditory verbal hallucinations. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 22(1), 49–68. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2004.09.001>

Fernyhough, C., & Borghi, A. M. (2023). Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 27, 1180–1193.

Forder, L., & Lupyan, G. (2019). Hearing words changes color perception: Facilitation of color discrimination by verbal and visual cues. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 148(7), 1105–1123.

Frankish, K. (2018). Inner speech and outer thought. In P. Langland-Hassan & A. Vicente (Eds.), *Inner speech: New voices* (pp. 221–243). Oxford University Press.

Gauker, C. (2011). *Words and images: An essay on the origin of ideas*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Geva, S. (2018). Inner speech and mental imagery: A neuroscientific perspective. In P. Langland-Hassan & A. Vicente (Eds.), *Inner speech: New voices* (pp. 105–130). Oxford University Press.

Geva, S., Bennett, S., Warburton, E. A., & Patterson, K. (2011). Discrepancy between inner and overt speech: Implications for post-stroke aphasia and normal language processing. *Aphasiology*, 25(3), 323–343.

Geva, S., & Warburton, E. A. (2019). A test battery for inner speech functions. *Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology*, 34(1), 97–113.

Grandchamp, R., Rapin, L., Perrone-Bertolotti, M., Pichat, C., Haldin, C., Cousin, E., Lachaux, J. P., Dohen, M., Perrier, P., Garnier, M., Baciu, M., & Lœvenbruck, H. (2019). The ConDialInt model: Condensation, dialogality, and intentionality dimensions of inner speech within a hierarchical predictive control framework. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10, Article 2019. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02019>

Gregory, D. (2016). Inner speech, imagined speech, and auditory verbal hallucinations. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, 7, 653–673.

Heavey, C. L., & Hurlburt, R. T. (2008). The phenomena of inner experience. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 17(3), 798–810.

Hinwar, R. P., & Lambert, A. J. (2021). Auralia: The silent mind and its association with aphantasia. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 12, Article 744213. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.744213>

Hurlburt, R. T. (2011). *Investigating pristine inner experience*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511842627>

Hurlburt, R. T., & Akhter, S. A. (2006). The descriptive experience sampling method. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 5(3), 271–301.

Hurlburt, R. T., & Akhter, S. A. (2008). Unsymbolized thinking. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 17(4), 1364–1374.

Hurlburt, R. T., Heavey, C. L., & Kelsey, J. M. (2013). Toward a phenomenology of inner speaking. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 22(4), 1477–1494. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.10.003>

Hurlburt, R. T., & Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). *Describing inner experience? Proponent meets skeptic*. MIT Press.

Kay, L., Keogh, R., Andrillon, T., & Pearson, J. (2022). The pupillary light response as a physiological index of aphantasia, sensory and phenomenological imagery strength. *eLife*, 11, Article e72484. <https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.72484>

Keogh, R., Wicken, M., & Pearson, J. (2021). Visual working memory in aphantasia: Retained accuracy and capacity with a different strategy. *Cortex*, 143, 237–253.

Langland-Hassan, P. (2018). From introspection to essence: The auditory nature of inner speech. In P. Langland-Hassan & A. Vicente (Eds.), *Inner speech: New voices* (pp. 78–104). Oxford University Press.

Langland-Hassan, P., Faries, F. R., Richardson, M. J., & Dietz, A. (2015). Inner speech deficits in people with aphasia. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 6, Article 528. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00528>

Laurent, L., Millot, J.-L., Andrieu, P., Camos, V., Flocchia, C., & Mathy, F. (2016). Inner speech sustains predictable task switching: Direct evidence in adults. *Journal of Cognitive Psychology*, 28(5), 585–592.

Lidstone, J. S. M., Meins, E., & Fernyhough, C. (2010). The roles of private speech and inner speech in planning during middle childhood: Evidence from a dual task paradigm. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 107(4), 438–451. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2010.06.002>

Löevenbruck, H., Grandchamp, R., Rapin, L., Nalborczyk, L., Dohen, M., Perrier, P., Baciu, M., & Perrone-Bertolotti, M. (2018). A cognitive neuroscience view of inner language: To predict and to hear, see, feel. In P. Langland-Hassan & A. Vicente (Eds.), *Inner speech: New voices* (pp. 131–167). Oxford University Press.

Lupyan, G., Thompson-Schill, S. L., & Swingley, D. (2010). Conceptual penetration of visual processing. *Psychological Science*, 21(5), 682–691.

Lupyan, G., Uchiyama, R., Thompson, B., & Casasanto, D. (2023). Hidden differences in phenomenal experience. *Cognitive Science*, 47(1), Article e13239. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13239>

McCarthy-Jones, S., & Fernyhough, C. (2011). The varieties of inner speech: Links between quality of inner speech and psychopathological variables in a sample of young adults. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 20(4), 1586–1593.

Miyake, A., Emerson, M. J., Padilla, F., & Ahn, J. (2004). Inner speech as a retrieval aid for task goals: The effects of cue type and articulatory suppression in the random task cuing paradigm. *Acta Psychologica*, 115(2–3), 123–142.

Monzel, M., Mitchell, D., Macpherson, F., Pearson, J., & Zeman, A. (2022). Aphantasia, dyskinesia, anauralia: Call for a single term for the lack of mental imagery—Commentary on Dance et al. (2021) and Hinwar and Lambert (2021). *Cortex*, 150, 149–152. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2022.02.002>

Morin, A. (2018). The self-reflective functions of inner speech: Thirteen years later. In P. Langland-Hassan & A. Vicente (Eds.), *Inner speech: New voices* (pp. 276–298). Oxford University Press.

Morin, A., Duhnych, C., & Racy, F. (2018). Self-reported inner speech use in university students. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, 32(3), 376–382.

Murray, D. (1968). Articulation and acoustic confusability in short-term memory. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 78(4, Pt.1), 679–684.

Nalborczyk, L., Longcamp, M., Bonnard, M., Serveau, V., Spieser, L., & Alario, F.-X. (2023). Distinct neural mechanisms support inner speaking and inner hearing. *Cortex*, 169, 161–173.

Nedergaard, J. S. K., Christensen, M. S., & Wallentin, M. (2023). Mind over body: Interfering with the inner voice is detrimental to endurance performance. *Psychology of Sport and Exercise*, 68, Article 102472. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2023.102472>

Nedergaard, J. S. K., Wallentin, M., & Lupyan, G. (2023). Verbal interference paradigms: A systematic review investigating the role of language in cognition. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, 30(2), 464–488.

Oppenheim, G. M., & Dell, G. S. (2010). Motor movement matters: The flexible abstractness of inner speech. *Memory & Cognition*, 38(8), 1147–1160.

Perrone-Bertolotti, M., Rapin, L., Lachaux, J.-P., Baciu, M., & Lövenbruck, H. (2014). What is that little voice inside my head? Inner speech phenomenology, its role in cognitive performance, and its relation to self-monitoring. *Behavioural Brain Research*, 261, 220–239.

Perry, L. K., & Lupyan, G. (2014). The role of language in multi-dimensional categorization: Evidence from transcranial direct current stimulation and exposure to verbal labels. *Brain and Language*, 135, 66–72.

Racy, F., Morin, A., & Duhnych, C. (2020). Using a thought listing procedure to construct the general inner speech questionnaire: An ecological approach. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 33(4), 385–405.

R Core Team. (2022). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing* (Version 4.1.3) [Computer software]. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. <https://www.R-project.org>

Roebuck, H., & Lupyan, G. (2020). The Internal Representations Questionnaire: Measuring modes of thinking. *Behavior Research Methods*, 52(5), 2053–2070.

Rosson, B., & Pourtois, G. (2004). Revisiting Snodgrass and Vanderwart's object pictorial set: The role of surface detail in basic-level object recognition. *Perception*, 33(2), 217–236.

Soloducha, A. (2020, March 6). What it's like living without an inner monologue. *CBC News*. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/inner-monologue-experience-science-1.5486969>

Tian, X., Zarate, J. M., & Poeppel, D. (2016). Mental imagery of speech implicates two mechanisms of perceptual reactivation. *Cortex*, 77, 1–12.

Vicente, A., & Martinez-Manrique, F. (2016). The nature of unsymbolized thinking. *Philosophical Explorations*, 19(2), 173–187.

Wallace, G. L., Peng, C. S., & Williams, D. (2017). Interfering with inner speech selectively disrupts problem solving and is linked with real-world executive functioning. *Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research*, 60(12), 3456–3460.

Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade, A. R., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA*, 104(19), 7780–7785.

Zeman, A. Z., Della Sala, S., Torrens, L. A., Gountouna, V. E., McGonigle, D. J., & Logie, R. H. (2010). Loss of imagery phenomenology with intact visuo-spatial task performance: A case of 'blind imagination.' *Neuropsychologia*, 48, 145–155.