



The role of states in U.S. immigration: A study of population dynamics and subnational immigration laws

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ABSTRACT

Legislative action on issues of immigration emerged prominently across and within US states throughout the 2000s. The emerging literature on this topic demonstrates the political motivations driving anti-immigrant laws that negatively impact the mobility of Hispanic/Latino and Foreign-born populations across US states. Considerable research identifies the political mechanisms driving restrictive state-level immigration policies. Despite the growth of this scholarly work, the impact of these laws within states requires further study. This paper broadens the approach to the study of restrictive state-level omnibus immigration laws (OILs) using a rich dataset to uncover the effects of these laws on compositional change for undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations from 2005 to 2017. Using a quasi-experimental design, I show that by passing omnibus immigration laws, states shape demographic patterns of Foreign-born populations. Specifically, I find that states that pass omnibus immigration laws experience a decrease in undocumented and Foreign-born populations relative to states that did not pass similar laws. Effects are estimated each year after the passage of OILs, providing additional insight into the temporal impact of omnibus immigration laws on the settlement patterns of these groups. I conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of the multiple interior immigration law and policies, specifically at the state level, and their salience in shaping population dynamics across the United States.

1. Introduction

Subnational immigration laws rose precipitously across the interior of the United States in the early 2000s. Although studies of migration and mobility are dominated by the international migration perspective (Massey 1999), scholars argue for breaking the rigid conceptual and empirical divide between international and internal migration to better understand patterns of human mobility (Ellis et al., 2016). Indeed, internal migration patterns have important implications when examining socio-economic indicators such as economic gains for migrants (Hall 2009) and life-course outcomes and spatial and community processes (Coulter et al., 2016, Ellis et al., 2016). Less attention, however, is given to the myriad of subnational immigration policies impacting migration and population change for groups including Hispanic/Latino and foreign-born populations across US States. The emerging literature on this topic demonstrates the political motivations and mechanisms driving anti-immigrant laws (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2015). Despite the growth of scholarly work, a dearth of empirical research examining the impact of these laws have within states exists. Burgeoning literature is only now uncovering the role of subnational—specifically state-level—immigration policies play in shaping secondary

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migration patterns of individuals (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2017; Ellis et al., 2014). This paper builds from this approach by focusing on restrictive state-level omnibus immigration laws using a rich dataset to uncover the effects of these laws on compositional changes for undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations from 2005 to 2017. The primary focus of this paper is on the impact of *interior*, or subnational, immigration laws on population change across US States.

Using a quasi-experimental design, I show that by passing omnibus immigration laws states shape demographic patterns of foreign-born populations across states. Specifically, I find that states passing omnibus immigration laws experience a decrease in undocumented and foreign-born populations relative to states that did not pass similar laws. Findings are robust across a series of sensitivity tests controlling for social networks. Additional temporal analyses estimate the impact of omnibus immigration laws on settlement patterns for the primary variables of interest each year after the laws were passed. I conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of the multi-faceted make-up of interior immigration law and policies in the US, specifically at the state-level, and their salience in shaping mobility across the United States.

Omnibus immigration laws (OILs) are restrictive U.S. subnational immigration enforcement laws that shape how states integrate or restrict the rights of immigrants. Some of the earliest literature on these laws defines them as single bills combining three or more provisions related to immigration (Laglaron et al., 2008). This study expands that definition to include a bill, or a series of bills, enacted in one year that address immigration across multiple domains, including increased local law enforcement activity on immigration matters, limiting the use and access to identification documents for undocumented individuals, and reducing access to the benefits of state public services for undocumented populations. These laws are intended primarily to restrict the rights of undocumented immigrants; however, there is uncertainty regarding potential concomitant effects for other population groups with varying legal statuses (Allen and McNeely 2017; Ellis et al., 2016; Pedraza and Zhu 2015). Indeed, an estimated 16.7 million individuals live in the same household with at least one family member who does not have legal status (Mathema 2017). Research asserting that Latino populations avoid states with hostile immigration policies is based in part on the existence of such “mixed-status families” (Ellis et al., 2016).

Literature on the devolution of immigration law since the mid-1990s is robust (Wells 2004; Varsanyi 2008, Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2015; García, 2019). Although federal law dictates the criteria for obtaining legal residency, subnational localities have an important role in shaping outcomes for immigrants across the country (Ellis 2006). Scholarship finds a dynamic trend within national immigration policymaking, such as its unpredictable and malleable implementation and the critical role local governments play when responding to the needs of immigrant communities (Wells 2004; Mollenkopf and Pastor 2016; de Graauw and Els and Vermeulen, 2016; Huang and Liu, 2018; de Wilde et al., 2021). Trends associated with increased subnational immigration enforcement and regulation are also implicated in the neoliberal rescaling of what membership policy and citizenship mean in the United States (Ellis 2006; Varsanyi 2008). Indeed, county governments are influenced by the racialization of immigration discourse when deciding to adopt labor market regulations from 2004 to 2014 (Visser and Simpson 2019). The multifaceted make-up of interior, sub-national, immigration laws and policies warrant further study.

Conventional theory on the determinants of migration do not account for changes in immigration laws to understand immigrants' migratory patterns. A “missing element” in explaining Mexican-U.S. migration is the “self-interested bureaucrats, politicians, and pundits” who mobilize political and material support to influence immigration (Massey, 2015). Moreover, scholars argue for breaking the rigid conceptual and empirical divide between international migration and internal migration to better understand patterns of human mobility (Ellis et al., 2016). Indeed, internal migration patterns have important implications when examining life-course outcomes and spatial and community processes (Coulter et al., 2016, Ellis et al., 2016). Research also points to underlying inequities in US immigration laws that significantly affect individuals' migration decisions (Ryo 2013). While population change has two components, the natural increase or the excess of births or deaths and net migration or the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants (Rowland 2003), compositional net change is the main dependent variable measure for this study. Based on these logics, variation in OILs across states should increase the likelihood of compositional changes, specifically for undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino population groups.

The influence states have on almost every aspect of individuals' lives is decisive yet understudied (Montez et al., 2019; Robertson 2017). In addition to their role in socio-economic and demographic outcomes for individuals, states also legislate access to a range of resident services, including healthcare, licensing, and education. States also shape the rights and services available to immigrants through dynamic local laws and policies. For example, states that provide in-state resident tuition policies reduced the likelihood of Mexican foreign-born non-citizens from dropping out of high school by eight percentage points (Potochnick 2014). Moreover, examining the scope and consequences of the sustained increase in the number of state-level restrictive OILs enacted in the US is paramount (Morse 2020). Research must advance from examining why states pass these laws, to consider how these laws shape the lives of those living under them (Jimenez et al., 2021).

Substantial research has identified many reasons for the proliferation of restrictive state-level immigration policies (Boushey and Adam, 2011; Chavez and Provine, 2009; Commins and Wills 2017; Cornelius 2010; Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2015; Zingher 2014). A dearth of empirical research examines the impact these laws have within states. Research on health effects represents the largest body of extant literature in this area (Philbin et al., 2018, Martinez et al., 2013). Surveys of Latinas/os find a decrease in the probability of respondents reporting optimal health (Vargas et al., 2017) and mental health outcomes (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2017) in states with restrictive immigration laws. Scholars who assert the immigrant social determinant of health thesis (Castañeda et al., 2015) find these laws restrict immigrants' access to services and may contribute to geographic disparities in accessing health care for Latinas/os and their children (Philbin et al., 2018; Allen and McNeely, 2017; Pedraza and Zhu, 2015; Hardy et al., 2012). Understanding how immigration laws affect individuals is of critical importance to many issues related to social groups, such as public health (Philbin et al., 2018), yet the extent to which these laws affect certain populations is not completely understood.

This paper extends existing literature in several ways. First, I build a dataset from multiple sources to construct robust estimates of the undocumented population in the U.S. To date I find no study utilizing such data to examine how state-level laws like OILs shape migration patterns. Second, I build on nascent literature examining the influence and significance of subnational hostile immigration state-level laws on key populations living in the United States. I focus this analysis on a period during which subnational immigration laws and policies rose precipitously across localities and states. Findings from this paper provide important insights to understand patterns of internal, or secondary, migration of immigrant and likely immigrant groups. With a focus on the compositional change within key populations, I augment past research by emphasizing the importance of understanding subnational laws and the effects they can have on immigrant groups (Ellis et al., 2016; Hall 2009). Moreover, this study urges continued research of the multi-jurisdictional and patchwork approach to immigration policymaking within the interior of the US. By centering analysis on the subnational context, specifically states, this research advances empirical evidence in understanding and conceptualizing the devolution of immigration law and policies.

The next section presents empirical and theoretical concerns to understand how subnational immigration laws influence population change, specifically in consideration of migration. Thereafter, I discuss the analytical strategy employed to conduct this study. I combine longitudinal estimates of the undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations linking key sources across economic, legal, and demographic variables for all 50 states and the District of Columbia from 2005 to 2017. Employing a quasi-experimental design, I leverage fixed effects across time and space to estimate population changes of three demographic groups. Lastly, I test the effects of OILs each year after initial passage. I conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of the multi-faceted make-up of interior immigration law and policies in the US and their salience in shaping mobility across the United States.

2. Background

2.1. Subnational immigration laws and migration

Most research examining the effects of immigration policy on migration focuses on international migration near border states (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2017; Massey and Capoferro 2008.) Other research finds that federal changes in immigration law since the 1986 passage of IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 1986) and the 1996 passage of IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 1996) are significant events that influence mobility patterns of immigrants and increasing state-level involvement in immigration law (Orrenius and Zavodny 2003; Kerwin 2018). Ryo (2013) finds that individuals respond to perceived inequities underlying U.S. immigration policy when deciding to migrate into the country. However, U.S. states began to play an increasingly significant role in contemporary immigration policymaking within the United States in the early 1990s (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2015). For example, despite the inclusion of the 287(g) provision² in the federal IIRIRA legislation, it was only after 2001 that the first jurisdictions in the nation implemented the program (Kerwin 2018). Indeed, the 9/11 attacks dramatically increased funding and institutional and public support for immigration enforcement and terrorist-related concerns inside and out side US borders. This paper asserts that the early 2000s mark a meaningful and sustained shift in subnational immigration law within the United States that continues unabated.

Subnational immigration policymaking became salient at the turn of the twenty-first century when local communities expanded their response to managing immigrants and immigration. For example, Fig. 1 illustrates the precipitous rise of state-level immigration initiatives since 2005. This new immigration federalism highlights the power of states to shape their response to increasing immigration-related issues. Despite the notable shift in subnational immigration-related law and policies, the myriad local responses to immigration within jurisdictions is less understood (see Fig. 2).

Note: This figure includes cumulative counts by year for all types of laws enacted within US states, both restrictive and protective, related to immigration and immigrant issues. This figure does not account for passed resolutions related to immigration and immigrant issues.

Important considerations surface when examining the sharp increase in state-level immigration policies during the first two decades of the 2000s. First, this was a period of significant economic and demographic changes across the country and within states. From 2007 to 2009 the global economy witnessed a Great Recession. The United States doubled its long-term unemployment rate during this eighteen-month economic upheaval (Song and von Wachter 2014). This global financial crisis had a more profound impact on the movement of individuals worldwide than any other economic downtown since the migration era of post-World War II (Fix et al., 2009). Annual flows from Mexico to the United States from 2006 to 2009 dropped nearly 50% in unauthorized immigration (Fix et al., 2009). Another factor contributing to the decreasing composition of the undocumented immigrant population is the unprecedented increase in deportation rates over the study period, peaking in 2013 with 433,000 individuals deported in that year alone.³ Moreover, more Mexicans left than arrived in the US with a documented decline in Mexican net immigration in 2010 and 2011 (Passel et al.,

² Section 287(g) of the INA allows the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enter into formal written agreements (Memoranda of Agreements) with state or local law enforcement agencies and deputize selected state and local law enforcement officers to perform certain functions of federal immigration agents. The program has evolved since its initial inception including the termination of two types of 287(g) agreements (the “task force” and “hybrid” model) in 2012 due to mounting concerns over immigrants and police-community relations and the growth of the Secure Communities program. American Immigration Council (2021). “The 287(g) Program: An Overview.”

³ Pew Research Center. U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips to Lowest Level in a Decade. November 27, 2018. <https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2018/11/27/u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-total-dips-to-lowest-level-in-a-decade/>.




Fig. 1. Total Enacted US State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, 2005-2017

SOURCE: National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL), annual reports on State Immigration Laws, 2005–2017, compiled by author (n = 4526). <https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx>.



Fig. 2. States with omnibus immigration laws (OIL) since 2005.

2012).

Despite the marked decrease in international migration, a 2013 study finds a “perceived immigrant threat” narrative associated with the Great Recession that exacerbated anti-immigrant sentiment across 22 countries (Kwak and Wallace 2018). Various administrative actions, executive decisions, and presidential orders helped address the perceived concerns of immigration and immigrants in the United States.⁴ While immigration advocates continued to push for a comprehensive immigration reform package for the millions of undocumented immigrants living in the United States, a profound and sustained increase in mass deportations occurred. From 2009 to 2016, more than 3 million individuals were deported from the United States, more than any other time in US history.⁵ These events increased anti-immigrant hostilities and sentiments and contributed to the upsurge in subnational restrictive immigrant legislation, such as OILs.

Existing literature examining subnational laws focuses the empirical lens on understanding the impact of laws within single states (Ellis et al., 2014; Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2017; Schildkraut et al., 2019; Morse 2020) or a single restrictive subnational policy, such as localities with a 287(g) policy (Watson 2013). One study creates an index of hostility in states to determine to what extent environments generally affect migration across various demographic groups (Ellis et al., 2016). Other studies addressing similar ‘attrition through enforcement’ policies use a comparative approach and find no connection between specific hostile subnational immigration policies and migrants’ decisions to stay in the United States (García, 2013). Although such literature provides insight on the overall context of anti-immigrant or restrictive policy climates, this study takes a different approach by isolating expansive and wide-reaching laws and their potential impact on migratory patterns of demographic groups across all US states.

⁴ Rather than seeking to improve immigrant reception and integration as national priority, President Obama’s immigration agenda focused primarily on refining its enforcement priorities resulting in the greatest number of removals by any US president to date.

⁵ Cato Institute. *Deportation Rates in Historical Perspective*. September 16, 2019. <https://www.cato.org/blog/deportation-rates-historical-perspective>.

Understanding the impact hostile state-level subnational laws have on immigrant groups can provide insight into secondary effects on other demographic groups not targeted by the legislation. For example, studies find that anti-immigrant hostilities affect other populations, specifically Hispanic/Latino populations, and their internal migration patterns in the United States (Ellis et al., 2016). The limited research on this topic finds a sustained and significant impact on migratory patterns in Arizona after the state passed the 2008 Legal Arizona Workers Act (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano, 2017; Ellis et al., 2014). Foreign-born, non-citizen Hispanic/Latino groups were significantly likely to out-migrate from Arizona, while foreign-born Hispanic/Latino citizens were not significantly likely to do the same (Ellis et al., 2014). Another study found indications that U.S.-born Hispanic/Latino groups did out-migrate, likely because this group is particularly sensitive to feelings of alienation in Arizona, a state that has adopted a markedly hostile stance toward immigrants and Latinos, relative to its neighbor New Mexico (Schildkraut et al., 2019).

Foreign-born populations may also be responding to such increasingly hostile subnational immigration policies. Prior research finds a sustained out-migration of non-citizen, foreign-born individuals away from Arizona after the state passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) in 2008 (Ellis et al., 2014). The same study found no significant out-migration effect of foreign-born, U.S.-citizen Latino populations and only some LAWA-induced migration responses from U.S.-born Latinos after the passage of the law; however, this response was not sustained (Ellis et al., 2014). Past research establishes the role of economics in driving foreign-born migratory flows, yet less is known to what extent states' policies attract or deter migrants. Although OILs have an intended impact on the non-legal, non-citizen population, the present study examines to what extent OILs have concomitant effects when considering compositional changes in other likely immigrant groups, such as foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino populations.

2.2. How do OILs shape population change for immigrant groups?

Beginning in the early 1990s, immigrant settlement patterns within the United States shifted from traditionally receiving states such as California, New York, and Illinois to distinct and smaller locales termed "new destinations" (NASEM, 2017; Singer 2004). Foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino populations remain heavily concentrated in traditionally receiving states even while these locations experienced a 3.4 percent point decline in newcomers arriving since 2000 (Ellis et al., 2016). The reasons behind these shifting patterns of migration are well studied yet predominately focus on immigrant migration patterns upon the *initial* arrival to the United States. Secondary patterns of migration, or decisions to migrate after immigrants have settled in the United States, also contribute to understanding the economic and social impact of internal immigrant mobility (Hall 2009).

Past analysis of immigrant interstate migration patterns point to varying motivations to explain why both immigrant and native populations migrate. Social network theory argues that the concentration of immigrant populations in a specific locality helps explain current migrant flows (Gurak and Kritz 2000). Additional studies point to local economic conditions in sending and receiving communities, including unemployment and labor demands, as indicators for immigrants to relocate (Borjas and George, 1999; Harris and Todaro 1970). Research also documents how demographic and human capital attributes such as educational attainment and ambition for work will also affect immigrant mobility patterns (Feliciano 2005, Portes and Rumbaut, Rubén, G., 2006). Structural and economic interpretations that help explain interstate migration patterns find that variation in occupational licensing accounts for only a small decrease in interstate migration of workers (Johnson and Kleiner 2020). In contrast, relatively little research exists on the importance of policy and laws in shaping population and demographic patterns for immigrants.

Another challenge when examining the changing demographic patterns among immigrant populations is the lack of accurate data on undocumented populations. Until recently, precise estimates of the undocumented population were unavailable (Warren and Warren 2013). For example, Good (2013) finds that non-citizen/foreign-born individuals arriving to the US after 1982, whom he proxies as undocumented, show evidence of outflows in response to state-level immigration laws. The concern here is that non-citizen foreign-born population estimates will naturally inflate the undocumented population as this category includes individuals with legal permanent residency and temporary visas, such as students and temporary workers. This study addresses this data constraint in prior literature by utilizing more accurate measures of the undocumented population.

Notwithstanding, the salience of subnational immigration policy cannot be overstated. Burgeoning migration literature considers the impact of immigration policy on individuals' motivations to migrate. Yet, the US does not have one immigration policy that governs the entire nation, rather a patchwork of immigration policies within the interior of the country. State-level immigration policy has been afforded less attention in scholarly literature on demographic patterns of immigrants. This omission in the literature is unsurprising since much of immigration law is adjudicated at the federal level. In contrast, scholars also argue the importance of examining regional and local differences and legal policy when considering changes in demographic composition (Hall 2009). This line of scholarship argues that state-level analysis may mask critical variability found within states and localities. However, the magnitude of recent state-level activity on immigration law over the last two decades is significant. Moreover, although local-level policies are salient in the everyday lives of residents living and working in these jurisdictions, states maintain legal supremacy over local governments affording them the power to set and enforce changes in immigration law (Jimenez et al., 2021). However, a patchwork of immigration policy is dynamic and local jurisdictions still matter. Disentangling how this context of reception affects immigrant demographic patterns and individuals living proximate to them, such as the Hispanic/Latino population, remains understudied.

3. Data and methods

To isolate the effect of OILs on population change, I build a novel dataset drawing from multiple sources across all 50 states and the District of Columbia over a thirteen-year period from 2005 to 2017 ($n = 663$). Data are compiled for all variables of interest from the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), and the American Community Survey (ACS). The

unit of analysis for this study is state-year. I include additional state-level economic and policy control variables from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the US Census, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, the US Department of Homeland Security, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, and the Immigrant Legal Resource Center.

3.1. Population and compositional changes of key demographic groups

Three demographic groups are the focus for this study: the undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations. As noted, OILs primary attempt to regulate the undocumented population, yet theory points to a potential effect on other populations (Ellis et al., 2014). To capture this potential effect, this study also measures changes in the foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino population drawing on the American Community Survey (ACS) and Center for Migration Studies (CMS) estimates.

Estimating the undocumented population change presents several unique challenges, including the lack of available census data on individuals with legal or non-legal immigration status (Warren and Warren 2013). One study (Good 2013) utilizes “demographic narrowing” techniques to isolate non-citizen, undocumented populations, specifically individuals who are noncitizen/foreign-born and arrived in the US after 1982. To improve accuracy when measuring undocumented populations in states, this study relies on a basis residual method for identification developed and analyzed in previous research (Warren and Warren 2013).

In the absence of reliable census counts, analysts utilize residual methods for estimating undocumented populations. Estimates begin with the total foreign-born population. ACS counts then subtract out reported counts of legal residents, emigration estimates, individuals forcibly removed from the country through deportation, adjustments for those who gained legal status, and mortality rates. Additional statistical corrections are completed to address overestimation (Warren and Warren 2013). This method builds upon prior estimates to ensure a smaller sampling error range than those from the Pew Hispanic Center and the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics, both of which also utilize residual methods.

There are several advantages with respect to using CMS estimates for the undocumented population considered in this study. First, the accuracy of their counts provides a strong indicator to conduct robust long-term trend analyses. Notably, CMS estimates account for annual net change for the undocumented population, including both inflows and outflows. Another advantage is that CMS uses data from the ACS rather than the CPS (Current Population Survey), the latter of which may yield greater ranges of sampling error due to its small sample size. Finally, CMS disaggregates estimates within all states, which is the central unit of analysis for the present study.

3.2. Omnibus immigration legislation

To assess whether a state passed an OIL, I first examine all state immigration laws compiled by and publicly available from the National Conference of State Legislatures, whose data captures all legislation introduced, passed, and enacted related to immigrants and immigration since 2008. To verify and supplement these records, I draw on Allen and McNeely (2017), which provides a systematic review of enacted OILs. I isolate only legislation considered to be an OIL, which means a state must pass a bill (or a series of bills in one year) that address immigration across multiple domains. This selection criteria expands the definition of an OIL by including states that pass a series of immigration-related bills in one year. Such legislation includes elements related to increasing law enforcement activity, limiting access to identification documentation for undocumented individuals, and/or limiting access and provisions for undocumented populations to state public services. In addition, the legislation must be explicitly restrictive toward immigrants, in particular undocumented individuals. Fig. 2 illustrates a map of states that passed OILs during the study period.

I code a dummy variable indicating the state-year an OIL is passed and maintain this code throughout the study period.⁶ Five states repeatedly passed OILs over the period of this study. For example, Georgia was the first state to enact an OIL in 2006 and then passed another in 2010. For states that passed OILs in multiple years, the binary code remains consistent through the length of the study period.

3.3. State-level controls: economic and policy considerations

Numerous important characteristics will theoretically induce compositional changes within states over time. Although the fixed effect model controls for state aspects that, stable over time, could generate and attract individuals, I consider additional, varying state-level characteristics, including economic- and policy-relevant changes. Economic characteristics such as unemployment rates and housing values serve as economic indicators for this analysis and have an important role in state-level demographic composition changes (Ellis et al., 2016). To measure unemployment, I utilize Bureau of Labor Statistics annual state-level unemployment rates and the US Census median housing value.⁷ Unemployment rates assist in identifying income-related economic characteristics while median housing values account for expense-related economic variation, potentially mediating population changes.

Accounting for local and federal immigration policies unevenly implemented across states and over time is critical. Early work on the potential factors driving local immigration policies emphasize the geographical and localized nature of these variegated policies (Walker and Helga, 2011). Moreover, these policy changes may influence how states respond to immigration and enforcement of immigration within their jurisdictions, independent of whether a state enacted an OIL. Research points to county-level decreases in

⁶ This study examines the year that an OIL was passed, rather than enacted. For most states these dates are the same; however, some states may enact an OIL six months after passage.

⁷ Median housing values are identified for each year from the US Census 1-year ACS estimates from 2005 to 2017.

Hispanic/Latino noncitizen populations when restrictive policies are enacted, relative to neighboring counties that do not pass similar legislation (Capps et al., 2011). Following the logic that tougher and more restrictive measures will impact population changes in localities where such policies are adopted, jurisdictions passing more immigrant-friendly ordinances and policies will likely attract more immigrants. Sanctuary city policies are local-level initiatives meant to promote a pro-immigrant, welcoming environment for immigrants. Therefore, the most salient policy considerations to consider when analyzing demographic changes in states is local 287(g) policies and sanctuary city policies.

This study compiles all 287(g) agreements in place from 2005 to 2013 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).⁸ Many of these agreements are initiated at a unit of analysis smaller than state-level, thus I account for the total number of agreements in place within each state in two ways. I create a weighted value for the total number of agreements by population size. I run different models to assess the 287(g) measurement: 1) as a binary variable the state-year when at least one 287(g) agreement was enacted and 2) as a population weighted value for all the policies in place over the study period. This study uses the latter weighted measure in the final analysis.

Finally, I account for the presence of sanctuary policies within states over the study period. A sanctuary policy is a local level ordinance that explicitly limits any government official from cooperating with the federal government to enforce immigration laws. I compile this list from two sources: the Federation for American Immigration Reform and the Immigrant Legal Resource Center. Both organizations document existing sanctuary policies in place across the country, including jurisdictions and date of enactment.⁹ I compile and cross-reference each source to confirm accuracy of the presence of these policies. Similar to 287(g) agreements, I develop two measures: a binary variable in a state if at least one sanctuary policy was in place and a weighted variable accounting for state population size covered by sanctuary policies in place in the state and across years. Findings presented in this study use the weighted sanctuary policy variable.

3.4. Analytical strategy

Using a quasi-experimental design, I exploit incidents from 2005 to 2017 when twelve states variably pass an omnibus immigration law. Using a fixed effect model, I seek to uncover to what extent the passage of OILs in specific states affects demographic compositions for the undocumented, foreign-born, Hispanic/Latino populations. I draw on past research that uses longitudinal data and state-level fixed effects models to better represent changes in population composition (Eason 2010, Light and Thomas, Julia., 2021). I estimate a set of pooled fixed-effect regressions comparing state characteristics before and after the passage of omnibus legislation. I adjust for state-specific period changes to control for any influence on population changes in states that pass an OIL in comparison to states that do not pass an OIL over the study period. The fixed effect model is ideal for this study for several reasons. First, the model controls for time-invariant characteristics, such as relative population size, climate, physical amenities, and other fixed and unobserved data (Wooldridge 2013). Second, this study design also controls for all uniform state characteristics that may influence key variables, including federal-level changes in law and policy such as immigration enforcement priorities and presidential executive orders.¹⁰

Several questions motivate the study. Are these policies inducing undocumented populations to migrate away from states with an OIL relative to states that do not pass one? Is there a concomitant, or more precisely a “chilling” effect among documented individuals, specifically foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino population groups? Do economic or policy characteristics mediate any identified compositional changes in these populations over the study period? Finally, are non-linear decreases in these populations evident one, two, or nine years after an OIL is enacted? To address these questions, I test the following hypotheses.

1. The passage of a state-level omnibus immigration legislation in states from 2005 to 2017 will have significant negative effect on a) the foreign-born, b) Hispanic/Latino and c) the undocumented population relative to states that do not pass an OIL.
2. Economic characteristics within states will likely have a positive effect on changes in population for identified groups within states that pass an OIL relative to states that do not, likely reducing the impact of OILs in states.
3. Immigration policies will have a positive (sanctuary city policies) or negative (287(g) policies) effect on demographic compositional changes in states that pass an OIL relative to states that do not.
4. The estimated impact on the compositional change as measured by percentage change of key demographic groups will increase within states (that pass an OIL) the first year after passage of an OIL legislation.

To test these hypotheses, I estimate the following regression equation for this study¹¹:

$$DEMOG_{X|SY} = \alpha + \beta_1 OIL_{(SY)} + \beta_2 ECON_{(SY)} + \beta_4 POL_{(SY)} + \delta STATE + \sigma YEAR + \varepsilon$$

⁸ In 2013, President Obama stopped directly funding 287(g) and subsumed the program under the Secure Communities program, thereby requiring all (more than 3000) counties in the United States to comply with mandatory fingerprinting, which I argue is a form of severe punishment. Although municipalities can still opt-in to the 287(g) program, Secure Communities took over the cooperation with the federal government and local governments.

⁹ Additional validation of these data including web searches of relevant articles and actual policy documentation for each agreement in place. I thank Julia Low-Chappell for compiling these data.

¹⁰ Several important federal level immigration changes occurred over the study period, such as the 2012 implementation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) as well as President Obama’s changes in priorities for removal of undocumented individuals in 2011.

¹¹ Three separate models are run for each demographic group (DEMOG).

Table 1

Descriptive statistics for all variables across all states, OIL vs. Non-OIL, 2005–2017.

	All States (51)			OIL States (12)			Non-OIL States (39)			Source
	N	Mean	sd	N	Mean	sd	N	Mean	sd	
<i>Percent of total population</i>										
Foreign-born	663	8.81	6.05	156	7.77	3.97	507	9.13	6.53	ACS: 1-year
Hispanic/Latino	663	10.58	9.91	156	12.79	10.62	507	9.90	9.58	ACS: 1-year
Undocumented	663	2.44	1.75	156	2.97	1.56	507	2.28	1.77	CMS
<i>Economic Variables</i>										
Housing Value	663	2.04	0.97	156	1.57	0.46	507	2.18	1.04	US Census
Unemployment Rate	663	6.01	4.60	156	6.20	2.14	507	5.96	2.14	US Census
<i>Policy Variables</i>										
287(g) Agreement	663	0.51	0.49	156	0.60	0.46	507	0.48	0.49	ICE
Sanctuary City Policy	663	0.48	0.50	156	0.29	0.45	507	0.54	0.50	ILRC & FAIR

Note: Number of states in parenthesis.

Abbreviations: sd = standard deviation; ACS = American Community Survey, 1-year estimates; CMS = Center for Migration Studies; ICE = Immigration and Customs Enforcement; ILRC = Immigrant Legal Resource Center; FAIR = Federation for American Immigration Reform.

Composition is the steepest during the first five years after the initial implementation of the legislation and does not return to pre-OIL legislation levels in the seven years following implementation.

Whether a state passed an OIL in a particular year is indicated in the year and state the OIL is enacted.¹² I run three models, one for each demographic group (*DEMOG*) as the primary dependent variable. Economic variables (*ECON*) include employment and housing measures. The weighted policy variables (*POL*) account for the presence of 287(g) agreements and sanctuary policies in place in states at the time of an enacted OIL. The fixed effect model will account for state-invariant factors that vary by state (*STATE*) and time-invariant factors varying over time (*YEAR*) and are entered into the specification linearly and additively. Additional analyses estimate the impact of an OIL on migration of each demographic group after the first year of implementation across states. I assign values of *dif* + 1 for each year after the first year of an enacted OIL, assigning the base category as all state-years with no enacted OIL (See Table A).

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive and event history analyses

From 2005 to 2017, twelve US states passed omnibus immigration legislation.¹³ Each of these states vary in their socio-demographic characteristics. There are, on average, more people in non-OIL states than in OIL states. The percentage of the undocumented population, slightly higher in OIL states than in non-OIL states, ranges from a low of 0.98 percent in Missouri, to nearly 7 percent of Texas' population. State-level economic characteristics are generally less favorable in OIL versus non-OIL states. The mean unemployment rate is greater, and the mean housing value is lower in OIL states relative to non-OIL states. The proportion of Hispanic/Latino population is greater in OIL states compared to non-OIL states; however, approximately 1.4 percent fewer foreign-born reside in OIL states relative to non-OIL states. The average year of passage of an OIL over the study period is 2011. I examine the top ten states with the highest percent change in immigrant population and find 50 percent of OIL states have the highest percent increase in their immigrant population from 2000 to 2010. The top two states with the greatest percent change in immigration population, Alabama and South Carolina, respectively experienced 92.1 percent, and 88.4 percent increase in their immigrant populations over the study period.¹⁴

OIL states have greater percentages of undocumented populations at the start of the study period relative to non-OIL states, trending toward no difference at the end of the study period. OIL states have greater percent reduction of undocumented individuals compared to non-OIL and all states from 2005 to 2017. Table 2 provides descriptive information for each state that passed an OIL over the study period. All states show that the percentage of the undocumented population across each state decreases over the study period with the greatest variability in Arizona. At the time of passage of an OIL, all states see a decreasing percent change in their undocumented population immediately following the year of passage.

Next, I turn to a series of event history analyses to document the changes for each demographic group when states passed an OIL. This series of tests support the parallel trends assumption required for the subsequent fixed effects estimation models. Figs. 3–5 illustrate the results of these tests between the passage of an OIL and the primary variables of interest. Specifically, I examine the changes in the undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations five years prior to enacting OILs and approximately six years after the passage of the legislation. Fig. 3 shows that in the first year after the enactment of OILs, a drop in the composition of undocumented individuals occurred. States that pass an OIL exhibit an average reduction of half a percentage point in the first year

¹² I also code and analyze the variable at the time the bill was enacted; results are similar and available upon request.

¹³ See Table 2 for each year a state passed an OIL during the study period.

¹⁴ Analysis utilized data from Migration Policy Institute (MPI) tabulation of data from the US Census Bureau, the 2010 and 2018 American Community Surveys (ACS), and the 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census.

Table 2

Descriptive statistics of variables for OIL states and Non-OIL states, 2005–2017.

State	Year of passage	Undocumented (%)	Hispanic/Latino (%)	Foreign- born (%)	Total Population	Unemployed (%)	Mean Housing Value	First 287(g)	First Sanctuary policy
AL	2011	1.45	3.44	3.21	4,748,479	7.08	1.22	2003	–
AZ	2010	4.46	30.18	13.92	6,539,529	6.75	1.94	2005	2014
CO	2006	3.59	20.66	9.88	5,132,561	5.59	2.55	2007	2005/2014
GA	2010	3.78	8.58	9.59	9,825,896	7.07	1.57	2007	2014
IN	2011	1.54	5.87	4.59	6,475,713	6.62	1.25	–	–
MO	2009	0.98	3.52	3.77	5,975,315	6.81	1.39	2008	–
NE	2009	2.23	9.09	6.27	1,833,225	4.68	1.31	–	2014
NC	2015	3.33	8.18	7.40	9,550,534	7.08	1.53	2006	–
OK	2007	2.33	8.78	5.41	3,755,527	4.95	1.13	2007	–
SC	2012	1.87	4.75	4.58	4,647,091	7.49	1.38	2007	–
TX	2017	6.69	37.62	16.42	25,600,000	5.72	1.34	2008	1997
UT	2011	3.33	12.76	8.24	2,814,266	4.56	2.20	2008	2013
# of States		Undocumented (%)	Hispanic/Latino (%)	Foreign- born (%)	Total Population	Unemployed (%)	Mean Housing Value		
Non-Oil States	39	2.28	9.90	9.13	5,741,363	5.96	2.18		
OIL States	12	2.97	12.79	7.77	7,241,666	6.20	1.57		




Fig. 3. Event analysis for average percentage change of undocumented population.




Fig. 4. Event analysis for average percentage change of foreign-born population.

after implementation. The drop in population.

Fig. 4 illustrates similar trends in the undocumented population for changes in the foreign-born population. In the first two years after the implementation of an OIL, there is a marked decrease in the foreign-born population in states that pass OILs. After this initial drop, the percentage of foreign-born remains below pre-OIL levels until year six after implementation. The change in the Hispanic/Latino population after OIL implementation follows comparable trends with a decrease in the population during the first two years after the passage of an OIL (Fig. 5); however, the trends for Hispanic/Latino populations later diverge relative to the undocumented and foreign-born populations. After an initial drop in Hispanics/Latinos after enactment of OILs, the group starts to rebound, increasing slightly after year two. In contrast, the foreign-born population remains stagnant until year six, and the percentage of the undocumented population steadily decreases.

4.2. Fixed effects results

I employ a series of nested models testing population shifts of three demographic groups in states that pass OILs from 2005 to 2017 relative to non-OIL states. Each model accounts for potential exogenous variables that can influence population shifts in states. For brevity, I provide results from the final full model in Table 3.¹⁵

Accounting for neoclassical migration theory, I include state-level economic indicators, including unemployment rates and median

¹⁵ Estimation results from all nested models are available upon request.




Fig. 5. Event analysis for average percentage change of Hispanic/Latino population.

Table 3

Estimation results of OILs on percent changes in undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations, 2005–2017.

Variables	(1) UNDOCUMENTED		(2) FOREIGN-BORN		(3) HISPANIC/LATINO	
	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.
First Passage of OIL	-0.231***	[-0.332 to -0.130]	-0.341***	[-0.490 to -0.192]	-0.0820	[-0.249 - 0.0849]
State Unemployment	-0.0131	[-0.0350 - 0.00889]	-0.00643	[-0.0387 - 0.0258]	0.0451*	[0.00886 - 0.0813]
Mean Housing value	0.379***	[0.273-0.485]	-0.0193	[-0.175 - 0.137]	-0.463***	[-0.638 to -0.288]
287(g) agreement	-0.0158	[-0.135 - 0.104]	-0.00782	[-0.184 - 0.168]	0.0643	[-0.133 - 0.262]
Sanctuary Policy	-0.333***	[-0.451 to -0.215]	0.226*	[0.0519-0.400]	0.701***	[0.506-0.896]
Constant	1.957***	[1.702-2.212]	8.240***	[7.865-8.616]	9.596***	[9.175-10.02]
Observations	663		663		663	
R ²	0.284		0.559		0.846	
# of States	51		51		51	
State FE	YES		YES		YES	
Year FE	YES		YES		YES	

Abbreviations: b = regression coefficient; c.i. = 95% confidence interval.

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

housing values. In addition, because states and localities respond to immigration changes within states variably and over time, the final nested model includes relevant immigration policies that are implemented across and within states heterogeneously. As described earlier, these immigration policies range between restrictive policies, e.g., 287(g), and protective policies, e.g., sanctuary policies. These subnational immigration laws and policies are variably enacted within and across states and localities. Next, I provide the results for each of these explanatory variables.

Recall, I hypothesize that the passage of an OIL will induce population changes for all three groups in states with an OIL relative to non-OIL states from 2005 to 2017. Each model results in an interesting mix of significance and non-significance across all variables. The r-squared improves when examining across model (1) to model (3). Approximately 28 percent of the variation in changes in the undocumented population are explained by this model. Model 3, measuring changes in the Hispanic/Latino population, is higher at approximately 85 percent of the variation in changes for this population explained by the model. Not surprisingly, the r-squared measured in model 1 is not nearly as strong as models 2 and 3. This discrepancy in r-squared across models is most likely due to greater measurement error in the CMS estimates of the undocumented population. Data from the ACS is a more precise population measure than the residual estimation used to measure the undocumented population. These analyses include both state- and year-fixed effects with state-fixed effects soaking up most of the variation and pointing to the importance of the state in explaining most of the variation for population changes. Meanwhile, these models find a significant negative change in the undocumented and foreign-born population in states that pass an OIL relative to states that do not pass an OIL.

In states that pass an OIL, I find a significant impact on changes in the undocumented population relative to states that did not pass an OIL over the study period. Specifically, I find a 0.231 percentage decrease of the undocumented population in states that pass an OIL relative to the undocumented population in states that did not pass similar legislation. These results show that the passage of OILs in states has a statistically negative impact on the population of undocumented individuals over the study period. Although these results show a relatively small overall percentage change, the total number of affected individuals is striking. For example, in Texas, the state with the largest number of undocumented individuals among all OIL states, these findings predict an average reduction in the State's

undocumented population by 360,360 to 418,318 undocumented individuals over the study period.

States with increasing unemployment and the likelihood of a 287(g) agreement find a nonsignificant decrease in the undocumented population over the study period. Surprisingly, results point to a significant decrease of the undocumented population in states with sanctuary policies. This finding may be due to a potentially strong presence of sanctuary policies already in place throughout states prior to 2005, which may attenuate the impact of any new additional sanctuary policy enacted during the study period. This study also finds evidence that states with increasing housing values see a statistically significant increase in the undocumented population. This finding supports research connecting the positive correlations between immigration and the economy. Specifically, immigrants support the economy by forming new businesses, paying taxes, and raising business productivity. Undocumented immigrants may indeed be overrepresented in certain industries, i.e., construction, which may correlate with higher home values. Indeed, research points to evidence that positive inflows of immigration into an area is associated with increases in rents and housing values (Mussa et al., 2017).

As for the foreign-born population, I find a statistically negative impact in states that pass OILs relative to states without similar legislation when accounting for both state- and time-fixed effects. Specifically, these models find a negative 0.341 percentage change in the composition of foreign-born population in the states that pass an OIL relative to states that do not. Although this is a relatively small percentage change, it translates to large total numbers of individuals affected by these types of laws. Here, I estimate a reduction, for example, of approximately 338,130 foreign-born individuals in Arizona, a state with a proportionally large foreign-born population relative to the total population over the study period.

This outcome controls for all economic and policy indicators potentially influencing population changes of foreign-born individuals. States with increasing unemployment, housing value, and the likelihood of a 287(g) agreement find a nonsignificant decrease in the foreign-born population over the study period. Finally, there is a positive association between the passage of a sanctuary policy and the foreign-born populations in this model.

The final model (3) addresses the impact of an OIL on the change in the percentage of Hispanic/Latino population of each state. Estimates from this test diverge from the prior findings by showing no significant effect of the passage of OILs in the full model, yet a negative effect is also evident. When considering the nested models¹⁶ for this population, the direction of the effect changes from positive to negative after controlling for year-fixed effects. This finding illustrates that the Hispanic/Latino population may not be affected by these types of laws in ways similar to other immigrant populations, which indicates that the Hispanic/Latino population cannot be considered a homogenous and unlikely to respond similarly to anti-immigrant legislation.

There is a positive and significant association between unemployment, additional sanctuary policies and the percentage of Hispanic/Latino population in this model. There is a nonsignificant, positive association between the presence of a 287(g) agreement and the Hispanic/Latino population. Finally, I find a negative and significant association between housing value and the Hispanic/Latino population over the study period. This finding points to evidence that Hispanic/Latino populations may be more economically disadvantaged and likely to live in communities that have lower housing values.

Using a standard OLS fixed effect model, this study thus far assumes a linear effect of the passage of an OIL; however, changes in policy may have differential effects each year after the law remains in effect. Extant research examining the impact of these laws rarely considers how anti-immigrant policies, such as OILs, may affect compositional changes of immigrants after the initial passage of an OIL. Next, I turn to analyses examining how the passage of an OIL may affect groups differentially one to nine years thereafter.

To test the effects of OILs over time, I estimate the change in the proportion of all population groups during each year post implementation of an OIL relative to states-years with no OIL legislation. The results of these estimates, shown in Fig. 6, illustrate an increasing negative effect of an OIL for each year after its initial passage. Generally, population composition steadily drops each year post-passage of an OIL for all groups analyzed in this study, with steep drops after year nine of the legislation. Specifically, this study estimates that for the undocumented population there is a significant decrease in its population from approximately the second to eighth year after initial passage of OILs. Foreign-born populations begin to see significant reductions in year three after initial passage of an OIL legislation. Finally, despite a drop in the Hispanic/Latino populations in states each year after passage of an OIL, the decrease is not statistically significant at 0.05.

Findings from this study illustrate mixed results when examining secondary impacts of these laws over time on populations not directly targeted by OILs and decisive findings for the undocumented population. Undocumented and foreign-born populations are affected significantly by the passage of OILs in states relative to non-OIL states. There is a clear drop in the percentage of undocumented and foreign-born populations in states that pass an OIL over the study period. In addition, both these demographic groups exhibit significant change in population in OIL states each year after implementation. Similar to undocumented populations, foreign-born populations experience a statistically significant reduction in states that pass an OIL relative to states that do not pass similar legislation over the study period. Findings diverge for Hispanic/Latino populations, estimating a non-significant reduction in this population over time relative to states with no OILs. These findings provide support for concomitant effects on mobility patterns of foreign-born populations and a non-significant negative trend for the Hispanic/Latino populations away from OIL states relative to non-OIL states.

Results indicate sustained significant reductions in the undocumented and foreign-born populations each year after states initially pass an OIL. These findings buttress past research by asserting that subnational immigration laws, as measured by state-level restrictive laws, do in fact affect compositional changes of undocumented and foreign-born individuals. Finally, when considering results for the

¹⁶ Results for the nested model estimation results are available upon request.




Fig. 6. Percent change of each demographic group by year after OIL is enacted.

Notes: A darkened marker denotes significance at a .05 significance level ($p < 0.05$), $N = 663$. See Appendix, [Table A](#) for related regression table used to produce this figure.

Hispanic/Latino populations, I find mixed results. Although there is a decrease in the Hispanic/Latino population in OIL states with respect to non-OIL states and when measuring these results each year after initial passage, these reductions are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval ($p < 0.05$). Findings from this study assert that the Hispanic/Latino population group is a complex and diverse population. This ethnic group cannot simply be examined as a monolith; a nuanced approach is required when examining this heterogenous population. Future research should account for citizenship status and social and familial composition.

4.3. Sensitivity analysis

An important consideration regarding the determinants of immigration is social capital theory (see [Palloni et al., 2001](#) for study on networks and social capital theory). Social capital is a set of intangible resources that promote development for a group or individual by possessing a network of mutual acquaintance and recognition ([Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992](#)). These network effects help explain the likelihood of an individual or group to settle in new destinations by understanding the conditions that are shared by the individual in the group in the receiving local. Given the importance of understanding how social networks impact population changes, further consideration is warranted to account for these potential confounders.

The human capital explanation of social capital theory posits that an individual's "migratory behaviors are correlated because they share *common characteristics and constraints* that influence the expected net return to migration, and, hence, the likelihood of its occurrence" ([Palloni et al., 2001](#), pp. 1265). Given the importance of social networks, I use fixed effects estimators which allow for significant leverage by focusing on within-unit changes while controlling for time- and state-invariant variables that could potentially confound this relationship in a state-level analysis ([Allison 2005](#)). I measure human capital networks through the relative population change over time and place for each group. However, demographic patterns of immigrants did fluctuate during the study period of this analysis most notably in 2010 and 2011 ([Passel et al., 2012](#)). I run a series of sensitivity analyses to test to what extent the presence of human capital in states may lead to spurious findings of omnibus immigration laws influencing compositional changes in the previous analyses.

Following [Palloni et al. \(2001\)](#), I rerun the models to include a range of demographic control variables to measure the social network effect on changes in population. For each model in the main analysis, I control for the percentage of undocumented, foreign-born, or Hispanic/Latino populations. I then run four additional models controlling for each network group individually, together, and then as an interaction for each of the three models in the main analysis. For example, when measuring the change of the undocumented population, I use four additional model specifications ([Table 4](#)) including controlling for: the percent foreign-born population (Model 1); percent Hispanic/Latino (Model 2); percent foreign-born population and percent Hispanic Latino (Model 3); and the interaction between foreign-born population and Hispanic/Latino (Model 4). I run similar tests for foreign-born ([Table 5](#)) and Hispanic/Latino ([Table 6](#)) populations. I report the results of these tests in the next section.

4.3.1. Results from sensitivity analyses

[Table 4](#) provides the regression results for each of these sensitivity tests. These tests find that social networks are highly salient for constructing the models in the present analysis. Moreover, I find the pattern of results from these alternate specifications mirror those from the main analysis. By controlling for human capital variables, these robustness tests show that social network only slightly

Table 4

Estimation results of OILs on percent changes in demographic group accounting for human capital networks. Undocumented Population.

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.
OIL	-0.145**	(-0.240 to -0.049)	-0.237***	(-0.338 to -0.137)	-0.131**	(-0.221 to -0.040)	-0.177***	(-0.261 to -0.092)
Foreign-born Pop	0.253***	(0.202–0.304)			0.341***	(0.288–0.393)	0.468***	(0.413–0.523)
Hispanic/Latino Pop			-0.0782**	(-0.127 to -0.0298)	-0.198***	(-0.245 to -0.151)	0.0193	(-0.041 - 0.080)
Interaction FBxHis/Lat							-0.0111***	(-0.013 to -0.0089)
Constant	-0.126	(-0.608 - 0.355)	2.708***	(2.179–3.237)	1.051***	(0.517–1.585)	-0.535	(-1.119 - 0.050)
Observations	663		663		663		663	
R-squared	0.383		0.296		0.448		0.527	
# of States	51		51		51		51	
Covariates?	YES		YES		YES		YES	

Abbreviations: b = regression coefficient; c.i. = 95% confidence interval.

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

attenuates the magnitude of my initial findings. However, the direction and significance of the findings are unaffected.

Turning to findings from the undocumented population for these additional tests, I find that after including controls to account for human capital in States, undocumented populations still exhibit a reduction in their population in states that pass an OIL relative to states that do not pass similar laws. This holds true across all four models. As expected, social networks attenuate this effect, however the significance and direction the coefficients mirror the analysis from the main study.

I examine the coefficients of human capital measured by the 1) percent change in the foreign-born population (b = 0.253; p < 0.001); 2) percent change in the Hispanic/Latino population (b = -0.0782; p < 0.01); 3) percent change of both foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino population (b = 0.341; p < 0.001 & b = -0.198; p < 0.001, respectively); and 4) percent change of both foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino population and the interaction of foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino population (b = 0.468; p < 0.001 & b = 0.0193; non-significant & b = -0.0111; p < 0.001). These results illustrate that human capital effects are significant for most measures in the model with a positive association with foreign-born and undocumented populations and a significant negative association between undocumented and Hispanic/Latino populations. This surprising finding is likely a result of the passage of OILs and the negative impact on the undocumented individuals. These findings, similar in direction and significance to the main analysis, illustrate that although social networks do matter, they do not eclipse the importance of states passing omnibus immigration laws on the compositional patterns of undocumented populations relative to states that do not pass similar laws.

Sensitivity tests for foreign-born populations exhibit similar findings as the undocumented population. That is, after controlling for human capital, foreign-born populations still show a reduction in population in states that pass an OIL relative to states that do not pass similar laws. This pattern is replicated across all four human capital models. Although human capital attenuates this effect, the significance and direction of the coefficients mirror the analysis from the main study. Finally, turning to Hispanic/Latino population sensitivity tests results show that variables controlling for human capital are significant, positively for foreign-born populations and negatively for the undocumented population. The impact of OILs largely remains negative and statistically insignificant across all the models.

Overall, I find that social networks do matter significantly when measuring population change for undocumented, foreign-born and

Table 5

Estimation results of OILs on percent changes in demographic group accounting for human capital networks. Foreign-born Population.

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.
OIL	-0.312***	(-0.449 to -0.175)	-0.215**	(-0.355 to -0.0743)	-0.162*	(-0.286 to -0.0387)	-0.218***	(-0.335 to -0.101)
Undocumented Pop			0.547***	(0.437–0.657)	0.632***	(0.535–0.730)	0.118	(-0.0277 - 0.264)
Hispanic/Latino Pop	0.352***	(0.286–0.418)			0.401***	(0.342–0.460)	0.300***	(0.240–0.360)
Interaction							0.0294***	(0.0229–0.0359)
Constant	4.866***	(4.145–5.587)	7.170***	(6.760–7.580)	3.154***	(2.462–3.845)	4.169***	(3.482–4.857)
Observations	663		663		663		663	
R-squared	0.627		0.620		0.708		0.742	
# of States	51		51		51		51	
Covariates?	YES		YES		YES		YES	

Abbreviations: b = regression coefficient; c.i. = 95% confidence interval.

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

Table 6

Estimation results of OILS on percent changes in demographic group accounting for human capital networks. Hispanic/Latino.

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.
OIL	0.0691	(-0.0870 - 0.225)	-0.131	(-0.300 - 0.0372)	-0.00732	(-0.156 - 0.142)	-0.0348	(-0.186 - 0.116)
Foreign-born Population	0.443***	(0.360-0.526)			0.576***	(0.492-0.661)	0.528***	(0.430-0.625)
Undocumented Population			-0.213**	(-0.345 to -0.0812)	-0.528***	(-0.653 to -0.404)	-0.694***	(-0.902 to -0.487)
Interaction							0.0130	(-2.02e-05 - 0.0260)
Constant	5.946***	(5.160-6.733)	10.01***	(9.522-10.50)	5.880***	(5.134-6.625)	6.340***	(5.465-7.214)
Observations	663		663		663		663	
R-squared	0.870		0.849		0.884		0.885	
# of States	51		51		51		51	
Covariates?	YES		YES		YES		YES	

Hispanic/Latino population, yet they do not support the conclusion that there is a spurious effect when measuring OILs on compositional change in the main analyses. While there are many ways to conceptualize and measure social networks, these sensitivity results further buttress the general findings from the main analysis. Future research may consider theories on economic motivations and social capital theory including family joint decision-making to maximize family resources and minimizing risk to diverse household income and worker productivity. Finally, selection effects are an important mechanism when considering network effects. Social and economic variables may interact to influence an individual's choice to migrate resulting in selection effects unobserved in the current data.

5. Discussion

Subnational immigration laws seek to manage and address real or perceived concerns regarding immigration within the interior of the US. Omnibus immigration laws are significant because of their expansive scope in both geography (across US states and localities) and in purpose (restrictive of rights, services, and movement while seeking to punish certain immigrant groups). Existing research is scant and has yet to fully uncover the impact of interior immigration laws and policies. The most salient research in this area takes a refined examination of the historical, institutional, legal, political, and racial differences at the subnational level. This study finds that OILs have negative effects on compositional changes for the undocumented, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino populations from 2005 to 2017 relative to states without these laws. These changes are statistically significant for the undocumented and foreign-born population. Concomitant effects of OILs are evident for immigrant populations in general; however, there is less evidence of compositional change for Hispanic/Latino populations across OIL states relative to states without these laws.

This study also highlights the importance of expanding the normative conceptual and empirical approaches throughout most of migration literature. By emphasizing the significance of interior immigration enforcement policies and practices, and specifically across states, my findings support past scholarship arguing for additional research in the domain of internal migration to expand understanding of migrant mobility patterns (Ellis 2012). Migration studies can benefit from this deepened look at internal migration patterns and the laws and policies influencing subnational mobility to expand the empirical and theoretical linkages with international migration. Findings from this paper add to the burgeoning literature on the importance of subnational immigration policy in helping to explain internal and residential mobility (or immobility) patterns of immigrant groups. Specifically, accounting for state-level policies is critical when considering a range of outcomes for individuals, including immigrants. Although theoretical research in this area is burgeoning, it remains understudied.

In addition, this study provides interesting sociological and demographic considerations for scholars examining Hispanic/Latino populations and their responses to restrictive anti-immigrant state-level legislation. Findings from this study diverge from prior literature on the impact of anti-immigrant laws and policies on Hispanic/Latino populations. Despite showing negative trends away from states with OILs, results were not statistically significant, which indicates that Hispanic/Latino populations are not responding to restrictive laws in the same ways as other immigrant groups. These results assert that the Hispanic/Latino population is a diverse and complex ethnic group. Future research examining how laws and policies differentially affect Hispanic/Latino populations should, for example, account for familial and individual dynamics such as mixed-status households. Household income and employment status may also elucidate differences within this heterogeneous population. Moreover, individual characteristics such as race, nativity, and gender are important when examining Hispanic/Latino populations. Researchers must be attuned to the complexity of the Hispanic/Latino population when examining the impact of immigration policies and mobility.

Insights from this study have important implications for demographers, social scientists, and policymakers. Both healthy and uncertain economies require robust participation by its workforce. Many research studies find that immigration benefits US workers. Indeed, economists assert that the future of the immigrant workforce will become increasingly central to the US economy (Bahar et al., 2022). When comparing descriptive trends between OIL and non-OIL states, I find that states enacting this punitive legislation exhibit higher unemployment rates and lower housing values over the study period. States with increasingly restrictive immigration policies such as OILs will likely continue to bear an increasing economic burden as they experience decreases in their immigrant population. Indeed, states with OILs are generally less robust economically than states that do not pass similar laws over the study period. Social science research would do well to focus on how state-level immigration laws impact a range of health and educational outcomes for immigrants and their social networks (Allen and McNeely, 2017; Potochnick 2014).

Although the findings presented in this study are robust across additional statistical specifications, there are limitations to this work challenging the true causal relationship between state level-immigration policies and demographic compositional changes. First, I use annual population estimates from the American Community Survey as a proxy to estimate mobility. These estimates are more vulnerable to sampling error than 3- or 5-year ACS estimates, thereby likely causing underestimation bias for some coefficients in the models. Moreover, sampling error in yearly estimates may be exacerbated in states that have very small foreign-born populations, such as Montana. Additionally, despite using data on the undocumented population that to date is the most accurate estimations available, measurement error continues to be a salient concern. Evident when comparing the r-squared values across models in the present study, ACS models perform better than models using CMS data as the main variable of interest.

Additionally, using state-level estimations may also limit a precise picture of mobility patterns for individuals. Research on immigrant populations point to important regional and local differences that should be considered when examining demographic composition and geographical variances within localities (Hall 2009). Examining variation within states can provide clues on an individual's migration decisions within a given state. For example, although an OIL is a state-level law, municipalities enact them variably. Thus, there may be interesting in-state differences that could help us understand to what extent these policies and laws are influencing migration decisions for individuals. For example, the Great Recession of 2008 affected certain industries differently, and undocumented and foreign-born populations may be overly represented in those industries. Controlling for industry-specific changes

of unemployment for each demographic group will assist in providing evidence in future research on the magnitude of the impact across economies, industries, and restrictive policies. Despite these limitations, this study provides an initial understanding of aggregate state-level effects of omnibus immigration laws on the changes in key population groups and the unit of analysis is appropriate for this study. Moreover, my findings provide an important baseline to support further research in this area.

Through rules and regulations, states play a crucial role in legitimizing access to tangible benefits for individuals living within their jurisdictions. The arbitration of state laws, often appearing neutral and objective, is constructed based on a range of categories reflecting dominant political and economic interests (Menjívar 2023). This paper takes a critical approach by providing theoretical justification to center the role of the subnational in U.S. immigration matters. OILs legislate social exclusion within immigrant and undocumented communities living in their jurisdictions. Menjívar (2023) argues that this legal abandonment creates an “anti-category” or groups of individuals who are “ignored, underestimated, and neglected” (12). As such, these laws have significant implications for the welfare and health of all residents, citizens, and non-citizens alike and shape individuals’ lives on a routine basis (Menjívar and Abrego, 2012). Omnibus immigration laws represent a growing threat of anti-immigrant, restrictive state policy and create a hostile environment for many immigrants. This paper advances theoretical and empirical contributions on the salience of these hostile subnational laws and policies in issues of immigration. Future research should examine subnational variations in immigration laws and the heterogeneity of the Hispanic/Latino population. The multifaceted makeup of interior immigration law and policies, specifically at the state level, is essential when examining overall population dynamics for immigrants in the United States.

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Appendix

Table A
Estimation Results each year after OIL passage by group.

Variables	(1) Undocumented		(2) Foreign-Born		(3) Hispanic/Latino	
	b	c.i.	b	c.i.	b	c.i.
1 year after OIL passage	-0.0515	[-0.222 - 0.119]	-0.128	[-0.363 - 0.107]	0.0275	[-0.266 - 0.321]
2 years after OIL passage	-0.209*	[-0.389 to -0.0297]	-0.245	[-0.492 - 0.00157]	-0.0100	[-0.318 - 0.298]
3 years after OIL passage	-0.190*	[-0.370 to -0.00904]	-0.324*	[-0.572 to -0.0761]	-0.106	[-0.416 - 0.204]
4 years after OIL passage	-0.122	[-0.312 - 0.0684]	-0.421**	[-0.683 to -0.160]	-0.199	[-0.525 - 0.128]
5 years after OIL passage	-0.233*	[-0.425 to -0.0414]	-0.466***	[-0.729 to -0.203]	-0.259	[-0.588 - 0.0697]
6 years after OIL passage	-0.274**	[-0.467 to -0.0807]	-0.563***	[-0.828 to -0.297]	-0.360*	[-0.692 to -0.0283]
7 years after OIL passage	-0.231*	[-0.435 to -0.0267]	-0.541***	[-0.822 to -0.261]	-0.425*	[-0.776 to -0.0750]
8 years after OIL passage	-0.315*	[-0.561 to -0.0689]	-0.687***	[-1.025 to -0.349]	-0.374	[-0.796 - 0.0484]
9 years after OIL passage	-0.0970	[-0.394 - 0.2001]	-0.325	[-0.734 - 0.0826]	-0.304	[-0.814 - 0.206]
10 years after OIL passage	-0.326	[-0.738 - 0.0852]	-0.803**	[-1.369 to -0.238]	-0.295	[-1.002 - 0.411]
11 years after OIL passage	-0.285	[-0.698 - 0.127]	-0.987***	[-1.554 to -0.420]	-0.396	[-1.104 - 0.312]
12 years after OIL passage	-0.712*	[-1.284 to -0.140]	-1.272**	[-2.058 to -0.486]	-0.946	[-1.928 - 0.0356]
Constant	49.04***	[36.64-61.45]	-228.2***	[-245.3 to -211.2]	-500.6***	[-521.9 to -479.3]
Observations	663		663		663	

Abbreviations: b = regression coefficient; c.i. = 95% confidence interval.

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

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