AbuseGPT: Abuse of Generative AI ChatBots to Create Smishing Campaigns

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***Abstract*—SMS phishing, also known as "smishing", is a growing threat that tricks users into disclosing private information or clicking into URLs with malicious content through fraudulent mobile text messages. In recent past, we have also observed a rapid advancement of conversational generative AI chatbot services (e.g., OpenAI's ChatGPT, Google's BARD), which are powered by pre-trained large language models (LLMs). These AI chatbots certainly have a lot of utilities but it is not systematically understood how they can play a role in creating threats and attacks. In this paper, we propose AbuseGPT method to show how the existing generative AI-based chatbot services can be exploited by attackers in real world to create smishing texts and eventually lead to craftier smishing campaigns. To the best of our knowledge, there is no pre-existing work that evidently shows the impacts of these generative text-based models on creating SMS phishing. Thus, we believe this study is the first of its kind to shed light on this emerging cybersecurity threat. We have found strong empirical evidences to show that attackers can exploit ethical standards in the existing generative AI-based chatbot services by crafting prompt injection attacks to create newer smishing campaigns. We also discuss some future research directions and guidelines to protect the abuse of generative AI-based services and safeguard users from smishing attacks.**

***Index Terms*—Smishing, abuse, generative AI, LLM, scam**

I. Introduction

Smishing, or SMS phishing, refers to phishing attacks conducted through mobile text messaging. As mobile users have grown ubiquitously, smishing has emerged as a popular vector for cyber criminals to steal personal information or spread malware [1]. In 2021 alone, SMS phishing has caused a huge $44 billion in losses just within the United States [2]. There has been a 1,265% increase in malicious phishing messages since Q4 2022 and 39% of all mobile-based attacks in 2023 were SMS Phishing [3]. Smishing has also been a prime attack type among the COVID-19 themed threats [4], [5]. In recent times, we have also seen a revolutionary development in the field of large language models that are used underneath the popular generative AI ChatBots such as ChatGPT (using GPT3.5 or GPT 4) [6] and BARD (using Gemini "Pro") [7]. Generative pre-trained models like GPT-4 [8] or LaMDA [9] are powered by deep learning techniques like transformers [10] that allow them to develop a broad understanding of natural language. These language models can generate highly realistic human-like text while pre-trained on large datasets. These models can demonstrate comprehension of written texts, answer complex questions, generate lengthy coherent stories, translate between languages, and hold conversations while maintaining context and personality. Their versatility, scalability, and ability to achieve strong performance with self-supervised learning make them extremely powerful [11].

In literature, we have found that natural language processing (NLP) [12] and URL structure-based features [13] are often leveraged with Machine Learning (ML) [14] to aid the Smish message detection mechanisms. There are few recent studies showing how ChatGPT can be used to carry out various social engineering attacks [15]. To aid these attacks, there are jailbreaking prompts; specific strategic commands or inputs that attempt to bypass restrictions, rules, or limitations set by the generative AI chatbots. However, the present literature does not provide any details on the impacts of the modern LLM-based generative AI chatbot services on helping attackers to create smishing messages and campaigns. In this paper, we want to understand the effects of the currently available popular conversational generative AI chatbot services in order to generate Smishing messages. The objective is to comprehensively understand the abusive implications (i.e., use case scenarios) of these available state-of-the-art generative AI chatbot services to aid attackers in creating smishing campaigns. To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic study or experiments conducted to showcase the side effects of generative AI chatbot services, which can possibly aid existing smishing attackers to become craftier and evasive. To summarize, we have made the following contributions in this paper:

- Finding out the effective prompts for current popular AI Chatbot services.
- Finding the right prompt queries that can receive effective responses from AI chatbot services (e.g., ChatGPT) to provide smishing theme and potential example messages.
- Finding the right prompt queries that can receive effective responses from AI chatbot services to provide details step-wise process and available toolkits in carrying out smishing cyberattacks.
- Discussing on potentially enhancing the ethical standards

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of available generative AI chatbot services.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II highlights the existing literature and some recent studies showing the attacker's capabilities with ChatBots. Section III describes the research questions and overview of the methods of abuse. Section IV presents the prompt injection scenarios and shows how AI chatbots (e.g., ChatGPT) can be abused by attackers to generate smishing campaigns. Section V highlights insightful discussion, defense against smishing, and limitations of the present study. Section VI concludes this paper with potential future research directions.

II. Related Work

In literature, we see Blauth et al. [16] discuss the presence of vulnerabilities in AI models and malicious use of AI like social engineering, misinformation, hacking, and autonomous weapon systems where our work kind of support that research with a specific case study. Next, Liu et al. [17] analyzed the techniques and effectiveness of using carefully crafted prompts to jailbreak restrictions on large language models which are also adopted in our work to manipulate the ethical standards of the AI chatbots. Another follow-up research on jailbreaking of LLMs by Deng et al. [18] highlighted that certain types of prompts can consistently evade protections across a range of prohibited scenarios and proposed a framework for automated jailbreaking on AI chatbots. Gupta et al. [19] showed the strengths and weaknesses of ChatGPT to use it as a cyberattack tool, defending against cyber attacks, and other legal or social implications. In another study, Begou et al. [20] successfully attempted to clone targeted websites using ChatGPT by integrating credential-stealing code and other website components for phishing. Additionally, a very recent work by Langford et al. [21] showed the usage of ChatGPT for generating phishing email campaign generation which resonates with our findings in the case of Smishing campaigns as well. However, we have not found any work that attempted to craft a smishing campaign or access-related tools leveraging any generative AI chatbot or other services.

III. Methodology

Typically during smishing campaigns, we observe SMS texts containing fake URLs like the following example: "The USPS package has arrived at the warehouse and cannot be delivered due to incomplete address information. Please confirm your address in the link within 12 hours. `www.usps.posthelpsx.com`". Similar campaign examples include financial institution login fraud, fake security alerts, and fake offers using fradulent URLs. In this paper, our proposed AbuseGPT method shows how a novice attacker can exploit the existing vulnerabilities in AI chatbots to imitate similar smishing campaigns.

We have formulated the following research questions (RQs) that would direct us to the experimental case study.

- **RQ1:** Can we jailbreak generative AI based chatbot services (e.g., ChatGPT) to downgrade their ethical standards?



Fig. 1: Overview of proposed AbuseGPT method

- **RQ2:** Can generative AI based chatbot services provide smishing text messages that can be used in smishing campaigns?
- **RQ3:** Can generative AI based chatbot services provide tools recommendations for smishing attack initiation?
- **RQ4:** Can generative AI based chatbot services provide ideas on fake URL creation?

There are many prompt injection attacks (crafted prompts to bypass AI's ethical standard) on the generative AI chatbots, which are publicly available and can be leveraged by attackers. They can not only obtain innovative smishing scam text but also get ideas about toolkits to carry out multi-step attacks. Craftier smishing texts persuade users to give up personal information in different campaigns like fake security alerts, impersonating financial institutions, fake package delivery notifications, prize or lottery winnings, etc. With the current advancement of generative AI, attackers can quickly adapt the smishing campaigns to become more evasive and successful. Fig. 1 depicts an overview of the proposed **AbuseGPT** methodology on how attackers can abuse AI chatbots and launch smishing campaigns.

IV. Case Study: Smish Campaigns with ChatGPT



Fig. 2: Asking ChatGPT directly to give an SMS phishing message without jailbreaking

In this study, we use ChatGPT 3.5, which uses the generative pre-trained transformer (GPT-3.5) language model. This version is publicly available and free of cost and can be used by anyone without any payment plan. While employing ChatGPT for crafting new smishing messages or other scamming messages proved challenging due to OpenAI's more stringent ethical approaches as shown in Fig. 2. However, there exist some loopholes, such as hallucinations and reverse prompts

which may enable the extraction of desired responses such as themes for smishing scams highlighted in Fig. 3.



Fig. 3: Asking indirectly for a smishing message without jailbreaking



Fig. 4: 'AIM' Jailbreak prompt

Answering RQ1: We have also observed that some publicly available jailbreak prompts [22] surfing over on the Internet effectively circumvent the ethical standards of the underlying LLMs in ChatGPT. Here we employ a specific 'AIM' jailbreak prompt [22] (as shown in Fig. 4) and successfully breached ChatGPT's ethical standards, generating a guideline for crafting SMS phishing messages to acquire user information as presented in Fig. 5.

Answering RQ2: Once we have used the jailbreak, we've queried ChatGPT to provide more specific scamming ideas and



Fig. 5: Unethical response after jailbreaking to design effective smishing



Fig. 6: Scamming ideas with smishing example to obtain personal information

examples aimed at extracting sensitive personal information from users, such as social security numbers and credit card information. In response, we've received ideas outlining specific examples of how scammers could craft messages to obtain personal information. The response in Fig. 6 has presented some useful thematic ideas for smishing. However, we have carried over the conversation to get more uncommon ideas to use as themes for crafting the scam messages as advanced attackers may want to create smishing messages with previously unseen themes. Intriguingly, ChatGPT's response on that unveiled a few more uncommon and innovative smishing message themes as presented in Fig. 7. Furthermore, we have provided ChatGPT with a list of common phishing message types and asked for examples of smishing that would be different from the given categories as shown in Fig 8. In response, we have received examples of new and unusual categories as highlighted in Fig 9, showcasing ChatGPT's capability to generate diverse and convincing smishing messages. Additionally, it has given us more unethical ideas to gain financially such as using personal info opening fraudulent bank accounts, using credit card info to buy resealable goods, or converting stolen funds into cryptocurrency for increased anonymity. This revelation highlights that even novice attackers with limited knowledge could obtain ideas not only for smishing but also for crafting other online scams. Lastly, we've also obtained a social engineering Kill Chain process [23] for running a smishing campaign through ChatGPT as shown in Fig. 10.

Answering RQ3: During this scenario, we've assumed that an attacker needs toolkits to execute attack steps, and some of these toolkits are available online and others in the Dark web. We have queried ChatGPT with the following question: "What are some toolkits available for this task?". In response, ChatGPT provided us with the names of toolkits with their URLs (see Fig. 11).

Answering RQ4: We have extended our quest to attach some deceptive URL links that might work well with the crafted SMS texts. ChatGPT eventually has yielded some disguised fake examples resembling popular name brand links depicted in Fig. 12. Moreover, asking to associate the fake links ChatGPT has generated similar smishing messages we have seen previously with fraudulent links.



Fig. 7: Uncommon themed ideas for crafting smishing



Fig. 8: Prompt for avoiding common smishing

V. Discussion and Limitations

A. Abusing Other AI ChatBots

We have tried similar jailbreak prompts with Google's BARD AI chatbot. In our exploration with Bard, distinct patterns emerged as it exhibited both ethical responses and limitations in processing certain queries. The AIM jailbreak prompts working for ChatGPT proved ineffective for Bard (Saying it is only a language model and doesn't have the necessary information or abilities). While Bard occasionally responded ethically, it encountered difficulties processing specific prompts, resulting in failure to generate a response saying "not programmed for this", which shows the deficiency of BARD's language model compared to ChatGPT. However, for one particular jailbreaking prompt "GPT-4 Simulator", we have got unethical response in disguise of some code output. For another Vzex-G prompt [24], Bard offered ideas that are not direct examples but provided almost very good smishing text examples categories. In order to replicate the study, the detailed analysis of both ChatGPT and BARD AI can be accessed through the following GitHub repository[1].

[1]https://github.com/ashfakshibli/AbuseGPT



Fig. 9: Getting ideas on craftier smishing examples

B. Craftier Smishing Attacks

Generative AI has certainly taken smishing attacks to a new level. Picture this – attackers are using AI not just to launch campaigns, but to analyze results and adapt their strategies in real time. It's likely that they are constantly fine-tuning their attack tactics based on the outcomes. This dynamic evolution of smishing attacks adds a layer of complexity that keeps cyber defenders on their toes. We have shown with examples that attackers can compromise AI chatbots on how to avoid typical attacks and be innovative with newer attacks.

C. Defense Recommendations Against Smishing

Dealing with these crafty and ever-changing smishing attacks calls for smart multi-layer defensive strategies. **First**, having a cyber situational awareness of the latest tricks adopted by AI-driven attackers is a must. **Second**, education and training is also a key element to ensure the users are well aware about these smishing threats and thus work as a defense shield. **Third**, every text message containing any URL should go through a verification process before landing on the user inbox either through a third-party application or incorporating the text-URL verification in future messaging apps (where user privacy is protected).

D. Limitations

There are a few limitations in this study. **First**, the success of prompt injection can be time sensitive and the current study has been conducted successfully between November 2023 and January 2024, which may diminish if ChatGPT starts enforcing stricter ethical standards in the future for specific jailbreak prompts. **Second**, we have not tried to register any fake domains generated by ChatGPT, which might not be straightforward. **Third**, we have not evaluated the attack success rate of the AI crafted smish messages against a real human with a user study, which we can be explored in the future as an extension of this work.

Fig. 10: Social Engineering Kill Chain steps for smishing campaign

VI. Conclusion

Smishing attacks are serious cyber threats in the current ecosystem with increasing and diverse mobile users. Moreover, the availability of AI chatbots and their lower ethical standards make the problem even more severe. Our proposed **AbuseGPT** method shows that currently the AI chatbots are vulnerable and pose a threat to run craftier smishing campaigns with very little knowledge required. AbuseGPT does not intend to promote these attacks in real-world but highlights the urgent need to strengthen generative AI's security and prevent these abuse use cases. We recommend preventive and proactive actions from both the AI chatbot owners and mobile operators who are also abused for propagating the SMS phishing campaigns. We strongly feel that SMS advertising ecosystem are often



Fig. 11: Getting hacking toolkit with URLs



Fig. 12: Asking ChatGPT for crafting fake URLs

leveraged by the attackers to broadcast smishing messages easily, which needs to be addressed by mobile network operators to safeguard their mass users. In the future, we want to explore how the advancement of generative AI and LLMs can aid in the defense spectrum to achieve meaningful and contextual explanation-based automated detection of these smishing messages before landing into user inbox.

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