

1           A Digital Twin Framework for Efficient Electric Power Restoration and  
2           Resilient Recovery in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Considering the  
3           Interdependencies with Road Network and Essential Facilities

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9        **Abstract**

10      The community's resilience in the face of natural hazards relies heavily on the rapid and efficient  
11     restoration of electric power networks, which plays a critical role in emergency response,  
12     economic recovery, and the functionality of essential lifeline and social infrastructure systems.  
13     Leveraging the recent data revolution, the digital twin (DT) concept emerges as a promising tool  
14     to enhance the effectiveness of post-disaster recovery efforts. This paper introduces a novel  
15     framework for post-hurricane electric power restoration using a hybrid DT approach that combines  
16     physics-based and data-driven models by utilizing a dynamic Bayesian network. By capturing the  
17     complexities of power system dynamics and incorporating the road network's influence, the  
18     framework offers a comprehensive methodology to guide real-time power restoration efforts in  
19     post-disaster scenarios. A discrete event simulation is conducted to demonstrate the proposed  
20     framework's efficacy. The study showcases how the electric power restoration DT can be  
21     monitored and updated in real-time, reflecting changing conditions and facilitating adaptive  
22     decision-making. Furthermore, it demonstrates the framework's flexibility to allow decision-  
23     makers to prioritize essential, residential, and business facilities and compare different restoration  
24     plans and their potential effect on the community.

25        **Keywords:** Community resilience, digital twin, disaster recovery strategies, electric power  
26     restoration, hurricanes, road network.

27        **Abbreviations:** AI: artificial intelligence; BN: Bayesian network; DBN: dynamic Bayesian  
28     network; DES: discrete event simulation; DT: digital twin; EPN: electric power network; IoT:  
29     internet of things; RN: road network; RW: repair worth.

30        **1. Introduction**

31        **1.1. Motivation and problem statement**

32 Post-hazard recovery has gained significant attention in recent years, highlighting the critical  
33 role of community resilience in effective disaster management, as it contributes to reducing losses,  
34 expediting recovery, and mitigating social and economic disruptions [1]. One key aspect of  
35 community resilience is the fast and efficient restoration of electric power, which holds immense  
36 importance for emergency response, economic recovery, and the proper functioning of essential  
37 lifeline and social infrastructure systems [2]. While the interest in community response to  
38 hurricanes dates back at least half a century [3], and despite the extensive research dedicated to  
39 enhancing the resilience of the community in general and the electric power network (EPN) in  
40 particular, the restoration and recovery of the EPN after hurricanes still face significant challenges  
41 [4]. This is mainly due to the size and complexity of the EPN, coupled with its vulnerability to  
42 natural hazards, and is further exacerbated by the deregulated nature of the profit-oriented  
43 electricity market, which provides a minimal incentive for investing in community resilience  
44 through preparedness and preplanning ([5]; [6]).

45 The main objective of post-disaster EPN recovery is to restore electricity to the maximum  
46 number of customers as fast as possible, considering their significance in maintaining community  
47 resilience [7]. Over the past decade, the reliability, hardening, and risk assessment of the EPN in  
48 the face of strong-wind hazards have been extensively studied (e.g., [8]; [9]; [10]; [11]; [12]; [13];  
49 [14]; [15]; [16]; [17]; [18]; [19]). Moreover, many studies analyzed the post-hurricane  
50 performance and recovery of the EPN and its spatial and socio-economic distribution (e.g., [20];  
51 [21]; [22]; [23]). Other studies proposed various methods to perform predictions and model the  
52 response and restoration of the EPN in the face of hurricanes. These methods can broadly be  
53 classified into two categories: (i) physics-based approaches, where hazard and fragility analysis  
54 are coupled with network analysis (e.g., [24]; [25]; [26]; [27]; [28]; [29]; [30]), and (ii) data-driven

55 approaches, which involve utilizing statistical models and machine learning (e.g., [31]; [32]; [33];  
56 [34]; [35]).

57 Physics-based methods play a crucial role in pre-hazard mitigation and preparedness, where  
58 sophisticated hazard and structural damage models are developed using numerical and finite  
59 element techniques. These methods offer strengths such as a solid physical foundation,  
60 interpretability, scenario testing capabilities, and the ability to model probabilistic and uncertainty  
61 factors. However, their static probabilistic outputs may be limited in post-disaster scenarios due to  
62 significant epistemic and aleatory uncertainties inherent in natural hazards and their interactions  
63 with structures. Furthermore, these methods often lack the capability to update prior estimates  
64 during the restoration process. On the other hand, data-driven methods rely on post-disaster reports  
65 and surveys, offering advantages in adaptability, efficiency, and handling complexities. However,  
66 they encounter challenges during immediate emergency response phases due to the time required  
67 for data collection and analysis. Moreover, the large volume of data needed is often unavailable  
68 shortly after the disaster. Therefore, an integrated framework that combines the strengths of both  
69 physics-based and data-driven methods is essential to extend the applicability of the risk  
70 assessment framework to post-disaster emergency response. This integration can facilitate  
71 adaptive decision-making and guide the restoration process effectively.

72 Amid the data revolution and the enormous advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and the  
73 Internet of Things (IoT), data-driven methods have advanced significantly, motivating researchers  
74 to expand their use to collect and analyze real-time data to generate insights into current events  
75 during and after the hazard occurrence. Therefore, the capabilities of the models can extend  
76 beyond offline (pre-disaster) predictions toward online (post-disaster) learning. This can be  
77 achieved through a digital twin (DT), which provides a virtual model integrated with the real

78 system through real-time data transfer. Hence, researchers have recently proposed visions to  
79 integrate DT in disaster management (e.g., [2]; [36]; [37]; [38]). When applied at the community  
80 level, the DT has the potential to enhance disaster management and significantly improve its  
81 resilience. By utilizing high-fidelity models and dynamic simulations that are updated in real-time,  
82 decision-makers can make informed choices based on the actual conditions and take proactive  
83 measures to mitigate the impact of disasters.

84 A DT is considered as an essential step toward smart cities [39]. A smart city DT relies on  
85 physical and other types of sensors driven by the enormous advancements in the IoT and the fifth  
86 generation of wireless systems [40]. Therefore, various studies have proposed DT frameworks for  
87 the management and operation of the EPN (e.g., [41]; [42] [43]; [44]). These methods combine  
88 the technologies of cyber-physical systems, smart grids, and the IoT to provide continuous real-  
89 time data that is used to update the initial state estimates of the network. However, these methods  
90 rely on the availability of large amounts of data and hence are suited for scenarios with limited  
91 disruptions and the availability of almost complete information. Consequently, their direct  
92 applicability in disaster management, where extensive damage is widespread across multiple  
93 lifelines and social infrastructure systems including the physical sensors, and immediate  
94 knowledge is often limited, may be constrained.

95 Therefore, a fundamental difference exists between a DT in normal conditions and the aftermath  
96 of hazards. Integrating the concept of the DT at the community level and in the face of natural  
97 hazards still faces significant challenges [45]. Since physical sensors are susceptible to damage,  
98 and the traditional data gathering methods such as customer calls and site investigations are slow  
99 and inefficient, virtual data sensing using smart technologies such as image recognition and social  
100 sensing is an alternative method that is getting traction lately ([2]; [37]). While data-driven

101 methods are essential parts of any DT as they provide the connection between the actual system  
102 and its digital replica, they require a large amount of data that is usually not readily available after  
103 the disaster. They also lack the generalization and interpretability of physics-based methods.  
104 Hence, the DT must also incorporate physics-based methods [38]. Still, most proposed DT  
105 frameworks for disaster management have mainly focused on data sensing in smart cities using  
106 social sensors (e.g., [46]; [47]; [48]; [49]; [36]). Another challenge is that the DT requires a model  
107 that is both highly detailed and computationally efficient. These are often two conflicting goals,  
108 and the DT must balance between them.

109 Recently, Braik and Koliou [45] proposed a framework for a DT of the EPN subjected to  
110 hurricanes. In their framework, a Bayesian network (BN) is utilized to generate a highly detailed  
111 network model that captures the dependencies between the various elements of the EPN. The  
112 Bayesian Network (BN) is initially constructed as a physics-based model, based on hazard and  
113 fragility analysis. It is then extended to a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) over the time domain  
114 to facilitate updating with data evidence. This approach allows for the incorporation of new  
115 information as it becomes available, enhancing the model's accuracy and reliability in real-time  
116 scenarios. The proposed DBN is a hybrid physics-based and data-driven model that is both highly  
117 detailed and computationally efficient, and therefore, extends the capabilities of predictive models  
118 from offline learning to online learning where estimates are updated using real-time data. Still,  
119 applying the DT in post-disaster recovery to guide the EPN restoration remains largely unexplored.

120 The road network (RN) plays a significant role in post-disaster power restoration [50] and must  
121 be considered in the DT. The coupling of the EPN and RN was considered in a few previous EPN  
122 restoration studies mainly through methods such as optimization (e.g., [51]) and reinforcement  
123 learning (e.g., [52]). However, these methods are better suited for normal operation scenarios

124 where large amounts of data are available. On the other hand, the physics-based methods following  
125 the risk-assesment framework rarely consider the interdependency between the EPN and the RN.

126 Hence, a significant gap is highlighted in previous studies, as there is a lack of a DT framework  
127 to guide the post-disaster restoration and repair process. Addressing this gap, this paper proposes  
128 a DT framework for EPN restoration. The DT enables adaptive decision-making, considering  
129 interdependencies between the EPN and RN. It utilizes detailed network analysis and physics-  
130 based estimates for pre-hazard preparedness, extending to post-disaster recovery by updating  
131 estimates with real-time data via DBN. The framework automates repair prioritization, accounting  
132 for uncertainties, repair times, and essential facility importance, allowing for efficient restoration  
133 and resilient recovery.

134 ***1.2. Background on digital twins and their capabilities***

135 The DT is a dynamic and interactive digital replica of a physical system, providing continuous  
136 bidirectional synchronization of real-time data. Depending on the depth of integration between the  
137 physical and digital twins, three primary modeling levels can be identified: digital model, digital  
138 shadow, and DT. A digital model serves as a static snapshot of the real system at a specific  
139 moment, lacking any further data transfer. In contrast, the digital shadow involves unidirectional  
140 data flow, transmitting information from the real system to its digital counterpart. At the highest  
141 level of integration, we find the DT, where continuous data transfer occurs in both directions. The  
142 digital replica remains continuously updated through real-time data received from the physical  
143 system, enabling it to offer feedback and simulate scenarios to support adaptive decision-making.  
144 Ultimately, the DT can fully control the physical system [53].

145 DTs can be classified based on their capabilities. The supervision and operational DT represents  
146 the lowest level, providing basic visualization and monitoring features. The simulation and

147 prediction DT surpasses this level by optimizing system performance and making predictions  
148 using algorithms and optimization techniques. Moving up, the intelligent DT incorporates machine  
149 learning techniques to learn from data in addition to the previous capabilities. Finally, the  
150 supervisory and control DT expands on all previous capabilities and encompasses decision-  
151 making. In its simplest form, human involvement is required to implement the decisions, while in  
152 its most advanced form, a fully autonomous DT is capable of making and executing decisions [54].

## 153 **2. Scope**

154 This paper proposes a DT framework for post-disaster restoration of the EPN, considering its  
155 interdependency with the RN. The scope encompasses the entirety of the DT's development  
156 process, integrating physics-based and data-driven modeling to enhance the efficiency of disaster  
157 recovery strategies. First, disaster impact assessment is addressed, incorporating data, hazard, and  
158 fragility analysis of the elements of the EPN and the RN. Then, network analysis is discussed,  
159 where the EPN is modeled utilizing the BN framework proposed by Braik and Koliou [45], while  
160 the RN is represented through an undirected graph network. A significant aspect of the restoration  
161 process is establishing a repair hierarchy sequence, where elements are prioritized based on their  
162 contribution to community resilience. Subsequently, the restoration process is analyzed,  
163 considering the interdependencies between the EPN and RN. To demonstrate the applicability and  
164 efficacy of the framework, the paper concludes with a discrete event simulation (DES) of the  
165 restoration of Galveston Island's EPN following Hurricane Ike, showcasing its practical  
166 application in guiding resilient post-disaster recovery.

## 167 **3. Methodology**

168 Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the proposed framework. Then, the methodology's details are  
169 discussed in the following sections.




Figure 1: Flowchart showing key steps of the proposed DT framework of electric power restoration.

### 3.1. Disaster impact assessment

#### 3.1.1. Data analysis

To effectively build the power restoration DT, detailed data from both the EPN and RN is required. This dataset encompasses comprehensive information about the various components within the EPN, such as substations, transmission towers, utility poles, and customers, as well as the road segments and intersections within the RN. This includes details regarding the connectivity of these elements, geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude), and essential properties necessary for fragility analysis, such as the height, diameter, age, and elevation. Then, the EPN can be modeled as a directed BN graph, while the RN can be modeled as an undirected network graph as explained in section 3.2.

#### 3.1.2. Hazard analysis

To perform accurate fragility analysis within the DT framework, a detailed hurricane model is needed with multiple simulations performed for various hurricane return periods to capture the stochastic nature of the hazard ([55]; [56]). In this paper, the Advanced Circulation (ADCIRC) and Simulating Waves Nearshore (SWAN) hurricane models generated by Darestani *et al.* [56] and obtained from Incore [57] are used to provide detailed wind, wave, and surge maximum loads for all locations within the system. However, for simplicity, a single hazard model is used per case

189 study, representing either the historical Hurricane Ike or synthetic hurricanes of various return  
 190 periods. Hence, the hazard loads are modeled as deterministic, while the uncertainty in the damage  
 191 analysis employed within the DES stems from the fragility functions, as discussed in the next  
 192 section. Future research could focus on comprehensive hurricane probabilistic analysis to enhance  
 193 the prior load estimates.

194 *3.1.3. Fragility analysis*

195 A fragility function is a mathematical model that quantifies the probability that a system or  
 196 component will reach or exceed a specified damage state given a certain level of demand. Given  
 197 hazard intensity measures, fragility functions can be used to calculate the conditional failure  
 198 probabilities of various EPN and RN elements. In this paper, the fragility functions obtained from  
 199 Darestani *et al.* [58]; Darestani *et al.* [14]; Sánchez-Muñoz *et al.* [59]; and Darestani *et al.* [56] are  
 200 utilized to calculate the probabilities of failure of wood utility poles, transmission towers,  
 201 substations, and RN segments respectively, as shown in Equations 1-4, where  $\sigma(y)$  is the standard  
 202 logistic function.  $V_W$  is the wind speed (m/s),  $\theta_W$  is the wind direction (radians),  $V_F$  is the water  
 203 velocity (m/s),  $H_S$  is the surge height (m),  $H_W$  is the significant wave height (m),  $H_p$  is the pole  
 204 height (m),  $t_p$  is the pole age (years),  $A_C$  is the conductor's effective area ( $\text{m}^2$ ),  $F$  is the flood  
 205 height (m),  $D_s$  is the distance from shore (m), and  $I_F$  is the flood duration (hours). The coefficients  
 206 ( $a_0: a_7, a_0: a_3, \gamma_0: \gamma_1, \beta_0: \beta_2$ ) can be obtained from existing literature adopted in this study (see  
 207 references above).

$$208 P_{failure-pole} = \left( 1 \right. \\ 209 \left. + \exp \left( - \left( a_0 + a_1 V_W + a_2 (H_p - H_S - H_W) + a_3 V_F H_S + a_4 V_W \sin(\theta_W) \right. \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \left. + a_5 V_W A_C + a_6 \max(t_p, 25) + a_7 H_W \right) \right) \right)^{-1} \quad (1)$$

211  $P_{failure-tower} = 1 - [1 - \sigma(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 V_W \sin(\theta_W))][1 - \sigma(\alpha_2 + \alpha_3 V_W \cos(\theta_W))]$  (2)

212  $P_{failure-substation} = \Phi((\ln(F) - \gamma_0)/\gamma_1)$  (3)

213  $P_{failure-road} = (1 + \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(D_s) + \beta_2 \ln(I_F)))^{-1}$  (4)

214 The EPN incorporates isolator elements, positioned upstream of each line, to enable isolation in  
 215 response to disruptions [60]. This has been utilized by previous studies to aggregate EPN elements  
 216 into lines (e.g., [10]; [13]). Therefore, this allows aggregating elements within a line into nodes in  
 217 the BN proposed herein. For a line of  $m$  poles or towers, each having a probability of failure  $q_i$ ,  
 218 the line's probability of failure  $P_L$  can be calculated using Equation 5 [45].

219  $P_L = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^m (1 - q_i)$  (5)

220 **3.2. Network analysis**

221 **3.2.1. EPN analysis**

222 The DBN DT framework proposed by Braik and Koliou [45] is adopted in this study. The EPN  
 223 network is modeled using a BN, where each element is assigned two nodes: a physical node  
 224 representing the physical state of the element (failed or not failed) obtained from the fragility  
 225 analysis, and a performance node representing the operational state of the element (outage or  
 226 restored). Figure 2 shows a sample DBN, where  $F$  and  $P$  stand for physical and performance nodes  
 227 respectively, while  $S, T, D$ , and  $C$  stand for substation, transmission line, distribution line, and  
 228 customers. When evidence is received about the physical state (failure or survival) of transmission  
 229 tower  $T_1$ , the probabilities of downstream nodes at time  $t_0$  ( $BN_0$ ) are updated. The updated physical  
 230 node probabilities are then passed to the Bayesian Network at the next time step  $t_1$  ( $BN_1$ ).  
 231 Similarly, if evidence is received regarding the performance state of customer  $C_3$ , the probabilities

232 of the entire  $BN_1$  are updated and subsequently passed to the next BN at time step  $t_2$  ( $BN_2$ ). This  
233 process continues, with the DBN being updated at each subsequent time step  $t_x$ .

234 The BN's ability to update prior estimates using data evidence distinguishes it from approaches  
235 such as fault-tree analysis, where node states are sampled using Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS)  
236 [61], and hence allows for extending the applicability of the risk assessment framework from pre-  
237 hazard mitigation and preparedness toward post-disaster emergency response. The first step to  
238 constructing the BN is to estimate the failure probabilities via fragility analysis. These represent  
239 the marginal probabilities of the upstream physical nodes. Then, logical dependency rules between  
240 nodes are established using conditional probability tables. Thus, the consideration of power flow  
241 is based on the connectivity of EPN nodes, given the direct link between system failure and  
242 physical damage to EPN components. For example, in Figure 2, the performance state of upstream  
243 nodes like  $PS_1$  depends solely on the state of the physical node of the same element  $FS_1$ . On the  
244 other hand, the performance state of intermediate nodes like  $PT_1$  depends on both the state of the  
245 physical node  $FT_1$  and that of the upstream performance node  $PS_1$ . Once the BN is constructed,  
246 forward propagation can be used to calculate the probability of power outage for every  
247 performance node in the network. Then, the BN can be updated in real-time using data by  
248 extending the BN toward a DBN [45]. This data can be obtained via various data sensing methods  
249 (discussed in Section 1). The algorithm for building the EPN BN and then updating the DBN with  
250 data evidence is summarized in Table 1. Details on performing forward propagation for the BN  
251 and updating the conditional distributions can be found in Darwiche [62].

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


Figure 2: Sample EPN DBN

Table 1: Algorithm for building the BN and updating the DBN

## Algorithm for building the BN and updating the DBN:

1. Input: Probabilities of physical damage to EPN elements from hazard and fragility analysis, Connectivity data of the EPN elements, data evidence  $[d_1, d_2, \dots, d_T]$  obtained at times  $[t_1, t_2, \dots, t_T]$
2. Construct the BN nodes and edges using connectivity data and build the conditional distribution tables based on logical dependencies
3. Populate the prior estimates of the upper (physical) nodes using probabilities obtained from hazard and fragility analysis
4. Perform forward propagation to calculate the outage probabilities of performance nodes conditional on physical nodes and upstream performance nodes. This will generate the prior  $BN_0$  at time  $t_0$
5. Define Function  $DBN(BN_i, d_i)$ :
6.     Update all physical and performance nodes probabilities conditional on  $d_i$  to generate  $BN_{i+1}$
7.     Return the posterior  $BN_{i+1}$
8.  $BN = BN_0$
9. for  $d$  in  $[d_1, d_2, \dots, d_T]$ :
10.      $BN = DBN(BN, d)$

255

256

## 3.2.2. RN analysis

257 The RN can be modeled using a non-directed weighted graph network, where segments of the  
 258 graph represent the edges connecting the nodes, while the time of travel between two adjacent  
 259 nodes, which can be calculated as the length of the segment divided by the average travel speed,  
 260 is the weight of the edge within the graph. Ertugay *et al.* [63] suggested reducing the estimated  
 261 travel speed in proportion to the probability of road closure, and hence, the travel time (weight of  
 262 the edge within the graph) in this paper is divided by  $(1 - P_{f-r})$  to consider the effect of road  
 263 closure following hurricanes, where  $P_{f-r}$  is the probability of failure of the road segment estimated  
 264 using the fragility functions. Moreover, as long as the road segment is flooded, the travel time is  
 265 assumed to be infinity. Hence, the travel time through any road segment, which represents the  
 266 weight of the segment's graph edge, depends on its probability of failure  $P_{f-r}$  and the flood


267 duration. This allows for estimating the minimum travel time between any two nodes within the  
268 RN [64]. Therefore, based on these assumptions and by constructing the graph network, the  
269 minimum travel time can be calculated for various states of flooding and damage to the RN  
270 segments. Then, real-time data obtained about the actual states of the segments and travel times  
271 can be used to update the physics-based estimates.

272 It is important to acknowledge that, in this framework, the initial physics-based estimates of the  
273 RN post-disaster conditions only consider the damage and flooding states. Therefore, the RN  
274 model focuses mainly on connectivity and accessibility to estimate the repair unit's ability to reach  
275 failed elements. On the other hand, the effect of the traffic flow is not considered. Up to date, most  
276 post-hazard RN proposed models use pre-hazard traffic demand (e.g., [65]; [66]). Therefore, the  
277 high computational cost of these models won't necessarily enhance the accuracy of the  
278 estimations. Recently, some studies have been proposing methods to estimate the traffic demand  
279 resulting from the evacuation process (e.g., [67]). Such models can be further enhanced if coupled  
280 with agent-based modeling (e.g., [68]; [69]; [70]). Hence, a more comprehensive RN analysis that  
281 considers both the topology and the traffic flow could be incorporated within the proposed DT  
282 framework in future studies.

283 *3.2.3. Interdependencies between the EPN and RN*

284 The interdependencies between the EPN and RN are considered by connecting each node within  
285 the EPN to its closest RN node. Consequently, when an EPN repair crew unit completes repairs in  
286 one element and needs to move to another, the travel time between these two is modeled based on  
287 the distance between the nearest pair of RN nodes. This is explained using Figure 3, where the  
288 travel time between EPN nodes E1 and E2 will be calculated using the travel time between RN  
289 nodes R1 and R2, while the travel time between E1 and E3 will be calculated using R1 and R3.

290 However, it is important to note that this paper does not account for other interdependencies, such  
291 as the impact of damaged utility poles on the RN or the consequences of traffic signal outages and  
292 it is acknowledged as a potential limitation.



293

Figure 3: Interdependencies between the EPN and RN nodes

### 295 ***3.3. Restoration modeling and repair prioritization***

296 To maximize the efficiency of the restoration process, the repair and restoration of the EPN  
297 elements during post-disaster outages follow a hierarchical process. This is consistent with the  
298 principles outlined in the literature and industry practices for power restoration in utility networks,  
299 where the priority sequence starts with repairing damaged substations and transmission towers and  
300 then distribution lines serving essential facilities. After that, repairing the remaining utility poles  
301 is based on restoring power to the largest number of customers as fast as possible ([71]; [72]; [73];  
302 [74]).

303 During post-hurricane scenarios, the assessment of utility poles becomes challenging due to their  
304 large numbers within the EPN compared to substations and transmission towers, making it harder  
305 to evaluate their significance and monitor their conditions with limited information available.  
306 Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio [72] proposed a formula to estimate the repair worth (RW) for  
307 distribution lines in the EPN as the ratio of the number of customers served by the line to the repair  
308 time required. However, this formula doesn't consider the uncertainties in the physical and  
309 performance states of the lines, and hence requires a near-complete knowledge of each line's

310 condition, which is rarely attainable in post-hurricane scenarios. Moreover, it doesn't allow for  
 311 giving different weights to customers based on their importance for community resilience and  
 312 recovery. It also does not incorporate factors such as travel time to reach the line or the accessibility  
 313 of the road segments, which are important considerations in prioritizing repair efforts and  
 314 optimizing the restoration process in post-disaster scenarios. Therefore, in this paper, a modified  
 315 RW formula is proposed, building upon the formula proposed by Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio [72]  
 316 per equation (6), where  $RW_j$  is the RW of distribution line  $j$ ,  $n$  is the total number of customers in  
 317 the system, and  $T_j$  is the total time for repair of line  $j$ , including both the repair time and the travel  
 318 time. Moreover,  $q_i$  is the probability of power restoration of customer  $i$  before the repair, and  $q_{ij}'$   
 319 is the probability of power restoration of the same customer if line  $j$  is repaired.  $q_i$  and  $q_{ij}'$  can be  
 320 calculated using the BN via the forward propagation variable elimination algorithm [45].  
 321 Therefore,  $q_i$  represents the marginal probability of restoration, while  $q_{ij}'$  represents the  
 322 conditional probability of restoration conditioned on updating the physical node of element  $j$  to be  
 323 repaired. Finally,  $w_i$  is the weight assigned to the customer  $i$  based on its importance for  
 324 community resilience.

$$325 \quad RW_j = \frac{(\sum_n q_{ij}' w_i - \sum_n q_i w_i)}{(T_j \sum_n q_i w_i)} \quad (6)$$

326 While a single forward propagation run of the BN is computationally efficient as demonstrated  
 327 by Braik and Koliou [45], equation (6) requires running the algorithm to compare hundreds of  
 328 elements, and hence, it can become computationally expensive. Therefore, it is important to utilize  
 329 conditional independence within the BN [62] to prune the network and hence reduce its complexity  
 330 without affecting the mathematical accuracy of the results. This can be explained using Figure 2,  
 331 where repairing distribution line 2 (updating the state of  $FD_2$  to “repaired”) only affects the state

332 of customers  $PC_3$  and  $PC_4$ , while the states of the remaining customers are conditionally  
 333 independent of  $FD_2$ . Hence, when applying equation (6) to  $FD_2$ , the BN can be pruned to include  
 334 only  $FD_2 \rightarrow PD_2 \rightarrow (PC_3, PC_4)$ , while  $q_{ij}'$  for the other customers will be equal to  $q_i$ . As the  
 335 computational cost of the BN is proportional to its size [75], this will considerably reduce the run  
 336 time while resulting in equivalent mathematical results.

337 Therefore, once substations and transmission towers are checked and repaired, a weight of 1.0 is  
 338 given to the essential facilities (such as fire stations, police stations, hospitals, and major water  
 339 structures including water pumps and elevated tanks) and zero to the remaining customers. Then,  
 340 the lines feeding the essential facilities are prioritized for check and repair based on equation (6).  
 341 This can be utilized to further reduce the computational costs, as in this stage, only lines serving  
 342 customers with non-zero weights need to be compared, while the remaining lines and the  
 343 customers they feed can be pruned from the BN, as their computed RW using equation (6) will be  
 344 zero. Table 2 summarizes the algorithm for pruning the BN and prioritizing element for repair  
 345 using equation (6).

346 Table 2: Algorithm for BN pruning and prioritizing EPN elements for repair

Algorithm for BN pruning and selecting the EPN node with the maximum RW:

1. Input:  $n$ : number of customers,  $w_i$ : weight of customer  $i$  for all  $i$  in  $[1:n]$ ,  $e$ : number of upstream non-repaired EPN nodes,  $T_j$ : total time of repair of line  $j$  for all  $j$  in  $[1:e]$ , BN: The full constructed BN
2. Define Function Prioritize\_Element\_for\_Repair\_Based\_on\_RW<sub>max</sub>( $n$ , list of  $w_i$ ,  $e$ , list of  $T_j$ , BN):
3. Calculate the outage probabilities  $q_i$  for all  $i$  in  $[1:n]$  using the full BN
4. for  $j$  in  $1:e$ :
  5. Prune the BN to BN', which includes only customers  $C'$  (with size  $h \leq n$ ) downstream of the EPN node  $j$
  6. if  $(w_k = 0 \text{ for all } k \text{ in } [1:h]) \text{ or } (T_j = \infty)$ :
  7.  $RW_j = 0$
  8. else:
    9. Update the probabilities of the pruned BN' conditional on repairing the EPN node of  $j$
    10. for  $i$  in  $1:n$ :
      11. if customer  $i$  is in  $C'$ :
      12. calculate the outage probability  $q'_i$  using the pruned BN'
      13. else:
      14.  $q'_i = q_i$
      15. calculate  $RW_j$  using Equation (6)
    16. Return the EPN node corresponding to the maximum RW value

348 Once all essential facilities are restored, the remaining customers are given weights according to  
349 their importance per stakeholder priorities, and the lines feeding them are checked and repaired in  
350 order based on equation (6). The assignment of weights to customers is a crucial task that falls  
351 upon decision-makers, and therefore, simulation analysis using techniques like DES is employed  
352 in this paper to estimate the impact of different weights that can assist decision-makers in  
353 understanding their effects. A formal definition and details of applying the DES to model the  
354 restoration of the EPN are provided in Section 4 below. While some decision-makers may  
355 prioritize residential customers, considering the significant role of prompt power restoration in  
356 individuals and families' recovery, it is important to recognize that neglecting business and  
357 industrial customers can have detrimental effects on them ([76]; [77]; [78]), resulting in long-term  
358 consequences on the overall recovery and resilience of the community.

359 ***3.4. DT for disaster management***

360 The electric power restoration framework proposed in this study allows for combining and  
361 leveraging the advantages of both physics-based and data-driven modeling approaches. The  
362 physics-based damage analysis and network modeling allow for a highly detailed model capable  
363 of making predictions before the hazard occurrence. This enables decision-makers to test various  
364 restoration scenarios to help in preplanning and preparedness and provides a basis to immediately  
365 guide post-disaster investigation and repair. Then, the proposed framework allows for real-time  
366 updating of the initial physics-based estimations with data. By utilizing a DBN, receiving data on  
367 the state (physical or performance) of any element within the network can be used to update the  
368 prior belief of the entire network while remaining within the true physical nature of the system.  
369 Hence, the restoration process can be monitored and updated in real-time, reflecting changing  
370 conditions and facilitating adaptive decision-making. Thus, the framework in this paper is

371 proposed as a DT, with the digital model being continuously updated using real-time data sensing  
372 and can influence the real system through adaptive decision-making.

373 The proposed DT possesses a range of capabilities, starting with supervision based on the  
374 visualizations and models it generates. It also performs simulations and makes predictions utilizing  
375 DES . Additionally, it incorporates the intelligence of the DT by updating the DBN and learning  
376 from collected data. Furthermore, it is capable of controlling the real system through adaptive  
377 decision-making and directing the restoration processes. However, it is essential to acknowledge  
378 that in disaster management, achieving a fully autonomous DT is unlikely in the near future. Some  
379 level of human involvement will still be necessary to apply and implement the decisions made by  
380 the DT. For instance, repair crews would be responsible for executing repair decisions suggested  
381 by the DT.

382 **4. Application study using discrete event simulation**

383 To showcase the practicality of the proposed framework, an illustrative application study  
384 utilizing DES is conducted.

385 **4.1. *Galveston testbed***


386 In this application study, the Galveston Island testbed in conjunction with the Hurricane Ike  
387 model is utilized. A comprehensive dataset compiled from various sources, including Darestani  
388 and Padgett [79], SPDCPB [80], Incore [57], and GalvestonGIS [81], provides the location, type,  
389 properties, and connectivity of EPN components such as poles, towers, and substations.  
390 Additionally, it provides details regarding the location and type of electricity receiving customers,  
391 as well as the spatial distribution and connectivity of road segments and intersections within the  
392 RN. This compiled dataset is used to build a high-fidelity model of the EPN and RN, as

393 summarized in Table 3. The EPN elements, RN elements, buildings, and essential facilities of  
 394 Galveston are shown in Figure 4. To reduce the size of the BN as recommended by Braik and  
 395 Koliou [45], the poles are aggregated into 2,718 distribution lines, while the transmission towers  
 396 are aggregated into 1 transmission line. Moreover, the residential, commercial, and industrial  
 397 buildings are clustered into 2,102, 1,108, and 248 building clusters, respectively where the  
 398 buildings in each are assumed to share a common electricity feeder. Furthermore, this dataset  
 399 includes the results of Hurricane Ike simulations needed for fragility analysis, providing spatial  
 400 variations of wind speed and direction, wave speed, direction, and height, highest flood depth, and  
 401 flood duration across the island.

402 Table 3: Summary of EPN, RN, customer, and essential facilities quantities

Component	Utility pole	Transmission tower	Substation	Residential building	Commercial building	Industrial building
<b>Count</b>	13,207	52	9	24,756	2,681	357
<b>Component</b>	<b>Fire station</b>	<b>Police station</b>	<b>Hospital</b>	<b>Water facility</b>	<b>Road segment</b>	
<b>Count</b>	7	1	21	22	5,035	

403 Hence, by using the infrastructure data and the hazard analysis, fragility analysis is performed  
 404 for both the EPN and RN, which concludes step 1 of the methodology through disaster impact  
 405 assessment. Further discussion on the results of the fragility analysis is presented in Section 4.3.  
 406 Subsequently, utilizing the connectivity data, network analysis is performed in accordance with  
 407 step 2 of the methodology, facilitating the establishment of interdependencies between the EPN  
 408 and RN. The progression to step 3 of the methodology, restoration modeling and repair  
 409 prioritization, is demonstrated through the application of DES. The physics-based predictions  
 410 derived from hazard and fragility analysis serve as the prior estimates and initial conditions of the  
 411 DES. Subsequently, stochastic simulation is employed to model the entire restoration process. The  
 412 assumptions of the DES are explained in Section 4.2, while the results are elaborated upon in  
 413 Sections 4.3 and 4.4.



414

415 Figure 4: Graphic view of Galveston Island's: (a) Building and essential facilities map (b) EPN map (c) RN map

416     4.2. *Discrete event simulation assumptions*

417     DES is a computational method that models the behavior of complex systems as a discrete  
418     sequence of events [82]. In this study, the events triggering a change in the state of the system are  
419     the occurrence of hazards, leading to damages, outages, and flooding, as well as the subsequent  
420     repair and drainage of the EPN and RN elements. The repair activities are conducted by repair  
421     crew units, while the drainage is assumed to naturally occur following the estimations of the hazard  
422     analysis. It is assumed that a fixed number of repair crew units is available for both the EPN and  
423     RN and that these units possess equivalent capacities, with each capable of handling one task at a  
424     time. Furthermore, the crew members within the unit will operate in shifts to ensure continuous  
425     work throughout the simulation.

426     Assumptions of the repair times of the EPN and RN elements are based on average times  
427     obtained from the literature. An average repair time  $t_{avg}$  of 72 hours is assumed for a single  
428     substation or transmission tower, while the repair of a damaged utility pole takes an average of 5  
429     hours [24]. Therefore, a line consisting of  $m$  poles or towers each having a predicted probability  
430     of failure  $q_i$  will have an expected number of failed elements of  $m' = \sum_{i=1}^m q_i$ . Hence, the expected  
431     repair time will be  $m'$  times the average time of repair of a single element within the line. On the  
432     other hand, the average time to repair a 1-km length road segment is assumed to be 1 day, if the  
433     probability of damage to the road segment is less than 0.2, 7 days if it is more than 0.8, and 2 days  
434     for all other cases [83]. However, it should be noted that the reliance on deterministic average  
435     repair times might result in underestimating the uncertainties in the restoration process.

436     While the method proposed in this paper allows for updating the estimations based on various  
437     types of evidence data as demonstrated by Braik and Koliou [45], it is assumed in the DES that  
438     the only source of evidence is the feedback of repair crews. Therefore, once a repair crew reaches

439 the selected line, the state of its elements is stochastically sampled based on their probabilities of  
440 failure to give either failed or not failed, and the simulated time of repair is the number of damaged  
441 elements times the average time of repair of a single element. Therefore, if a line contains  $m$  poles  
442 or towers, the simulated number of damaged elements  $m''$  is stochastically sampled following  $m$   
443 independent non-identical Bernoulli (INB) trials [84], where the probability for each trial is equal  
444 to the probability of failure of the element estimated through the fragility analysis. Even if no  
445 element is failed, it is assumed that the minimum checking time  $t_{check}$  is 0.5 hours for distribution  
446 lines and 5 hours for substations and transmission lines. Therefore,  $t_{repair-j}$ , the time of repair of  
447 a line  $j$ , is sampled using equation (7), where  $t_{check}$ ,  $t_{avg}$ , and  $m''$  are the minimum checking time,  
448 average repair time, and simulated number of damaged elements, respectively, as defined above,  
449 and  $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_m$  are the failure probabilities of poles or towers within the line  $j$ .

450 
$$t_{repair-j} = \max(t_{check}, m''.t_{avg}), \text{Where } m'' \sim INB(q_1, q_2, \dots, q_m) \quad (7)$$

451 The EPN units are assumed to start working 4 hours after the hurricane [85], while the RN units  
452 are assumed to start working only after all roads are drained. Both EPN and RN units start from  
453 the road node in the mainland before the Galveston bridge. An average travel speed of 25 mph  
454 (11.2 m/s) is assumed through an undamaged and drained road segment. This speed is reduced  
455 based on the probability of failure of the road as elaborated in Section 3.2.2. This reduction in  
456 travel speed is capped at a minimum of 2.5 mph (1.12 m/s), ensuring that even in the presence of  
457 substantial damage, travel remains possible but significantly slowed. In the case of flooded  
458 roadways, repair units are expected to face impassable conditions, except for access to substations,  
459 where it is expected that given the high value and significance of the substations, access will be  
460 made possible even in the event of flooding.

461 The repair prioritization follows the criteria discussed earlier, with substations and transmission  
462 lines taking precedence for repair. Subsequently, distribution lines are prioritized based on their  
463 RW, where Equation (6) is used to assign each EPN crew unit an element to repair. Since any  
464 downstream line cannot operate unless all its upstream lines are repaired, the upstream lines are  
465 compared for prioritization at each step. Initially, priority is given to restoring essential facilities,  
466 indicated by assigning them a weight of one, while assigning a weight of zero to the rest of the  
467 customers. Subsequently, attention shifts to the remaining customers, who are then assigned non-  
468 zero weights. The road segment with the highest probability of damage is given the highest repair  
469 priority.

470 ***4.3. Supervisory and control DT***

471 In Figure 5, a dynamic dashboard is presented, tracking the progress of electric power  
472 restoration. In this application study, equal importance is assigned to the restoration of residential,  
473 commercial, and industrial buildings. Additionally, allocation has been made for 8 repair units for  
474 the EPN and 5 units for the RN. Figure 5 (a) displays the initial state of the EPN immediately after  
475 the hurricane's impact. As no data has yet been collected, the estimates are primarily based on the  
476 prior physics-based analysis and show a significant failure of EPN components, resulting in a  
477 nearly complete power outage across the island. Furthermore, most RN segments are flooded, with  
478 damage concentrated near the shoreline.

479 Figure 5 (b) portrays the intermediate state of the EPN on the sixth day following the hazard  
480 occurrence. At this stage, the restoration of essential facilities and a substantial portion of the  
481 remaining customers has been achieved. Additionally, the RN has been drained, and repairs are  
482 being undertaken for damaged segments. Notably, significant recovery has been experienced in  
483 the upper half of the island, while the other half still faces a widespread outage. This underscores

484 the importance of visualizing spatial variations, allowing for the identification of overlooked areas.

485 Finally, in Figure 5 (c), the fully repaired and restored state of the EPN on day 16 is shown.


486 As discussed in Section 3.4, the proposed DT exhibits a versatile range of capabilities, from  
487 supervision to intelligent decision-making. The DT provides dynamic and detailed visualizations  
488 that allow decision-makers to assess the damage and performance of the EPN components and  
489 their effect on customers, in addition to the state of the RN segments and their effect on the  
490 mobility of repair units. It extends its capabilities further through simulation and prediction, as  
491 demonstrated by the DES application study and the resulting estimates. One of its standout features  
492 is its intelligent capability, achieved through the BN updates. By collecting data on specific nodes  
493 within the EPN, the entire network can be updated. Therefore, predictions for other nodes that  
494 share upstream connections with the nodes we have monitored can be enhanced. This adaptive  
495 learning ensures the DT's ability to provide more accurate predictions following real-time data  
496 sensing. Moreover, by prioritizing elements for repair through the RW calculations, the DT can be  
497 used in adaptive decision-making and to direct and control the restoration process. Furthermore, it  
498 allows decision-makers to intervene at any point in time and redirect the restoration strategies and  
499 the distribution of resources. Hence, the proposed DT possesses the full capabilities of a  
500 supervisory and control DT.

501 **4.4. Case studies**


502 In this section, an analysis of different case studies is conducted, with a focus on the modification  
503 of prioritization strategies, the adjustment of weights, and the reallocation of resources. These are  
504 compared to the benchmark case presented in Section 4.3.

505        4.4.1. *Sensitivity analysis*

506        To enable a comparison between the results of stochastic simulations, MCS is utilized.  
507        Therefore, the convergence of the cumulative mean of the samples is examined, and it is  
508        subsequently used to compare different cases. Figure 6 shows the convergence of the cumulative  
509        mean of the restoration percentage for the benchmark case for days 1 to 16 after the occurrence of  
510        the hazard. Similar checks were performed in other cases and for various types of customers and  
511        essential facilities. Convergence for all cases was achieved after 40 runs, hence, the restoration  
512        plots of the mean of the 40 runs are used.



514      Figure 5: DT dashboard for: (a) Day 0 (immediately after the hurricane), (b) Day 6, and (c) Day 16 (end of EPN  
 515      repair and restoration)



516

517      Figure 6: Convergence of the MCS cumulative mean for the benchmark case

518      4.4.2. *Comparison studies*


519      In Figure 7 (a), a comparison is made between the restoration of the benchmark case described  
 520      above and the actual restoration of Galveston Island following Hurricane Ike, as retrieved from  
 521      historical records [29]. The almost linear shape of the actual restoration plot, when compared to  
 522      the S-shaped curve of the simulation plot, suggests that a more efficient restoration could have  
 523      been attained if a more informed prioritization of elements for repair had been followed, as  
 524      proposed in this paper. Figure 7 (b) compares the restoration curves of synthetic hurricanes based  
 525      on Hurricane Ike of various return periods;  $T=50$ ,  $100$ , and  $500$  years. The return period events  
 526      were determined by water level exceedance probabilities at Stewart Beach, near the eastern end of  
 527      Galveston Island [56]. The results of the hurricane models were obtained from [57, 86]. The time  
 528      to restoration of the 500-year return period hurricane is significantly larger than the other  
 529      hurricanes, which shows the considerable effect of the hazard intensity on the restoration process.  
 530      Figure 7 (c) shows the impact of resource allocation on the restoration process. As anticipated, an  
 531      increase in the number of repair crew units results in an acceleration of the restoration rate. This  
 532      graphical representation serves as a tool for evaluating the incremental advantages of adding  
 533      resources. The transition from 5 to 8 repair units yields significantly more benefit compared to  
 534      increasing the numbers from 8 to 10 units.

535 Figure 8 displays the restoration plots for residential, commercial, and industrial customers for  
536 different prioritization strategies. In Figure 8 (a), the benchmark case is shown where equal  
537 weights are assigned to all customers, resulting in similar restoration plots with small variations  
538 influenced by spatial distributions. In contrast, Figure 8 (b) reveals the restoration plots when  
539 prioritization is centered around residential customers. In this scenario, the residential restoration  
540 plot is shifted slightly to the right, with a more noticeable effect on the delay of restoration for  
541 commercial and industrial plots. Then, in Figure 8 (c), the restoration plots are shown when  
542 prioritization factors are determined by the expected monetary loss per hour of outage, following  
543 the ratios of 1:325:1200 for residential, commercial, and industrial customers, respectively [87].  
544 Therefore, in this case, business recovery takes precedence, and rapid restoration is observed for  
545 industrial and commercial buildings compared to the benchmark case, while the restoration of  
546 residential buildings is slightly delayed.

547 Figure 9 demonstrates the impact of prioritizing essential facilities for restoration. Figure 9 (a)  
548 shows that when not given priority, the restoration of water facilities takes nearly three times the  
549 duration. Similarly, in Figure 9 (b), a significant delay in hospital power restoration is seen when  
550 considered as regular customers.


551 These figures include confidence bands showing one standard deviation above and below the  
552 average MCS restoration plots. It is noted that the variability becomes more pronounced when  
553 focusing on the restoration of a smaller subset of customers, such as industrial facilities, compared  
554 to the total restoration, since the aggregated effect tends to reduce variability in larger systems.  
555 This highlights the importance of considering spatial and categorical variability. However, some  
556 assumptions made, such as the deterministic hazard model and the use of average repair times,

557 contribute to underestimating the total uncertainty. This motivates a more comprehensive  
 558 uncertainty quantification in future studies.




559

560 Figure 7: Comparison studies of: (a) the benchmark case restoration against the actual restoration obtained from  
 561 historical records (b) the restoration plots of various hurricane return periods (c) the effect of allocated resources



562

563 Figure 8: Restoration plots for residential, commercial, and industrial buildings for: (a) equal weights (benchmark  
 564 case) (b) residential buildings given priority (c) business facilities given priority




565

566 Figure 9: Effect of prioritizing: (a) water facilities (b) hospitals

#### 567 4.4.3. *Updating prior estimations with data evidence via backward propagation*

568 To demonstrate the capability of the DT in updating prior estimates using belief propagation, a  
 569 case study is considered in which the outage and restoration state of 10 customers have been  
 570 observed. When data evidence about the outage or restoration status of any customer is obtained,  
 571 it can be used to update the prior outage probabilities for the entire island. This method influences

572 the estimations for customers connected to the same upstream line as those for whom data has  
 573 been received, even if there is no direct data available for them. As shown in Figure 10 (a), 5  
 574 customers in the middle of the island were observed to have power restored, while another 5  
 575 customers in the lower part of the island experienced power outages at the same time. The updated  
 576 outage map, displayed in Figure 10 (b), shows a significant portion of the island having power  
 577 restored using only these 10 data points. It is noteworthy that the upper right portion of the island  
 578 was not significantly updated using the observed data. This is because the observed restored  
 579 customers receive electricity directly from the mainland substation via an underground electricity  
 580 cable, as illustrated in Figure 4.



581  
 582 Figure 10: DT outage map for (a) prior estimations (b) posterior estimations using observed data  
 583

## 5. Conclusions and future work

584 This paper has introduced a novel framework for post-hurricane electric power restoration,  
 585 leveraging the concept of the DT. As demonstrated in this study, the DT provides dynamic  
 586 visualizations that offer a holistic evaluation of the EPN performance, while also assessing the  
 587 condition of the RN and its influence on the mobility of repair units. By employing a DBN that  
 588 integrates physics-based and data-driven models, the framework expands its capabilities from  
 589 offline to online learning, enabling real-time updates to continuously enhance the accuracy of the

590 estimations. These capabilities are further extended through simulation and prediction, as  
591 showcased by the DES application study. Additionally, the ability to guide and prioritize repair  
592 and restoration efforts allows for adaptive decision-making, extending the framework toward a  
593 supervisory and control DT.

594 Despite the promising results, the proposed framework still has limitations in its current form.  
595 The case studies rely on scenarios of single hazards rather than comprehensive hazard analysis.  
596 Moreover, several assumptions regarding restoration times are treated as deterministic average  
597 values rather than probabilistic random variables, potentially underestimating the uncertainty in  
598 the results. Additionally, the RN is modeled as a graph network and does not incorporate traffic  
599 and flow analysis, nor does it account for debris that might disrupt traffic. Finally, the cascading  
600 effect of power outages on the RN is not considered. The water network is only considered by  
601 including main water facilities, such as water pumps, instead of modeling a comprehensive water  
602 network.

603 Future research can focus on the RN by conducting comprehensive traffic and flow analyses that  
604 account for evacuation, return, the impact of debris, and other important factors that might affect  
605 the mobility of repair units. Furthermore, there is a need for a more comprehensive hazard analysis  
606 considering the stochastic nature of hurricane loads. Additionally, there exists potential for in-  
607 depth analysis of the restoration of the water network and its impact on community functionality  
608 and resilience. Future research can also explore the synergy between the disaster management DT  
609 of the EPN and the normal operation DT. By integrating these two, where power flow is based on  
610 connectivity during disasters and on DC flow analysis during normal operations, researchers can  
611 combine the concepts of smart and resilient infrastructure systems.

612 Moreover, the proposed framework can be utilized to analyze restoration efforts focusing on  
613 socially vulnerable communities. The simulation analysis offered can further evolve through the  
614 application of agent-based modeling, taking into consideration various social systems in  
615 conjunction with critical infrastructure systems, ultimately developing a full community DT. Since  
616 the proposed DT framework utilizes data to update prior estimates, future research could focus on  
617 innovative data collection and analysis approaches to enhance the efficiency of the restoration  
618 process. Therefore, this paper establishes the groundwork for a paradigm shift in disaster recovery  
619 strategies through more efficient, adaptable, and data-informed methods that enhance post-  
620 hurricane electric power restoration, ultimately contributing to more resilient communities.

621 **Relevance to resilience**

622 This paper presents a framework for post-hurricane electric power restoration using a DT  
623 approach, focusing on the restoration of the EPN and RN. By prioritizing repairs and optimizing  
624 resource allocation, the framework enhances infrastructure resilience, ensuring efficient  
625 restoration of essential services crucial for maintaining community functionality and well-being  
626 after a disaster. Through adaptive decision-making and data-driven methodologies, the framework  
627 contributes to building more resilient communities and enabling real-time updates based on  
628 accurate information. Overall, the study underscores the importance of leveraging DT technology  
629 to enhance post-disaster recovery efforts, ultimately contributing to community resilience.

630 **Declaration of competing interests**

631 The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal  
632 relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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636 findings, conclusions, and recommendations presented in this paper are those of the authors and  
637 do not necessarily reflect the views of NSF.

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