Intrinsic Run-Time Row Hammer PUFs: Leveraging the Row Hammer Effect for Run-Time Cryptography and Improved Security †
- Award ID(s):
- 1651945
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10064748
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Cryptography
- Volume:
- 2
- Issue:
- 3
- ISSN:
- 2410-387X
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 13
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography2030013
