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Title: What makes long-term monitoring convenient? A parametric analysis of value of information in infrastructure maintenance: What makes long-term monitoring convenient? A parametric analysis of value of information in infrastructure maintenance
Authors:
;
Award ID(s):
1653716
Publication Date:
NSF-PAR ID:
10090423
Journal Name:
Structural Control and Health Monitoring
Volume:
26
Issue:
5
Page Range or eLocation-ID:
e2329
ISSN:
1545-2255
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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