Commodity operating system (OS) kernels, such as Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, and FreeBSD, are susceptible to numerous security vulnerabilities. Their monolithic design gives successful attackers complete access to all application data and system resources. Shielding systems such as InkTag, Haven, and Virtual Ghost protect sensitive application data from compromised OS kernels. However, such systems are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Worse yet, compromised OS kernels can leverage their control over privileged hardware state to exacerbate existing side channels; recent work has shown that a compromised OS kernel can steal entire documents via side channels.
This paper presents defenses against page table and last-level cache (LLC) side-channel attacks launched by a compromised OS kernel. Our page table defenses restrict the OS kernel’s ability to read and write page table pages and defend against page allocation attacks, and our LLC defenses utilize the Intel Cache Allocation Technology along with memory isolation primitives. We proto- type our solution in a system we call Apparition, building on an optimized version of Virtual Ghost. Our evaluation shows that our side-channel defenses add 1% to 18% (with up to 86% for one application) overhead to the optimized Virtual Ghost (relative to the native kernel) on real-world applications.
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Spectres, Virtual Ghosts, and Hardware Support
Side-channel attacks, such as Spectre and Meltdown, that leverage speculative execution pose a serious threat to computing systems. Worse yet, such attacks can be perpetrated by compromised operating system (OS) kernels to bypass defenses that protect applications from the OS kernel.
This work evaluates the performance impact of three different defenses against in-kernel speculation side-channel attacks within the context of Virtual Ghost, a system that protects user data from compromised OS kernels: Intel MPX bounds checks, which require a memory fence; address bit-masking and testing, which creates a dependence between the bounds check and the load/store; and the use of separate virtual address spaces for applications, the OS kernel, and the Virtual Ghost virtual machine, forcing a speculation boundary. Our results indicate that an instrumentation-based bit-masking approach to protection incurs the least overhead by minimizing speculation boundaries. Our work also highlights possible improvements to Intel MPX that could help mitigate speculation side-channel attacks at a lower cost.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1652280
- PAR ID:
- 10094682
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the Seventh International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1 to 9
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3214292.3214297
