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Concerns over foreign and domestic interference have raised questions about the legitimacy of U.S. elections. While research has explored election administration and public views on electronic voting, little attention has been given to election administrators’ perspectives. This study addresses that gap by examining how Georgia election officials perceive the use of electronic pollbooks (e-pollbooks) for voter check-in. The research hypothesizes that administrators view e-pollbooks as enhancing democratic legitimacy and election security. To test this, the paper presents findings from an NSF-funded online survey conducted two months before the 2024 general election. The survey was distributed to all 159 Georgia county election administrators and received IRB approval. It asked respondents to evaluate the security, reliability, ease of use, and fairness of various voter check-in systems, along with broader characteristics of elections in their counties. The results offer insight into how those managing elections assess the tools that support electoral integrity.
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Weaponized information seeks a new target in cyberspace: Users’ minds
The Russian attacks on the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the country’s continuing election-related hacking have happened across all three dimensions of cyberspace – physical, informational and cognitive. The first two are well-known: For years, hackers have exploited hardware and software flaws to gain unauthorized access to computers and networks – and stolen information they’ve found. The third dimension, however, is a newer target – and a more concerning one.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1753681
- PAR ID:
- 10110265
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- The Conversation
- ISSN:
- 2431-2134
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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