The conventional (election) voting systems, e.g., representative democracy, have many limitations and often fail to serve the best interest of the people in a collective decision-making process. To address this issue, the concept of liquid democracy has been emerging as an alternative decision-making model to make better use of “the wisdom of crowds”. However, there is no known cryptographically secure e-voting implementation that supports liquid democracy.
In this work, we propose a new voting concept called statement voting, which can be viewed as a natural extension of the conventional voting approaches. In the statement voting, instead of defining a concrete elec- tion candidate, each voter can define a statement in his/her ballot but leave the vote “undefined” during the voting phase. During the tally phase, the (conditional) actions expressed in the statement will be carried out to determine the final vote. We initiate the study of statement voting under the Universal Composability (UC) framework, and propose several construction frameworks together with their instantiations. As an application, we show how statement voting can be used to realize a UC-secure liquid democracy voting system. We remark that our statement voting can be extended to enable more complex voting and generic ledger-based non-interactive multi-party computation. We believe that the statement voting concept opens a door for constructing a new class of e-voting schemes.
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Pandering in a (flexible) representative democracy
In representative democracies, regular election cycles are supposed to prevent misbehavior by elected officials, hold them accountable, and subject them to the “will of the people." Pandering, or dishonest preference reporting by candidates campaigning for election, undermines this democratic idea. Much of the work on Computational Social Choice to date has investigated strategic actions in only a single election. We introduce a novel formal model of pandering and examine the resilience of two voting systems, Representative Democracy (RD) and Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), to pandering within a single election and across multiple rounds of elections. For both voting systems, our analysis centers on the types of strategies candidates employ and how voters update their views of candidates based on how the candidates have pandered in the past. We provide theoretical results on the complexity of pandering in our setting for a single election, formulate our problem for multiple cycles as a Markov Decision Process, and use reinforcement learning to study the effects of pandering by single candidates and groups of candidates over many rounds.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2007955
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10480841
- Publisher / Repository:
- Proceedings of Machine Learning Research
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the 39th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Pittsburgh, PA, USA
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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