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1. Lower Bounds for Dynamic Distributed Task Allocation

   Su, H.; Wein, N. (January 2020, 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020))

   We study the problem of distributed task allocation in multi-agent systems. Suppose there is a collection of agents, a collection of tasks, and a demand vector, which specifies the number of agents required to perform each task. The goal of the agents is to cooperatively allocate themselves to the tasks to satisfy the demand vector. We study the dynamic version of the problem where the demand vector changes over time. Here, the goal is to minimize the switching cost, which is the number of agents that change tasks in response to a change in the demand vector. The switching cost is an important metric since changing tasks may incur significant overhead. We study a mathematical formalization of the above problem introduced by Su, Su, Dornhaus, and Lynch [Su et al., 2017], which can be reformulated as a question of finding a low distortion embedding from symmetric difference to Hamming distance. In this model it is trivial to prove that the switching cost is at least 2. We present the first non-trivial lower bounds for the switching cost, by giving lower bounds of 3 and 4 for different ranges of the parameters. 

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2. Inducing Equilibria in Networked Public Goods Games through Network Structure Modification

   Kempe, David; Yu, Sixie; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy (January 2020, International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS))

   Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security investment, and crime reporting. While every agent's utility is increasing in their neighbors' joint investment, the specific form can vary widely depending on the scenario. A principal, such as a policymaker, may wish to induce large investment from the agents. Besides direct incentives, an important lever here is the network structure itself: by adding and removing edges, for example, through community meetings, the principal can change the nature of the utility functions, resulting in different, and perhaps socially preferable, equilibrium outcomes. We initiate an algorithmic study of targeted network modifications with the goal of inducing equilibria of a particular form. We study this question for a variety of equilibrium forms (induce all agents to invest, at least a given set S, exactly a given set S, at least k agents), and for a variety of utility functions. While we show that the problem is NP-complete for a number of these scenarios, we exhibit a broad array of scenarios in which the problem can be solved in polynomial time by non-trivial reductions to (minimum-cost) matching problems. 

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3. Agent goal management using goal operations

   Kondrakunta, Sravya; Gogineni, Venkatsampath R.; Cox, Michael T. (November 2021, Proceedings of the 9th Goal Reasoning Workshop)

   Goal management in autonomous agents has been a problem of interest for a long time. Multiple goal operations are required to solve an agent goal management problem. For example, some goal operations include selection, change, formulation, delegation, monitoring. Many researchers from different fields developed several solution approaches with an implicit or explicit focus on goal operations. For example, some solution approaches include scheduling the agents’ goals, performing cost-benefit analysis to select/organize goals, agent goal formulation in unexpected situations. However, none of them explicitly shed light on the agents’ response when multiple goal operations occur simultaneously. This paper develops an algorithm to address agent goal management when multiple-goal operations co-occur and presents how such an interaction would improve agent goal management in different domains. 

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4. Sample-Efficient Reinforcement Learning with loglog({T}) Switching Cost

   Qiao, Dan; Yin, Ming; Min, Ming; Wang, Yu-Xiang (June 2022, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research)

   Chaudhuri, Kamalika and (Ed.)

   We study the problem of reinforcement learning (RL) with low (policy) switching cost {—} a problem well-motivated by real-life RL applications in which deployments of new policies are costly and the number of policy updates must be low. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm based on stage-wise exploration and adaptive policy elimination that achieves a regret of $$\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{H^4S^2AT})$$ while requiring a switching cost of $$O(HSA \log\log T)$$. This is an exponential improvement over the best-known switching cost $$O(H^2SA\log T)$$ among existing methods with $$\widetilde{O}(\mathrm{poly}(H,S,A)\sqrt{T})$$ regret. In the above, $S,A$ denotes the number of states and actions in an $$H$$-horizon episodic Markov Decision Process model with unknown transitions, and $$T$$ is the number of steps. As a byproduct of our new techniques, we also derive a reward-free exploration algorithm with a switching cost of $O(HSA)$. Furthermore, we prove a pair of information-theoretical lower bounds which say that (1) Any no-regret algorithm must have a switching cost of $$\Omega(HSA)$$; (2) Any $$\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$$ regret algorithm must incur a switching cost of $$\Omega(HSA\log\log T)$$. Both our algorithms are thus optimal in their switching costs. 

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5. Identifying Susceptible Agents in Time Varying Opinion Dynamics through Compressive Measurements

   Wai, Hoi To; Ozgladar, Asuman E.; Scaglione, Anna (April 2018, ICASSP 2018)

   We provide a compressive-measurement based method to detect susceptible agents who may receive misinformation through their contact with ‘stubborn agents’ whose goal is to influence the opinions of agents in the network. We consider a DeGroot-type opinion dynamics model where regular agents revise their opinions by linearly combining their neighbors’ opinions, but stubborn agents, while influencing others, do not change their opinions. Our proposed method hinges on estimating the temporal difference vector of network-wide opinions, computed at time instances when the stubborn agents interact. We show that this temporal difference vector has approximately the same support as the locations of the susceptible agents. Moreover, both the interaction instances and the temporal difference vector can be estimated from a small number of aggregated opinions. The performance of our method is studied both analytically and empirically. We show that the detection error decreases when the social network is better connected, or when the stubborn agents are ‘less talkative’. 

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