How do people use human-made objects (artifacts) to learn about the people and actions that created them? We test the richness of people’s reasoning in this domain, focusing on the task of judging whether social transmission has occurred (i.e. whether one person copied another). We develop a formal model of this reasoning process as a form of rational inverse planning, which predicts that rather than solely focusing on artifacts’ similarity to judge whether copying occurred, people should also take into account availability constraints (the materials available), and functional constraints (which materials work). Using an artifact-building task where two characters build tools to solve a puzzle box, we find that this inverse planning model predicts trial-by-trial judgments, whereas simpler models that do not consider availability or functional constraints do not. This suggests people use a process like inverse planning to make flexible inferences from artifacts’ features about the source of design ideas.
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Children use inverse planning to detect social transmission in design of artifacts
Do children use objects to infer the people and actions that created them? We ask how children judge whether designs were socially transmitted (copied), asking if children use a simple perceptual heuristic (more similar = more likely copied), or make a rational, flexible inference (Bayesian inverse planning). We found evidence that children use inverse planning to reason about artifacts’ designs: When children saw two identical designs, they did not always infer copying occurred. Instead, similarity was weaker evidence of copying when an alternative explanation ‘explained away’ the similarity. Thus, children inferred copying had occurred less often when designs were efficient (Exp1, age 7-9; N=52), and when there was a constraint that limited the number of possible designs (Exp2, age 4-5; N=160). When thinking about artifacts, young children go beyond perceptual features and use a process like inverse planning to reason about the generative processes involved in design.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1749551
- PAR ID:
- 10174908
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society
- ISSN:
- 1069-7977
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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