In modern democracies, governmental transparency is thought to have great value. When it comes to addressing administrative corruption and mismanagement, many would agree with Justice Brandeis’s observation that sunlight is the best disinfectant. Beyond this, many credit transparency with enabling meaningful citizen participation. But even though transparency appears highly correlated with successful governance in developed democracies, assumptions about administrative transparency have remained empirically untested. Testing effects of transparency would prove particularly helpful in developing democracies where transparency norms have not taken hold or only have done so slowly. In these contexts, does administrative transparency really create the sorts of benefits attributed to it? Transparency might grease the gears of developed democracies, but what good is grease when many of the gears seem to be broken or missing entirely? This Article presents empirical results from a first-of-its-kind field study that tested two major promises of administrative transparency in a developing democracy: that transparency increases public participation in government affairs and that it increases government accountability. To test these hypotheses, we used two randomized controlled trials. Surprisingly, we found transparency had no significant effect in almost any of our quantitative measurements, although our qualitative results suggested that when transparency interventions exposed corruption, some limited oversight could result. Our findings are particularly significant for developing democracies and show, at least in this context, that Justice Brandeis may have oversold the cleansing effects of transparency. A few rays of transparency shining light on government action do not disinfect the system and cure government corruption and mismanagement. Once corruption and mismanagement are identified, it takes effective government institutions and action from civil society to successfully act as a disinfectant. more »« less
Zhao, Boyuan; Cheng, Shaoming; Schiff, Kaylyn Jackson; Kim, Yeonkyung
(, Government Information Quarterly)
Janssen, Marijn; Janowski, Tomasz Tomasz
(Ed.)
This paper examines the relationship between digital transparency and citizens' participation in government activity, specifically, online crowdsourcing. Many local governments have enhanced service transparency by disclosing and sharing information of government activities in digital format. These digital-driven transparency mechanisms often introduce interactive, tailor-made, and user-generating features to online government platforms. This paper explores the efficacy of digital transparency on citizens' participation in online crowdsourcing activities and its heterogeneous influences on various socioeconomic groups. Using the Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-Differences (PSM-DID) method, this study analyzes the impact of digitized information disclosure to citizens' participation in Sacramento 311, an online crowdsourcing platform. It is found that enhancing digital transparency promotes citizens' participation in online crowdsourcing activities. Furthermore, results suggest that the influence of digital transparency on citizen participation is short termed and varies across communities of different socioeconomic conditions.
Kim, Jieun; Stern, Rachel E.; Liebman, Benjamin L.; Wu, Xiaohan
(, Comparative Political Studies)
How and when do opportunities for political participation through courts change under authoritarianism? Although China is better known for tight political control than for political expression, the 2008 Open Government Information (OGI) regulation ushered in a surge of political-legal activism. We draw on an original dataset of 57,095 OGI lawsuits, supplemented by interview data and government documents, to show how a feedback loop between judges and court users shaped possibilities for political activism and complaint between 2008 and 2019. Existing work suggests that authoritarian leaders crack down on legal action when they feel politically threatened. In contrast, we find that courts minted, defined, and popularized new legal labels to cut off access to justice for the super-active litigants whose lawsuits had come to dominate the OGI docket. This study underscores the power of procedural rules and frontline judges in shaping possibilities for political participation under authoritarianism.
Molina‐Garzón, Adriana; Grillos, Tara; Zarychta, Alan; Andersson, Krister_P
(, American Journal of Political Science)
Abstract Collective action among public officials is necessary for the effective delivery of many social services, but relatively little is known about how it can be fostered through policy reforms. In this article, we compare cooperation among public officials within decentralized versus centrally‐administered municipalities in Honduras. Leveraging a quasi‐experiment in health sector reform, coupled with behavioral games and social network surveys, we find that decentralization is associated with greater cooperation. When they are able to communicate, health sector workers in decentralized municipalities contribute more to a public good than their centrally‐administered counterparts. This increase in cooperative behavior results in part from the decentralization reform engendering greater numbers of interactions and stronger ties across different levels of government. These findings indicate that institutional reforms like decentralization can favorably reconfigure patterns of social interactions across public organizations, which is an important component of administrative capacity in developing countries.
Mulligan, Deirdre K.
(, Berkeley technology law journal)
null
(Ed.)
At every level of government, officials contract for technical systems that employ machine learning-systems that perform tasks without using explicit instructions, relying on patterns and inference instead. These systems frequently displace discretion previously exercised by policymakers or individual front-end government employees with an opaque logic that bears no resemblance to the reasoning processes of agency personnel. However, because agencies acquire these systems through government procurement processes, they and the public have little input into-or even knowledge about-their design or how well that design aligns with public goals and values. This Article explains the ways that the decisions about goals, values, risk, and certainty, along with the elimination of case-by-case discretion, inherent in machine-learning system design create policies-not just once when they are designed, but over time as they adapt and change. When the adoption of these systems is governed by procurement, the policies they embed receive little or no agency or outside expertise beyond that provided by the vendor. Design decisions are left to private third-party developers. There is no public participation, no reasoned deliberation, and no factual record, which abdicates Government responsibility for policymaking. This Article then argues for a move from a procurement mindset to policymaking mindset. When policy decisions are made through system design, processes suitable for substantive administrative determinations should be used: processes that foster deliberation reflecting both technocratic demands for reason and rationality informed by expertise, and democratic demands for public participation and political accountability. Specifically, the Article proposes administrative law as the framework to guide the adoption of machine learning governance, describing specific ways that the policy choices embedded in machine learning system design fail the prohibition against arbitrary and capricious agency actions absent a reasoned decision-making process that both enlists the expertise necessary for reasoned deliberation about, and justification for, such choices, and makes visible the political choices being made. Finally, this Article sketches models for machine-learning adoption processes that satisfy the prohibition against arbitrary and capricious agency actions. It explores processes by which agencies might garner technical expertise and overcome problems of system opacity, satisfying administrative law's technocratic demand for reasoned expert deliberation. It further proposes both institutional and engineering design solutions to the challenge of policymaking opacity, offering process paradigms to ensure the "political visibility" required for public input and political oversight. In doing so, it also proposes the importance of using "contestable design"-design that exposes value-laden features and parameters and provides for iterative human involvement in system evolution and deployment. Together, these institutional and design approaches further both administrative law's technocratic and democratic mandates.
Zarychta, Alan; Benedum, Michelle_E; Sanchez, Emily; Andersson, Krister_P
(, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory)
Abstract Decentralization reform has both advantages and risks. Bringing service delivery “closer to the people” can improve information flows and strengthen accountability, but it may also leave systems vulnerable to elite capture and corruption by municipal government officials. While past research has acknowledged the possibility of corruption under decentralization, relatively little work has connected those risks to features of these reforms or specific local institutional arrangements. To explore the conditions that can help mitigate the risks of corruption under decentralization, we study the case of health sector reform in Honduras where municipal governments, associations, and NGOs each serve as intermediary-managing organizations under a common decentralized health service delivery model. We argue that three types of institutional arrangements reflecting local accountability practices serve as checks on the authority granted through decentralization and can help guard against corruption: external supervision, civil society engagement, and public participation. Empirically, we draw on data from more than 600 street-level bureaucrats, valuable but under-utilized informants about municipal corruption, across a matched sample of 65 municipalities with contrasting forms of administration. We find that reported corruption is highest under decentralization led by municipal governments, as compared to association- or NGO-led varieties. Both external supervision and civil society engagement help attenuate the positive association between decentralization and corruption, but public participation does not. Overall, this research highlights the importance of considering reform features and local conditions when designing policies to help manage risks and support effective social sector decentralization.
Daniels, Brigham, Buntaine, Mark T., and Bangerter, Tanner. TESTING TRANSPARENCY. Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10187416. Northwestern University law review 114.5
Daniels, Brigham, Buntaine, Mark T., & Bangerter, Tanner. TESTING TRANSPARENCY. Northwestern University law review, 114 (5). Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10187416.
Daniels, Brigham, Buntaine, Mark T., and Bangerter, Tanner.
"TESTING TRANSPARENCY". Northwestern University law review 114 (5). Country unknown/Code not available. https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10187416.
@article{osti_10187416,
place = {Country unknown/Code not available},
title = {TESTING TRANSPARENCY},
url = {https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10187416},
abstractNote = {In modern democracies, governmental transparency is thought to have great value. When it comes to addressing administrative corruption and mismanagement, many would agree with Justice Brandeis’s observation that sunlight is the best disinfectant. Beyond this, many credit transparency with enabling meaningful citizen participation. But even though transparency appears highly correlated with successful governance in developed democracies, assumptions about administrative transparency have remained empirically untested. Testing effects of transparency would prove particularly helpful in developing democracies where transparency norms have not taken hold or only have done so slowly. In these contexts, does administrative transparency really create the sorts of benefits attributed to it? Transparency might grease the gears of developed democracies, but what good is grease when many of the gears seem to be broken or missing entirely? This Article presents empirical results from a first-of-its-kind field study that tested two major promises of administrative transparency in a developing democracy: that transparency increases public participation in government affairs and that it increases government accountability. To test these hypotheses, we used two randomized controlled trials. Surprisingly, we found transparency had no significant effect in almost any of our quantitative measurements, although our qualitative results suggested that when transparency interventions exposed corruption, some limited oversight could result. Our findings are particularly significant for developing democracies and show, at least in this context, that Justice Brandeis may have oversold the cleansing effects of transparency. A few rays of transparency shining light on government action do not disinfect the system and cure government corruption and mismanagement. Once corruption and mismanagement are identified, it takes effective government institutions and action from civil society to successfully act as a disinfectant.},
journal = {Northwestern University law review},
volume = {114},
number = {5},
author = {Daniels, Brigham and Buntaine, Mark T. and Bangerter, Tanner},
}
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