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Title: Post-decision biases reveal a self-consistency principle in perceptual inference
Making a categorical judgment can systematically bias our subsequent perception of the world. We show that these biases are well explained by a self-consistent Bayesian observer whose perceptual inference process is causally conditioned on the preceding choice. We quantitatively validated the model and its key assumptions with a targeted set of three psychophysical experiments, focusing on a task sequence where subjects first had to make a categorical orientation judgment before estimating the actual orientation of a visual stimulus. Subjects exhibited a high degree of consistency between categorical judgment and estimate, which is difficult to reconcile with alternative models in the face of late, memory related noise. The observed bias patterns resemble the well-known changes in subjective preferences associated with cognitive dissonance, which suggests that the brain’s inference processes may be governed by a universal self-consistency constraint that avoids entertaining ‘dissonant’ interpretations of the evidence.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1350786
NSF-PAR ID:
10189368
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
eLife
Volume:
7
ISSN:
2050-084X
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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