- Editors:
- van den Berg, Ronald
- Award ID(s):
- 1350786
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10291220
- Journal Name:
- PLOS Computational Biology
- Volume:
- 17
- Issue:
- 6
- Page Range or eLocation-ID:
- e1008968
- ISSN:
- 1553-7358
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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