Title: Differential privacy in the 2020 US census: what will it do? Quantifying the accuracy/privacy tradeoff
Background: The 2020 US Census will use a novel approach to disclosure avoidance to protect respondents’ data, called TopDown. This TopDown algorithm was applied to the 2018 end-to-end (E2E) test of the decennial census. The computer code used for this test as well as accompanying exposition has recently been released publicly by the Census Bureau. Methods: We used the available code and data to better understand the error introduced by the E2E disclosure avoidance system when Census Bureau applied it to 1940 census data and we developed an empirical measure of privacy loss to compare the error and privacy of the new approach to that of a (non-differentially private) simple-random-sampling approach to protecting privacy. Results: We found that the empirical privacy loss of TopDown is substantially smaller than the theoretical guarantee for all privacy loss budgets we examined. When run on the 1940 census data, TopDown with a privacy budget of 1.0 was similar in error and privacy loss to that of a simple random sample of 50% of the US population. When run with a privacy budget of 4.0, it was similar in error and privacy loss of a 90% sample. Conclusions: This work fits into the beginning of a discussion on how to best balance privacy and accuracy in decennial census data collection, and there is a need for continued discussion. more »« less
Cohen, Aloni; Duchin, Moon; Matthews, J. N.; Suwal, Bhushan
(, Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing)
Ligett, Katrina; Gupta, Swati
(Ed.)
The 2020 Decennial Census will be released with a new disclosure avoidance system in place, putting differential privacy in the spotlight for a wide range of data users. We consider several key applications of Census data in redistricting, developing tools and demonstrations for practitioners who are concerned about the impacts of this new noising algorithm called TopDown. Based on a close look at reconstructed Texas data, we find reassuring evidence that TopDown will not threaten the ability to produce districts with tolerable population balance or to detect signals of racial polarization for Voting Rights Act enforcement.
M Abowd, John; M Schmutte, Ian; N Sexton, William; Vilhuber, Lars
(, AEA Papers and Proceedings)
When Google or the US Census Bureau publishes detailed statistics on browsing habits or neighborhood characteristics, some privacy is lost for everybody while supplying public information. To date, economists have not focused on the privacy loss inherent in data publication. In their stead, these issues have been advanced almost exclusively by computer scientists who are primarily interested in technical problems associated with protecting privacy. Economists should join the discussion, first to determine where to balance privacy protection against data quality--a social choice problem. Furthermore, economists must ensure new privacy models preserve the validity of public data for economic research.
Gao, Jie; Gong, Ruobin; Yu, Fang-Yi
(, Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence)
Many data applications have certain invariant constraints due to practical needs. Data curators who employ differential privacy need to respect such constraints on the sanitized data product as a primary utility requirement. Invariants challenge the formulation, implementation, and interpretation of privacy guarantees. We propose subspace differential privacy, to honestly characterize the dependence of the sanitized output on confidential aspects of the data. We discuss two design frameworks that convert well-known differentially private mechanisms, such as the Gaussian and the Laplace mechanisms, to subspace differentially private ones that respect the invariants specified by the curator. For linear queries, we discuss the design of near-optimal mechanisms that minimize the mean squared error. Subspace differentially private mechanisms rid the need for post-processing due to invariants, preserve transparency and statistical intelligibility of the output, and can be suitable for distributed implementation. We showcase the proposed mechanisms on the 2020 Census Disclosure Avoidance demonstration data, and a spatio-temporal dataset of mobile access point connections on a large university campus.
Dharangutte, Prathamesh; Gao, Jie; Gong, Ruobin; Yu, Fang-Yi
(, Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence)
We propose new differential privacy solutions for when external invariants and integer constraints are simultaneously enforced on the data product. These requirements arise in real world applications of private data curation, including the public release of the 2020 U.S. Decennial Census. They pose a great challenge to the production of provably private data products with adequate statistical usability. We propose integer subspace differential privacy to rigorously articulate the privacy guarantee when data products maintain both the invariants and integer characteristics, and demonstrate the composition and post-processing properties of our proposal. To address the challenge of sampling from a potentially highly restricted discrete space, we devise a pair of unbiased additive mechanisms, the generalized Laplace and the generalized Gaussian mechanisms, by solving the Diophantine equations as defined by the constraints. The proposed mechanisms have good accuracy, with errors exhibiting sub-exponential and sub-Gaussian tail probabilities respectively. To implement our proposal, we design an MCMC algorithm and supply empirical convergence assessment using estimated upper bounds on the total variation distance via L-lag coupling. We demonstrate the efficacy of our proposal with applications to a synthetic problem with intersecting invariants, a sensitive contingency table with known margins, and the 2010 Census county-level demonstration data with mandated fixed state population totals.
Fioretto, Ferdinando
(, International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2021))
Data sets and statistics about groups of individuals are increasingly collected and released, feeding many optimization and learning algorithms. In many cases, the released data contain sensitive information whose privacy is strictly regulated. For example, in the U.S., the census data is regulated under Title 13, which requires that no individual be identified from any data released by the Census Bureau. In Europe, data release is regulated according to the General Data Protection Regulation, which addresses the control and transfer of personal data. Differential privacy has emerged as the de-facto standard to protect data privacy. In a nutshell, differentially private algorithms protect an individual’s data by injecting random noise into the output of a computation that involves such data. While this process ensures privacy, it also impacts the quality of data analysis, and, when private data sets are used as inputs to complex machine learning or optimization tasks, they may produce results that are fundamentally different from those obtained on the original data and even rise unintended bias and fairness concerns. In this talk, I will first focus on the challenge of releasing privacy-preserving data sets for complex data analysis tasks. I will introduce the notion of Constrained-based Differential Privacy (C-DP), which allows casting the data release problem to an optimization problem whose goal is to preserve the salient features of the original data. I will review several applications of C-DP in the context of very large hierarchical census data, data streams, energy systems, and in the design of federated data-sharing protocols. Next, I will discuss how errors induced by differential privacy algorithms may propagate within a decision problem causing biases and fairness issues. This is particularly important as privacy-preserving data is often used for critical decision processes, including the allocation of funds and benefits to states and jurisdictions, which ideally should be fair and unbiased. Finally, I will conclude with a roadmap to future work and some open questions.
Petti, Samantha, and Flaxman, Abraham. Differential privacy in the 2020 US census: what will it do? Quantifying the accuracy/privacy tradeoff. Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10192012. Gates Open Research 3. Web. doi:10.12688/gatesopenres.13089.2.
Petti, Samantha, & Flaxman, Abraham. Differential privacy in the 2020 US census: what will it do? Quantifying the accuracy/privacy tradeoff. Gates Open Research, 3 (). Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10192012. https://doi.org/10.12688/gatesopenres.13089.2
@article{osti_10192012,
place = {Country unknown/Code not available},
title = {Differential privacy in the 2020 US census: what will it do? Quantifying the accuracy/privacy tradeoff},
url = {https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10192012},
DOI = {10.12688/gatesopenres.13089.2},
abstractNote = {Background: The 2020 US Census will use a novel approach to disclosure avoidance to protect respondents’ data, called TopDown. This TopDown algorithm was applied to the 2018 end-to-end (E2E) test of the decennial census. The computer code used for this test as well as accompanying exposition has recently been released publicly by the Census Bureau. Methods: We used the available code and data to better understand the error introduced by the E2E disclosure avoidance system when Census Bureau applied it to 1940 census data and we developed an empirical measure of privacy loss to compare the error and privacy of the new approach to that of a (non-differentially private) simple-random-sampling approach to protecting privacy. Results: We found that the empirical privacy loss of TopDown is substantially smaller than the theoretical guarantee for all privacy loss budgets we examined. When run on the 1940 census data, TopDown with a privacy budget of 1.0 was similar in error and privacy loss to that of a simple random sample of 50% of the US population. When run with a privacy budget of 4.0, it was similar in error and privacy loss of a 90% sample. Conclusions: This work fits into the beginning of a discussion on how to best balance privacy and accuracy in decennial census data collection, and there is a need for continued discussion.},
journal = {Gates Open Research},
volume = {3},
author = {Petti, Samantha and Flaxman, Abraham},
}
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