When a security vulnerability or other critical bug is not detected by the developers’ test suite, and is discovered post-deployment, developers must quickly devise a new test that reproduces the buggy behavior. Then the developers need to test whether their candidate patch indeed fixes the bug, without breaking other functionality, while racing to deploy before cyberattackers pounce on exposed user installations. This can be challenging when the bug discovery was due to factors that arose, perhaps transiently, in a specific user environment. If recording execution traces when the bad behavior occurred, record-replay technology faithfully replays the execution, in the developer environment, as if the program were executing in that user environment under the same conditions as the bug manifested. This includes intermediate program states dependent on system calls, memory layout, etc. as well as any externally-visible behavior. So the bug is reproduced, and many modern record-replay tools also integrate bug reproduction with interactive debuggers to help locate the root cause, but how do developers check whether their patch indeed eliminates the bug under those same conditions? State-of-the-art record-replay does not support replaying candidate patches that modify the program in ways that diverge program state from the original recording, but successfulmore »
Ad hoc Test Generation Through Binary Rewriting
When a security vulnerability or other critical bug is not detected by the developers' test suite, and is discovered post-deployment, developers must quickly devise a new test that reproduces the buggy behavior. Then the developers need to test whether their candidate patch indeed fixes the bug, without breaking other functionality, while racing to deploy before attackers pounce on exposed user installations. This can be challenging when factors in a specific user environment triggered the bug. If enabled, however, record-replay technology faithfully replays the execution in the developer environment as if the program were executing in that user environment under the same conditions as the bug manifested. This includes intermediate program states dependent on system calls, memory layout, etc. as well as any externally-visible behavior. Many modern record-replay tools integrate interactive debuggers, to help locate the root cause, but don't help the developers test whether their patch indeed eliminates the bug under those same conditions. In particular, modern record-replay tools that reproduce intermediate program state cannot replay recordings made with one version of a program using a different version of the program where the differences affect program state. This work builds on record-replay and binary rewriting to automatically generate and run more »
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10192348
- Journal Name:
- IEEE 20th International Working Conference on Source Code Analysis and Manipulation (SCAM)
- Page Range or eLocation-ID:
- 115 to 126
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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