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Title: Approximating Cumulative Pebbling Cost Is Unique Games Hard
The cumulative pebbling complexity of a directed acyclic graph G is defined as cc(G) = min_P ∑_i |P_i|, where the minimum is taken over all legal (parallel) black pebblings of G and |P_i| denotes the number of pebbles on the graph during round i. Intuitively, cc(G) captures the amortized Space-Time complexity of pebbling m copies of G in parallel. The cumulative pebbling complexity of a graph G is of particular interest in the field of cryptography as cc(G) is tightly related to the amortized Area-Time complexity of the Data-Independent Memory-Hard Function (iMHF) f_{G,H} [Joël Alwen and Vladimir Serbinenko, 2015] defined using a constant indegree directed acyclic graph (DAG) G and a random oracle H(⋅). A secure iMHF should have amortized Space-Time complexity as high as possible, e.g., to deter brute-force password attacker who wants to find x such that f_{G,H}(x) = h. Thus, to analyze the (in)security of a candidate iMHF f_{G,H}, it is crucial to estimate the value cc(G) but currently, upper and lower bounds for leading iMHF candidates differ by several orders of magnitude. Blocki and Zhou recently showed that it is NP-Hard to compute cc(G), but their techniques do not even rule out an efficient (1+ε)-approximation algorithm for any constant ε>0. We show that for any constant c > 0, it is Unique Games hard to approximate cc(G) to within a factor of c. Along the way, we show the hardness of approximation of the DAG Vertex Deletion problem on DAGs of constant indegree. Namely, we show that for any k,ε >0 and given a DAG G with N nodes and constant indegree, it is Unique Games hard to distinguish between the case that G is (e_1, d_1)-reducible with e_1=N^{1/(1+2 ε)}/k and d_1=k N^{2 ε/(1+2 ε)}, and the case that G is (e_2, d_2)-depth-robust with e_2 = (1-ε)k e_1 and d_2= 0.9 N^{(1+ε)/(1+2 ε)}, which may be of independent interest. Our result generalizes a result of Svensson who proved an analogous result for DAGs with indegree 𝒪(N).  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1755708
NSF-PAR ID:
10200737
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Leibniz international proceedings in informatics
Volume:
151
ISSN:
1868-8969
Page Range / eLocation ID:
13:1--13:27
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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