Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers

Ezra, Tomer; Feldman, Michal; Neyman, Eric; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Weinberg, Matt

doi:10.1109/FOCS.2019.00025

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Citation Details

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers

Award ID(s):: 1717899

PAR ID:: 10204982

Author(s) / Creator(s):: Ezra, Tomer; Feldman, Michal; Neyman, Eric; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal; Weinberg, Matt

Date Published:: 2019-11-01

Journal Name:: Foundations of Computer Science

Page Range / eLocation ID:: 249 to 272

Format(s):: Medium: X

Sponsoring Org:: National Science Foundation

Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
Accepted Manuscript
Conference Paper:
https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2019.00025

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