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Title: Cooperative Control of Mobile Robots with Stackelberg Learning
Multi-robot cooperation requires agents to make decisions that are consistent with the shared goal without disregarding action-specific preferences that might arise from asymmetry in capabilities and individual objectives. To accomplish this goal, we propose a method named SLiCC: Stackelberg Learning in Cooperative Control. SLiCC models the problem as a partially observable stochastic game composed of Stackelberg bimatrix games, and uses deep reinforcement learning to obtain the payoff matrices associated with these games. Appropriate cooperative actions are then selected with the derived Stackelberg equilibria. Using a bi-robot cooperative object transportation problem, we validate the performance of SLiCC against centralized multi-agent Q-learning and demonstrate that SLiCC achieves better combined utility.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1646556
PAR ID:
10211141
Author(s) / Creator(s):
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Intelligent robots and systems
ISSN:
2523-6466
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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