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Title: Integrating Security in Resource-Constrained Cyber-Physical Systems
Defense mechanisms against network-level attacks are commonly based on the use of cryptographic techniques, such as lengthy message authentication codes (MAC) that provide data integrity guarantees. However, such mechanisms require significant resources (both computational and network bandwidth), which prevents their continuous use in resource-constrained cyber-physical systems (CPS). Recently, it was shown how physical properties of controlled systems can be exploited to relax these stringent requirements for systems where sensor measurements and actuator commands are transmitted over a potentially compromised network; specifically, that merely intermittent use of data authentication (i.e., at occasional time points during system execution), can still provide strong Quality-of-Control (QoC) guarantees even in the presence of false-data injection attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. Consequently, in this work, we focus on integrating security into existing resource-constrained CPS, in order to protect against MitM attacks on a system where a set of control tasks communicates over a real-time network with system sensors and actuators. We introduce a design-time methodology that incorporates requirements for QoC in the presence of attacks into end-to-end timing constraints for real-time control transactions, which include data acquisition and authentication, real-time network messages, and control tasks. This allows us to formulate a mixed integer linear programming-based method for direct synthesis of schedulable tasks and message parameters (i.e., deadlines and offsets) that do not violate timing requirements for the already deployed controllers, while adding a sufficient level of protection against network-based attacks; specifically, the synthesis method also provides suitable intermittent authentication policies that ensure the desired QoC levels under attack. To additionally reduce the security-related bandwidth overhead, we propose the use of cumulative message authentication at time instances when the integrity of messages from subsets of sensors should be ensured. Furthermore, we introduce a method for the opportunistic use of the remaining resources to further improve the overall QoC guarantees while ensuring system (i.e., task and message) schedulability. Finally, we demonstrate applicability and scalability of our methodology on synthetic automotive systems as well as a real-world automotive case-study.  more » « less
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Author(s) / Creator(s):
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Date Published:
Journal Name:
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 27
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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