As radio spectrum sharing matures, one of the
main challenges becomes finding adequate governance systems
and the appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Historically, these
processes were assigned to a central entity (in most cases a
governmental agency). Nevertheless, the literature of Common
Pool Resources (CPRs) shows that other governance mechanisms
are possible, which include collaboration with a private, thirdparty
regulator or the complete absence of central institutions,
as in self-enforcement solutions. These alternatives have been
developed around well-known CPRs such as fisheries, forests, etc.
As argued by Weiss et al [50], and other researchers, spectrum
can indeed be considered to be a CPR. In this work we study
the two extremes of governance systems that could be applied
to spectrum sharing scenarios. Initially, we study the classical
centralized scheme of command and control, where governmental
institutions are in charge of rule-definition and enforcement.
Subsequently, we explore a government-less environment, i.e., a
distributed enforcement approach. In this anarchy situation (i.e.,
lack of a formal government intervention as defined by Leeson
[29]), rules and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product
of repeated interactions among the intervening agents. For our
analysis, we have selected the spectrum sharing framework of
the 1695-1710MHz band. We also use the definitions presented
by Bhattarai et al. [9], [10] as well as Altamimi [3] for managing
the size of the coordination and exclusion zones. In addition, we
utilize Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) to analyze the applicability
of these governance mechanisms. ABM simulation allows us to
explore how macro phenomena can emerge from micro-level
interactions of independent agents.
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Spectrum anarchy: why self-governance of the radio spectrum works better than we think
Abstract The exploitation of radio-electric spectrum bands for wireless transmission purposes has some features of the commons: it is subject to congestion and conflict without rules governing its use. The Coasean approach is to assign private property rights to overcome the tragedy of the spectrum commons. The process of assigning these rights is still centralized, with governments assigning property rights through agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the USA. We consider the possibility of self-governance of the spectrum. We use insights from the study of common pool resources governance to analyze the emergence of property rights to spectrum in a ‘government-less’ environment in which norms, rules, and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product of the repeated interactions among participants in the network. Our case study considers the spectrum-sharing arrangement in the 1,695–1,710 MHz band. Using agent-based modeling (ABM), we show that self-governance of the spectrum can work and under what conditions it is likely to improve the efficiency of the allocation of property rights.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1642949
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10218701
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Journal of Institutional Economics
- Volume:
- 16
- Issue:
- 6
- ISSN:
- 1744-1374
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 863 to 882
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137420000259
