WebAssembly (Wasm) is a low-level portable code format offering near native performance. It is intended as a compilation target for a wide variety of source languages. However, Wasm provides no direct support for non-local control flow features such as async/await, generators/iterators, lightweight threads, first-class continuations, etc. This means that compilers for source languages with such features must ceremoniously transform whole source programs in order to target Wasm.
We present WasmFX an extension to Wasm which provides a universal target for non-local control features via effect handlers, enabling compilers to translate such features directly into Wasm. Our extension is minimal and only adds three main instructions for creating, suspending, and resuming continuations. Moreover, our primitive instructions are type-safe providing typed continuations which are well-aligned with the design principles of Wasm whose stacks are typed. We present a formal specification of WasmFX and show that the extension is sound. We have implemented WasmFX as an extension to the Wasm reference interpreter and also built a prototype WasmFX extension for Wasmtime, a production-grade Wasm engine, piggybacking on Wasmtime's existing fibers API. The preliminary performance results for our prototype are encouraging, and we outline future plans to realise a native implementation.
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Wasm/k: delimited continuations for WebAssembly
WebAssembly is designed to be an alternative to JavaScript that is a safe, portable, and efficient compilation target for a variety of languages. The performance of high-level languages depends not only on the underlying performance of WebAssembly, but also on the quality of the generated WebAssembly code. In this paper, we identify several features of high-level languages that current approaches can only compile to WebAssembly by generating complex and inefficient code. We argue that these problems could be addressed if WebAssembly natively supported first-class continuations. We then present Wasm/k, which extends WebAssembly with delimited continuations. Wasm/k introduces no new value types, and thus does not require significant changes to the WebAssembly type system (validation). Wasm/k is safe, even in the presence of foreign function calls (e.g., to and from JavaScript). Finally, Wasm/k is amenable to efficient implementation: we implement Wasm/k as a local change to Wasmtime, an existing WebAssembly JIT. We evaluate Wasm/k by implementing C/k, which adds delimited continuations to C/C++. C/k uses Emscripten and its implementation serves as a case study on how to use Wasm/k in a compiler that targets WebAssembly. We present several case studies using C/k, and show that on implementing green threads, it can outperform the state-of-the-art approach Asyncify with an 18% improvement in performance and a 30% improvement in code size.
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- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10220886
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- ACM SIGPLAN International Symposium on Dynamic Languages (DLS)
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 16 to 28
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3426422.3426978
