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Title: FALCON: Framework for Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control Systems
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used to control physical processes in critical infrastructure. These systems are used in a wide variety of operations such as water treatment, power generation and distribution, and manufacturing. While the safety and security of these systems are of serious concern, recent reports have shown an increase in targeted attacks aimed at manipulating physical processes to cause catastrophic consequences. This trend emphasizes the need for algorithms and tools that provide resilient and smart attack detection mechanisms to protect ICS. In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection framework for ICS based on a deep neural network. The proposed methodology uses dilated convolution and long short-term memory (LSTM) layers to learn temporal as well as long term dependencies within sensor and actuator data in an ICS. The sensor/actuator data are passed through a unique feature engineering pipeline where wavelet transformation is applied to the sensor signals to extract features that are fed into the model. Additionally, this paper explores four variations of supervised deep learning models, as well as an unsupervised support vector machine (SVM) model for this problem. The proposed framework is validated on Secure Water Treatment testbed results. This framework detects more attacks in a shorter period of time than previously published methods.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1846493
PAR ID:
10222650
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Electronics
Volume:
9
Issue:
8
ISSN:
2079-9292
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1192
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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