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Can deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for image classification be interpreted as utility maximizers with information costs? By performing set-valued system identifica- tion for Bayesian decision systems, we demonstrate that deep CNNs behave equivalently (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) to rationally inattentive Bayesian utility maximizers, a generative model used extensively in economics for human decision-making. Our claim is based on approximately 500 numerical experiments on 5 widely used neural network archi- tectures. The parameters of the resulting interpretable model are computed efficiently via convex feasibility algorithms. As a practical application, we also illustrate how the reconstructed interpretable model can predict the classification performance of deep CNNs with high accuracy. The theoretical foundation of our approach lies in Bayesian revealed preference studied in micro-economics. All our results are on GitHub and completely reproducible.
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Rationally Inattentive Inverse Reinforcement Learning Explains YouTube Commenting Behavior
We consider a novel application of inverse reinforcement learning with behavioral economics constraints to model, learn and predict the commenting behavior of YouTube viewers. Each group of users is modeled as a rationally inattentive Bayesian agent which solves a contextual bandit problem. Our methodology integrates three key components. First, to identify distinct commenting patterns, we use deep embedded clustering to estimate framing information (essential extrinsic features) that clusters users into distinct groups. Second, we present an inverse reinforcement learning algorithm that uses Bayesian revealed preferences to test for rationality: does there exist a utility function that rationalizes the given data, and if yes, can it be used to predict commenting behavior? Finally, we impose behavioral economics constraints stemming from rational inattention to characterize the attention span of groups of users. The test imposes a Rényi mutual information cost constraint which impacts how the agent can select attention strategies to maximize their expected utility. After a careful analysis of a massive YouTube dataset, our surprising result is that in most YouTube user groups, the commenting behavior is consistent with optimizing a Bayesian utility with rationally inattentive constraints. The paper also highlights how the rational inattention model can accurately predict commenting behavior. The massive YouTube dataset and analysis used in this paper are available on GitHub and completely reproducible
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- Award ID(s):
- 1714180
- PAR ID:
- 10227155
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Journal of machine learning research
- Volume:
- 21
- ISSN:
- 1532-4435
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1-39
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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