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1. SGD Learns One-Layer Networks in WGANs

   Lei, Q; Lee, J; Dimakis, A (January 2020, 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2020)

   null (Ed.)

   Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a widely used framework for learning generative models. Wasserstein GANs (WGANs), one of the most successful variants of GANs, require solving a minmax optimization problem to global optimality, but are in practice successfully trained using stochastic gradient descent-ascent. In this paper, we show that, when the generator is a one-layer network, stochastic gradient descent-ascent converges to a global solution with polynomial time and sample complexity. 

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2. Extra-gradient with player sampling for provable fast convergence in n-player games

   Jelassi, Samy; Domingo-Enrich, Carles; Scieur, Damien; Mensch, Arthur; Bruna, Joan (January 2020, international conference on machine learning)

   Data-driven modeling increasingly requires to find a Nash equilibrium in multi-player games, e.g. when training GANs. In this paper, we analyse a new extra-gradient method for Nash equilibrium finding, that performs gradient extrapolations and updates on a random subset of players at each iteration. This approach provably exhibits a better rate of convergence than full extra-gradient for non-smooth convex games with noisy gradient oracle. We propose an additional variance reduction mechanism to obtain speed-ups in smooth convex games. Our approach makes extrapolation amenable to massive multiplayer settings, and brings empirical speed-ups, in particular when using a heuristic cyclic sampling scheme. Most importantly, it allows to train faster and better GANs and mixtures of GANs. 

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3. On adversarial robustness and the use of Wasserstein ascent-descent dynamics to enforce it

   https://doi.org/10.1093/imaiai/iaae018  

   García_Trillos, Camilo Andrés; García_Trillos, Nicolás (July 2024, Information and Inference: A Journal of the IMA)

   Abstract We propose iterative algorithms to solve adversarial training problems in a variety of supervised learning settings of interest. Our algorithms, which can be interpreted as suitable ascent-descent dynamics in Wasserstein spaces, take the form of a system of interacting particles. These interacting particle dynamics are shown to converge toward appropriate mean-field limit equations in certain large number of particles regimes. In turn, we prove that, under certain regularity assumptions, these mean-field equations converge, in the large time limit, toward approximate Nash equilibria of the original adversarial learning problems. We present results for non-convex non-concave settings, as well as for non-convex concave ones. Numerical experiments illustrate our results. 

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4. Stochastic Smoothed Gradient Descent Ascent for Federated Minimax Optimization

   Shen, W; Huang, M; Zhang, J; Shen, C (July 2024, Proceedings of The 27th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics)

   In recent years, federated minimax optimization has attracted growing interest due to its extensive applications in various machine learning tasks. While Smoothed Alternative Gradient Descent Ascent (Smoothed-AGDA) has proved successful in centralized nonconvex minimax optimization, how and whether smoothing techniques could be helpful in a federated setting remains unexplored. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm termed Federated Stochastic Smoothed Gradient Descent Ascent (FESS-GDA), which utilizes the smoothing technique for federated minimax optimization. We prove that FESS-GDA can be uniformly applied to solve several classes of federated minimax problems and prove new or better analytical convergence results for these settings. We showcase the practical efficiency of FESS-GDA in practical federated learning tasks of training generative adversarial networks (GANs) and fair classification. 

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5. From Nash Equilibria to Chain Recurrent Sets: An Algorithmic Solution Concept for Game Theory

   https://doi.org/10.3390/e20100782  

   Papadimitriou, Christos; Piliouras, Georgios (October 2018, Entropy)

   In 1950, Nash proposed a natural equilibrium solution concept for games hence called Nash equilibrium, and proved that all finite games have at least one. The proof is through a simple yet ingenious application of Brouwer’s (or, in another version Kakutani’s) fixed point theorem, the most sophisticated result in his era’s topology—in fact, recent algorithmic work has established that Nash equilibria are computationally equivalent to fixed points. In this paper, we propose a new class of universal non-equilibrium solution concepts arising from an important theorem in the topology of dynamical systems that was unavailable to Nash. This approach starts with both a game and a learning dynamics, defined over mixed strategies. The Nash equilibria are fixpoints of the dynamics, but the system behavior is captured by an object far more general than the Nash equilibrium that is known in dynamical systems theory as chain recurrent set. Informally, once we focus on this solution concept—this notion of “the outcome of the game”—every game behaves like a potential game with the dynamics converging to these states. In other words, unlike Nash equilibria, this solution concept is algorithmic in the sense that it has a constructive proof of existence. We characterize this solution for simple benchmark games under replicator dynamics, arguably the best known evolutionary dynamics in game theory. For (weighted) potential games, the new concept coincides with the fixpoints/equilibria of the dynamics. However, in (variants of) zero-sum games with fully mixed (i.e., interior) Nash equilibria, it covers the whole state space, as the dynamics satisfy specific information theoretic constants of motion. We discuss numerous novel computational, as well as structural, combinatorial questions raised by this chain recurrence conception of games. 

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