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People often test changes to see if the change is producing the desired result (e.g., does taking an antidepressant improve my mood, or does keeping to a consistent schedule reduce a child’s tantrums?). Despite the prevalence of such decisions in everyday life, it is unknown how well people can assess whether the change has influenced the result. According to interrupted time series analysis (ITSA), doing so involves assessing whether there has been a change to the mean (‘level’) or slope of the outcome, after versus before the change. Making this assessment could be hard for multiple reasons. First, people may have difficulty understanding the need to control the slope prior to the change. Additionally, one may need to remember events that occurred prior to the change, which may be a long time ago. In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested how well people can judge causality in 9 ITSA situations across 4 presentation formats in which participants were presented with the data simultaneously or in quick succession. We also explored individual differences. In Experiment 3, we tested how well people can judge causality when the events were spaced out once per day, mimicking a more realistic timeframe of how people make changes in their lives. We found that participants were able to learn accurate causal relations when there is a zero pre-intervention slope in the time series but had difficulty controlling for nonzero pre-intervention slopes. We discuss these results in terms of 2 heuristics that people might use.
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Causal Learning with Interrupted Time Series
Interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) is a statistical procedure that evaluates whether an intervention causes a change in the intercept and/or slope of the time series. However, very little research has accessed causal learning in interrupted time series situations. We systematically investigated whether people are able to learn causal influences from a process akin to ITSA, and compared four different presentation formats of stimuli. We found that participants’ judgments agreed with ITSA in cases in which the pre-intervention slope is zero or in the same direction as the changes in intercept or slope. How- ever, participants had considerable difficulty controlling for pre-intervention slope when it is in the opposite direction of the changes in intercept or slope. The presentation formats didn’t affect judgments in most cases, but did in one. We discuss these results in terms of two potential heuristics that people might use aside from a process akin to ITSA.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1651330
- PAR ID:
- 10237621
- Editor(s):
- Fitch, T; Lamm, C; Leder, H; Tessmar, K
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society
- ISSN:
- 1069-7977
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
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