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Modern attacks against enterprises often have multiple targets inside the enterprise network. Due to the large size of these networks and increasingly stealthy attacks, attacker activities spanning multiple hosts are extremely difficult to correlate during a threat-hunting effort. In this paper, we present a method for an efficient cross-host attack correlation across multiple hosts. Unlike previous works, our approach does not require lateral movement detection techniques or host-level modifications. Instead, our approach relies on an observation that attackers have a few strategic mission objectives on every host that they infiltrate, and there exist only a handful of techniques for achieving those objectives. The central idea behind our approach involves comparing (OS agnostic) activities on different hosts and correlating the hosts that display the use of similar tactics, techniques, and procedures. We implement our approach in a tool called Ostinato and successfully evaluate it in threat hunting scenarios involving DARPA-led red team engagements spanning 500 hosts and in another multi-host attack scenario. Ostinato successfully detected 21 additional compromised hosts, which the underlying host-based detection system overlooked in activities spanning multiple days of the attack campaign. Additionally, Ostinato successfully reduced alarms generated from the underlying detection system by more than 90%, thus helping to mitigate the threat alert fatigue problem.
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Hopper: Modeling and Detecting Lateral Movement
In successful enterprise attacks, adversaries often need to gain access to additional machines beyond their initial point of compromise, a set of internal movements known as lateral movement. We present Hopper, a system for detecting lateral movement based on commonly available enterprise logs. Hopper constructs a graph of login activity among internal machines and then identifies suspicious sequences of logins that correspond to lateral movement. To understand the larger context of each login, Hopper employs an inference algorithm to identify the broader path(s) of movement that each login belongs to and the causal user responsible for performing a path's logins. Hopper then leverages this path inference algorithm, in conjunction with a set of detection rules and a new anomaly scoring algorithm, to surface the login paths most likely to reflect lateral movement. On a 15-month enterprise dataset consisting of over 780 million internal logins, Hopper achieves a 94.5% detection rate across over 300 realistic attack scenarios, including one red team attack, while generating an average of < 9 alerts per day. In contrast, to detect the same number of attacks, prior state-of-the-art systems would need to generate nearly 8× as many false positives.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1705050
- PAR ID:
- 10287362
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- USENIX Security Symposium
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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