skip to main content


Title: Swarm Contracts: Smart Contracts in Robotic Swarms with Varying Agent Behavior
Award ID(s):
1718755
NSF-PAR ID:
10292232
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
265 to 272
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. “Data is the new oil” has become a popular catch-phrase in the world of technology, emphasizing the immense value of data in today's digital age. Most services and platforms rely on data, but collecting this data can be challenging and costly. To address this issue, we leverage a novel distributed crowdsourcing framework - termed Swarm Contracts - that utilizes blockchain and is applied to robotics technologies. The framework encourages an incentivized crowdsourcing model through open-source robots and a secure, decentralized, and transparent blockchain-based incentive system. As a demonstration of the framework's capabilities, we use it to collect Google Street View ® map data, which can be a resource-intensive task to keep up to date using traditional centralized methods. Our Swarm Contract framework uses Google Street View ® Publish API, which allows for the contribution of street view data to Google Maps @to implement the incentive-based crowdsourcing of street view images. By incorporating a swarm contract-powered framework with the Google Street View ® Publish API, we show that the incentivized crowdsourcing of street view data can be a practical solution to maintain accurate and up-to-date Google Street View ® maps. 
    more » « less
  2. We study the problem of designing cyber insurance policies in an interdependent network, where the loss of one agent (a primary party) depends not only on his own effort, but also on the investments and efforts of others (third parties) in the same eco-system (i.e., externalities). In designing cyber insurance policies, the conventional wisdom is to avoid insuring dependent parties for two reasons. First, simultaneous loss incidents threaten the insurer's business and capital. Second, when a loss incident can be attributed to a third party, the insurer of the primary party can get compensation from the insurer of the third party in order to reduce its own risk exposure. In this work, we analyze an interdependent network model in order to understand whether an insurer should avoid or embrace risks interdependencies. We focus on two interdependent agents, where the risk of one agent (primary party) depends on the other agent (third party), but not the other way around. We consider two potential scenarios: one in which an insurer only insures a primary party, and another one in which the insurer of the primary party further insures the third party agent. We show that it is in fact profitable for the primary party's insurer to insure both agents. Further, we show that insuring both agents not only provides higher profit for the insurer, but also reduces the collective risk. 
    more » « less