skip to main content

Title: CONTRA: Defending against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is an emerging machine learning paradigm. With FL, distributed data owners aggregate their model updates to train a shared deep neural network collaboratively, while keeping the training data locally. However, FL has little control over the local data and the training process. Therefore, it is susceptible to poisoning attacks, in which malicious or compromised clients use malicious training data or local updates as the attack vector to poison the trained global model. Moreover, the performance of existing detection and defense mechanisms drops significantly in a scaled-up FL system with non-iid data distributions. In this paper, we propose a defense scheme named CONTRA to defend against poisoning attacks, e.g., label-flipping and backdoor attacks, in FL systems. CONTRA implements a cosine-similarity-based measure to determine the credibility of local model parameters in each round and a reputation scheme to dynamically promote or penalize individual clients based on their per-round and historical contributions to the global model. With extensive experiments, we show that CONTRA significantly reduces the attack success rate while achieving high accuracy with the global model. Compared with a state-of-the-art (SOTA) defense, CONTRA reduces the attack success rate by 70% and reduces the global model performance degradation by 50%.
Authors:
; ;
Award ID(s):
2014552
Publication Date:
NSF-PAR ID:
10294585
Journal Name:
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. Federated learning (FL) is known to be susceptible to model poisoning attacks in which malicious clients hamper the accuracy of the global model by sending manipulated model updates to the central server during the FL training process. Existing defenses mainly focus on Byzantine-robust FL aggregations, and largely ignore the impact of the underlying deep neural network (DNN) that is used to FL training. Inspired by recent findings on critical learning periods (CLP) in DNNs, where small gradient errors have irrecoverable impact on the final model accuracy, we propose a new defense, called a CLP-aware defense against poisoning of FL (DeFL). The key idea of DeFL is to measure fine-grained differences between DNN model updates via an easy-to-compute federated gradient norm vector (FGNV) metric. Using FGNV, DeFL simultaneously detects malicious clients and identifies CLP, which in turn is leveraged to guide the adaptive removal of detected malicious clients from aggregation. As a result, DeFL not only mitigates model poisoning attacks on the global model but also is robust to detection errors. Our extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets demonstrate that DeFL produces significant performance gain over conventional defenses against state-of-the-art model poisoning attacks.
  2. Federated learning (FL) allows a set of agents to collaboratively train a model without sharing their potentially sensitive data. This makes FL suitable for privacy-preserving applications. At the same time, FL is susceptible to adversarial attacks due to decentralized and unvetted data. One important line of attacks against FL is the backdoor attacks. In a backdoor attack, an adversary tries to embed a backdoor functionality to the model during training that can later be activated to cause a desired misclassification. To prevent backdoor attacks, we propose a lightweight defense that requires minimal change to the FL protocol. At a high level, our defense is based on carefully adjusting the aggregation server's learning rate, per dimension and per round, based on the sign information of agents' updates. We first conjecture the necessary steps to carry a successful backdoor attack in FL setting, and then, explicitly formulate the defense based on our conjecture. Through experiments, we provide empirical evidence that supports our conjecture, and we test our defense against backdoor attacks under different settings. We observe that either backdoor is completely eliminated, or its accuracy is significantly reduced. Overall, our experiments suggest that our defense significantly outperforms some of the recently proposedmore »defenses in the literature. We achieve this by having minimal influence over the accuracy of the trained models. In addition, we also provide convergence rate analysis for our proposed scheme.« less
  3. Recent years have seen the increasing attention and popularity of federated learning (FL), a distributed learning framework for privacy and data security. However, by its fundamental design, federated learning is inherently vulnerable to model poisoning attacks: a malicious client may submit the local updates to influence the weights of the global model. Therefore, detecting malicious clients against model poisoning attacks in federated learning is useful in safety-critical tasks.However, existing methods either fail to analyze potential malicious data or are computationally restrictive. To overcome these weaknesses, we propose a robust federated learning method where the central server learns a supervised anomaly detector using adversarial data generated from a variety of state-of-the-art poisoning attacks. The key idea of this powerful anomaly detector lies in a comprehensive understanding of the benign update through distinguishing it from the diverse malicious ones. The anomaly detector would then be leveraged in the process of federated learning to automate the removal of malicious updates (even from unforeseen attacks).Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate its effectiveness against backdoor attacks, where the attackers inject adversarial triggers such that the global model will make incorrect predictions on the poisoned samples. We have verified that our method can achieve 99.0% detection AUCmore »scores while enjoying longevity as the model converges. Our method has also shown significant advantages over existing robust federated learning methods in all settings. Furthermore, our method can be easily generalized to incorporate newly-developed poisoning attacks, thus accommodating ever-changing adversarial learning environments.« less
  4. The conventional machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) methods use large amount of data to construct desirable prediction models in a central fusion center for recognizing human activities. However, such model training encounters high communication costs and leads to privacy infringement. To address the issues of high communication overhead and privacy leakage, we employed a widely popular distributed ML technique called Federated Learning (FL) that generates a global model for predicting human activities by combining participated agents’ local knowledge. The state-of-the-art FL model fails to maintain acceptable accuracy when there is a large number of unreliable agents who can infuse false model, or, resource-constrained agents that fails to perform an assigned computational task within a given time window. We developed an FL model for predicting human activities by monitoring agent’s contributions towards model convergence and avoiding the unreliable and resource-constrained agents from training. We assign a score to each client when it joins in a network and the score is updated based on the agent’s activities during training. We consider three mobile robots as FL clients that are heterogeneous in terms of their resources such as processing capability, memory, bandwidth, battery-life and data volume. We consider heterogeneous mobile robotsmore »for understanding the effects of real-world FL setting in presence of resource-constrained agents. We consider an agent unreliable if it repeatedly gives slow response or infuses incorrect models during training. By disregarding the unreliable and weak agents, we carry-out the local training of the FL process on selected agents. If somehow, a weak agent is selected and started showing straggler issues, we leverage asynchronous FL mechanism that aggregate the local models whenever it receives a model update from the agents. Asynchronous FL eliminates the issue of waiting for a long time to receive model updates from the weak agents. To the end, we simulate how we can track the behavior of the agents through a reward-punishment scheme and present the influence of unreliable and resource-constrained agents in the FL process. We found that FL performs slightly worse than centralized models, if there is no unreliable and resource-constrained agent. However, as the number of malicious and straggler clients increases, our proposed model performs more effectively by identifying and avoiding those agents while recognizing human activities as compared to the stateof-the-art FL and ML approaches.« less
  5. Motivated by the ever-increasing concerns on personal data privacy and the rapidly growing data volume at local clients, federated learning (FL) has emerged as a new machine learning setting. An FL system is comprised of a central parameter server and multiple local clients. It keeps data at local clients and learns a centralized model by sharing the model parameters learned locally. No local data needs to be shared, and privacy can be well protected. Nevertheless, since it is the model instead of the raw data that is shared, the system can be exposed to the poisoning model attacks launched by malicious clients. Furthermore, it is challenging to identify malicious clients since no local client data is available on the server. Besides, membership inference attacks can still be performed by using the uploaded model to estimate the client's local data, leading to privacy disclosure. In this work, we first propose a model update based federated averaging algorithm to defend against Byzantine attacks such as additive noise attacks and sign-flipping attacks. The individual client model initialization method is presented to provide further privacy protections from the membership inference attacks by hiding the individual local machine learning model. When combining these two schemes,more »privacy and security can be both effectively enhanced. The proposed schemes are proved to converge experimentally under non-lID data distribution when there are no attacks. Under Byzantine attacks, the proposed schemes perform much better than the classical model based FedAvg algorithm.« less