We propose a quantum algorithm for computing an isogeny between two elliptic curves E1,E2 defined over a finite field such that there is an imaginary quadratic order O satisfying O~End(Ei )for i=1,2. This concerns ordinary curves and supersingular curves defined over Fp (the latter used in the recent CSIDH proposal). Our algorithm has heuristic asymptotic run time exp(O(√log(|Δ|))) and requires polynomial quantum memory and exp(O(√log(|Δ|))) quantumly accessible classical memory, where Δ is the discriminant of O. This asymptotic complexity outperforms all other available methods for computing isogenies.We also show that a variant of our method has asymptotic run time e exp(Õ(√log(|Δ|))) while requesting only polynomial memory (both quantum and classical).
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A trade-off between classical and quantum circuit size for an attack against CSIDH
Abstract We propose a heuristic algorithm to solve the underlying hard problem of the CSIDH cryptosystem (and other isogeny-based cryptosystems using elliptic curves with endomorphism ring isomorphic to an imaginary quadratic order 𝒪). Let Δ = Disc(𝒪) (in CSIDH, Δ = −4 p for p the security parameter). Let 0 < α < 1/2, our algorithm requires: A classical circuit of size 2 O ˜ log ( | Δ | ) 1 − α . $$2^{\tilde{O}\left(\log(|\Delta|)^{1-\alpha}\right)}.$$ A quantum circuit of size 2 O ˜ log ( | Δ | ) α . $$2^{\tilde{O}\left(\log(|\Delta|)^{\alpha}\right)}.$$ Polynomial classical and quantum memory. Essentially, we propose to reduce the size of the quantum circuit below the state-of-the-art complexity 2 O ˜ log ( | Δ | ) 1 / 2 $$2^{\tilde{O}\left(\log(|\Delta|)^{1/2}\right)}$$ at the cost of increasing the classical circuit-size required. The required classical circuit remains subexponential, which is a superpolynomial improvement over the classical state-of-the-art exponential solutions to these problems. Our method requires polynomial memory, both classical and quantum.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1839805
- PAR ID:
- 10295503
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
- Volume:
- 15
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 1862-2984
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 4 to 17
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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