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Title: Discriminative Pattern Mining for Runtime Security Enforcement of Cyber-Physical Point-of-Care Medical Technology
Point-of-care diagnostics are a key technology for various safety-critical applications from providing diagnostics in developing countries lacking adequate medical infrastructure to fight infectious diseases to screening procedures for border protection. Digital microfluidics biochips are an emerging technology that are increasingly being evaluated as a viable platform for rapid diagnosis and point-of-care field deployment. In such a technology, processing errors are inherent. Cyber-physical digital biochips offer higher reliability through the inclusion of automated error recovery mechanisms that can reconfigure operations performed on the electrode array. Recent research has begun to explore security vulnerabilities of digital microfluidic systems. This paper expands previous work that exploits vulnerabilities due to implicit trust in the error recovery mechanism. In this work, a discriminative data mining approach is introduced to identify frequent bioassay operations that can be cyber-physically attested for runtime security protection.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1837472
NSF-PAR ID:
10301322
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2021 IEEE 45th Annual Computers, Software, and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1066 to 1072
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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