We study learning-based trading strategies in markets where prices can be manipulated through spoofing: the practice of submitting spurious orders to mislead traders who use market information. To reduce the vulnerability of learning traders to such manipulation, we propose two variations based on the standard heuristic belief learning (HBL) trading strategy, which learns transaction probabilities from market activities observed in an order book. The first variation selectively ignores orders at certain price levels, particularly where spoof orders are likely to be placed. The second considers the full order book, but adjusts its limit order price to correct for bias inmore »
This content will become publicly available on June 1, 2022
Spoofing the Limit Order Book: A Strategic Agent-Based Analysis
We present an agent-based model of manipulating prices in financial markets through spoofing: submitting spurious orders to mislead traders who learn from the order book. Our model captures a complex market environment for a single security, whose common value is given by a dynamic fundamental time series. Agents trade through a limit-order book, based on their private values and noisy observations of the fundamental. We consider background agents following two types of trading strategies: the non-spoofable zero intelligence (ZI) that ignores the order book and the manipulable heuristic belief learning (HBL) that exploits the order book to predict price outcomes. We conduct empirical game-theoretic analysis upon simulated agent payoffs across parametrically different environments and measure the effect of spoofing on market performance in approximate strategic equilibria. We demonstrate that HBL traders can benefit price discovery and social welfare, but their existence in equilibrium renders a market vulnerable to manipulation: simple spoofing strategies can effectively mislead traders, distort prices and reduce total surplus. Based on this model, we propose to mitigate spoofing from two aspects: (1) mechanism design to disincentivize manipulation; and (2) trading strategy variations to improve the robustness of learning from market information. We evaluate the proposed approaches, taking more »
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10310773
- Journal Name:
- Games
- Volume:
- 12
- Issue:
- 2
- ISSN:
- 2073-4336
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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