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Concurrent systems software is widely-used, complex, and error-prone, posing a significant security risk. We introduce VRM, a new framework that makes it possible for the first time to verify concurrent systems software, such as operating systems and hypervisors, on Arm relaxed memory hardware. VRM defines a set of synchronization and memory access conditions such that a program that satisfies these conditions can be mostly verified on a sequentially consistent hardware model and the proofs will automatically hold on relaxed memory hardware. VRM can be used to verify concurrent kernel code that is not data race free, including code responsible for managing shared page tables in the presence of relaxed MMU hardware. Using VRM, we verify the security guarantees of a retrofitted implementation of the Linux KVM hypervisor on Arm. For multiple versions of KVM, we prove KVM's security properties on a sequentially consistent model, then prove that KVM satisfies VRM's required program conditions such that its security proofs hold on Arm relaxed memory hardware. Our experimental results show that the retrofit and VRM conditions do not adversely affect the scalability of verified KVM, as it performs similar to unmodified KVM when concurrently running many multiprocessor virtual machines with real application workloads on Arm multiprocessor server hardware. Our work is the first machine-checked proof for concurrent systems software on Arm relaxed memory hardware.
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ARM Virtualization: Performance and Architectural Implications
ARM servers are becoming increasingly common, making server technologies such as virtualization for ARM of growing importance. We present the first study of ARM virtualization performance on server hardware, including multi-core measurements of two popular ARM and x86 hypervisors, KVM and Xen. We show how ARM hardware support for virtualization can enable much faster transitions between VMs and the hypervisor, a key hypervisor operation. However, current hypervisor designs, including both Type 1 hypervisors such as Xen and Type 2 hypervisors such as KVM, are not able to leverage this performance benefit for real application workloads on ARMv8.0. We discuss the reasons why and show that other factors related to hypervisor software design and implementation have a larger role in overall performance. Based on our measurements, we discuss software changes and new hardware features, the Virtualization Host Extensions (VHE), added in ARMv8.1 that bridge the gap and bring ARM's faster VM-to-hypervisor transition mechanism to modern Type 2 hypervisors running real applications.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1422909
- PAR ID:
- 10310788
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Operating systems review
- Volume:
- 52
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 0163-5980
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3273982.3273987
