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Title: Probabilistic annotations for protocol models
We describe how a probabilistic Hoare logic with localities can be used for reasoning about security. As a proof-of-concept, we analyze Vernam and El-Gamal cryptosystems, prove the security properties that they do satisfy, and disprove those that they do not. We also consider a version of the Muddy Children puzzle, where children’s trust and noise are taken into account.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1662487
PAR ID:
10312051
Author(s) / Creator(s):
Editor(s):
Dougherty, D.
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Lecture notes in computer science
Volume:
13066
ISSN:
1611-3349
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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