Online trackers are invasive as they track our digital footprints, many of which are sensitive in nature, and when aggregated over time, they can help infer intricate details about our lifestyles and habits. Although much research has been conducted to understand the effectiveness of existing countermeasures for the desktop platform, little is known about how mobile browsers have evolved to handle online trackers. With mobile devices now generating more web traffic than their desktop counterparts, we fill this research gap through a large-scale comparative analysis of mobile web browsers. We crawl 10K valid websites from the Tranco list on real mobile devices. Our data collection process covers both popular generic browsers (e.g., Chrome, Firefox, and Safari) as well as privacy-focused browsers (e.g., Brave, Duck Duck Go, and Firefox-Focus). We use dynamic analysis of runtime execution traces and static analysis of source codes to highlight the tracking behavior of invasive fingerprinters. We also find evidence of tailored content being served to different browsers. In particular, we note that Firefox Focus sees altered script code, whereas Brave and Duck Duck Go have highly similar content. To test the privacy protection of browsers, we measure the responses of each browser in blocking trackers and advertisers and note the strengths and weaknesses of privacy browsers. To establish ground truth, we use well-known block lists, including EasyList, EasyPrivacy, Disconnect and WhoTracksMe and find that Brave generally blocks the highest number of content that should be blocked as per these lists. Focus performs better against social trackers, and Duck Duck Go restricts third-party trackers that perform email-based tracking.
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OmniCrawl: Comprehensive Measurement of Web Tracking With Real Desktop and Mobile Browsers
Abstract Over half of all visits to websites now take place in a mobile browser, yet the majority of web privacy studies take the vantage point of desktop browsers, use emulated mobile browsers, or focus on just a single mobile browser instead. In this paper, we present a comprehensive web-tracking measurement study on mobile browsers and privacy-focused mobile browsers. Our study leverages a new web measurement infrastructure, OmniCrawl, which we develop to drive browsers on desktop computers and smartphones located on two continents. We capture web tracking measurements using 42 different non-emulated browsers simultaneously. We find that the third-party advertising and tracking ecosystem of mobile browsers is more similar to that of desktop browsers than previous findings suggested. We study privacy-focused browsers and find their protections differ significantly and in general are less for lower-ranked sites. Our findings also show that common methodological choices made by web measurement studies, such as the use of emulated mobile browsers and Selenium, can lead to website behavior that deviates from what actual users experience.
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- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10313206
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Volume:
- 2022
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 2299-0984
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2022-0012
