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We solve a long-standing challenge to the integrity of votes cast without the supervision of a voting booth: ``{\it improper influence},'' which typically refers to any combination of vote buying and voter coercion. Our approach allows each voter, or their trusted agents (which we call ``{\it hedgehogs}''), to {\it ``nullify''} (effectively cancel) their vote in a way that is unstoppable, irrevocable, and forever unattributable to the voter. In particular, our approach enhances security of online, remote, public-sector elections, for which there is a growing need and the threat of improper influence is most acute. We introduce the new approach, give detailed cryptographic protocols, show how it can be applied to several voting settings, and describe our implementation. The protocols compose a full voting system, which we call {\it {\votexx}}, including registration, voting, nullification, and tallying---using an anonymous communication system for registration, vote casting, and other communication in the system. We demonstrate how the technique can be applied to known systems, including where ballots can be mailed to voters and voters use codes on the ballot to cast their votes online. In comparison with previous proposals, our system makes fewer assumptions and protects against a strong adversary who learns all of the voter's keys. In {\votexx}, each voter has two public-private key pairs. Without revealing their private keys, each voter registers their public keys with the election authority. Each voter may share their keys with one or more hedgehogs. During nullification, the voter, or one or more of their hedgehogs, can interact through the anonymous communication system to nullify a vote by proving knowledge of one of the voter's private keys via a zero-knowledge proof without revealing the private key. We describe a fully decentralizable implementation of {\votexx}, including its public bulletin board, which could be implemented on a blockchain.
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Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and Preferences
We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. As a special case, our model captures the common scenario where voters can be categorized into three types: those who always prefer one alternative, those who always prefer the other, and those contingent voters whose preferences depends on the state. In this setting, even if every voter is a contingent voter, agents voting according to their private information need not result in the adoption of the universally preferred alternative, because the signals can be systematically biased.We present a mechanism that elicits and aggregates the private signals from the voters, and outputs the alternative that is favored by the majority. In particular, voters truthfully reporting their signals forms a strong Bayes Nash equilibrium (where no coalition of voters can deviate and receive a better outcome).
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- PAR ID:
- 10316791
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34 pre-proceedings (NeurIPS 2021)
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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We solve a long-standing challenge to the integrity of votes cast without the supervision of a voting booth: ``improper influence,'' which we define as any combination of vote buying and voter coercion. In comparison with previous proposals, our system is the first in the literature to protect against a strong adversary who learns all of the voter's keys---we call this property ``extreme coercion resistance.'' Our approach allows each voter, or their trusted agents (which we call ``hedgehogs''), to ``nullify'' (effectively cancel) their vote in a way that is unstoppable and irrevocable, and such that the nullification action is forever unattributable to that voter or their hedgehog(s). We demonstrate the security of VoteXX in the {universal composability} model. Additionally we provide concrete implementations of sub-protocols---including inalienable authentication, decentralized bulletin boards, and anonymous communication channels---that are usually left as abstract assumptions in the literature. As in many other coercion-resistant systems, voters are authorized to vote with public-private keys. Each voter registers their public keys with the Election Authority (EA) in a way that convinces the EA that the voter has complete knowledge of their private keys. Voters concerned about losing their private keys can themselves, or by delegating to one or more hedgehog(s), monitor the bulletin board for malicious ballots cast with their keys, and can act to nullify these ballots in a privacy-preserving manner with zero-knowledge proofs. In comparison with previous proposals, our system makes fewer assumptions and protects against a stronger adversary. For example, votexx makes none of the following assumptions made by previous systems: the voter must complete registration before being coerced; the election will not close before the voter can cast a ballot after coercion; the voter needs to generate a fake password to evade coercion; and the voter knows an honest Election Authority official.more » « less
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