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We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. As a special case, our model captures the common scenario where voters can be categorized into three types: those who always prefer one alternative, those who always prefer the other, and those contingent voters whose preferences depends on the state. In this setting, even if every voter is a contingent voter, agents voting according to their private information need not result in the adoption of the universally preferred alternative, because the signals can be systematically biased.We present a mechanism that elicits and aggregates the private signals from the voters, and outputs the alternative that is favored by the majority. In particular, voters truthfully reporting their signals forms a strong Bayes Nash equilibrium (where no coalition of voters can deviate and receive a better outcome).
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The Wisdom of Strategic Voting
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the "correct" decision, outperforming the common non-strategic behavior of informative voting and sincere voting. Our results give merit to strategic voting for making good decisions. To this end, we investigate a natural model, where voters' preferences between two alternatives depend on a discrete state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated with the state variable. We reveal a surprising equilibrium between a strategy profile being a strong equilibrium and leading to the decision favored by the majority of agents conditioned on them knowing the ground truth (referred to as the informed majority decision): as the size of the vote goes to infinity, every ε-strong Bayes Nash Equilibrium with ε converging to 0 formed by strategic agents leads to the informed majority decision with probability converging to 1. On the other hand, we show that informative voting leads to the informed majority decision only under unbiased instances, and sincere voting leads to the informed majority decision only when it also forms an equilibrium.
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- PAR ID:
- 10536747
- Publisher / Repository:
- ACM
- Date Published:
- ISBN:
- 9798400701047
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 885 to 905
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- London United Kingdom
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597681
