We have been studying the stratigraphy of core LWB4-1 taken in 2001 in the Hudson River about 100 meters north of the calculated transit path of the Peekskill meteorite in October 1992. We measured magnetic susceptibility at 1cm intervals from 0 -70 cm depth and found a layer with a magnetic susceptibility of 11 cgs units at 6 cm depth. This is the highest susceptibility in the top 40 cm of the core. Scanning X-Ray Fluorescence spectroscopy revealed the high susceptibility layer at 6 cm depth is part of a 3 cm interval with a high Ni/Cr ratio, but the depth of the peak in the Ni/Cr ratio is poorly resolved due to measurement error. We plan to dry and homogenize discreet samples for analysis on bench top XRF to reduce Ni and Cr error. Based on our identification of the base of modern Pb at 68 cm depth, the top 40 cm of the core covers the time interval from 2001 to 1930. From previous work on Central Park Lake, the base of modern Pb represents the year 1880 A.D. A uniform sedimentation rate model is supported a peak in Pb and As at 8 cm depth. The peakmore »
This content will become publicly available on June 1, 2023
Bone hydration: How we can evaluate it, what can it tell us, and is it an effective therapeutic target?
- Award ID(s):
- 1952993
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10322785
- Journal Name:
- Bone Reports
- Volume:
- 16
- Issue:
- C
- ISSN:
- 2352-1872
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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