Human reasoning is grounded in an ability to identify highly abstract commonalities governing superficially dissimilar visual inputs. Recent efforts to develop algorithms with this capacity have largely focused on approaches that require extensive direct training on visual reasoning tasks, and yield limited generalization to problems with novel content. In contrast, a long tradition of research in cognitive science has focused on elucidating the computational principles underlying human analogical reasoning; however, this work has generally relied on manually constructed representations. Here we present visiPAM (visual Probabilistic Analogical Mapping), a model of visual reasoning that synthesizes these two approaches. VisiPAM employs learned representations derived directly from naturalistic visual inputs, coupled with a similarity-based mapping operation derived from cognitive theories of human reasoning. We show that without any direct training, visiPAM outperforms a state-of-the-art deep learning model on an analogical mapping task. In addition, visiPAM closely matches the pattern of human performance on a novel task involving mapping of 3D objects across disparate categories.
- Award ID(s):
- 1827374
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10330132
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Abstract Advances in artificial intelligence have raised a basic question about human intelligence: Is human reasoning best emulated by applying task‐specific knowledge acquired from a wealth of prior experience, or is it based on the domain‐general manipulation and comparison of mental representations? We address this question for the case of visual analogical reasoning. Using realistic images of familiar three‐dimensional objects (cars and their parts), we systematically manipulated viewpoints, part relations, and entity properties in visual analogy problems. We compared human performance to that of two recent deep learning models (Siamese Network and Relation Network) that were directly trained to solve these problems and to apply their task‐specific knowledge to analogical reasoning. We also developed a new model using part‐based comparison (PCM) by applying a domain‐general mapping procedure to learned representations of cars and their component parts. Across four‐term analogies (Experiment 1) and open‐ended analogies (Experiment 2), the domain‐general PCM model, but not the task‐specific deep learning models, generated performance similar in key aspects to that of human reasoners. These findings provide evidence that human‐like analogical reasoning is unlikely to be achieved by applying deep learning with big data to a specific type of analogy problem. Rather, humans do (and machines might) achieve analogical reasoning by learning representations that encode structural information useful for multiple tasks, coupled with efficient computation of relational similarity.
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Abstract We argue that analogical reasoning, particularly Gentner's (1983, 2010) structure‐mapping theory, provides an integrative theoretical framework through which we can better understand the development of symbol use. Analogical reasoning can contribute both to the understanding of others’ intentions and the establishment of correspondences between symbols and their referents, two crucial components of symbolic understanding. We review relevant research on the development of symbolic representations, intentionality, comparison, and similarity, and demonstrate how structure‐mapping theory can shed light on several ostensibly disparate findings in the literature. Focusing on visual symbols (e.g., scale models, photographs, and maps), we argue that analogy underlies and supports the understanding of both intention and correspondence, which may enter into a reciprocal bootstrapping process that leads children to gain the prodigious human capacity of symbol use.
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