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Title: Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games on Random Directed Networks
The study of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games on directed networks was initiated in Feng, Fouque & Ichiba [7]. In that work, the game on a directed chain with finite or infinite players was defined as well as the game on a deterministic directed tree, and their Nash equilibria were computed. The current work continues the analysis by first developing a random directed chain structure by assuming the interaction between every two neighbors is random. We solve explicitly for an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the system and we find that the dynamics under equilibrium is an infinite-dimensional Gaussian process described by a Catalan Markov chain introduced in [7]. The discussion about stochastic differential games is extended to a random two-sided directed chain and a random directed tree structure.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1814091
PAR ID:
10331380
Author(s) / Creator(s):
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Journal of mathematics and statistical science
Volume:
7
Issue:
3
ISSN:
2411-2518
Page Range / eLocation ID:
79-108
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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